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Theory 
I am what is around me 
Women understand this. 
One is not duchess 
A hundred yards from a carriage. 
These then are portraits: 
A black vestibule; 
A high bed sheltered by curtains. 
These are merely instances. 
Wallace Stevens 
Collected Poems, 1955 
AIDAN FEENEY 
INFORMATION SELECTION AND BELIEF UPDATING IN 
HYPOTHESIS EVALUATION 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the factors underlying both selection and use of 
evidence in the testing of hypotheses. The work it describes examines the role played in 
hypothesis evaluation by background knowledge about the probability of events in the 
environment as well as the influence of more general constraints. 
Experiments on information choice showed that subjects were sensitive both to 
explicitly presented probabilistic information and to the likelihood of evidence with regard 
to background beliefs. It is argued - in contrast with other views in the literature - that 
subjects' choice of evidence to test hypotheses is rational allowing for certain constraints 
on subjects' cognitive representations. The majority of experiments in this thesis, however, 
are focused on the issue of how the information which subjects receive when testing 
hypotheses affects their beliefs. A major finding is that receipt of early information creates 
expectations which influence the response to later information. This typically produces a 
recency effect in which presenting strong evidence after weak evidence affects beliefs 
more than if the same evidence is presented in the opposite order. These findings run 
contrary to the view of the belief revision process which is prevalent in the literature in 
which it is generally assumed that the effects of successive pieces of information are 
independent. The experiments reported here also provide evidence that processes of 
selective attention influence evidence interpretation: subjects tend to focus on the most 
informative part of the evidence and may switch focus from one part of the evidence to 
another as the task progresses. in some cases, such changes of attention can eliminate the 
recency effect. 
In summary, the present research provides new evidence about the role of 
background beliefs, expectations and cognitive constraints in the selection and use of 
information to test hypotheses. Several new findings emerge which require revision to 
current accounts of information integration in the belief revision literature. 
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CHAPTER I- SELECTING EVIDENCE TO EVALUATE 
HYPOTHESES: THE ROLE OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1 Introduction to the thesis 
For any state of affairs in the world there are almost always at least two possible 
explanations, causes, or descriptions in which one is likely to have different degrees of 
confidence. The basic questions which this thesis asks are: 
9 How do we go about choosing information to evaluate how likely each of these 
possibilities is? 
0 Once that information has been received how do we use it in revising our beliefs about 
what is actually the case? 
Typically these questions are asked, and answered, separately, in wholly different ways, by 
different groups of researchers. It is obvious, however, that they are very closely related. 
One of the goals of this thesis will be to demonstrate how it may be possible to answer 
these questions in the same terms. 
This thesis is not unique in attempting to draw together the traditionally separate 
questions of information choice and information use. For example, Evans, Manktelow and 
Over (1993), and Johnson-Laird (1994) have sketched proposals for the unification of the 
fields of reasoning and decision-making. Evans et al attempted to do so by reconceiving a 
problem used in the reasoning literature as a decision making task, whilst Johnson-Laird 
attempted to apply a theoretical framework, induced from work on deductive reasoning, to 
the problem of probabilistic thinking. This work is interesting because it attempts to 
integrate two separate traditions and thereby hints at the possibility of a unified theory of 
thinking. Although this thesis does not have an aim as grand as a unified theory of high- 
I 
level cognition, it is hoped that the reader will find it to contain some interesting, and well 
justified, experiments. It is also hoped that the sense which has been made of their results, 
and the attempts made to integrate these results with the existing literature, will make 
sense to the reader. 
The central theme of the thesis is how background knowledge is used to inform 
both the selection, and use, of information for the evaluation of hypotheses. Accordingly, 
the first chapter will be a review of the literature on the effects of background knowledge 
on the selection of information for hypothesis testing. This will be followed by a chapter 
detailing the results of two experiments investigating some sources of information in 
background knowledge and their effect on information selection. Next, the literature on 
belief revision will be critically reviewed. The subsequent three chapters will describe a 
series of experiments carried out in the light of that review. The final chapter will relate the 
experimental findings to each other, and to the existing literature. 
1.1.2 Introduction to Chapter 1 
This, the first chapter of the thesis, will concern itself with previous work on the 
role of background knowledge in the selection of information to test hypotheses. By so 
doing, it will pave the way for the experimental work to be described in Chapter 2. In a 
sense, the literature on information selection has been task driven. Most of the 
experimental work to be described in this chapter centres around Wason's Selection Task 
(Wason, 1966). Recently, however, some very interesting theoretical developments have 
taken place. These have been the attempts made to explain the effects of subjective 
probability (e. g. Oaksford and Chater, 1994) and pragmatics (e. g. Sperber, Cara and 
Girotto, 1995; Evans and Over, 1996b) on subjects' behaviour in the task. The first section 
of this chapter will, therefore, be taken up with a description of early work using both 
abstract and thematic versions of the Wason Selection Task, whilst subsequent sections 
will outline the recent theoretical developments. There will be three such developments 
discussed. The first of these is pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985). 
It will be argued that whilst the introduction of a schema-based approach revolutionised 
2 
the theoretical landscape, such an approach is inadequate in accounting for the effects of 
background knowledge on subjects' information selection. The next two developments to 
be discussed will be the relevance theoretic approach (Sperber, Cara, and Girotto, 1995) 
and Oaksford and Chater's model of maximised expected information gain. Once again, it 
will be argued that, either of these approaches, on their own, are inadequate. However, it 
will be concluded that the work of Evans and Over (1996) offers an indication of how 
these approaches might be integrated in some way, in order to produce a satisfactory 
account of the part played by background knowledge in the selection of information for the 
evaluation of hypotheses. 
A superficial reading of the literature on information selection for hypothesis 
evaluation might lead the casual observer to conclude that there exists only one task for the 
study of how people select evidence. Although such a conclusion would be 
understandable, it would also be unjustified. There exists a suitable, but under-utilised, 
alternative. This alternative is the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm (Doherty, Mynatt, 
Tweney and Schiavo, 1979). A later section of this chapter will present and, using some of 
the ideas discussed in the previous sections, analyse the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm. It 
is hoped to demonstrate not only that the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm is a suitable tool 
for experimentation, but also that it offers a relatively easy means of obtaining evidence 
about the factors influencing information selection for hypothesis evaluation. As the 
section on recent theoretical developments will show, such new evidence is badly needed, 
for there is a debate currently raging in the literature which cries out for arbitration. 
1.2. WASON'S SELECTION TASK 
1.2.1 The abstract selection task 
There are a variety of tasks in the literature where subjects are asked to select some 
information in order to verify the truth or falsity of a rule or to decide between alternatives. 
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The most widely researched of these is the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966). The task, 
in its original form is presented in Figure 1.1. 
If there is an A on one side of the card then there is a3 on 
the other side of the card 
AD 
Figure I. I: The abstract version of the Wason selection task 
Subjects are given a conditional rule of the form if p then q. They are then shown one side 
of each of four cards corresponding to p, not-p, q, and not-q. Finally, subjects are asked 
which cards must be turned over in order to decide whether the rule is true or false. The 
normatively correct choice is to select the p card (A in Figure 1.1) and the not-q card (7 in 
Figure 1.1). These are the only two cards which might falsify the rule. The not-p and q 
cards are of no use because the rule does not specify any relationship between instances of 
not-p and q. Therefore, the truth or falsity of the rule cannot be inferred from a not-p card 
with aq on the back or from aq card with a not-p on the back. 
The task seems simple. It is deceptively so. In Wason's original paper only 10% of 
subjects made the correct selections. This result has been replicated several times in the 
literature (e. g. Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1970; Jackson and Griggs, 1988). However, on 
the many so-called concrete versions of the selection task - where the conditional rule 
specifies a relationship with which subjects are assumed to be familiar - normatively correct 
card selections can rise to 100% (see Yachanin, 1986), and regularly rise above 75%. It is 
with these versions of the selection task that this section will be primarily concerned. 
However, we will first consider some of the factors which are thought to affect card 
selections on the abstract form of the task. 
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Evans, Newstead, and Byrne (1993) identify two main contemporary theories of 
subjects' performance on the abstract selection task. These are the heuristic/analytic 
approach of Evans (1984; 1989) and the mental models account offered by Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne (1991). The Evans account of performance on the task rests on his distinction 
between a pre-attentive stage of processing and a later analytic stage. The former stage 
determines what cards the subject attends to whilst any reasoning which might take place 
occurs in the latter stage. Evans holds that in the case of the abstract selection task only the 
pre-attentive stage is involved. He also argues that the cards attended are determined by 
their linguistic relevance. He claims that there are two determinants of relevance at work on 
the task. These have been termed the NOT-heuristic and the IF-heuristic (Oaksford and 
Stenning, t992). The word i in the rule directs attention to the circumstance it hypothesises 
whilst the word not directs attention to the circumstance it negates. 
Although there is some empirical support for this account in the literature (see 
Evans, Ball, and Brooks, 1987; Evans, 1992; Evans, 1996) it has also come in for criticism 
of several types. The first of these is that Evans' account suggests that subjects do not 
engage in any reasoning on the task, thereby deeming them to be irrational (Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne, 199 1; Oaksford and Stenning, 1992). For the purposes of this review this is not 
a central criticism, although it is of greater importance in the rationality debate where 
philosophers of mind such as Stich (1990) have cited work on the selection task as evidence 
for the view that humans are inherently irrational. 
Three further criticisms of the theory have also been made. Firstly Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne point out that it does not specify a deductive device which is necessary to 
account for the numerous cases of human deductive competence in the literature. 
Secondly, 
it has been claimed (Oaksford and Chater, 1993) that the Evans' account is poorly specified 
and does not lead to clear experimental predictions. However, such a criticism seems unfair 
in the light of recent work by Evans, Clibbens, and Rood (1996) which actually tested, and 
confirmed, empirical predictions derived from Evans' account. Finally, Oaksford and 
Chater 
(1993) claim that it is unlikely that an appropriate set of heuristics will be found to 
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overcome the computational intractability problems faced by all current theories of 
deduction. 
In response to the deductive mechanism criticism mentioned at the start of the 
previous paragraph, Evans (1993) has outlined how his approach could adopt the mental 
models approach of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (199 1). Their approach to deductive 
reasoning is based on the idea that it depends on constructing a model (or models) of the 
situation described by the premises. Next, a conclusion must be derived which is true in the 
models and which makes explicit something which was only implicit in the premises. 
Finally, the validity of the conclusion is checked by searching for alternative models 
consistent with the premises in which the initial conclusion is false. If no counterexample is 
found then the conclusion is valid. It is this final stage which constitutes Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne's criterion for the attribution of rationality (see Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1993 for a 
discussion of this point) 
As applied to the abstract selection task, mental model theory accounts for the data 
by claiming that there are certain principles governing what subjects will include in their 
initial representation of a proposition. For example, they account for matching bias by 
claiming that subjects will represent positive items. Thus they will represent the A and the 3 
in an initial single model of the rule contained in Figure 1. In a case where the rule was "If 
there is not an A on one side of the card then there is a3 on the other", Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne suggest that subjects will initially represent the positive items (A and 3) in two 
separate models. 
Whilst not wanting to go into the details of their account (for detailed examinations 
see Evans, Newstead, and Byrne, 1993; Evans, 199 1; 1992) it is worth pointing out that 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne claim that anything which leads subjects to include not-q in their 
initial representation of the problem will facilitate their performance on the task. Evans, 
Newstead and Byrne point out that this fact leads to the conclusion that the position of 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne is very similar to that of Evans. This cannot be the case as the 
former authors claim that subjects do engage in some explicit reasoning on the task whilst 
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the latter author does not. However, they do have in common the claim that factors to do 
with the linguistic structure of the problem are crucial in determining subjects' card 
selections. From the point of view of this review what is important is the claim that certain 
factors contained in the problem make certain cards relevant (for a definition of Relevance 
see Section 1.3.3) thus causing them to be either (a la Evans) chosen or (a la Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne) represented in an initial model. In other words, both accounts stress the 
importance of focus to card selection. 
What the literature on the abstract selection task demonstrates is the importance of 
non-logical factors to subjects' information choices in hypothesis evaluation. The 
importance of such factors is highlighted by work done with concrete versions of the 
selection task. This latter work also emphasises the importance of background knowledge in 
the explanation of subjects' behaviour. The next section will review this literature and 
accordingly our theme will initially switch from linguistically determined focus to the 
effects of background knowledge. However, the notion of linguistic relevance will be 
briefly returned to in the concluding section of the chapter. 
1.2.2 The thematic selection task: Early research 
Although much work continues to be done with the abstract selection task, in recent 
years work on thematic versions of the task has achieved pre-eminence. This work started in 
the early 1970s with the publication by Wason and Shapiro (197 1) of the first paper on the 
topic and continues apace. The basic issue is one of determining how background 
knowledge is used by subjects in choosing information for the evaluation of hypotheses. As 
we shall see, there are many possible ways in which this might happen and there are also 
many different factors which contribute to the process. This section will concentrate on the 
work done in the 1970s and early 1980s using the thematic selection task. The reader should 
bear in mind throughout the rest of this review that the work on the role of background 
knowledge in the selection of information for the evaluation of hypotheses which will be 
discussed, is essential to an understanding of the experiments to be presented in Chapter 2. 
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As mentioned above, the original demonstration of a facilitatory effect for thematic 
materials was reported by Wason and Shapiro (197 1). These authors substituted the rule 
"Every time I go to Manchester I travel by car" for the standard abstract rule described in 
the previous section. Subjects were then shown cards which had "Manchester" (p), "Leeds" 
(not -p), licar" (q), and "train" (not-q) printed on their exposed sides. Subjects were asked to 
decide which cards they would turn over in order to tell whether the experimenter's rule was 
true or false. Significantly more subjects chose the appropriate combination of cards than 
did subjects in a control condition who received a standard abstract form of the task. 
Although facilitation with this rule was replicated several times in the 1970s (e. g. Gilhooly 
and Falconer, 1974), later attempts at replication failed (Manktelow and Evans, 1979; 
Griggs and Cox, 1982; Reich and Ruth, 1982). These later studies, combined with 
Manktelow and Evans' (1979) failure to obtain facilitation with other thematic materials 
and the population specific facilitation produced by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and 
Legrenzi's (1972) postal rule, led Manktelow and Evans to suggest that perhaps thematic 
versions of the selection task were a test of memory rather than a. test of reasoning. Results 
from studies using the postal rule materials were central to this line of argument. 
The postal rule is "If a letter is sealed then it has a 50 lire stamp on it". Subjects are 
shown a display of four envelopes, two of which are face up and two of which are face 
down. Of the face up envelopes, one has a 50 lire stamp and the other has a 40 lire stamp. 
Of the other two envelopes one is sealed whilst the other is unsealed. Johnson-Laird et al 
found that the vast majority of subjects given these materials (8 1 %) selected the correct 
cards. However, Manktelow and Evans argued that the rate of facilitation was this high only 
because there was a postal rule in operation in England at this time which meant that sealed 
letters had to have a stamp of higher value than did unsealed letters. Griggs and Cox (1982) 
found that if these materials were given to American subjects in the absence of a context 
there was no effect of facilitation. Likewise, Golding (198 1) found that amongst 
English 
subjects, only the performance of those who remembered the original postal rule 
(it had 
been abolished in England shortly after the study of Johnson-Laird et aý was facilitated. 
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As pointed out by Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993), there was an awareness 
amongst researchers at the time that the "memory cueing" hypothesis (and Pollard's, 1982 
similar "availability" explanation) were unsatisfactory before Cheng and Holyoak (1985) 
took issue with the claim that subjects were making selections on the task based on their 
memory of domain-specific experiences. That subjects were not selecting based on specific 
remembered experiences was already strongly suggested in work by D'Andrade (1982) who 
found facilitation for materials with which subjects could have had no prior experience. 
Equally bad news for the memory cueing/availability hypotheses was the fact that Cox and 
Griggs (1982) had found significant transfer between thematic materials which did not 
produce facilitation and materials which did. This only happened when subjects were given 
the facilitatory materials first. This strongly suggested that there was some reasoning by 
analogy going on in the study for which a simple memory cueing approach could not 
account. Although there has been considerable debate since then about transfer from 
facilitatory to non-facilitatory materials (see Berry, 1983; Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese, 
1989), nevertheless the stage was set for the emergence of a new account. It is this account 
and the work which it has inspired which will next be discussed. 
1.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - THE INFLUENCE OF PRAGMATICS 
1.3.1 A Not So Recent Development - Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas 
In this section of the chapter, Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) notion of pragmatic 
reasoning schemas will be discussed at some length. Although this discussion 
is not directly 
relevant to the studies which will be presented in Chapter 2, it is necessary 
for at least two 
reasons. The first of these is that Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) work was to 
become central 
to the development of the field in the ensuing years. It seems to have triggered an explosion 
of papers (both theoretical and experimental) on the selection task. 
Secondly, the pragmatic 
reasoning schemas approach to the selection task contrasts strongly with the approaches of 
both Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) and Oaksford and Chater (1994). Accordingly, an 
exposition of Cheng and Holyoak's approach will provide a useful 
background against 
which to assess more recent theoretical work. 
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As mentioned above, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) took issue with the then approach 
to thematic facilitation on the selection task. Specifically, they pointed to D'Andrade's 
results and the fact that Manktelow and Evans (1979) had been unable to obtain facilitation 
using materials with which subjects should have had experience. Instead of a simple 
it selection based on remembered instances model" they proposed an approach based on "a 
type of knowledge structure qualitatively different from those postulated by other theories 
of deductive reasoning" (pg. 395). This knowledge structure is the schema, first proposed 
by Kant (1787/1963) as a means of organising our experience of the world. The notion of 
schemas as organising framework has also been used by Bartlett (1932) and Piaget (1967) 
and became prominent in the 1970s with Schank's (1972) work on "primitive acts", 
Minsky's (1975) work on "frames" in artificial intelligence, and Schank and Abelson's 
(1977) proposal of "scripts" to account for people's stereotypical knowledge of frequently 
experienced situations. 
Schemas, generally speaking, have the following features (Eysenck and 
Keane, 1990): 
relations which can take simple (hit, kick etc. ) or complex (enable, cause etc. ) forms 
slots which take variables or other sub-schemata 
0 values which refer to the specific items which fill slots 
4o the property of general application so that they may be applied in many specific 
situations 
Cheng and Holyoak postulated the existence of a number of reasoning schemas which they 
claimed were "inducedfrom ordinary life experiences such as 'pennissions ''obligations' 
and 'causations"'(pg. 395). Further to the properties listed above, pragmatic reasoning 
schemas were claimed to be defined in terms of goals and relationships to these goals. It 
was also claimed that the primary importance of goals constrained subjects to pragmatically 
useful inferences. 
10 
The initial case study offered by Cheng and Holyoak was that of the permission 
schema which they defined as describing "a type of regulation in which taking a particular 
action requires satisfaction of a particular precondition" (pg. 396). The permission schema 
may be characterised by the following four rules: 
I If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied 
2. If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be satisfied 
3. If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken 
4. If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken 
Cheng and Holyoak claimed that most of the rules used to demonstrate thematic facilitation 
on the selection task fit a permission schema. As an illustration of how this might work we 
will consider one of the rules most frequently used on thematic versions of the selection 
task. The Drinking Age rule (Griggs and Cox, 1982) has been used to demonstrate the 
facilitating effect of thematic materials many times (e. g. Griggs and Cox, 1983; Griggs, 
1984). The rule states that "If a person is drinking beer then the person must be over 19 
years of age". In this case p (drinking beer) is the action that is to be taken and q (being over 
19 years of age) is the precondition that must be satisfied. The rules for the permission 
schema tell the subject that p (Rule 1) and not-q (Rule 4) must be chosen as these are the 
only rules which contain the deontic imperative must.. Given the experimental rule, subjects 
avoid the selection of the q card because Rule 3 merely states that the action may be carried 
out if the precondition is satisfied. It is not important to check drinkers who are over 19 in 
this case. 
This type of analysis explains most of the thematic materials research which had 
been carried out up until 1985. It explains why Wason and Shapiro's (197 1) original Towns 
and Transport rule is unreliable (it is not a permission rule) and the effectiveness of the 
Postal Rule scenario amongst subjects who have had experience of a similar rule. It also 
explains the importance of the context in which the thematic rule is placed. For example, 
the usual context for the Drinking Age rule is that of the subject imagining herself to be a 
police officer checking to see whether people are conforming to certain rules. Evans and 
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Pollard (1987) have found that the Drinking Age rule is not an effective facilitator when it 
is administered without this context. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) found that when the Postal 
Rule, which Griggs and Cox (1982) had found to be ineffective with American subjects, 
was administered in the context of maximising revenue for the postal service, the 
performance of American subjects was just as good as that of subjects from Hong Kong 
where a similar rule had been in operation. 
In addition to the result just mentioned, Cheng and Holyoak provided several other 
experimental findings which suggested the importance of pragmatic reasoning schemas to 
performance on the thematic selection task. In Experiment 2 of their paper they presented 
an abstract selection task where subjects were told that they were an authority checking 
regulations all of which were of the form "If one is to take action 'A' then one must fulfil 
precondition V. " The fours cards used were as follows: 
has taken action A (p) 
has not taken action A (not-p) 
has fulfilled precondition P (q) 
has not fulfilled precondition P (not-q) 
These materials obviously contain no thematic content, yet Cheng and Holyoak predicted 
that they would evoke the permission schema. This they did with 61 % of subjects choosing 
the p and not-q cards compared with 19% correct choices in a standard abstract control 
condition. A third experiment showed that when subjects were asked to rephrase permission 
statements the words must or may were used more often than they were when subjects were 
asked to rephrase arbitrary rules. Additional support for pragmatic reasoning schemas 
comes from Girotto and co-workers (e. g. Girotto, Light, and Colbourn, 1988; Light, Blaye, 
Gilly, and Girotto, 1990) who have demonstrated the facilitation effects of permission 
schemas on the cards selected by children as young as 10 years old. 
Although there have been extensions of the original work on pragmatic reasoning 
schemas (see Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver, 1986; Kroger, Cheng, and Holyoak, 
1993; Politzer, and Nguyen-Xuan, 1992; Holyoak and Cheng, 1995), the approach has been 
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criticised almost since it first appeared. Apart from the methodological complaints of 
Jackson and Griggs ( 1990) and Griggs and Cox ( 1992) (see Evans et al, 1993 for a 
discussion of this debate) there have been several theoretical attacks on the approach. 
One serious attack on the pragmatic reasoning schema approach to information 
choice on the selection task has come from those investigators (Manktelow and Over. ) 1991; 
Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992) who have demonstrated that subjects' information selection on 
thematic versions of the selection task can be reversed if they are asked to take a different 
perspective. Recently, Holyoak and Cheng (1995) have enlarged somewhat upon their 
initial position in order to account for these findings. However, the remainder of this section 
will focus on other problems which have been pointed out along with Cheng and Holyoak's 
replies to these various criticisms. These other problems are more central to the concerns of 
this chapter as they relate to more general questions of how information is organised in 
background knowledge. As shall be seen in subsequent sections of this chapter, a recent 
theoretical focus in the literature has been on how best to characterise the information 
stored in long-term memory which subjects bring to bear on hypothesis evaluation tasks. 
Apart from the perspective shift findings, two of the most common criticisms of the 
schema approach are that it is firstly too narrow and secondly too inflexible. As Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne (1995) have pointed out, there exists no support for the existence of 
pragmatic reasoning schemas outside the experimental literature on the selection task. This 
narrow field of focus is not in itself disastrous for the approach. However, before schema 
theory is to be widely accepted, a large body of work, using a wide variety of tasks, must be 
built up. Similarly, Oaksford and Chater (1993), drawing on Fodor's (1983) work on 
modularity have commented that Cheng and Holyoak's assumption that the knowledge 
drawn upon by subjects in the thematic selection task is domain-specific, renders their 
approach too inflexible to be a viable explanation of how we reason. Once again, this 
criticism is not disastrous. Much has been made of Fodor's distinction between 
impenetrable, and modularised, input systems and the high-level central systems (such as 
thinking) which he claims to be domain-general. His assumption that higher systems must 
be domain-general is based on a further assumption that all of our knowledge must be 
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available to us for a task such as thinking. However, there has been much progress since 
1983 and several authors (e. g. Gigerenzer, 1995; Sperber, 1994) have pointed out that 
modularity does not imply cognitive impenetrability. That is, there may exist modules 
which are organised vertically so as to allow the passing of information from one to the 
other. There also exists some evidence in the literature on categorisation that there are 
domain specific differences in the ways that social and object knowledge is organised (e. g. 
Wattenmaker, 1995). Whilst it is true that cognitively impenetrable, domain-specific 
modules would lead to a system which was hopelessly rigid, this is not necessarily assumed 
by Cheng and Holyoak's approach. 
A much more serious criticism of schema theory is the claim that it does not clearly 
specify how knowledge structures are separated into domains. Once again Oaksford and 
Chater make this point very tellingly 
A second reason to suspect that domain-specific approaches are inadequate 
concerns the lack of any general principles concerning how an appropriate 
compartmentalisation of knowledge is to be achieved. (pg. 47) 
This point has also been made by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (199 1). The central issue here is 
that there are many ways in which knowledge may be structured and, without more 
evidence, there is no a priori reason to accept Cheng and Holyoak's version. All workers in 
the field agree that the way in which our knowledge of the world is divided up is crucial in 
determining how we reason and how we select information to reason with. However, 
several authors have suggested that pragmatic reasoning schemas are not the most 
parsimonious means of answering these questions. 
At this stage in the review only preliminary conclusions may be drawn. What is very 
clear is the importance of the questions which Cheng and Holyoak have raised. As 
Gigerenzer (1995) astutely pointed out, human reasoning cannot be studied in isolation 
from "the content of the Ps and Qs" and the social context in which it takes place. The 
ways in which knowledge is both organised in, and retrieved from, long term memory are 
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crucial to any account of human reasoning. That the application of what we know about 
pragmatics will be instrumental in understanding these processes is unquestionable. What is 
questionable, however, is the extent to which Cheng and Holyoak have found the right 
approach. All workers in the area seem happy to admit the importance of the study of rules, 
obligations, and regulations in our understanding of human reasoning and evidence 
selection. As is normal in science, these same researchers cannot agree on the details. 
Undoubtedly, Cheng and Holyoak need firstly to specify their account more tightly, giving 
a stronger rationale for cutting up our knowledge of the world as they do. Secondly, there is 
a need for extensive testing of schema theory in settings which do not involve the Wason 
selection task. 
1.3.3 The Relevance Theoretic Approach 
An alternative account of subjects' behaviour on Wason's Selection Task has been 
offered by Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995). Like Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) work, this 
account has its roots in the principles of pragmatics. It will be argued that Sperber et al's 
approach, whilst inadequate on its own, contains valuable insights into information 
selection for hypothesis evaluation. Specifically, the importance of their Cognitive 
Principle of Relevance to a comprehensive account of information selection will be 
emphasised. Before describing their account in more detail, the notion of Relevance must 
be explained. 
As Oaksford and Chater (1995) have pointed out, a theoretical account of the 
relevance of information to an individual is needed because current theories of reasoning 
are computationally intractable. They all assume that subjects only represent the most 
relevant or plausible information from which to draw inferences but none of them specify 
how that relevant information is retrieved from memory. The work of Sperber and Wilson 
and colleagues demonstrates how the most relevant information might be brought to mind. 
They call their approach Relevance Theory. 
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Relevance Theory defines the relevance of a piece of information to an individual 
using the following constraints: 
0 the greater the cognitive effect of processing a piece of information, the greater its 
relevance 
the greater the processing effort required for processing a piece of information, the less 
is its relevance 
These constraints are fundamental, not only to Relevance Theory, but also to the 
experiments to be described in the next chapter. They will also be revisited in Chapter 5. 
Some brief discussion of them here is warranted therefore. 
Sperber and Wilson (1986,1995) point out that any new piece of information is 
processed against the background of already existing information (i. e. existing beliefs and 
conjectures). They claim that if bringing this new information and the context together 
provides the information processor with some cognitive effect which could not have been 
achieved from the either the new information or the context alone, then this new 
information is relevant to the information processor in this context. Cognitive effects which 
lead to relevance might consist of the addition, abandonment, or revision of beliefs. Sperber 
and Wilson also claim that relevance is a matter of degree so that the greater the cognitive 
effects achieved by bringing a new piece of information together with a context, the greater 
the relevance of that piece of information. Likewise, the greater the cognitive effort 
involved in bringing this new piece of information together with a context, the less is the 
relevance of that piece of information to the information processor. 
Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) illustrate the interaction of these constraints with 
the following example. Suppose you are standing on a train platform and you want to catch 
the next train to Manchester. You don't have a train timetable however so, being told that 
the next train to Manchester leaves at 5.30 is relevant to you. This is because you are able to 
bring the already existing information that you want to go to Manchester as soon as is 
possible together with this new information to infer that the earliest that you can possibly 
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leave for Manchester is 5.30. Being told, on the other hand, that the next train to 
Manchester leaves after 4.00, whilst still relevant, is not as relevant. This is so if only 
because the proposition that the train leaves at 5.30 implies the proposition that the train 
leaves after 4.00, but not conversely. This part of the example concerns how cognitive 
effect might be a matter of degree. 
The other part of their example concerns cognitive effort and goes as follows. 
Suppose that you are once again on the train platform (mentioned in the previous 
paragraph) and were in the same predicament - you want to go to Manchester but you don't 
have a timetable. Somebody tells you that the next train to Manchester leaves at 7500 
seconds after 3.25. If you take the time, you can infer from this new piece of information 
that the next train leaves at 5.30, as well as all the information which follows from knowing 
that the next train leaves at 5.30. However, because there is extra processing effort involved 
in this case, it is not as relevant as the former piece of information. 
All of the above leads to "the first (or Cognitive) Principle of Relevance" (Sperber, 
Cara, and Girotto, 1995) which states that "people tend to pay attention, at any given time, 
to the most relevant information available to them at the time, and to bring to bear on it a 
context of assumptions that will maximise its relevance" (pg. 49). The "Second (or 
Communicative) Principle of Relevance" (Sperber et al 1995) which was originally called 
the Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) involves differentiating 
communicated information from information present in the environment. It says that "every 
act of communication carries a presumption of its own relevance" (pg. 50). This is because 
a communicator, in order to facilitate the act of communication, requests the attention of 
her audience. She wants her audience to presume that what she requests their attention for is 
relevant. 
This Communicative Principle of Relevance has both an effect, and an effort, 
component. These lead to the following "rational" comprehension strategy: 
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(1) the consideration of possible cognitive effects in the order of their accessibility 
(i. e. exerting as little cognitive effort as possible) 
(2) stopping when the expected level of relevance is achieved 
Following such a strategy is claimed to be rational because firstly, the addressee of any 
utterance may presume that the speaker has attempted to minimise the effort needed to 
arrive at the intended interpretation of their utterance and secondly, because the addressee 
need not assume maximal effect for the utterance. They need assume only adequate effect. 
Given this brief outline of the basics of the relevance theoretic approach to 
communication, we may now turn to how it attempts to deal with the selection task. It does 
so in a very simple manner, by assuming firstly, that subjects understand the task as one of 
selecting relevant evidence for testing a rule and that this rule may only be tested indirectly 
(i. e. through its observationally testable consequences). Secondly, inferring some of the 
consequences of the rule is done spontaneously, as part of the process of comprehension. 
These spontaneous inferences lead to an interpretation of the rule which contains certain 
expectations of relevance (i. e. expectations, on the part of the subjects, about what is 
relevant to the experimenter). Also subjects trust both these relevance expectations and the 
processes which lead to them. Finally, subjects will select the cards which, if they could be 
observed, would lead to the testing of these spontaneously inferred consequences. 
As may be seen from this account, the crucial factor is the spontaneous inferences 
which subjects make whilst comprehending the rule. This is what determines the way in 
which any conditional rule is found to be relevant. Sperber et al claim that these 
spontaneous inferences are predictable from the content of the rule and the context in which 
it is presented. To demonstrate this they concentrate on situations where subjects will 
interpret the task rule as a denial of the occurrence of P-and-(not-Q) cases. As they point 
out however, working from their effect and effort constraints, there are two reasons why 
subjects will generally fail to interpret the rule in this way. Firstly, it requires more 
processing effort to represent the rule as a denial of the occurrence of P-and-(not-Q) cases. 
This is because such an interpretation involves two negations, the implicit propositional 
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attitude of denial, and the explicit denial of Q. As Relevance Theory holds that processing 
effort is used as a source of information about the intended interpretation, then the extra 
effort involved in representing the rule in this way will suggest that this is not the intended 
interpretation of the rule. 
Secondly, the normal effect of a conditional statement is the inference of Q from a 
combination of the rule and the premise P or the inference that there exist cases of P and Q 
from a combination of the rule and an assumption of relevance. This leads to two 
expectations. The first of these is compatible with the standard modus ponens inference: 
If there is aP then there is a 
There is aP 
Therefore, there is a 
The second of these expectations corresponds to an invalid Denial of the Consequent 
inference: 
If there is aP then there is a 
There is aQ 
Therefore, there is aP 
Accordingly, Sperber et al argue that in order to prevent subjects from interpreting the task 
rule in the usual way it is necessary to manipulate both the effect of the conditional 
involved and the effort involved in interpreting the conditional as denying the existence of 
cases of P-and-(not-Q). 
Sperber et al propose what they call "a recipe for constructing easy versions of the 
task" (Pg. 58). As regards cognitive effort, this involves selecting a pair of features P and Q 
such that the instance P-and-(not-Q) is as easy, or easier, to represent than the instance P- 
and-Q. As regards cognitive effect the recipe prescribes a context where knowing of the 
existence of P-and-(not-Q) cases will lead to cognitive effects equal to, or greater than, 
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those derived from knowing of the existence of P-and-Q cases. These authors present a 
series of four experiments along with their theoretical re-analysis of the selection task. Each 
of these experiments manipulates either the ease with which an instance of P-and-(not-Q) 
may be represented or the effects to be derived from knowing of the existence of a P-and- 
(not-Q) instance. In each case subjects' patterns of evidence selection correspond closely to 
those predicted by the authors. Four different effort manipulations were found to 
significantly facilitate subjects' selections. These were (1) including a P-and-(not-Q) case in 
the text of the problem; (2) ensuring that the P-and-(not-Q) case corresponded to a 
lexicalised item e. g. someone who is male (P) and unmarried (not-Q) is a bachelor; (3) 
giving subjects an intermediate task where they had to single out P-and-(not-Q) instances; 
(4) creating a simple universe where P and Q are complemented by R and S which 
correspond to not-P and not-Q respectively. Sperber et al argue that this makes all four 
possible combinations of features equally easy to represent. On the side of cognitive effect 
two manipulations were found to significantly facilitate evidence selection. These were (1) 
making the existence of P-and-Q cases trivial whilst the existence of P-and-(not-Q) cases is 
unlikely and contentious; (2) making the existence of P-and-(not-Q) cases diagnostic of 
something in context. 
The relevance theoretic approach to the selection task has several advantages over 
the pragmatic reasoning schemas approach. Firstly, it can account for a lot more of the data 
than can pragmatic reasoning schemas. Secondly, the basic approach has far wider 
implications for cognitive psychology than does the notion of pragmatic reasoning 
schemas. The idea that subjects' behaviour on the selection task is due to a fundamental 
cognitive tension between effect and effort is a very attractive one indeed. 
However, there is an apparent problem with relevance theory. It is possible that the 
approach is simply too broad to be of any real use. The real usefulness of relevance theory 
is that it specifies a constraint on the retrieval of background knowledge from long-term 
memory. This of course, is also true of the pragmatic reasoning schemas approach. As has 
already been seen however, a schema based approach is simply too rigid to be of much use. 
The problem with a relevance theoretic approach is that it merely specifies a general 
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principle and is unable to make more specific predictions about the characteristics of 
information which will be important in any given context. A much more specific alternative 
has been presented by Oaksford and Chater (1994). This will now be presented. 
1.4. SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND THE SELECTION TASK 
1.4.1. Oaksford and Chater's Rational Analysis 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) claim that the approach which they have adopted to the 
selection task accounts for not only the results on both abstract and thematic selection tasks 
discussed above but also for results on a variety of other selection task experiments which 
will be discussed below. Their approach will be critically evaluated in some detail here. 
This is because of its direct relevance to the experiments which will be presented in 
Chapter 2. Its direct relevance is due to the emphasis which it places on subjects' use of 
their background knowledge about the probabilities of events in their environment when 
selecting information with which to evaluate hypotheses. Oaksford and Chater's (1994) 
account follows the account given by Anderson (1990,199 1) of memory, categorisation, 
and problem solving. What these accounts have in common is their assumption that the 
attribution of rationality to an organism is dependent on whether that organism's behaviour 
is optimally adapted to its environment. Accordingly, Oaksford and Chater reject logic as a 
normative standard for subjects' behaviour on the Wason selection task and instead propose 
an alternative Bayesian account based upon the principles of optimal data selection 
(Federov, 1972; MacKay, 1992). 
The basic principle behind optimal data selection is very simple and may be 
illustrated by the following example. Suppose you are asked to test the rule "If an 
individual is exposed to radiation then that individual will develop cancer". There are four 
classes of individuals one could examine to test the rule: individuals who have been 
exposed to radiation (p); individuals who have not been exposed to radiation (not-P); 
individuals who have developed cancer (q); individuals who have not developed cancer 
(not-q). The question, of course, is one of deciding which classes of individuals will supply 
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the most useful information. Intuitively, p, q, and not-q individuals are likely to be 
informative whereas not-p individuals will supply no information whatsoever. Oaksford 
and Chater have formalised these intuitions using Shannon-Wiener information theory and 
elements from the probability calculus. These intuitions are formalised differently for 
abstract and thematic versions of the Wason selection task and so Oaksford and Chater's 
accounts of these separate tasks will be dealt with separately. First however, the general 
approach will be further explained. 
Oaksford and Chater claim that hypothesis testers should choose experiments to 
provide the greatest possible "expected information gain" when trying to decide between 
two hypotheses. In the case of the selection task these hypotheses are (1) that p is invariably 
associated with q (henceforth this hypothesis will be referred to as H 1) and (2) that p and q 
are independent (this will be referred to as 142). For eachof these hypotheses they derive a 
probability model from both the prior probability that each hypothesis is the case (which 
they assume to be equal in both cases i. e. = . 5) and the probabilities of p and q in the task 
rule. Next, they define information gain as the difference between uncertainty before and 
after the selection of a card where uncertainty is defined using Shannon-Wiener 
information. Therefore, given n mutually exclusive and exhaustve hypotheses (Hi)the 
information gain which a piece of data (D) leads to is defined as: 
Information before receiving D: I(Hi) -- 
n 
Y, P(Hi)lOg2P(Hi) 
i=l 
n 
Information after receiving D: I(HiID) = -jP(Hi1D)lOg2P(Hi1D) 
i=l 
Information gain: Ig = I(Hi I D) - I(Hi) 
P(Hi/D) is calculated using Bayes theorem (for a discussion of Bayes theorem see a later 
section). Therefore, information gain may be thought of as the difference between the 
information contained in the prior probability of Hi and the information contained in the 
posterior probability of H, given some piece of evidence D. 
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However, when choosing which piece of evidence (card) to select, subjects do not 
know what the piece of evidence will actually be. Accordingly, Oaksford and Chater claim 
that subjects will calculate expected information gain with respect to all possible outcomes 
(i. e. for the p card the two possible outcomes are q and not-q). Oaksford and Chater's 
analysis leads to the following general predictions about the informativeness of the four 
cards on the selection task: 
P Card: Is informative when P(q) is low. Its informativeness is largely independent of P(P) 
Q Card: Is informative when P(p) and P(q) are both small 
Not-q Card: Is informative when P(p) is low. Its informativeness is independent of P(q) 
Not-p Card: This card is not informative. 
In order to model the experimental data Oaksford and Chater are forced to make four 
assumptions. The first of these is that P(p) and P(q) are assumed by subjects to be low. 
They call this their "rarity assumption" and justify its application by reference to Klayman 
and Ha's (1987) "minority phenomenon" assumption and Anderson's (1990) work on causal 
inference. The justification for, and implications of, this assumption will now be discussed. 
The rarity assumption is invoked only to model data from the abstract selection task. 
The argument is that most lexicalised properties refer to objects and events that are rare in 
our environment and on the abstract selection task subjects will use the default assumption 
that the tokens in the rule are rare. However, on the thematic selection task content and 
context will combine to provide information for the subject about the likely probability of p 
and q. Whether these are perceived to be rare will therefore, depend on the background 
knowledge which subjects bring to bear on the task. 
There are several problems with this assumption. The first is the selective 
application of the rarity assumption. Two questions arise here. Firstly, is it not possible (as 
Kirby, 1994a suggests) that subjects may be using what they know about items in the 
abstract rule (i. e. Vowels, consonants, letters, even and odd numbers, etc. ) to determine 
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their likely probability of occurrence'? The second question which this selective application 
of the principle raises is why subjects can deal so easily with thematic rules if occasionally 
they do not respect rarity? And why bother to assume that some subjects will understand 
the items in a thematic rule to be common? If rarity is such an over-riding principle, surely 
subjects will assume these items to be rare. After all, they are generally not given enough 
information to be sure. 
The second problem with the rarity assumption is its speculative nature. As 
Oaksford and Chater correctly point out, an environmental analysis of the type suggested 
by Anderson (1990) would be required to test the validity of the assumption. However, as 
Anderson points out, there are various types of converging analysis which may be carried 
out. Oaksford and Chater are unable to offer evidence from any sort of analysis. They cite 
Klayman and Ha's (1987) equally speculative assumption about the "minority 
phenomenon". Klayman and Ha do show that the structure of a rule discovery task, such as 
the Wason 246 task, changes if the probability of an event being governed by the rule goes 
over . 5. It is arguable as to whether a probability of .5 constitutes rarity however. What is 
certain is that all of the probability values which Oaksford and Chater use in their analysis 
of the abstract selection task are far below . 5. 
The second assumption which Oaksford and Chater make is that P(q) ý! P(p). They 
argue that this is a reasonable assumption because if P(q) ! -< 
P(p) then the hypothesis that q 
is invariably associated with p cannot hold. Once again, this is a problematic assumption. 
This is because it relies on a completely circular argument. The assumption concerns the 
subjects' perceived base rates for the items in the rule. If the base rate for q is perceived to 
be less than that for p then presumably, subjects would have more confidence in the 
hypothesis that p and q are independent (i. e. the task rule does not hold). However, subjects 
in most cases do not have any information about the base rates of the items in the rules 
typically used in the task. Consider the abstract rule: If there is an A on one side of the card 
then there is a3 on the other side of the card. Subjects in most cases have information about 
neither the population from which the cards have been taken nor the base rates of certain 
attributes amongst that population. A similar (although weaker) argument may be made 
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with respect to many of the thematic materials used in the literature. The point is that 
although subjects may realise that in order for the task rule to hold, P(q) must be greater 
than, or equal to, P(p), they do not know that this is the case. The assumption that subjects 
use a base rate of q which is greater than or equal to their base rate for p suggests that they 
are assuming something which they do not know to be true in order to discover what is 
most likely to be true. Any subject adopting this strategy would, at the end of her analysis, 
know the information gain to be expected from each card assuming that P(q) ý! P(p). 
The third assumption which Oaksford and Chater make is that every card has the 
possibility of being chosen. They make this assumption because although their initial model 
claims that the not-p card is never informative, nevertheless a small percentage of subjects 
do select that card. They assume that this is the case because not every subject will perform 
the appropriate, or any, analysis. To counteract this they add a constant (. 1) to the E(Ig)s for 
each card. Although Oaksford and Chater are very likely to be correct in assuming that 
some subjects do not perform any analysis on the selection task, their method for allowing 
for this seems inappropriate. In effect, they are attempting to model the behaviour of two 
separate groups of subjects using the notion of expected information gain, whilst accepting 
that only one of these groups actually computes expected information gain. 
This point has two repercussions for the theory. Firstly, it is likely that much more 
accurate predictions could be made using the Oaksford and Chater model if the card 
selections of successful subjects only was modelled. Secondly, because the model is not 
concerned with the mechanisms involved in deciding which cards to select, it has very little 
to say about erroneous (in its own terms) card selections. Although the notion of 
mechanism will be discussed in greater detail below, it is worth commenting upon briefly 
here. Evans and Over (I 996a) have pointed out that the Oaksford and Chater model 
constitutes an alternative normative theory. Although they also point out that this 
alternative theory approximates more closely subjects' card selections than does 
Popper's 
(1959) notion of falsification (i. e. the old normative theory), nevertheless, Oaksford and 
Chater's account is primarily one of what subjects should do rather than an account of how 
they do it. This neglect of the mechanisms involved in selecting information to test 
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hypotheses means that the model very often cannot account for the behaviour of subjects 
who fail to behave as the model says they should. 
The fourth assumption which Oaksford and Chater make is that "card choice is a 
competitive matter" (pg. 614). By this they mean that the less distinguishable a card is from 
alternatives the more likely it is to be selected. Before considering the steps which Oaksford 
and Chater take to implement this assumption in their model it should be pointed out that 
even taken at face value it is questionable. For example, it would be just as easy to argue 
that the more pronounced the difference in the expected information gain of two cards, the 
more likely it is that the card with the higher expectation gain would be chosen. Indeed 
there is evidence (Tversky and Shafir, 1992) that subjects find it very difficult to choose 
between two similar, or equally valued, options. Of course, if the selection task is properly 
viewed as a decision task, these competing predictions would be very easy to test. 
However, there is one very instructive mismatch between actual data and predicted 
expected information gain contained in Oaksford and Chater's paper. This mismatch exists 
in their attempts to model the data from 13 studies, reporting 34 standard abstract selection 
tasks, and involving 845 subjects. The predicted expected information gains for each card 
and the actual proportion of times each card was selected in these studies is given in 
Table 1.1. 
P Card Q Card Not-Q Card Not-P Card 
Predicted E(Ig) . 76 
Prom selected . 89 
. 20 
. 62 
. 09 
. 25 
.0 
. 16 Table LI: Predicted expected information gain versus actual proportion of cards selected from Oaksford and 
Chater's (1994) meta-analysis of results on the standard abstract selection task. 
The first noticeable feature of Table 1.1 is the contrast between the predicted E(Ig) 
for the not-p card and the actual proportion of all not-p cards which were selected. This is 
because Oaksford and Chater did not implement their assumption about some subjects 
failing to analyse the task appropriately when modelling this data. It does however, make 
the point that subjects seem to fall into two separate groups on the task. More importantly 
however, is the disparity between the E(Ig)s for the p and q cards and the rate at which they 
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were selected. Although the p card is predicted to have an expected information gain which 
is almost four times that of the q card, the q card is selected on almost two thirds of all 
occasions. It is obviously not the case therefore, that the more similar the E(Ig) for a card is 
to the alternatives, the more often it is likely to be chosen. In fact, there is no obvious 
relationship between the E(Ig)s predicted by Oaksford and Chater and the rate at which 
subjects choose the different cards, other than the fact that the orderings are the same. 
Nevertheless, in order to model a different set of findings from the literature, Oaksford and 
Chater scale E(Ig)s by the mean information available. In other words, they divide the E(Ig) 
for each card by the mean information gain for all of the cards. In this way they reduce the 
differences in E(Ig) between all of the cards. This is worrying for two reasons. Firstly, it 
does not seem to be warranted by the data. Secondly, it is a procedure which is used when 
modelling some aspects of the literature and not others. This second problem directly leads 
to a third problem. Because of their seemingly indiscriminate use of this scaling procedure, 
Oaksford and Chater seem to be suggesting that more processing takes place on some tasks 
than on others. There are absolutely no a priori grounds for such a suggestion. 
Having examined in detail the assumptions underlying the Oaksford and Chater 
model of selection task performance it is now time to consider how well it actually deals 
with the data. Obviously, an attempt to discuss all of the data is out of the question here. It 
is worth mentioning however, the variety of selection task variants for which Oaksford and 
Chater have attempted to account. As discussed above, they have modelled results on the 
standard abstract selection task. They have also modelled the finding that card selections on 
the abstract task are non-independent (Pollard, 1985) and what they claim to be the findings 
on the negations paradigm (Evans and Lynch, 1973; Manktelow and Evans, 1979; Evans, 
1989). In the negations paradigm the antecedent and the consequent of a rule can contain 
negated constituents. This leads to four possible selection task rules (if p then q; if not-p 
then q; if p then not-q; if not-p then not-q). Initially it was found (Evans and Lynch, 1973) 
that subjects selected those cards which matched the terms in the rule. Later work 
(Manktelow and Evans, 1979) suggested that matching mainly occurs for the consequent 
card whereas antecedent card selections tend to be in accord with logical case. The order of 
predicted E(Ig) for the cards in this paradigm agree with the rates at which cards tend to be 
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selected. Likewise, the Oaksford and Chater model also predicts the order in which cards 
tend to be selected in the various studies (e. g. Reich and Ruth, 1982; Oaksford and 
Stenning, 1992) which have managed to suppress this matching effect. However, it should 
be noted that there is some uncertainty as to whether matching mainly occurs for the 
consequent card only. Based on a meta-analysis of four experiments, Evans, Newstead and 
Byrne (1993) concluded that matching occurs for all four logical cases. On the other hand, 
the data upon which Oaksford and Chater base their meta-analysis does not include one of 
the studies considered by Evans, Newstead and Byrne, but does include a further three 
experiments, two of which are contained in Oaksford and Stenning (1992) and one of which 
is an unpublished control experiment. 
In order to model results on the thematic selection task, Oaksford and Chater have 
introduced the notion of subjective expected utility (for a further discussion of subjective 
expected utility, see the General Discussion of Chapter 2) and argue that subjects on 
thematic variations of the task are attempting to maximise expected utility. The basic 
notion is the utility of both the condition and the action to those individuals governed by the 
rule. To model thematic facilitation Oaksford and Chater weight the utility of a piece of 
information by the probability that checking the relevant card will produce that information. 
This leads to the following four equations which express the expected utilities of each card 
from the enforcer's and the actor's perspective (where "con" refers to condition, and "act" 
refers to action): 
EU(con) = P(act I con)U(con, act) + P(act I con)U(con, act) eq. I 
EU(con) = P(act I con) U(con, act) + P(act I con) U(con, act) eq. 2 
EU(act) - P(con I act)U(con, act) + P(con I act)U(con, act) eq. 
3 
EU(act) = P(con I act)U(con, act) + P(con I act)U(con I act) eq. 4 
This part of the Oaksford and Chater account is relatively uncontroversial. The majority 
consensus in the field at the moment is that expected utility is crucial in understanding the 
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facilitatory effect of thematic materials on the Wason selection task (Holyoak and Cheng, 
1995; Evans and Over, 1996b; Manktelow and Over, 1992). 
Despite Oaksford and Chater's uncontroversial use of the notion of expected utility 
in modelling subjects' performance on thematic versions of the selection task, there still 
remains a core problem with attempting to compare the Oaksford and Chater model with 
any other in the reasoning literature. The problem is one of incommensurability (see 
Brown, 1988 for a discussion of this issue). Essentially, Oaksford and Cater disagree with 
the majority of workers in the area as to what constitutes the proper subject matter for the 
scientific study of evidence selection. That this is true is borne out by reference to Oaksford 
and Chater's claim that "The purpose of a rational analysis is to show that behaviour is 
optimally adapted to the environment" (pg. 609). Further evidence of the 
incommensurability of the positions is provided by Anderson's (1990) claim that a rational 
analysis constitutes a theory at the "computational level" (see Marr, 1982) and helps define 
the issues in developing a mechanistic theory of the behaviour being studied. It is 
inappropriate to argue therefore (as both Oaksford and Chater and Holyoak and Cheng have 
done) that their theories are interchangeable. They are simply theories at a different level. 
One seeks to justify observed patterns of behaviour by recourse to an analysis of the 
environment (in this context Evans and Over's characterisation of Oaksford and Chater's 
account as a normative one makes eminent sense) whilst the other seeks to present a 
mechanistic account of how that behaviour is produced. 
Unfortunately for Oaksford and Chater however, their analysis does not confine 
itself to the environment. At each step they have been forced to make assumptions about 
psychological processes. All of the criticisms which have been made above of the 
assumptions underlying their analysis are concerned with this point. At worst, as with the 
assumption that card selection is competitive, they make very questionable assumptions 
about the cognitive factors underlying behaviour, and at best, as with the notion of "scaled" 
E(Ig), they implement these assumptions without regard for processing constraints. 
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That there is such confusion within the theory argues against its acceptance. Some 
workers in the field have also argued that the model is unsuccessful in accounting for data 
which exists in the literature. For example, Evans and Over (1996a&b) have argued that the 
model does not account for results found by Pollard and Evans (1983) and Kirby (1994) 
(see the next section for a discussion of these studies). Almor and Sloman (1996) complain 
that the theory cannot account for their data. Laming (1996), whilst making some of the 
same criticisms made here, emphasises the fact that 
Oaksford and Chater propose a theory with three free parameters, to which 
they assign particular values, and other assumptions besides, to achieve 
merely rank order agreement withfour observedfrequencies (pg. 365). 
He argues that a rank order correspondence may be achieved in many ways and, on its 
own, does not justify the theoretical conclusions which Oaksford and Chater draw. 
Although the debate is ongoing about whether Oaksford and Chater's model does, 
or indeed needs to (Oaksford and Chater, 1996), account for this data, it will not be 
described in detail here. Instead the work of Kirby (1994a) and Pollard and Evans (1983) 
will be discussed in detail in the next section. Suffice it to say that Oaksford and Chater's 
work has been very controversial and there is by no means agreement amongst workers in 
the field about its status. Oaksford and Chater themselves are not clear as to the level at 
which they want their account to work. 
1.4.3 The effect of subjective probability 
The central tenet of Oaksford and Chater's thesis about non-deontic selection tasks 
is that subjects are sensitive to the probabilities of events occurring in their environment. 
There exist several sources of evidence which suggest that they are correct in this 
assumption. For example, in the concept literature there is a long history of research into 
the importance of feature frequency. Several authors have pointed out that since frequent 
features occur consistently amongst positive instances of a concept whilst infrequent 
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features occur inconsistently, the defining features of a concept may be identified by 
accumulating frequency information (e. g. Bourne and Restle, 1959; Hull, 1920; Restle, 
1955). There has been some recent work which supports this view. Kellog (1980) has 
demonstrated the importance of high frequency features on an abstract concept learning 
task, whilst Bourne (1982) and Neumann (1974,1977) have shown that single feature 
frequencies are encoded in concept learning tasks. Even more recently, Wattenmaker 
(1993) found that single feature frequencies were encoded in both intentional and 
incidental concept learning tasks. 
A second line of research which suggests that subjects are sensitive to the 
probabilities of events occurring in their environment comes from the extensive work done 
on implicit learning (see Reber, 1994 and Berry and Diennes, 1993 for reviews and 
discussion). Reber and Millward's work using a probability learning paradigm is especially 
instructive in this regard. Reber and Millward (197 1) found that subjects can accurately 
anticipate the changing probabilities of events even when the anticipatory response 
requires an integration of information across 50 preceding events. Millward and Reber 
(1972) reported results which suggested that subjects were sensitive to dependencies 
between events where there were up to six intervening events between the dependent 
events. 
The importance of these demonstrations of the effects of feature frequency on 
subjects' acquisition of concepts and prediction of future events to the current discussion 
should be clear. The more frequently an event or feature occurs the more probable it may 
be said to be. The two lines of research briefly described above suggest that subjects are 
sensitive to the probabilities of events in their environment. If this is the case, then it 
would be expected that the probabilities of the events, or items, which are governed by the 
hypotheses which subjects are reasoning about, should have an effect on the information 
selected to test those hypotheses. Despite the centrality of this assumption to Oaksford and 
Chater's model, surprisingly little research has been done on this question. As the notion of 
subjective probability will be crucial to an understanding of the experiments to be 
described in Chapter 2, the work which has been done will now be reviewed. 
31 
The first study which will be discussed is that of Kirby (1994a). In the experiments 
contained in this study he investigated the effect of subjective probability on subjects' 
pattern of card selection on the indicative selection task. All of these experiments were 
based upon a re-analysis of Wason's (1966) original selection task. The original rule which 
Wason used was "If a card has a vowel on one side then it has an even number on the 
other side". He points out that the set of P-instances (all 5 vowels) is smaller than the set 
of not-P instances (the 21 consonants). Therefore, the fact that Wason (1968) reported 
only a minority of subjects choosing the not-Q card may have been due to the fact that the 
posterior probability (the prior odds) of finding aP on the back of the not-Q card were 
low. Accordingly, Kirby reports the results of three experiments where the relative sizes of 
the not-P and the P set were varied. 
In the first of these experiments subjects were given a scenario concerning a 
computer which had been given the task of printing cards with an integer from 0 to 1000 
on one side and one of two arithmetic symbols (+ or -) on the other side. The rule for the 
small P set condition was: "If the card has a0 on one side, then it has a+ on the other 
side". The rule for the large P set condition was: "If the card has a numberfrom I to 1000 
on one side, then it has a+ on the other side". Thus, the likelihood of finding aP on the 
back of the not-Q card was higher in the large P set than it was in the small P set condition. 
If subjeýctive probability does affect subjects' patterns of evidence selection then choice of 
the not-Q card should be higher in the large P set condition than in the small P set 
condition. This is exactly what was found. A total of 73% of subjects (N = 44) selected the 
not-Q card in the large P set condition versus 49% (N = 45) in the small P set condition. 
This result was replicated in two subsequent experiments. As the size of the P set 
increases, so too does the proportion of subjects selecting the not-Q card. 
Unfortunately however, there is a problem with the design of Kirby's experiments 
(Over and Evans, 1994; Kirby, 1994b). Over and Evans argue that there is a plausible 
alternative reading of Kirby's task which would lead subjects in the small P set to conclude 
that there is only one instance of P amongst the cards. Remember that subjects were told 
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that the computer was given the task of printing out cards with an integer from 0 to 1000 
on one side. Thus subjects may have inferred that there were 1001 cards in total. 
Remember also that the rule concerned cards with a0 (P) on one side and a+ on the other 
side (Q). As the P-card is always one of the cards from which selections are allowed, 
subjects may have inferred that there could not be aP on the back of the not-Q card 
because they could already see the front of the card with a P. Such a reading of the task 
would lead subjects not to choose the not-Q card which confounds the set size explanation 
offered by Kirby. 
Fortunately, Over and Evans are able to cite two other studies which support 
Kirby's hypothesis. The first of these is Evans and Pollard (198 1). These authors presented 
subjects with indicative conditional rules the truth or falsity of which had been 
independently rated. They found that subjects were more likely to select the not-Q card 
when the conditional rule being tested was believed to be false. Evans and Pollard 
interpreted this finding as being due to the falsifying case of P and not-Q being readily 
available to subjects who did believe the conditional rule to be false. As Over and Evans 
(1994) point out, this explanation is essentially the same as that offered by Kirby for his 
results as it makes the selection of the not-Q card dependent upon subjects' expectations of 
finding a P. 
The second study which Over and Evans cite is that of Pollard and Evans (1983). 
This study also demonstrated facilitation of false consequent selections but this time a 
probability learning paradigm was employed. The rules used were abstract with and 
without negative components, and the probabilities of the combinations of values on the 
cards were established prior to the selection task. The materials which Pollard and Evans 
used consisted of sets of cards with red and blue sides. For example, subjects could be 
shown a card with a red side which had a triangle or was blank and a blue side which had a 
star or was blank. Selection task conditionals such as: 
if there is a triangle on one side then there is a star on the other side 
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were established with different contingencies in the probability learning task. For instance, 
the usually true conditional was composed of 
seven cards with aP on one side and aQ on the other 
one card with aP on one side and a not-Q on the other 
seven cards with a not-P on one side and aQ on the other 
one card with a not-P on one side and not-Q on the other 
In the above case the probability of both not-Q given P, and P given not-Q, was 
1/8. For the usuallyfalse conditionals on the other hand, both of the equivalent 
probabilities were 7/8. As predicted, significantly more not-Q card selections were made 
with usuallyfalse conditionals. 
As previously mentioned, there is a problem with the design of Kirby's 
experiments. Therefore, as Evans and Over (1996a) argue, it cannot be used as evidence 
for or against Oaksford and Chater's rational analysis. The Pollard and Evans study on the 
other hand, is sound. Unfortunately however, there is very little agreement about how it 
should be modelled. Oaksford and Chater claim that Pollard and Evans' results are 
predicted by their model whilst Evans and Over (1996a and b) argue that Oaksford and 
Chater only succeed in modelling the data by making highly questionable adjustments to 
their parameter values. 
It would seem then that there is no existing empirical evidence, the status of which 
all concerned parties agree on, which may be used to test the Oaksford and Chater model. 
However, the point of this section is not to arbitrate between Oaksford and Chater's 
account and its competitors. Rather it is to establish that subjective probability does have 
an effect on subjects' patterns of card selections. In the light of the evidence discussed it 
would seem that subjective probability is an important factor in determining the rate at 
which subjects select the not-Q card. One of the aims of the first study to be described in 
the next chapter will be to demonstrate the importance of subjective probability in an 
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alternative selection task. It is to a description of this alternative selection task which we 
will now turn. 
1.5 AN ALTERNATIVE SELECTION TASK 
1.5.1 The pseudodiagnosticity paradigm: An alternative selection task 
One of the few tasks, other than Wason's selection task, which has been used to 
investigate the evidence which subjects select to test hypotheses is the pseudodiagnosticity 
task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney and Schiavo, 1979). Pseudodiagnosticity is the descriptive 
term for subjects' failure, when asked to select evidence needed to make a judgement under 
uncertainty, to select diagnostically relevant information. For example, subjects in the 
original Doherty et al study were asked to decide whether a pot recovered by a diver came 
from one of two islands - Coral Island or Shell Island. They were told that the pot 
possessed a list of eight characteristics such as being made from smooth clay and having 
curved handles. Subjects were then told that they could select information about the 
percentages of pots from each of the two islands which possessed these characteristics. 
Consider Bayes theorem, which states that 
P(HilDi) 
P(H21Di) 
P(DilHi) 
P(DiIH2) 
P(Hi) 
P(H2) 
equation 2.1 
where H and D stand for hypotheses and data respectively, the subscripts 1 and 2 label two 
exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, and i labels a piece of evidence. P(Hj/Di) is the 
posterior probability that HI is the case, P(H I) and P(H2) are the base rates or prior 
probabilities of HI and H2 respectively. P(Di/Hl) and P(Di/H2) are the probabilities of the 
evidence given the hypotheses under test. In the example given above, the percentages of 
pots from Coral and Shell Islands which possess a given feature are equivalent to P(Di/Hl) 
and P(Di/H2)- 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that subjects should select information 
about both the percentage of pots on Shell Island and on Coral Island which possess any 
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particular feature. Typically, this is not what subjects do. Instead, when allowed to choose 
six pieces of information, only 13% of Doherty et al's subjects chose evidence about three 
features relevant to both hypotheses. The vast majority of subjects did not choose any 
evidential pairs i. e. evidence about the percentage of pots on both islands possessing a 
particular feature. 
This study by Doherty et al investigated subjects' choice of evidence to allow them 
to make a judgement under uncertainty. Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) used 
essentially the same task structure to examine subjects' use of normative information in 
making such a judgement. They found that subjects given a diagnostic likelihood ratio (i. e. 
P(Di/Hi) > P(Di/H2) or P(Di/Hi) < P(Di/H2)) responded in the direction appropriate to the 
relative likelihoods. Almost 50% of subjects who were given non diagnostic information 
(P(Di/Hi) = P(DiIH2)) did not change their levels of belief in the focal hypothesis upon 
receipt of that information. Thus it would seem that subjects, when given the appropriate 
evidence, do have some working understanding of diagnosticity. This conclusion must be 
moderated in the light of some work by Ofir (1988) who found that the false alarm 
(P(Di/H2) was only utilised in cases where there was inconsistency between the base rate 
and the likelihood for H I. It seems that subjects will only use diagnostic information to 
resolve inconsistency and so do not possess an understanding of the diagnosticity of 
evidence. 
1.5.2. The Pseudodiagnosticity task: A closer inspection 
From the research described in the previous section two conclusions about the 
pseudodiagnosticity task may be drawn. Firstly, and most obviously, it is a selection task. 
Secondly, the uses to which it has been put are inextricably tied up with research into 
subjects' understanding of Bayes theorem. However, before it is put to use in investigating 
the factors underlying the selection of evidence for the evaluation of hypotheses, it must be 
re-analysed. This is because previous analyses of the task have been concerned with only 
one normative application of Bayes theorem. As Oaksford and Chater have suggested, 
subjects may be conforming to Bayes theorem in a non-obvious way. 
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The most simple version of the task is the one used by Mynatt, Doherty, and 
Dragan (1993). They presented subjects with a scenario which described an object (0) as 
belonging to one of two categories -X or Y (the hypothesis that 0 belongs to X will be 
referred to as Hx whilst its complementary hypothesis will be referred to as Hy) - and 
asked them to select information to help them decide between the hypotheses. Below is an 
example of such a scenario: 
Your sister has a car she bought a couple of years ago. It's either a car X or a 
car Y but you can't remember which. You do remember that her car does over 
25 miles per gallon and has not had any major mechanical problems in the 
two years she's owned it. 
Next, subjects were told what percentage of car Xs do over 25 miles per gallon and were 
asked to choose one piece of information from the remaining three. Figure 1.2 illustrates 
how Mynatt et al conceptualised the task. 
As may be seen from the figure below two of the four possible pieces of 
information are relevant to Hx whilst the remaining two are relevant to Hy. Mynatt, 
Doherty and Dragan (1993) found that, in a standard version of their task, the majority of 
subjects selected pseudodiagnostic information. Mynatt et al suggested focus as the cause 
of such pseudodiagnostic evidence selection. They claimed that underlying focus is 
subjects' inability to hold in working memory more than one hypothesis at a time. 
However, they also demonstrated that when evidence emerges which causes focus to shift 
from one alternative to its complement subjects choose diagnostic evidence. This 
demonstration consisted of giving subjects information about X which suggested that its 
complement was actually the case (e. g. by telling subjects that 35% of instances of car Xs 
do over 25 m. p. g. ). They further demonstrated that focus may be manipulated onto an 
evidential feature rather than onto an alternative. For example, if the task of choosing 
between alternatives is given some utility for subjects (in this case they are told to imagine 
that they are going to act on their decision), then when given one piece of information 
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subjects will choose the information that allows them to make a comparison between the 
alternatives on that feature (i. e. they will choose the diagnostic evidence). 
Altematives 
Information 
% over 
25 mpg 
(Dl) 
% no problems 
in two years 
(D2) 
Car X (Hx) Car Y (Hy) 
Cell A Cell B 
p(DI/Hx) p(DI/Hy) 
Cell C Cell D 
p(D2/Hx) p(D2/Hy) 
Figure 1.2: Mynatt et al's (1993) conceptual isation of the pseudodiagnosticity task 
It is clear (see Evans and Over, 1996b for a discussion of this point) that Mynatt et 
al's interpretation of the pseudodiagnosticity task accords with a relevance account of 
information selection. In the standard case subjects choose an additional piece of 
information about the hypothesis which they are currently considering as it is the most 
relevant. However, when the decision between the two alternatives has some utility for 
subjects, they select the piece of information which will allow them to compare the 
alternatives. A similar interpretation of Mynatt et al's results has been offered by Evans and 
Over (1996b). 
The problem with such an interpretation is that it fails to consider the probabilistic 
structure of the task. For instance, it may be the case that subjects will in all cases select 
the information which is most likely to discriminate between the hypotheses i. e. they are 
attempting to maximise expected information gain. Such a reading of the task would lead 
one to conclude that in the standard version of the task, subjects might tend to choose an 
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additional piece of information about the hypothesis they are currently considering because 
they perceive it to be less likely that instances of the first category will possess both 
features than it is that members of either category will possess just one of the features. This 
is expressed by Inequality 1: 
p(Di & D2)! ý p(Di) Inequality 1.1 
Inequality I expresses the law of conjunction. The law of conjunction simply states that it 
is always less, or equally, likely that an object (or set of objects) will possess two features 
than it is that the object will possess just one of those features. As applied to the 
pseudodiagnosticity paradigm, this means that choosing p(D2/Hx) might, according to an 
Oaksford and Chater type analysis, be perceived by subjects to be the evidence selection 
with the highest associated information gain. In other words, subjects may consider it to be 
less likely that a high percentage of instances of category X will possess both features than 
it is that a high percentage of instances of category Y will possess the first feature. 
Accordingly, a selection of information concerning p(D2/H, ) may, in certain cases, be the 
one most likely to yield information which will discriminate between the hypotheses. 
Although a thorough analysis, of the type suggested, will not be attempted here, it is clear 
that the probabilistic nature of the pseudodiagnosticity task has never received the attention 
it deserves. The fact that it has not received this attention suggests that Mynatt Doherty and 
Dragan's (1993) results should be interpreted with caution. 
However, an analysis of the type suggested above rests on the assumption that 
subjects are aware of Inequality 1. There is much evidence that this is not the case. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have found that the majority of subjects violate 
the law of conjunction captured by Inequality 1. They gave subjects the following 
description: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
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discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
Subjects were then asked to rank a series of statements in terms of their Probability. 
Amongst the list were the following statements: 
(A) Linda is a bank teller 
(B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement 
Subjects rated statement B as being more probable than statement A. This result held up 
even when a between subjects design was used where subjects had to rate a list of 
statements where either A or B had been deleted. Equivalent results have been found by 
Agnoli (199 1) using a similar paradigm with children. 
In the face of such evidence about the conjunction fallacy, it is unlikely that 
subjects typically choose evidence about p(D2/Hx) because they perceive it to be the 
selection most probable to be informative, although, for other reasons, they may perceive it 
as being the most relevant (see the next section for a discussion of Evans and Over, 
1996b). However, the research described in the opening section of this chapter suggests 
that subjects are sensitive to the base rates of events occurring in the environment. If this is 
the case such a sensitivity should manifest itself on the pseudodiagnosticity task. The 
experiments to be described in the next chapter will examine the effect of subjective 
probability on subjects' information selections on the pseudodiagnosticity task. 
1.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed, in detail, three approaches to accounting for the effect of 
background knowledge on the selection of information for the evaluation of hypotheses. 
From the preceding review it is clear that the first of these approaches - Cheng and 
Holyoak's pragmatic reasoning schemas - was of central importance for its concentration 
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on pragmatics. Nevertheless, it does seem that the approach is too rigid to be ultimately 
successful. The level of organisation in background knowledge which it calls for, would, in 
the final analysis, seem too great. In addition, there is the fact that Cheng and Holyoak's 
account does not generalise past deontic selection tasks. Their account has to be viewed as 
being unparsimonious. 
Much more promising however, are the approaches of Sperber and colleagues, and 
of Oaksford and Chater. Such approaches require much less rigidity from background 
knowledge. Both seem capable of accounting for the vast range of human competence in 
applying background knowledge in order to select information. As was discussed however, 
there are potentially serious problems with both approaches. The theory of Sperber et al 
fails to deliver anything concrete in terms of what characteristics of a piece of information 
will be important in any given context. It is undeniable that their work on the effect/effort 
trade-off is crucial in explaining why some information will be more important than other 
information in a given situation. Nevertheless, it does seem important to give an account 
(which will possibly have to be domain- specific) of the sources of information which are 
important to the organism. In a sense, this is precisely what Cheng and Holyoak have done. 
Unfortunately, they have committed the sin of over-specificity rather than over-generality. 
The Oaksford and Chater approach, on the other hand, would seem, on the face of 
things, to have got the balance exactly right. They claim (Oaksford and Chater, 1995) to 
have produced a principled account of relevance on Wason's Selection Task. Certainly 
their concentration on a specific, but at the same time, general source of information for the 
subject (i. e. knowledge about subjective probability) seems laudable. As has been pointed 
out however, there exist serious problems with the specifics of their model. They are 
profligate with processing resources, introducing unprincipled extra stages of processing to 
model the results from individual tasks. Their rarity assumption, upon which so much of 
the model rests, seems questionable. Much more worrying however, is their apparent 
confusion about the level at which they want their account to work. Is it a normative 
account, as Evans and Over (1996a) have suggested? If so, then it is possible for their 
model to both preserve its normative status and work at a computational level (Marr, 
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1992). Unfortunately, Oaksford and Chater, as has previously been mentioned, do not 
confine their theorising to such a level of analysis. In order to make their equations work, 
they have had to make numerous assumptions which have consequences for the type, and 
amount, of processing required (a point also made by Laming, 1996). It would seem that, 
in order to explain all of the existing phenomena in terms of subjective probability, 
Oaksford and Chater have had to sacrifice plausibility. 
Nowhere is it more apparent that subjective probability will ultimately prove to be 
less than the whole story than in the earlier consideration of the pseudodiagnosticity task. 
Although it was argued (and will be tested in Chapter 2) that subjective probability would 
prove to have an effect on subjects' pattern of evidence selections on that task, it is obvious 
from the analysis contained in the previous section that subjective probability cannot be 
the whole story (in order for subjects to be selecting further information based on a 
probabilistic analysis they would have to be conforming to the law of conjunction which 
previous research makes unlikely). Even if subjective probability does turn out to affect 
subjects' behaviour on the task, the basic finding of pseudodiagnosticity remains to be 
explained. It is likely that the explanations of Mynatt et al (1993) and Evans and Over 
(1996b) will turn out to be correct. Subjects choose further information about the 
hypothesis which they are currently considering for reasons of cognitive economy. Having 
constructed an initial representation involving that hypothesis, it requires less cognitive 
effort to select further information relevant to that representation than it does to consider 
the alternative hypothesis. Interestingly, Evans and Over (1996a&b) also recognise the 
profound importance of subjective probability to information selection. Accordingly, it is 
worth discussing in some more detail, the specifics of Evans and Over's (1996b) account of 
how information from background knowledge informs the selection of information for 
hypothesis evaluation. 
Evans and Over take as their starting point the fact that "all human thought is 
highly subject ... to relevance effects" (pg. 
45). By this they mean that humans reason about 
only a highly selective representation of both the information contained in the situation at 
hand and background knowledge. It is obvious that this starting point has much in common 
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with the three perspectives previously discussed in this chapter. However, it is in their 
definition of what determines relevance that Evans and Over suggest a means of resolving 
the tension between accounts which are too general on the one hand, and accounts which 
are too specific on the other. Their account of the determinants of relevance has a decided 
advantage over the accounts of both Sperber and colleagues and Oaksford and Chater. Its 
advantage lies in the fact that it contains the best of both of the other accounts, and more. 
For example, Evans and Over claim that there are linguistic determinants of relevance. It 
will be remembered that these linguistic sources of relevance were discussed at the start of 
this chapter in the context of Evans' (1984; 1989) work on the abstract selection task. 
In addition to linguistically -determined relevance, Evans and Over claim that 
processing effort and constraints may also be a determinant of relevance. Once again, this 
claim has already been discussed in relation to the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm. Along 
with Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan (1993), Evans and Over claim that when selecting 
information to enable them to decide between the alternatives present in the 
pseudodiagnosticity task, subjects will select information relevant to the hypothesis which 
they are currently considering. Evans and Over argue that this is due to a fundamental 
constraint of the human information processing system: namely that, very often, subjects 
can only attend to one hypothesis at a time. 
As mentioned above, Evans and Over also emphasise the importance of subjective 
probability to the selection of information for hypothesis evaluation. However, instead of 
Oaksford and Chater's (1994) measure of Expected Information Gain, they suggest that the 
concept of Epistemic Utility be used. In this context, epistemic utility may be defined as 
the degree to which a piece of information is useful in deciding between two hypotheses, 
and is specified in terms of the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses in the light of the 
information. Although the precise measure which Evans and Over use to capture the 
notion of epistemic utility will not be described here, it will be briefly discussed at the end 
of Chapter 2. Most important in this context is not the measure which Evans and 
Over use, 
but the fact that they do not argue that it fully captures our concept of epistemic utility 
which they claim to be much richer than any fixed measure. Neither 
do they claim that 
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relevance is determined solely by our knowledge of the probabilities of the events in our 
environment. Instead, whilst recognising that some kind of principled account has to be 
given of the importance to the organism of specific sources of information (such as 
linguistic knowledge or background knowledge about subjective probabilities), Evans and 
Over also acknowledge the importance of the more general constraints of cognitive effort 
and cognitive effect. 
Whilst it may seem strange to discuss an alternative theoretical account in the 
concluding section of this chapter, it does seem fitting as, by so doing, a conclusion 
becomes possible. This conclusion is that in order to fully understand the role played by 
background knowledge in subjects' selection of information for the evaluation of 
hypotheses, it is necessary to combine approaches which already exist in the literature. It is 
necessary to temper specific work on the role of subjective probability and information 
gain, with the general insight that cognitive effect must be balanced against cognitive 
effort. The theoretical work of Evans and Over suggests that this is possible. The first two 
experiments in this thesis will best be understood as an attempt to manipulate this balance. 
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CHAPTER 2- EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2: SUBJECTIVE 
PROBABILITY AND THE SELECTION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE 
EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, several recent approaches to the question of how 
background knowledge affects subjects' selection of information for the evaluation of 
hypotheses were discussed. It was concluded that an account incorporating general 
relevance theoretic principles and specific assumptions concerning subjective probability 
(amongst other factors) was necessary. It was pointed out that Evans and Over (I 996b) 
have demonstrated that such an account is possible. It was also claimed that the 
pseudodiagnosticity task was an ideal instrument for testing the necessity of such an 
account. The experiments to be reported in this chapter will constitute such a test. Before 
proceeding with a description of these experiments, some initial discussion is warranted. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the version of the pseudodiagnosticity account used by 
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan (1993) involved presenting subjects with scenarios such as 
the following: 
Your sister has a car she bought a couple of years ago. It's either a car X or a 
car Y but you can't remember which. You do remember that her car does over 
25 miles per gallon and has not had any major mechanical problems in the 
two Years she's owned it. 
Next, subjects are told the likelihood that members of one of the hypothesised categories 
possess one of the features also possessed by the target instance. They are then asked to 
select a further piece of information to help them decide between the hypothesised 
categories. 
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According to Bayes theorem, this additional piece of information should always 
enable subjects to compare the hypothesised categories across a single feature. Thus, if the 
initial piece of information concerned the percentage of model Xs which do 25 miles per 
gallon, then the subject should select an additional piece of information concerning the 
percentage of model Ys which do over 25 miles per gallon. Typically however, this is not 
the selection which subjects make. The majority of subjects select a further piece of 
information relevant to the hypothesised category about which they already possess some 
information. 
Explaining this phenomenon is, as discussed in Chapter 1, very difficult for any 
account based solely on subjects' knowledge of subjective probability. As was pointed out, 
the explanation given by Mynatt et al for their results is very similar to that given by 
Evans and Over (1996b). Both sets of authors claim that subjects make the 
pseudodiagnostic selection for reasons of cognitive economy. Mynatt et al argued that 
subjects can hold in working memory, and operate upon, only one hypothesis at a time. In 
addition to this, they claimed that subjects have a bias to test the hypothesis they think to 
be true. Taken together, these assumptions account for the pseudodiagnostic selections 
observed on the task. 
The Evans and Over argument is slightly different. These authors claim that the 
initial piece of information leads to the foregrounding of the hypothesis to which it relates. 
This leads directly to the typical selection of further information concerning the 
foregrounded hypothesis. It will be remembered that Mynatt et al also presented some 
results which showed that if the context in which the problem was presented assigned 
utility to the decision between the alternatives, then subjects were more likely to select the 
diagnostic information. Specifically, they told subjects to imagine not that the car was 
their sister's, but that they were thinking of buying the car. Once again, Evans and Over's 
explanation of these results is slightly different to that of Mynatt and colleagues. They 
argue that the wording of the problem indicates concern with the car's attributes. This 
leads to the foregrounding of the attribute which the initial piece of information concerns 
which, in turn, leads to the selection of the diagnostic evidence. 
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These explanations are similar in that they both place a premium on the notion of 
cognitive economy. The Evans and Over explanation seems to be more plausible however, 
as it suggests that the observed patterns of information selection are due to the manner in 
which subjects initially represent the problem. Although Mynatt et al's explanation does 
explicitly discuss the notion of cognitive effect (i. e. the utility of a comparison), Evans and 
Over successfully account for the results in terms of cognitive effort. However, the 
balance between cognitive effort and cognitive effect may very easily be investigated 
using this task. 
Consider the subject presented with the following scenario: 
Your sister has a car she bought a couple of years ago. It's either a car X or a 
car Y but you can't remember which. You do remember that her car does over 
100 miles per gallon and has not had any major mechanical problems in the 
two years she's owned it 
Next the subject is told the percentage of model Xs which do over 100 miles per gallon. 
As usual., her task is to select a piece of information to help her decide between the 
hypotheses. Which piece of information should she select? For reasons of cognitive effort, 
she may select a further piece of information pertinent to model X cars. In this case 
however, she is more likely to accrue significant cognitive effects from the diagnostic 
selection. This is because from her background knowledge about cars, she knows that 
doing 100 miles to the gallon is, statistically, a very rare feature amongst the general 
population of cars. It is unlikely that very many model Y cars will do 100 miles per gallon. 
Accordingly, selection of information which allows for a comparison of the hypothesised 
categories on this features is very likely to discriminate between them. 
Although such a 
selection is likely to involve more cognitive effort, it 
is also likely to result in more 
cognitive effects. 
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The experiments to be presented in this chapter will examine whether such a trade- 
off between cognitive effect and cognitive effort is at work on the pseudodiagnosticity 
task. The first experiment to be reported should be thought of as an exploratory study, 
whilst the second experiment will follow up on the results of the first. 
2.2 EXPERIMENT I 
2.2.1 Introduction 
2.2.1.1 Manipulating the probability of the features 
The rationale for this, the first experiment of the thesis, is simple. If subjects are 
sensitive to the probabilities with which events occur in their environment (as both the 
previous analysis, and work using the selection task suggest), then manipulating the 
probability of the evidential features with which subjects are presented in the 
pseudodiagnosticity task should affect the rates at which they select the remaining pieces 
of evidence. This may be illustrated with reference to Mynatt et al's car problem. The 
features which they presented to their subjects were doing over 25 mpg and no major 
mechanical problems in the previous two years. Both of these features are quite common 
amongst the general population of cars. An alternative analysis is necessary, however, in 
the case where subjects are told that their sister's car possesses a rare attribute and a 
common attribute (e. g. it has leather upholstery and does over 25 mpg) and are then told 
the percentage of one type of car which possesses the rare feature. This alternative analysis 
is necessary because extrapolating from the work on subjective probability, described in 
Chapter 1, such a manipulation would be predicted to have profound effects on the 
additional piece of information which subjects perceive to be relevant. Subjects receiving 
an initial piece of information about a rare feature should tend to focus on information 
concerning p(DI/Hy) whilst subjects who receive initial information about a common 
feature should focus on information concerning p(D2/Hx). This is a direct consequence of 
subjects' sensitivity to the base rates of features of objects 
in their environment. The lower 
48 
the probability of a feature, the less likely it is that any object or category of objects will 
possess it. Accordingly, if one knows that members of a hypothesised category possess a 
rare feature in common with an object to be categorised, information about the rate at 
which members of the alternative hypothesised category posses that feature is likely to be 
informative. 
Unfortunately, the position is not quite as simple as the foregoing would suggest. 
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan (1993) found that the value of p(DI/H,, ) was important in 
determining evidence selections amongst their subjects. In Experiment I of their study all 
subjects were told that p(DI/Hx) was 0.65 whereas in their second experiment all subjects 
were told that p(DI/Hx) was 0.35. On their inference problems (where subjects were told 
that the car belonged to their sister) the majority of subjects selected a further piece of 
information concerning Hx when p(DI/Hx) was set at 0.65. However, on these same 
problems when p(DI/H,, ) was set at 0.35, the majority of subjects selected information 
au about p(DI/Hy). Mynatt et al explain their results by claiming that when p(DI[Hx) fell 
below 0.5 subjects reasoned pseudodiagnostically that Hx was probably false and shifted 
the focus of working memory to Hy, Importantly, Mynatt et al fail to take into 
consideration the base rate of the initial evidential feature. In contrast to Mynatt and his 
colleagues it is predicted here that an interaction between p(DI/Hx) and the perceived base 
rate of DI should be observed. The specific details of this prediction are presented below. 
Firstly, it is predicted that where the subjective probability of DI is high the rate at which 
information about P(DI/Hy) is selected will increase as p(DI/Hx) decreases. Secondly, it is 
predicted that where the subjective probability of DI is low, the rate at which information 
about p(DI/Hy) is selected will increase as p(DI/Hx) increases. Experiment 1, which 
attempts to test these predictions, will shortly be described. The second aim of this 
experiment must firstly be discussed. 
2.2.1.2 The use of diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic information 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, where the pseudodiagnosticity task was first 
introduced, there has been interest in the use to which subjects put diagnostic information. 
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There have been three studies (described on pgs. 35 - 36) which have investigated the use 
to which subjects put diagnostic information (Doherty et al 1979; Beyth-Marom and 
Fischhoff, 1983; Ofir, 1988). Unfortunately, there are two problems with all three of these 
studies. Firstly, in all cases subjects were given base rate evidence in addition to 
information about the likelihood ratios. Accordingly, there is no direct evidence about how 
subjects' use diagnostic information. It is entirely possible that in the absence of base rate 
information subjects will use the likelihood evidence in a more appropriate manner. 
Secondly, and much more importantly, the emphasis in all of these studies has been on 
what subjects do with normative evidence. This is despite the fact that the majority of 
subjects, when given the opportunity, do not choose that normative evidence. This problem 
obviously relates to the problem of the status of the normative theory in research on 
decision making and reasoning (see Baron, 1988 for a discussion of this issue). Evans 
(1991) has characterised standard logic as a yardstick against which subjects' performance 
on a variety of reasoning tasks may be evaluated. 
This view would also seem to be prevalent in much of the decision making 
literature and leaves unaddressed the question of what subjects actually do with the 
"incorrect" information which they tend to select on evidence choice tasks. As one of the 
major goals of this thesis is to investigate precisely how subjects revise their beliefs in a set 
of hypotheses in the light of evidence relevant to these hypotheses, the second aim of the 
first study described here will be an investigation of exactly that question. Subjects will be 
given an initial piece of evidence and then asked to choose one further piece of information 
to help them decide between two hypotheses and, upon receipt of that evidence, will be 
asked to use it to judge the relative likelihood of the hypotheses. It should be pointed out at 
this stage that such a procedure is not standard on the pseudodiagnosticity task. Although 
Tweney, Doherty, Mynatt and Schiavo (1979) did ask subjects to use the information 
which they received, Tweney et al's task was more complicated than the one which will be 
used here. Accordingly, it is very difficult to draw conclusions from their results. However, 
even though the task used by Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan (1993) was much simpler than 
that used by Tweney et al, the former experimenters did not require their subjects to put the 
information which they received to any use. 
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The main focus of this chapter remains the factors affecting subjects' selection of 
information for the testing of hypotheses. Accordingly subjects' use of the information 
which they receive in the course of the first experiment will not be discussed at great 
length. It will be returned to in Chapters 3 and 4 where it will be used as the basis for a 
more thorough investigation of the phenomena of belief revision. However, even at this 
stage it is worth pointing out there exists much experimental and theoretical work (which 
will be reviewed in Chapter 3) which suggests that subjects will revise their beliefs about a 
set of hypotheses in the light of non-diagnostic information. For example, the literature on 
impression formation is based on a non-normative paradigm where the issue of 
diagnosticity is rarely discussed (e. g. Asch, 1946; Jacobson and Anderson, 1965). There 
also exist several experimental examples of subjects revising their beliefs in the light of 
non-diagnostic information. Troutman and Shanteau (1977) provided subjects with 
samples from one of two boxes of beads. One box had 70 red, 30 white and 50 blue beads. 
The other box had 30 red, 70 white and 50 blue beads. Subjects' task was to state the 
subjective probability that the samples which they were shown came from the first or the 
second box. Because both boxes contained equal numbers of blue beads, a sample 
consisting of blue beads was uninformative. Yet subjects significantly revised their 
subjective probability estimates when they were given blue beads, in the direction of less 
extreme judgements. 
This finding leads to the prediction that even those subjects who select 
pseudodi agnostic information will use the information they receive to form beliefs which 
favour one or other of the hypotheses. Other than this prediction no other predictions were 
made about subjects' overall levels of belief in this experiment. 
2.2.2. Method 
Subjects: the subjects were 144 students of the Business School at the University of 
Plymouth. 
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Materials: each subject was presented with a booklet containing a set of instructions and 
one problem. The instructions were as follows: 
Accompanying these instructions is a decision problem. On the first page there 
is a brief description of a situation and you are asked to select a single piece of 
information in order to make a decision between two alternatives. You may 
feel that you would like to have more than one piece of information, but please 
pick only one. We are interested in which piece you think would be most useful 
in helping you make a decision, even though ideally more information might be 
he lpfu 1. 
Once you have marked the piece of information you think would be most useful 
in helping you make a decision, please remove the sticker which corresponds 
to that piece of information. It is important that you remove only the sticker 
corresponding to the piece of infonnation which you have chosen. 
On the next page is a scale designed to measure your confidence in each of the 
decision alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. 
One end of the scale corresponds to complete certainty that one of the decision 
alternatives is true and the other to complete certainty that the second 
alternative is true. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
beliefs about the alternatives. Remember that the greater your confidence in an 
alternative, the closer your mark should be to that alternative. 
It is very important to read the problem carefully and to think about it before 
picking the piece of information you think would be most useful in helping you 
make a decision. Take your time and consider your choice before you respond. 
Likewise, it is very important that you think carefully before decidingwhich 
point on the line best describes your beliefs about the likelihood of each 
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decision alternative. If you have any questions at any time, please raise your 
hand and the experimenter will help you. 
The structure of the problems used was similar to that of Mynatt et al (1993). Each 
subject was given a problem such as the following: 
Yourfriend is an engineer and worksfor a large construction company. It's either 
company X or company Y, but you can't remember which. You do remember that he 
earns overf]4,000 a year and that he drives a company car. 
You have thefollowing pieces of information: 
(a) 65% of engineers working for company X earn overf 14,000 a year. 
Three additional pieces of information are also available: 
(b) The percentage of engineers workingfor company Y that earn overf]4,000 a 
year. 
(c) The percentage of engineers working for company X that drive a company car. 
(d) The percentage of engineers working for company Y that drive a company car. 
Assuming that you couldfind out only ONE of these pieces of information (b, c, or d), 
which would you want in order to help you decide what company yourfriend works 
for? 
There were three other such problems concerning a friend who has just moved house, a 
friend who is staying in a hotel, and a friend who has just started university. Examples of 
each of these problems are presented in Appendix 1. 
Underneath each problem was the following statement: 
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Once you have marked your answer please peel back the sticker which 
corresponds to that answer. Underneath is the piece of information which you 
have selected. Now turn to the next page where you willfind a scale designed 
to measure your confidence in each of the decision alternatives in the light of 
the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that yourfriend works for company X and the other to 
complete certainty that he worksfor company Y. Please mark the point on the 
line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. Remember that the 
greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to 
that altemative. 
This statement was, of course, changed slightly for each scenario. On the next page was a 
line 100 mm. long with one end marked "certain ....... X" and the other marked 
"certain Y'. 
Design: as there are two parts to this experiment, the design of each part will be outlined 
separately. The first part of the study involved subjects' selection of evidence for the 
evaluation of the hypotheses present in the scenarios and had a 2x3x4 between subjects 
design. The first factor was Rarity and involved manipulating the feature about which the 
initial piece of evidence was given. Subjects received an initial piece of evidence about 
either a rare or a common feature of the object which they had been asked to categorise. 
The features used are given in Table 2.1. 
Problem Content Rare Feature Common Feature 2nd Feature 
Engineer 
House 
Hotel Room 
Friend starting 
earns E50,000 p. a. + 
swimming pool 
costs E165/night 
2As &I B at A-level 
earns E14,000 p. a. + 
garden 
costs E35/night 
IB &2Cs at A-level 
company car 
garage 
en-sulte bathroom 
must take up a foreign 
University language 
Table 2.1: Features used in Experiment I- 'Me 2ndfeature column refers to the feature kept constant across 
all conditions. 
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The second factor was Likelihood and had three levels. The Likelihood factor 
involved manipulating the level at which the first piece of evidence said the feature was 
present. Subjects were told that 65% or 95% of instances of category X possessed the 
feature or were simply told that instances of category X possessed the feature. In this latter 
case subjects were told that the available evidence was whether instances of X or Y 
possessed the features. It was assumed that informing subjects that instances of category X 
possessed the initial feature corresponded to telling them that 100% of instances of that 
category possessed the feature. Accordingly, this will be referred to as the 100% level of 
the Likelihood variable. The third factor was problem content. As has already been stated, 
there were four different contents used. 
The second part to this experiment concerned the use to which subjects put the 
evidence which they received. This part of the study had a 2x3x2x2x4 design. Alongside 
the factors involved in the first part of the study, there were a further two factors involved 
in the second part of the study. The first of these was Feedback. This involve manipulating 
the actual value of the evidence which subjects had selected. In all conditions this was 
printed beside the appropriate piece of information and was covered by an opaque sticker. 
Subjects were asked to mark the piece of evidence they had chosen and then to remove the 
corresponding sticker. In the 65% and 95% conditions subjects received evidence that was 
either positive or negative relative to category X. Positive evidence was supplied by having 
25%, 75%, and 25% under the stickers corresponding to b, c and d respectively (a brief re- 
examination of the example given above will make this clear). Negative evidence was 
supplied by giving the likelihoods in the order 75%, 25%, 75%. Those subjects who were 
told that instances of category X possessed the initial feature received feedback in a 
categorical yes1no form. Once again the sign of the evidence was determined by giving 
either yes or no as feedback to each of the possible evidential items. 
The second, additional, factor involved in the second part of the study was Choice, 
This refers to whether subjects had selected a diagnostic or a pseudodiagnostic piece of 
evidence. The design of both parts of the experiment is summarised in Table 2.2. 
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Task Independent Variables Levels 
Choice of Information LRARITY 
2. LIKELIHOOD 
3. PROBLEM CONTENT 
2- RARE, COMMON 
3- 65%, 95%, 100% 
4- see Table 2.1 
Use of Information 1,2 and 3 
4. FEEDBACK 2- POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
5. CHOICE 2- DIAGNOSTIC, 
PSEUDODIAGNOSTIC 
Table 2.2: Independent and Dependent variables involved in Experiment I 
Procedure: subjects were run in two groups, one of 97 and the other of 47. The 
experiment was run in class with subjects being assigned a problem randomly. 
2.2.3. Results and Interpretation 
Due to a typing error, the results of subjects on the house problem were invalidated. 
Of the remaining 108 subjects, one failed to provide a confidence rating, and only eight 
chose evidence about P(D2/Hy). Accordingly, the following results are those of the 99 
subjects who completed the engineer, hotel, and university problems and who chose to 
receive evidence about P(DI/Hy) or P(D2/HX). 
2.2.3.1 Information Choice 
There was no effect of problem content on subjects choice of information (X2 = 
1.09, df = 2, p> . 25). Thirty three percent of subjects who received 
the engineer problem 
chose P(D I /Hy) versus 61 % who chose P(D2/HX). The equivalent figures 
for the 
university and hotel problems were forty two percent versus fifty percent, and 
forty three 
percent versus forty nine percent respectively. 
The effect of Rarity and Likelihood on subjects' selection of evidence was analysed 
using log linear models. This is a technique designed to overcome the problems inherent in 
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multi dimensional contingency tables (see Howell, 1992 or Kennedy, 1983 for 
comprehensive introductions to the subject). The simplest explanation of the approach is 
that it involves comparing ever simpler models of the data until the most parsimonious 
model is found. In this case the most parsimonious model was that of a main effect for 
Likelihood (likelihood ratio chi square = 2.63, df = 3, p >. 45). Although there were other 
models which did not predict frequencies which were significantly different to the 
observed frequencies, this model is appropriate because all other potential models were 
more complex, and the model chosen did not differ significantly from these alternative 
models. Subjects' response frequencies, broken down by Rarity and Likelihood are given in 
Table 2.3. 
Common Rare 
Likelihood B c D B cD 
65% 11 6 1 9 72 36 
95% 9 8 1 8 9 36 
100% 4 12 2 1 15 35 
24 26 4 18 31 4 
Table 2.3: Response frequencies, broken down by Rarity and Likelihood, for Experiment 1. 
A chi-square was used to test for significant differences amongst the three levels of 
the Likelihood variable. The results are represented in Figure 2.1 whilst selection 
frequencies for the entire experiment are presented in Appendix 2. Overall, this was 
significant (X2 = 14.67, df = 2, p< . 00 1). Follow up chi squares revealed significant 
differences between the 95% level and the 100% level (X2 = 8.77, df = 1, p< . 005), and 
between the 65% level and the 100% level (X2 = 13.89, df = 1, p <. 001). There was a 
significant difference in frequency of diagnostic evidence selections (i. e. selection of 
P(DI/Hy)) due to the Likelihood variable (X2 = 9, df = 2, p <. 025). This difference was 
significant between the 95 % level and the 100% level (X2 = 6.5, df = 1, p< . 025), and 
between the 65% level and the 100% level (X2 = 6.5, df = 1, p <. 025). There was a 
corresponding significant difference in pseudodi agnostic selections (i. e. selection of 
P(D2/HX)) due to feature level (X2 = 8.19, df = 2, p< . 025). The only significant 
difference was that between the 65% level and the 100% level (X2 = 4.9, df = 1, p <. 05). 
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The only level of the Likelihood variable at which there was a significant difference 
between frequency of diagnostic and pseudodi agnostic selections was the 100% level (X2 
= 15.13, df = 1, p< . 001). 
The only significant difference in subjects' choice of information was caused by the 
Likelihood manipulation. Simply telling subjects that instances of category X possessed 
the first feature greatly increased the frequency with which subjects chose the 
pseudodi agnostic information. There are two possible explanations for this. The first of 
these is that giving subjects this information caused them to focus on the category to which 
that information related to the exclusion of the other category. This fits with the Mynatt et 
al (1993) account of subjects' pattern of evidence selection. 
100 
75 
50 
25 
0 
CHOICE 
65% 
M- 95% 
[2 100% 
Figure 2.1: The percentages of subjects choosing diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic information in 
Experiment I broken down by the level at which the first feature was said to be present amongst instances of X. 
However, there is an alternative view of this result. Telling subjects that instances 
of category X possessed the first feature, and giving them further information 
in terms of 
whether instances of categories X and Y possessed the remaining features, changed the 
structure of the task. This may be seen in Table 2.4. This change 
in the structure of the task 
is due to the fact that telling subjects whether instances of a category possess a feature 
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Diagnostic Pseudodiagnostic 
p(D I /Hy) p(D2[Hx) 
amounts to giving them propositional information. This propositional information allows 
subjects, in certain cases, to be certain in their decision between the alternatives. As may 
be seen from Table 2.4, a NO outcome from any of the possible pieces of information 
allows subjects to be certain about which of the categories the object belongs to. This is 
because a NO outcome means that instances of the category to which that piece of 
evidence relates do not possess at least one of the features possessed by the target object. 
For two out of the three pieces of information (whether instances of Y possess either of the 
features) a YES outcome leads to the situation where each of the categories possesses at 
least one of the features. Thus, in these two cases, subjects may be said to possess non- 
diagnostic information. 
Initial Evidence Remaining Possible Outcomes Results if Outcome Results if Outcome 
Evidence YES NO 
A. Instances of B. Whether YES or NO Uncertainty. Both Certainty. The 
category X possess instances of categories possess object must be an 
initial feature. category Y possess the initial feature. instance of X. 
the initial feature. 
C. Whether YES or NO Dependent on Certainty. The 
instances of inference about the object must be an 
category X possess diagnosticity of the instance of Y. 
the second feature. evidence. 
D. Whether YES or NO Uncertainty. Each Certainty. The 
instances of of the categories object must be an 
category Y possess possesses at least instance of X. 
the second feature. one feature. 
Table 2A Initial evidence, remaining possible evidence, possible outcomes, and the results of those 
outcomes when subjects are given propositional information on the pseudodiagnosticity task. 
However, information about whether instances of X possess the second feature (the 
choice overwhelmingly made by subjects in this experiment) is the most interesting case. 
As stated above, a NO outcome allows subjects to infer that the target object is an instance 
of Y. A YES outcome., on the other hand, means that instances of category X possess 
both 
of the features possessed by the target object. Logically this does not allow subjects to 
infer 
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that the target object is an instance of X. It may still be the case that all of the possible 
evidence is non-diagnostic and both of the features are possessed by instances of both 
categories. However, if subjects expect the information which they are given to be useful 
then, having been told that instances of category X possess the first feature, the optimal 
strategy is to select evidence about whether instances of category X possess the second 
feature. If instances of category X do possess the second feature then the target instance 
must belong to category X (assuming that the experimenter is not playing a trick and the 
evidence is diagnostic). If instances of category X do not possess the second feature then 
the target object must belong to the category Y. It may be the case then, that subjects who 
received evidence in a propositional format made the pragmatic inference that the evidence 
which they would receive was diagnostic and, based on this inference and a consideration 
of all possible selections and their contingent outcomes, decided to select information 
about whether instances of X possessed the second feature. 
That this second explanation is the case is unlikely for at least one a priori reason. 
For each of the possible evidence selections there are two alternative outcomes. This 
means that subjects must reason through six possible outcomes (see Table 2.4) in order to 
arrive at the correct selection. Even if it is the case that most subjects will not consider 
whether members of category Y possess D2, there are still four possible outcomes for 
subjects to reason through. Much of the work earlier mentioned has provided evidence that 
subjects, when reasoning, often fail to consider alternatives. This view is especially 
prevalent in the work of Johnson-Laird and colleagues (e. g. Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne, 1991). It seems much more likely therefore that subjects reason through 
the alternatives involved one by one, starting at the point to which the information 
in the 
problem directs them, and settle on a choice once they have an alternative which they 
feel 
will give them some information. 
2.2.3.2 Confidence Ratings 
it will be remembered from the Introduction to this experiment that it differs 
from 
I ference is due to the much previous work using the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm. 
This dif 
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subjects in this experiment being required to make use of the evidence which they received 
in the course of the task. They were asked to make use of that evidence by providing a 
rating of their confidence in the hypotheses in the light of all the evidence which they had 
available to them. In this section of the chapter subjects' confidence ratings will be 
analysed. 
As was pointed out in the previous section, telling subjects that instances of a 
category possess a feature (as was the case in the 100% level of the Likelihood 
manipulation) changed the structure of the task. Accordingly, the confidence ratings for the 
65% and 95% levels of the Likelihood variable will be analysed separately to those for the 
100% level (i. e. where subjects were given evidence in propositional form). 
2.2-3.2. a Confidence ratings with probabilistic evidence 
As was the case with the previous analysis of subjects' information selection, the 
confidence ratings of those subjects who attempted the house problem were also 
invalidated by a typing error. As before, this leaves 108 subjects who produced valid 
results. However, as only those subjects in the 65% and 95% levels of the Likelihood 
condition will be included in this first analysis, there will be a maximum of 72 sub ects j 
whose results will be analysed. Of these 72 subjects who attempted the engineer, university 
or hotel problems, five selected information about P(D2/Hy). Accordingly these subjects 
will not be included. 
It will be remembered that subjects were asked to express their confidence on a 
I OOm-m line. At one end of the line was labelled "certain ... V and at the other end 
to certain ... Y". 
For the purposes of the analysis which follows subjects' markings on the line 
were converted to scores on a 100 point scale ranging from 1 to 100. Each point on this 
scale corresponds to one millimetre on the line and the higher is a subject's score on this 
scale the more confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. . 
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Due to the reduced number of subjects, two separate analyses had to be carried out. 
The first of these was a one way Anova on the effect of problem content. This was not 
significant (F(2,64) < 1). The mean confidence ratings for the engineer, university, and 
hotel problems were 58 (S. D. = 26), 66 (S. D. = 26), and 56 (S. D. = 24) respectively. The 
summary table from this analysis is presented in Appendix 2. 
The main analysis performed was a 2x2x2x2 between subjects Anova to examine 
the effect of Rarity, Likelihood, Feedback and Choice (i. e. whether subjects chose 
diagnostic or pseudodi agnostic evidence) on confidence ratings. Choice is not a true 
independent variable as the level to which subjects were assigned (diagnostic or 
pseudodiagnostic choice) was not determined in advance by the experimenter but was 
instead determined by subjects' information selection. Accordingly, the effects of the 
Choice variable may only be interpreted in a correlational, rather than a causal, sense. The 
summary table from this analysis is presented in Appendix 2 as is a full table of means and 
standard deviations. 
The analysis produced four effects of interest, three of which were significant. The 
main effect of Likelihood was highly significant (F(I, 5 1) = 10.29, p< . 003). The mean 
confidence rating for subjects in the 65% condition was 49 (S. D. = 24), and for subjects in 
the 95% condition mean confidence was 70 (S. D. =23). This result is interesting because 
80 
75 
65% 
95% 
070 
65 
ý60 
055 
ýlv 
50 
45 
40 
Diagnostic Pseudodiagnostic 
Figure 2.2: The significant two way interaction between Likelihood and Choice from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in the 65% and 
95% conditions of Experiment 1. 
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there was no equivalent significant main effect for Feedback. Subjects seemed to be 
sensitive to the level at which the feature is said to be present in the first piece of evidence 
but not in the second. This is despite the fact that differences between levels was more 
pronounced in the second piece of evidence (i. e. 75% vs. 25%) than in the first (65% vs. 
95%). There was also a significant interaction between Likelihood and Choice (F(l, 51) = 
7.09, p< . 02). This interaction is represented in Figure 2.2 and the means and standard 
deviations involved are given in Table 2.5. 
Tests for simple main effects showed that the effect of Likelihood was highly significant 
when subjects chose diagnostic information (F(l, 36) = 21.23, p< .0 1), but not when 
subjects chose pseudodi agnostic information (F(l, 29) < 1). 
Likelihood 
Choice 65% 95% 
Diagnostic 43 (22) N= 20 76 (11) N= 17 
PseudodiaLynostic 59 (24) N= 13 65 (30) N= 17 
Table 2.5: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of subjects involved in the significant two wo 
interaction between Likelihood and Choice from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in the 65% and 95% 
conditions of Experiment 1. 
This result may be explained in terms of the relationship between the confidence 
ratings produced by those subjects who chose diagnostic evidence and the correct Bayesian 
probabilities given that evidence. Although it is not claimed that subjects should be 
expected to have produced confidence ratings which closely approximated Bayesian 
probabilities, it should be the case that changes in subjects' confidence due to differences in 
both Likelihood and Feedback mirror those prescribed by Bayes theorem. As may be seen 
from Table 2.6, this was not the case. 
Likelihood Feedback Confidence Bayesian Probability 
65% Positive (25%) 51 . 72 
Negative (75%) 34 . 46 
95% Positive (25%) 72 . 78 
Negative (75%) 78 . 56 
Table 2.6: The confidence ratings of subjects who chose diagnostic evidence in Experiment 1, broken down 
by Likelihood and Feedback, and the corresponding Bayesian probabilities given the evidence. 
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The first thing which an inspection of Table 2.6 reveals is that the significant two 
way interaction between Likelihood and Choice may be attributed to the relative under- 
confidence of subjects in the 65% conditions with both types of feedback (with positive 
feedback, actual rating of 51 vs. Bayesian probability of . 72; with negative feedback, actual 
rating of 34 vs. Bayesian probability of . 46), and to the overconfidence of subjects in the 
95% conditions who received negative feedback (mean rating of 78 vs. Bayesian 
probability of . 
56). The second thing which is apparent is that mean ratings are not even in 
the normatively correct order of magnitude. It would seem that even with the minimum 
amount of information required to make a judgement (i. e. the likelihood ratio), subjects do 
not follow Bayes theorem in their confidence ratings. 
The third effect of interest was the marginally non-significant interaction between 
Rarity and Choice (F(I, 5 1) = 3.79, p< . 06). The means involved in this interaction are 
given in Table 2.7. Once again tests for simple main effects were carried out which 
revealed that the effect of Rarity was significant when subjects chose the pseudodiagnostic 
evidence (F(l, 29) = 5.37, p <. 05), but not when they made the diagnostic choice (F(l, 36) 
<1). 
Rari 
Choice Common Rare 
Diagnostic 55 (25) N 20 61 (23) N 17 
Pseudodiagnostic 72 (27) N 14 54 (25) N 16 
Table 2.7: The means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and subject numbers involved in the interaction betw( 
Rarity and Choice from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in the 65% and 95% conditions of Experimen 
This interaction may be explained in terms of the significant three way interaction 
between Rarity, Feedback, and Choice (F(I, 5 1) = 4.59, p< . 04). The means and standard 
deviations involved in this interaction are given in Table 2.8, whilst the interaction is 
presented in Figure 2.4. Tests for simple interaction effects revealed a significant 
interaction between Rarity and Feedback when subjects chose pseudodi agnostic 
information (F(l, 26) = 6.03, p< . 025) but not when they chose diagnostic information 
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(F(l, 33) < 1). The significant half of the three way interaction was tested for simple main 
effects. Rarity had a significant effect when subjects received positive feedback (F(l, 14) 
10-99, p< . 01) but not when they received negative feedback (F(l, 14) < 1). 
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Figure 2.3: The significant three way interaction between Rarity, Feedback and Choice from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in the 65% and 95% conditions of Experiment 1. 
Although unexpected, this finding, on the surface seems quite clear. The Rarity 
manipulation had a significant effect only when subjects chose pseudodiagnostic evidence 
for which they received positive feedback. The mean confidence rating of subjects who, 
having already received information about a common feature, chose pseudodiagnostic 
Diagnostic Selection Pseudodiagnostic Selection 
Positive Fback Negative Fback Positive Fback Negative Fback 
Common 54 56 83 58 
25.73 25.98 15.03 34.83 
(N = 8) (N = 12) (N = 8) (N = 6) 
Rare 65 56 45 60 
23.05 23.22 26.50 22.71 
(N = 9) (N = 8) (N = 7) (N = 9) 
Table 2.8: Means (in bold), standard deviations and subject numbers involved in the significant three way 
interaction between Rarity, Feedback and Choice from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in the 65% anc 
95% conditions of Experiment 1. 
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evidence, and received positive feedback, was 83. Subjects who chose exactly the same 
evidence, and received the same feedback, but who had first received information about a 
rare feature produced a mean confidence rating of 45. 
One possible explanation for this is that the effect of being told that either 65% or 
95% of instances of category X possessed a rare feature was to cause subjects to expect a 
very high level of members of that same category to possess the common feature. When 
that expectation was not met, subjects' confidence in category X was diminished. Those 
subjects who had initially received information about a common feature did not have those 
expectations and so the effect of the second piece of evidence was not to confound 
expectations. The problem with this explanation is that it does not explain the pattern of 
results for those sub ects who had chosen pseudodi agnostic evidence and received negative 
feedback. Here there was no effect of the Rarity manipulation. It may be the case, however, 
that these subjects, faced with two overtly contradictory pieces of evidence, resolved the 
contradiction by discounting one of those pieces of evidence. If this is the case then the 
mean confidence of those subjects in the 95% conditions should be higher than for those 
subjects in the 65% conditions. This is the observed pattern for those subjects who 
received initial information about a rare feature (65 vs. 54) but not for those subjects who 
received information about a common feature (56 vs. 60). However, cell sizes at this level 
of analysis are too small for these means to be considered reliable. It should be 
remembered, however, that one of Ofir's (1988) findings was that subjects will use 
likelihood information as a means of resolving inconsistencies between the base rates. 
With only two pieces of inconsistent information available it is likely that subjects resorted 
to some characteristic of one of the evidential items to resolve that inconsistency. As for 
the expectation account, it will be developed and tested in Chapters 3 and 4. Therefore, the 
above results will be discussed again at the start of Chapter 4. 
2.2.3.2. b Confidence ratings with propositional evidence 
As was stated in the previous section, it was decided to analyse the confidence 
ratings of those subjects in the 65% and 95% Likelihood conditions separately from the 
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ratings of those subjects in the 100% Likelihood condition. This is because subjects in the 
100% condition were given evidence in a propositional format. This change in evidential 
format, from probabilistic to propositional, also changed the logical structure of the task. 
Accordingly, the analysis of the confidence ratings of those subjects in the 100% 
Likelihood condition will be presented in this section of the chapter. 
One third of all of the subjects who participated in this experiment received 
evidence in propositional form. This means that there was a maximum of 36 subjects 
whose confidence ratings could have been included in this analysis. Of these 36 subjects, 
four failed to provide a confidence rating, and only five selected information concerning 
p(D2/Hy). It was decided to exclude these subjects from the analysis and instead, to analyse 
the results of the 27 subjects who, having been told that instances of category X possessed 
the first feature, selected the pseudodiagnostic evidence. 
Once again, two analyses had to be carried out (again, summary tables and tables of 
means are to be found in Appendix 2). The first of these was a one way Anova on the 
effect of problem content. This was not significant. The mean confidence rating for the 
engineer problem was 57 (S. D. = 30.42, N= 11), for the university problem 57 (S. D. 
28.84, N= 9), and for the hotel problem 52 (S. D. = 39.23, N= 7). 
The second analysis was a 2x2 between subjects Anova to examine the effect of 
Rarity and Feedback on confidence ratings. For subjects given information in propositional 
format who chose the pseudodiagnostic evidence, positive feedback was achieved by 
telling subjects that instances of category X did possess the second evidential feature. 
Negative feedback consisted of informing subjects that instances of category X did not 
possess the second feature. 
The effect of Feedback was found to be significant (F(l, 23) = 5.73, p< . 03). The 
mean confidence rating of those subjects who received positive feedback was 
68 (S. D. = 
16.50, N= 14) whilst the mean for those who received negative feedback was 
41 (S. D. = 
37.95, N= 13). Neither the main effect of Rarity (F(l, 23) = 0.36, p> . 
5) nor the 
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interaction between Rarity and Feedback (F(l, 23) = 1.38, p >. 25) were found to be 
significant. 
Of most interest here is the significant main effect of Feedback on subjectso mean 
confidence ratings. Although Feedback had a significant effect on subjects' relative 
confidence in the hypotheses, the means involved in the interaction do not suggest that 
subjects understood the task. Remember that changing the format in which subjects 
received the information from probabilistic to propositional also changed the logical 
structure of the task. Accordingly, those subjects who, having chosen a further piece of 
information relevant to the hypothesis about which they already possessed some evidence, 
received negative feedback, could be confident that the target object was not an instance of 
category X. The mean confidence rating for these subjects does not suggest that subjects 
realised this. Those subjects who received negative feedback had a mean rating of 41, far 
short of complete confidence that Y was the case. 
Likewise, those subjects who received positive feedback had a mean confidence of 
68, once again far short of complete confidence that the target object was an instance of 
category X. Of course, as mentioned in a previous section, the structure of the task 
justified subjects' lack of confidence in category X. Although subjects who received 
positive feedback subsequent to a pseudodiagnostic selection knew that instances of 
category X possessed both of the evidential features, they did not know anything about 
instances of category Y. Thus subjects may have felt unsure that even if they had all of the 
information available to them they would have been able to decide between the 
alternatives. For example, instances of both X and Y categories might have turned out to 
possess both evidential features. It was earlier suggested that a partial cause of subjects' 
overwhelming tendency to select the pseudodiagnostic evidence when told that instances 
of category X possess the first evidential feature may have been the making of the 
pragmatic inference that the evidence which was available on the task was diagnostic. 
In 
other words, subjects may have inferred that instances of both X and Y categories 
did not 
possess both of the evidential features. However, the confidence ratings of subjects who 
received positive feedback does not suggest that this is the case. 
If subjects had inferred 
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that only one of the categories possessed both of the features, then information that 
instances of category X possessed both of the features should have resulted in near 
certainty that the target object was an instance of category X. This was not the case. 
2.2.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment I are both surprising and intriguing. Although no 
evidence was found to suggest that subjects are sensitive to the rarity of evidential features 
when they select further evidence to test hypotheses, changing the format (from 
probabilistic to propositional - as was achieved with the Likelihood manipulation) of the 
information which they received had a significant effect on their patterns of information 
selection. It seems likely that the significant effect of changing the format in which 
subjects receive information is due either to the change in the logical structure of the task 
or to the manner in which evidence in a propositional format directs subjects' attention. 
However, the failure to find a significant result due to the probabilities of the 
evidential features about which subjects received information need not necessarily be taken 
as evidence against the view that subjective probability plays a role in determining the 
information which subjects choose to test hypotheses. It should be remembered that 
Experiment I was an exploratory study and, as such, it contains several weaknesses. The 
first of these is that no pre-test was carried out to establish whether subjective probabilities 
of the evidential features used were as expected. Accordingly, such a pre-test was carried 
out before Experiment 2 was run. This pre-test will be described in the next section. The 
second weakness of this experiment is that it lacks statistical power. It may therefore be 
argued that the failure to find a significant result due to the Rarity manipulation may have 
been the result of too few subjects rather than to the non existence of such an effect. For 
this reason, Experiment 2 will employ a simpler design with greater numbers of subjects 
in 
each cell of the design. 
As stated previously, the interesting result from the information selection 
data 
collected in Experiment I was the significant effect which the Likelihood manipulation 
had 
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on subjects' pattern of evidence choice. There are two explanations for the observed 
patterns of results. Subjects initially told that instances of category X possessed the first 
evidential feature (i. e. given evidence in propositional form) may have selected further 
information about category X in overwhelming numbers firstly, because they appreciated 
the logical structure of the task, and secondly, because they assumed that the information 
available was useful. Having reasoned through all of the possible choices and outcomes 
they then selected the pseudodiagnostic piece of evidence - the single piece of evidence 
which they felt would allow them to decide between the hypotheses. A negative outcome 
from this selection (i. e. being told that instances of category X did not possess the second 
evidential feature) would enable subjects to conclude that the target object was an instance 
of category Y. A positive outcome (i. e. instances of category X possess the second, as well 
as the first, evidential feature), on the other hand, would enable subjects to conclude that 
the target object was an instance of category X, but only if the additional assumption that 
instances of both categories did not possess both features, had been made. 
As pointed out previously, such an explanation is unlikely to account for the 
observed pattern of results. This is because it is unlikely that most subjects would, or 
indeed could, engage in the kind of hypothetical thinking necessary to arrive at the correct 
selection in such a way. There is also the fact that subjects' ratings of their confidence in 
the hypotheses after receipt of both pieces of evidence does not suggest that they 
understood the logical structure of the task. Although a significant main effect of Feedback 
was found, the means involved suggest that subjects did not comprehend the task. For 
example, those subjects who received negative feedback were entitled to be completely 
certain that the target instance belonged to category Y. In fact, the mean confidence rating 
for subjects who received negative feedback was 41. On this basis alone it seems unlikely 
that the latter explanation for subjects' behaviour is correct. 
Whether subjects made the pragmatic assumption that the possible evidence was 
useful is a moot point. It may be argued that subjects could not be sure that any of the 
information which they might receive would enable them to discriminate between the 
hypotheses. Such a line of argument would claim that subjects only had access to the 
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information they were given and may not have assumed that this information was 
diagnostic. Accordingly, subjects who chose a further piece of information about category 
X and received positive feedback may have considered the possibility that information 
about category Y would make membership of category Y as probable as membership of 
category X. This counter-argument is weakened, however, by the fact that it does not seem 
to apply to the results of those subjects who received information in a probabilistic format. 
Although those subjects were equally entitled to doubt the diagnosticity of the evidence 
which they received, their confidence scores do not seem to reflect such a doubt. 
Nevertheless one of the goals of Experiment 2 will be to rule out the above counter- 
argument. 
As stated in the introduction to Experiment 1, the main focus of the experiment was 
subjects' evidence selections. Therefore the results on the confidence rating measure will 
not be discussed in great detail here. The main interest of the confidence ratings from those 
subjects given information in a propositional format is in relation to possible 
interpretations of subjects' evidence selections on those problems. The confidence ratings 
produced by subjects who received probabilistic information are of far greater interest. 
Firstly, these results suggest that subjects are not good Bayesians. The significant two way 
interaction between Likelihood and Choice was caused by subjects who chose diagnostic 
information being unable to produce confidence judgements which mirrored the 
prescriptions of Bayes theorem. 
It would seem that expectations created by the initial piece of information are 
important in determining subjects' level of confidence in the hypotheses. If this is the case 
it suggests that subjects are sensitive not only to the probability with which objects or 
events occur in their environment but also to the extent to which the occurrence of one 
event may be predicted from the occurrence of another. Once again, 
however, caution must 
be exercised in interpreting these results. As mentioned above, there 
is no independent 
measure of the subjective probabilities of the evidential 
features used in this experiment 
and the experiment lacks power. Neither was any 
direct measure of subjects' expectations 
nor of their confidence in the hypotheses taken after receipt of 
the first piece of evidence. 
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Experiment 3, which will be described in Chapter 4, will constitute an attempt to further 
investigate the issues raised here. Before attempting to clarify the issues raised by 
subjects' confidence ratings on Experiment I it was decided to further investigate some of 
the questions concerning information selection which were also raised by this experiment. 
2.3. EXPERIMENT 2 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As pointed out in the discussion of Experiment I there were several problems with 
both the design of the study and the interpretation of subjects' information selections. 
Firstly, because there were not enough subjects in the first experiment it is impossible to 
draw the conclusion that subjects were insensitive to the probability of occurrence of the 
features about which they received evidence even though no significant main effect was 
found for the Probability variable. Secondly, because the finding of no significant main 
effect for the Rarity manipulation is questionable, no conclusions can be drawn about the 
strategies subjects used in deciding which piece of evidence to select. As pointed out in the 
discussion of Experiment 1, subjects may have reasoned through all of the possibilities 
until they found one which would allow them to be certain in their decision between the 
alternatives or they may have considered only that piece of information to which their 
attention was directed by the problem content. The experiment to be described here will 
attempt to provide clarification of both these issues. 
It was also pointed out in the discussion of Experiment I that the evidential 
features 
used in that experiment had not been pre tested for their perceived probability of 
occurrence. In this second experiment it was decided to use problems containing 
both rare 
and common features which had been pre-tested. The pre-test will 
be described in the next 
section. 
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Essentially this experiment was a large scale replication of one part of Experiment 
1. All subjects were given information about the hypotheses in propositional form. That is, 
all subjects were told initially that instances of category X possessed one of the evidential 
features and were presented with further possible information concerning whether 
instances of the categories possessed the evidential features. As before, subjects were given 
an initial piece of information about either a common or a rare feature of an object to be 
categorised and asked to select a further piece of information in order to help them decide 
between hypothesised categories. Also as before, the target object was said to possess two 
features. This meant that there were three remaining pieces of information from which 
subjects had to choose. It was pointed out in the discussion of the previous experiment that 
a possible confound existed in the structure of the propositional form of the task. This 
confound is that although the selection of an initial piece of information about the 
hypothesis concerning which subjects are given an initial piece of information may allow 
them to discriminate between the hypotheses, they have no guarantee that this will be case. 
In other words, both of the hypothesised categories may possess both of the features, or 
both may possess just one of the features. Although the suggestion that this confound 
might have affected the results of Experiment I was deemed unlikely, it was controlled for 
in this experiment by use of a Hint manipulation. Accordingly, half of the subjects received 
an additional piece of information in the instructions stating that there was at least one 
piece of information available which would enable them to decide between the alternatives. 
This Hint manipulation controlled for the effects of subjects' assumptions about the 
diagnosticity of the evidence available to them. It was pointed out in the discussion of 
Experiment I that subjects' selection of further evidence may be dependent on the 
pragmatic assumption that the evidence available is diagnostic. Subjects who selected a 
further piece of evidence concerning the hypothesis about which they already possessed 
some information may have done so because they assumed that this piece of 
information 
was the only one which would allow them to decide between the alternatives with 
certainty, regardless of outcome. On the other hand, some subjects may not 
have made this 
assumption and so selected information about instances of category 
Y. In the Hint 
condition of this experiment subjects' selections were not 
dependent on any such pragmatic 
assumption. This is because telling subjects that there was at 
least one piece of information 
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available to them which would allow them to decide between the alternatives with certainty 
was in effect, telling them that the evidence was diagnostic. 
2.3.2 Pre-test 
The aim of this pre test was to select the features for four problems to be used in 
Experiment 2. Two of the problem contexts used in Experiment I were retained (the house 
and engineer problems) and a further two were added. The first of these new contexts 
involved a car which the subject's sister was said to have bought whilst the second 
concerned a villa where the subject's parents were said to have stayed. 
Subjects: the pre test was run in two stages. In the first stage, materials for the house, 
engineer and car problems were tested. 30 subjects took part in this stage of the pre test, 6 
of whom were male and 24 female. Their mean age was 27 with the youngest subject being 
19 and the oldest 43. In the second stage of the pre test 24 subjects rated materials for the 
Spanish villa problem. 18 of these subjects were male whilst 6 were female. Their mean 
age was 24 with the oldest subject being 37 and the youngest 19. All subjects were 
undergraduate students at the University of Plymouth and were paid for their participation. 
Materials: all subjects received a handout which comprised an instruction sheet and four 
sheets each of which contained a context and a list of features to be rated. 
Subjects in the first stage of the pre test rated features for the house, engineer and car 
problems and an additional problem whilst subjects in the second stage of the pre test rated 
materials for the Spanish villa problem and an additional three problems (none of these 
additional problems were used in the experiments described in this thesis). 
For all subjects the instructions were as follows: 
On thefollowing pages you willfind a series of three questions, each of which 
has eight subsections. Each question concerns one particular class of things. 
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The subsections ask you to estimate how often, in every ten thousand 
occurrences, an item will have a particularfeature. 
So, for example, you may be asked: 
Out of every 10,000 students how many would you expect to 
(a) own a car 
(b) have a part-time job 
If you feel that the answer to the first part of the question is 1,550, then you 
should write this in the space provided 
Please try to answer all of the questions. While it is unlikely that you will 
know the exact answer to any of the questions, we are interested in your best 
guess. This does not mean that we want you to put down the first number that 
pops into your head. Your knowledge of each of the things in the questions 
should enable you to give sensible answers in most cases! 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
help you. 
At the top of each rating sheet was a question in the following form: 
Out of every 10,000 holiday villas in Spain, how many would you expect to 
This was followed by a list of features for which subjects had to give frequency estimates. 
Each of these lists contained between 8 and 10 features. A copy of these materials 
is given 
in Appendix 4. 
Procedure: subjects were run in groups of between 5 and 10 in experimental sessions 
which had no time limit. 
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Results: mean estimations and standard deviations for all of the features rated are given 
in Appendix 4. Mean estimations (in the form of percentages) for the features used in 
Experiment 2 are given in Table 2.9. 
PROBLEM CONTENT Feature Rated Mean Estimations 
Engineer earns over E60,000 p. a. earns 12% 
E25,000 per annum 49% 
_ 
drives a company car 62% 
House has a swimming pool 3% 
has a garden 81% 
_ 
has a garage 56% 
Car top speed of 165 m. p. h. + has a 6% 
radio 92% 
has four doors 58% 
Spanish Villa costs E1000 per week 8% 
costs f 150 per week 51% 
built in last twenty years 84% 
Table 2.9: Problem contents and mean frequency estimations for the features used in Experiment 2. 
These features were chosen because they fell at either end of the distribution of 
subjects' estimations. However, it should be bome in mind that it was impossible to control 
completely for the perceived frequency of the features used. For example, although 
subjects expected only 12% of civil engineers to earn over E60,000 per annum, this was 
over three times greater than the number of houses they expected to have a swimming 
pool. Likewise, some features were regarded as being more common than others. 
2.3.3 Method 
Subjects: 96 subjects participated in this experiment as part of their course requirements. 
Subjects' mean age was 21. The youngest subject was 18 whilst the oldest was 
36.28 of 
the subjects were male and 68 were female. In addition to receiving course credit subjects 
were also paid for participation. 
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Materials: each subject received a handout which comprised an instruction sheet and four 
problems. The instructions given to half of the subjects were as follows: 
Accompanying these instructions is a series offour decision problems. Each 
consists of a description of a situation. ThefOllowing is an example of the type 
of situation we have used: 
Your friend has just bought a new television. You can't remember whether 
it's a model X or a model Y but you do remember that it has teletext and a 
remote control. 
Next you will be given a piece of information about the situation. These pieces 
of information are given in terms of the question you would ask to receive the 
information and answers which actually tell you what you want to know. For 
the example situation above you might be told 
Question A 
whether model X televisions have remote controls 
Answer: Yes 
Now you know that model X televisions do have remote controls. 
Following each piece of information you will be given a list of the three 
further questions you could ask with their possible answers. You will be asked 
to rate the potential usefulness of each question in helping you to decide 
between the X and Y alternatives present in the description of the situation. If 
you feel that knowing the answer to a particular question would be extremely 
helpful in deciding between the two alternatives, you should place a mark at 
the "OF GREAT USE" end of the rating scale. If youfeel that knowing the 
answer to a question would not be helpful in deciding between the two 
alternatives you should place your mark at the "OF LITTLE USE" end of the 
scale. Remember! The more or less useful that you think a question might 
be, 
the closer to the appropriate end of the scale you should place your mark. 
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After you have filled in the rating scales you will be asked to select the 
question which you think would be most helpful in deciding between the X and 
Y alternatives. You mayfeel that you would like to ask more than one question, 
but please pick only one. We are interested in which question you think would 
be most useful in helping you make a decision, even though ideally receiving 
the answer to more than one question might be useful. 
It is very important that you read the problems carefully and think about them 
before filling in the rating scales or picking the question you think would be 
most useful in deciding between the two alternatives. Take your time and 
consider your choice before you respond. 
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will help you. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this experiment, it was decided to include a 
Hint manipulation in the study. This manipulation was intended to control for the possible 
effects of subjects' pragmatic assumptions about the overall informativeness of the 
evidence on their pattern of information selections. Accordingly, the remaining subjects 
received the same instructions as above but were also told: 
N. B. For each of the four problems there is at least one question you can ask 
which, regardless of the answer to that question, will allow you to be certain in 
your decision between the alternatives. 
The problems used were similar to those used in Experiment 1. In this experiment 
however, subjects were asked to rate the usefulness of each piece of information before 
making a choice. Subjects received no feedback once they had chosen the piece of 
information which they considered to be most useful. However, as in Experimentl, a 
Rarity manipulation was employed in this experiment. Below is an example of one of the 
problems used in the Common condition. 
Your sister bought a new car in 1988. You can't remember whether it's a model 
X or a model Y but you do remember that it hasfour doors and a radio. 
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We have already asked the following question for you and have given you the 
answer: 
Ouestion A 
whether model X cars bought in 1988 have a radio 
Answer: YES 
Three additional questions are possible which we have listed below along with 
their possible answers: 
Ouestion B 
whether model Y cars bought in 1988 have a radio 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE 
Ouestion C 
whether model X cars bought in 1988 have four doors 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
OF GREAT USE 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Ouestion D 
whether model Y cars bought in 1988 have four doors 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Assuming that you could discover the answer to only one of these questions (B, 
C, or D), which would you ask in order to help you decide which model car 
your sister drives? 
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Please circle your choice D 
Subjects at the Common level of the Rarity manipulation received problems such as the 
one above. Subjects at the Rare level received problems which were exactly the same 
except that the initial piece of information which they received concerned a rare feature (in 
this case a top speed of over 165 mph). In summary, as with Experiment 1, there were two 
levels of the Rarity variable in this experiment. The first of these is the Rare level, where 
subjects were given an initial piece of information concerning a rare feature of the class of 
object to be categorised. The second level of the Rarity variable was the Common level 
where subjects were given an initial piece of information concerning a common feature of 
the target object. The four problem contents, with the features which were used, are shown 
in Table 2.10. Examples of each of the problems are given in Appendix 1. As may be seen, 
there were two versions of each problem. When crossed with the instructional 
manipulation this gives four separate conditions: Common with and without a hint, and 
Rare with and without a hint. 
The initial piece of information which subjects received always concerned the X 
alternative. In problems with two common features the initial information always 
concerned the same common feature, whilst in problems with one rare feature the initial 
piece of information always concerned that rare feature. The other possible pieces of 
information - whether instances of Y possessed the first feature, whether instances of 
X 
possessed the second common feature, whether instances of Y possessed the second 
common feature - will be referred to as B, C, and D respectively. To make this change 
in 
notation easier to follow it may be useful to remember that B corresponds to p(Dl/Hy) on 
the standard version of the task, whilst C corresponds to p(D2/HX) and D corresponds to 
p(D2/Hy). Unfortunately, this change in notation is made necessary by the fact subjects 
were given information in propositional rather than probabilistic form in this experiment. 
This change in information format also renders the terms diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic 
unsuitable as it changes the structure of the task. 
80 
A Latin square design was used to control for the order in which B, C, and D 
appeared (and hence, the order in which their potential usefulness was rated). Four subjects K 
in each condition were presented with one of the six possible orderings of B, C, and D for 
each problem. The order in which subjects received the problems was randomised. 
FEATURE PAIRS 
PROBLEM CONTENT Common Rare 
Engineer 
House 
Car 
Spanish Villa 
earns f25,000 per annum earns over f60, OOO p. a. 
_drives 
a coMpany car drives a company car 
has a garden has a swimming pool 
_has 
a garage has a garage 
has a radio top speed of 165 m. p. h. 
_has 
four doors has four doors 
costs E150 per week costs E 1000 per week 
built in the last twenty years built in the last twenty years 
Table 2.10: Problem contents and features used in Experiment 2 
Procedure: subjects were run in groups of between 4 and 12 in experimental sessions 
which had no time limit. 
Design: there were two dependent variables in this study. The first of these was the 
overall total of C choices (i. e. a further piece of information relevant to the hypothesis 
about which subjects already possessed some information) which subjects made 
throughout the experiment. This part of the study had a 2x2 between subjects design. The 
factors were Hint (the presence or absence of a hint), and Rarity (two common features or 
one common and one rare). 
The second dependent variable was subjects' ratings of the usefulness of each 
possible piece of information (Usefulness Rating). This had a2x2x3x4 mixed 
design. 
Once again, the between subjects factors were Hint (the presence or absence of a 
hint) and 
Rarity (common or rare initial feature). The within subjects factors were Item 
Rated (B, C 
or D) and problem content. The design of the entire experiment 
is summarised in Table 
2.11. 
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ndnent Variables Variables Levels 
C Choice 1. RARITY 2- RARE, COMMON 
2. HINT 2- HINT, NO HINT 
Usefulness Ratings I and 2 
3. ITEM RATED B, C, D 
4. PROBLEM CONTENT 4- See Table 2.9 
Table 2.11: The independent and dependent variables involved in Experiment 2 
2.3.4. Results 
Two subjects in the no hint/rare and common features condition failed to complete 
at least one of their four problems. Accordingly, they will not be included in the following 
analyses. 
2.3.4.1. Evidence selections 
The first dependent variable in this experiment was the total number of C (i. e. a 
further piece of information about instances of category X) choices made by subjects 
across the four problem contents. Before presenting an analysis of the results on this 
measure, however, overall patterns of information selection for the experiment will be 
discussed. The percentage of subjects selecting each of the three possible pieces of 
information, broken down by the Rarity and Hint manipulations, are shown in Table 2.12, 
whilst a frequency table for the entire experiment is given in Appendix 2. 
Across all conditions, the choice frequencies for problem contents were very 
similar. On the engineer problem, 31% of selections were of B, 53 % of C, and I I% of D. 
On the house problem the equivalent percentages were 34%, 62%, and 4%. On the car 
problem they were 33%, 61 %, and 6%, and on the villa problem they were 39%, 52%, and 
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COMMON 
B c D B c D 
HINT 25% 75% 0% 43% 51% 6% 
NO HINT 35% 56% 8% 36% 48% 16% 
30% 66% 4% 40% 49% 11% 
Table 2.12: Percentages of subjects choosing each item broken down by instructional manipulation and feature type for Experiment 2. 
9%. As expected, item C was the most highly selected piece of information, followed by 
item B and then item C. The numbers of item B., item C, and item D choices were 
tabulated for each subject across the four problem contents. The mean numbers of item 
choices, broken down by the Rarity and Hint manipulations, are given in Table 2.13. A 
2x2 between sub ects Anova was carried out on the mean number of item C choices in all j 
four between subjects conditions (a summary table for the Anova is given in Appendix 2). 
A significant main effect was found for Rarity (F(l, 90) = 4.3 1, p< 05). Neither the main 
effect of the Hint manipulation (F(l, 90) = 1.00, p> . 3), nor the interaction between Hint 
and Rarity (F(l, 90) = 2.0 1, p>. 15) were found to be significant. 
COMMON 
BCDBCD 
HINT 1.00 3.00 0.00 1.46 1.92 0.63 
1.44 1.44 0.00 1.28 1.61 0.77 
NO HINT 1.42 2.25 0.33 1.73 2.05 0.23 
1.50 1.42 0.56 1.64 1.53 0.53 
1.21 2.63 0.17 1.59 1.98 0.44 
1.47 1.47 0.43 1.45 1.56 0.69 
Table 2.13: Mean item selections (with standard deviations in bold) broken down by features and 
instructional manipulation from Experiment 2 
2.3.4.2. Usefulness Ratings 
The second dependent measure involved in this experiment was Usefulness 
Ratings. Subjects rated the usefulness of each piece of information by placing a mark on a 
line 100 millimetres long one end of which was labelled "Of little use" whilst the other end 
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was labelled "Of great use". Subjects' confidence ratings were converted to scores on a 100 
unit scale, running from 1 to 100, where each millimetre on the line corresponded to one 
unit on the scale. The higher a subject's score for a particular piece of information the more 
useful they rated that piece of information to be. 
A 2x2x3x4 mixed design Anova was used to analyse the results on this measure. 
The between subjects factors were Rarity and Hint, whilst the within subjects factors were 
Item Rated and problem content. A full Anova table for this analysis is given in Appendix 
2 as is a table of all of the means and standard deviations. The significant main effect for 
Item Rated (F(2,182) = 18.25, p< . 00 1) was as expected and follow up Tukey HSI)s 
revealed significant differences between all three means (p < . 005 in all cases with the 
exception of the difference between item B and item D where p <. 02). The mean 
usefulness rating for item B was 64 (S. D. = 22). For item C the mean rating was 71 (S. D. 
18), and for item D the mean rating was 57 (S. D. = 18). 
The significant main effect of problem content (F(3,273) = 2.70, p< . 05) was not 
expected however. The mean rating of usefulness for items on the engineer, house, car and 
villa problems were 63 (S. D. = 17), 67 (S. D. = 17), 63 (S. D. = 16), and 63 (S. D. = 18) 
respectively. Tukey HSI)s revealed no significant differences between any of these means. 
The only other significant result revealed by this analysis was the interaction between Item 
Rated and problem content (F(6,546) = 2.48, p <. 025). Tukey HSDs revealed no 
significant differences between the mean rating for each item across problem contents. The 
significance of this interaction, as Figure 2.4 suggests, was due to the fact that, for the car 
problem, the mean usefulness rating for B was significantly lower than for C but not 
significantly lower than for D. This is in contrast to the pattern present amongst the other 
contents where the difference between B and C ratings was not significant but the 
differences between both B and D and C and D were significant. 
Of the remaining higher order interactions, three approached significance. The least 
interesting of these is the four way interaction between Rarity, Hint, Item Rated and 
problem content (F(6,540) = 1.96, p< . 07). Much more 
interesting are the two way 
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interaction between Hint and Item Rated (F(2,180) = 2.70, p= . 07), and the three way 
interaction between Rarity, Hint and Item Rated (F(2,180) = 2.48, p <. 09). The two 
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72 
68 
64 
60 
56 
D 
52 
Engineer House Car Vifla 
CONTENT 
Figure 2A The interaction between the Item Rated and problem content from the analysis of subjects' 
usefulness ratings in Experiment 2. 
Hint Manipulation Item Rated 168 270 359 460 
(20) (17) (18) (24) 
573 655 
(18) (19) 
No Hint B 1 
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c 2 
. 05 . 001 
D 3 05 . 001 
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Table 2.14: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses) and significant differences between means 
for the interaction between Hint and Item Rated from the analysis of subjects' usefulness ratings in 
Experiment 2. 
way interaction is presented in Figure 2.5, whilst the means, standard deviations, and 
significant differences between means from this interaction are given in Table 2.14. The 
three way interaction is presented in Figure 2.6, whilst the means, standard deviations and 
significant differences between means are given in Table 2.15. Tukey HSI)s revealed that 
there were no significant differences between the item ratings across conditions. In other 
words, there were no significant differences between any of the four mean ratings for item 
B, no significant differences between any of the four mean ratings for item C and no 
significant differences between any of the ratings for item D. 
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Figure 2.5: The interaction between Hint and Item Rated from the analysis of subjects' usefulness ratings in 
Experiment 2 
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Figure 2.6: The interaction between Rarity, Hint and Item Rated from the analysis of subjects' usefulness 
ratings in Experiment 2. 
COMMON RARE 
BCDBCD 
HINT 60 (22)* 80(15) 55 (21)* 60 (25)* 66(18) 55 (17)* 
NO HINT 68 ý20) 70(17) 63 (19)* 68(21) 70(18) 56 (16)* 
Table 2.15: The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) involved in the interaction between Rarity, 
Hint, and the Item Rated from the analysis of subjects' usefulness ratings in Experiment 2. 
(* denotes a mean significantly lower than the rating for common/hint item Q. 
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2.3.5 Discussion 
The results of this experiment are, on the whole, as expected. Firstly, the pattern of 
evidence selection was as predicted. Overall, item C was the most frequently selected, 
followed by item B, with item Da poor third. Also as predicted, the Rarity manipulation 
had a significant effect on the mean number of item C choices which subjects made. 
Subjects who received an initial piece of information concerning a rare feature were 
significantly less likely to select a further piece of information relevant to category X than 
were subjects who received an initial piece of information concerning a common feature. 
This is interpreted as support for the claim that subjects' background knowledge about 
subjective probability, in some cases, informs their selection of information for the 
evaluation of hypotheses. The fact that item C was chosen significantly less often when 
subjects were given an initial piece of information about a rare feature also suggests that 
subjects will attend to, and therefore select, the information which is most likely to have 
the greatest effect on their beliefs (see the next section for a demonstration of this). 
Interestingly, this conclusion is in contrast to the recent claim by Evans and Over (1996) 
that subjects will select information which is relevant to the hypothesis which they 
currently consider most likely. This does not seem to be the case here, as subjects given 
information concerning a rare feature (presumably offering stronger support for the 
hypothesis to which it related than did receipt of information concerning a common 
feature) were significantly less likely to select further information concerning that 
hypothesis than were subjects given an initial piece of information about a common 
feature. 
Subjects given an initial piece of information about a rare feature seem to have 
inferred that knowing that instances of the category Y do not possess that rare feature will 
tell them that the target instance is a member of the focal category. It is uncertain as to 
whether they also inferred that knowing that instances of category Y possess the rare 
feature would not allow them to make a decision. However, given what is known about 
subjects' general failure to consider alternatives in many tasks, it is a reasonably safe 
assumption that subjects are satisfied with choosing B (p(DI/Hy) on the standard version 
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of the pseudodi agnostic i ty task) because firstly, they consider it likely to provide them with 
discriminatory information and secondly, they have failed to consider alternative possible 
pieces of information. 
The Hint manipulation had no effect on subjects' pattern of information selection. 
However, the results of the second dependent measure - Usefulness Ratings - are not as 
clear-cut in this regard as are the results on the Choice measure. Overall, the mean 
usefulness ratings for each of the evidential items correspond to the frequency with which 
subjects chose those items. However, the Hint manipulation seems to have had a greater 
influence here than it did on the choice data. This is evidenced by both the interaction 
between Hint and Item Rated and the interaction between Probability, Hint and Item Rated. 
Nevertheless, there were no significant differences found between the individual means for 
any of the items rated in either of the interactions i. e. there were no significant differences 
between ratings for B, no significant differences between ratings for C etc. Thus, it may be 
inferred that although the Hint manipulation had an effect on the differences between 
ratings of the items within each condition, it did not have a significant effect across 
conditions. The manipulation merely seems to have affected how subjects used the scale to 
discriminate between the usefulness of the alternative pieces of information. 
In a sense this experiment asks more questions than it answers, and certainly there 
is much more work to be done before we understand exactly what kinds of reasoning 
subjects are engaging in on the task. However, the experiment was not designed to 
examine the minutiae of the task. Rather, it was run as a demonstration of how subjects' 
knowledge about the likelihood that features will occur in their environment affects the 
information they select to evaluate hypotheses. In demonstrating this, the experiment has 
also shown that subjects in Experiment I were not reasoning through all of the 
consequences of selecting each piece of available information. If they had done so on this 
experiment, then the Rarity manipulation would not have had a significant effect on 
subjects' evidence selections. As Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) suggest, subjects seem 
to have inferred directly testable consequences from the initial information they were 
given. The order in which they made those inferences seems to 
have depended on what 
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was eing focused upon at the time. Thus, subjects who received an initial piece of 
information concerning a common feature predominantly chose a further piece of 
information about category X, not because it would enable them to discriminate between 
the hypotheses, but because of their initial representation of the problem. In other words, 
their initial representation was anchored (see Evans and Over, 1996b for a discussion of 
anchoring and representation) around the X hypothesis thus making further information 
about the X hypothesis seem relevant. The relevance of these results to the discussion of 
the literature in Chapter I will now be discussed. 
2.4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results of these experiments provide support for the model of information 
selection discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 1. It was argued that a model which 
captures both general relevance theoretic principles and specific findings concerning 
sources of information available to the subject (such as knowledge of subjective 
probabilities) is required. The first claim which may be made about these experiments is 
that they demonstrate the importance of subjects' background knowledge concerning the 
probability of events in their environment to their selection of information for the 
evaluation of hypotheses. 
It is not clear to what extent the increase in selection of information about category 
Y amongst subjects who received an initial piece of information about a rare feature is due 
to their initial representation of the task (to talk about subjects' initial representation of the 
task is equivalent to discuss what parts of the scenario subjects are initially focusing on). 
Evans and Over (I 996b) suggest that a similar tendency amongst the subjects in Mynatt, 
Doherty and Dragan's (1993) study was due to the manner in which subjects represented 
the task. They argue that by foregrounding the features, Mynatt et al caused subjects to 
construct an initial representation based upon the feature contained in the initial piece of 
information which subjects received. Although this may be the case here, subjects were not 
told that the decision between the alternatives had any utility for them. Neither were the 
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features foregrounded. Exactly the same problem structure was used with both common 
and rare features. It may be the case that the rare feature was fore-grounded because of its 
rarity. However, it is also plausible that subjects who received an initial piece of 
information about a rare feature chose further information about that feature even if it was 
not initially fore-grounded. The information which subjects expected to gain from the 
selection of evidence concerning category Y may have warranted the extra processing 
required to select that evidence. Although the design of Experiment 2 does not allow a 
decision as to which of these readings of the results is the correct one, both readings sit 
with a model which balances general principles of cognitive economy against specific 
sources of knowledge available to subjects in background knowledge. 
It is possible to formalise the information which subjects might have expected to 
gain from each of the pieces of evidence available to them on the version of the 
pseudodiagnosticity task used in Experiment 2. This may be done by conceptualising the 
task as one of making a decision about which piece of evidence to select. Next, the formula 
used in normative decision theory to calculate the subjective expected utility of any choice 
may be adapted for an analysis of the task. This formula is typically expressed as follows: 
SE U siUi Eq. 2.1 
where si refers to the probability of the ith possible outcome of the choice and Ui 
represents the utility of that outcome, and where i ranges over a finite set of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive outcomes. As applied to the version of the pseudodiagnosticity 
task used in Experiment 2, the formula may be used to calculate the information which 
subjects expect the selection of a particular piece of evidence to yield. 
Applying the formula to the task used in Experiment 2 is a relatively easy affair. 
For ease of exposition the structure of the task is represented in Figure 
2.7. For every 
possible piece of evidence there are only two possible mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
outcomes: the category to which the piece of evidence 
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Initial Evidence 
Instances of X 
possess DI 
VPQ JL JL-111. j 
Remaining Possible Evidence 
B- whether instances 
of Y possess DI 
YES 
C- whether instances 
of X possess D2 
D- whether instances 
of Y possess D2 
NO YES NO YES NO 
Figure 2.7: The structure of the variant of the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm used in Experiment 2. 
relates either possesses the particular feature or it doesn't. From the pre-test for 
Experiment 2, the frequency with which subjects expect the various features to be 
possessed by objects in the world is also known. Although there is some debate in the 
literature about the psychological equivalence of frequency and probability information 
(see Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1996), in this case it is likely that subjects' frequency judgements provide a reasonably 
good estimation of the perceived probability of the features used. The approximate 
probabilities from the pre-test are given in Table 2.16. All that remains is a calculation of 
the utilities associated with each particular outcome. Although this is difficult to do in 
practice, 
Initial B- whether instances of C- whether instances of D- whether instances of 
Feature Y possess initial feature X possess second feature Y possess second feature 
YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Common Prob .7 .3 .7 .3 .7 .3 
(Dx/Hx) 
Utility of 0m 0: 5n! ým in 0 in 
Outcome 
Rare Prob .1 .9 .7 .3 .7 .3 
(Dx/Hx) 
Utility of 0m0: 5n:! ým m0M 
Outcome 
Table 2.16: The probabilities and utilities associated with each possible outcome 
from the task used in 
Experiment 2. 
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an examination o Table 2.16 reveals that whilst it is not possible to assign exact utility 
values in every case, it is possible to say something about the likely relationships which 
must exist between the utilities of some of the possible outcomes on the task. It may also 
be seen that some outcomes have been assigned a utility of 0. This is true of YES outcomes 
for both of the pieces of information which concern category Y. YES outcomes in these 
instances simply tell the subject that instances of both categories possess at least one of the 
features possessed by the target object, and so do nothing to reduce her uncertainty. 
It will be seen from Table 2.16 that a utility of m has been assigned to a NO 
outcome for each of the possible pieces of information. In terms of the logical structure of 
the task, a NO outcome allows subjects to be completely certain which of the categories 
the target object belongs to. It could be argued therefore, that all of the NO outcomes 
should be assigned an infinite utility. There are two problems with this. Firstly, as Evans 
and Over (1996b) point out, it is unlikely to be the case that no uncertainty remains 
concerning a set of hypotheses after an observation or set of observations has been carried 
out. For this reason alone it is more satisfactory to think of hypotheses which have been 
verified or falsified as having probabilities close to I or 0. Secondly, if the measure of the 
utility of an outcome which is used happens to be the absolute log likelihood ratio (see Eq. 
2.2), as is advised by both Evans and Over (I 996a&b) and Laming (1996), problems arise 
when one starts to talk of verification or falsification in absolute terms. 
Epistemic Utility of Outcome = ABS[LOG 
Pr ob(E / H) 
Pr ob(E /not - H) 
Eq. 2.2 
As may be seen from Eq. 2.2, the utility of any outcome is determined by the 
posterior probability of the hypotheses given the evidence. The absolute value of the log 
likelihood ratio is taken to ensure that the informativeness of any piece of information will 
be symmetrical i. e. epistemic utility will increase as the probabilities move away 
from 0.5 
regardless of whether the outcome favours H or not-H. The problems referred to above 
arise if it is claimed that the the evidence discriminates absolutely between 
H and not-H i. e. 
if it is claimed that H has been absolutely verified by E. For this claim to 
be made, 
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Prob(E/H) must equal 1, Prob(E/not-H) must equal 0, and the likelihood ratio becomes, 
very inconveniently, infinity. 
Such a problem does not arise if a value of m is assigned to the NO outcome from 
each of the possible pieces of evidence. This value, m, should be understood as a number 
close to infinity. Likewise, assigning a value of 0 to two of the outcomes in Table 2.16 is, 
strictly speaking, implausible. These outcomes should have utilities close to, but not equal 
to, 0. For ease of exposition, however, they will be assigned utilities of 0. 
The only utility value remaining to be discussed is the utility of n assigned to a 
YES outcome arising from a request for further information concerning whether instances 
of category X possess the second evidential feature. A YES outcome means that instances 
of category X possess both of the features possessed by the target object but does not tell 
us anything about instances of category Y. The precise value of n will depend on several 
things. Firstly, it will depend on whether subjects even consider instances of category Y. It 
is likely that the less attention that is paid to category Y, the greater the value of n 
becomes. In the cases where subjects do attend to instances of category Y, the value of n 
may sometimes depend on whether the pragmatic assumption that the evidence available is 
diagnostic has been made by the subject. Imagine the subject considering whether she 
should choose to find out whether instances of category X possess the second evidential 
feature. If instances of X do turn out to possess that feature, what would she be able to 
infer? If she thinks that it is likely that instances of both categories will turn out to possess 
both of the features,, then her present uncertainty will be reduced very little by a YES 
outcome. On the other hand, if she thinks it unlikely that the experimenter would play such 
a trick on his subjects (in other words, if she assumes that the evidence available 
is 
diagnostic) then her uncertainty will be greatly reduced by a YES outcome. If the 
experimenter is not playing a trick on her, then it is extremely unlikely that 
instances of 
both categories will possess both of the features, so the target object 
is very likely to be an 
instance of category X. 
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The non-success of the Hint manipulation in Experiment 2 seems to suggest that 
the value assigned to n does not depend on subjects' pragmatic assumptions about the 
diagnosticity of the evidence. If subjects' selection of information was dependent on such 
assumptions then the effect of the Rarity manipulation should have been less marked in the 
condition where subjects were told that at least one piece of evidence, regardless of its 
outcome would lead to complete certainty in deciding between the alternatives. The only 
piece of information which fits this bill is further information about whether instances of 
category X possess the second feature. However, when given an initial piece of 
information concerning a rare feature, subjects who received a hint were just as likely to 
select information concerning whether instances of category Y possessed the rare feature 
as were subjects who did not receive the hint. If subjects were considering the problem at a 
level where assumptions about the diagnosticity of the evidence was important then an 
increase in selection of further information about category X would have been expected. 
However, it is also possible that the failure of the Hint manipulation may have been due to 
the wording used. Subjects were told that regardless of outcome there was, at least, one 
piece of information which would allow them to decide between the alternatives. Subjects 
may have understood this to refer to the logic of the problems rather than the actual 
answers to their questions. This understanding of the hint may have contradicted subjects' 
understanding of the logical structure of the task, causing them to ignore the hint. 
When the expected information yield for each possible piece of evidence is 
calculated (see Table 2.17), the importance of the value of n may be seen. 
Choice Initial Feature Expected Information Yield _ 
whether instances of Y possess the Common . 3m 
initial feature Rare . 9m 
whether instances of X possess the Common . 7n +. 
3m 
second feature Rare . 7n + . 
3m 
whether instances of Y possess the Common . 3m 
second feature Rare . 
3m 
Table 2.17: Expected information yield for each possible piece of information, broken down by Probability, 
from Experiment 2. 
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From Table 2.17 it may be seen that when subjects are given an initial piece of evidence 
concerning a common feature, asking whether instances of X possess the second evidential 
feature is the best option. This, of course, depends on the utility assigned to n being greater 
than 0. However, as was argued earlier, the value of n will depend on the extend to which 
subjects attend to category Y. Previous research (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney and Schiavo, 
1979; Mynatt, Dragan and Doherty, 1993), and the theorising of Evans and Over (1996b), 
suggests that on the standard version of the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm, subjects fail to 
consider the alternative hypothesis present on the task. It is likely, therefore, that n will be 
assigned a relatively high value, thus leading to a predominance of subjects asking for 
further information concerning category X. 
In the case where subjects receive an initial piece of information concerning a rare 
feature, however, the expected information yield associated with asking whether instances 
of category Y also possess that initial feature is three times as great as when the initial 
piece of evidence concerns a common feature. The expected information yield from asking 
whether instances of category X also possess the second feature is, normatively, exactly the 
same with an initial piece of information about a rare or a common feature. However, in 
the case where the initial piece of evidence concerns a rare feature, the utility assigned to a 
YES outcome in response to a request for further information concerning category X is 
likely to be lower than when the initial piece of evidence concerns a common feature. This 
is because the value assigned to n depends on the extent to which category Y is attended to. 
Because the presence of a rare feature will cause subjects to attend to category Y, the value 
assigned to n will be less than in the case where subjects receive an initial piece of 
information about a common feature. This explains why there were significantly fewer 
selections of further information about category X amongst subjects at the rare level of the 
Rarity manipulation than there were amongst subjects at the common level. 
What is most interesting about the above model of the task used in Experiment 2 is 
the premium which it places on psychological factors in the assignment of specific utilities 
to particular outcomes. This interdependence between probabilistic and psychological 
factors captures exactly the point made in Chapter I about the varied possible sources of 
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relevance. The value which subjects assign to n (the utility of a YES outcome in response 
to a request for information about whether instances of X possess the second feature) is 
dependent on the extent to which subjects represent, and consider, category Y. As Evans 
and Over (1996b) argue, it is impossible to give a purely probabilistic account of either the 
information from background knowledge, or the information contained in the problem, 
which subjects will attend to. Instead, a recognition of the complex interplay between 
notions of cognitive effect (i. e. expected information yield) and cognitive effort (i. e. a 
limited representational system) is required. 
The experiments contained in this chapter contain an additional point of interest. 
Although Experiment I did not provide evidence concerning the importance of subjective 
probability for the selection of information to evaluate hypotheses, it did demonstrate the 
importance of the format in which subjects receive that information. In so doing 
Experiment I has produced a new task for the study of hypothesis testing. As was stated in 
Chapter 1, the experimental study of hypothesis testing has centred around two tasks: the 
Wason selection task and the pseudodiagnosticity task. These tasks differ in the normative 
model which may applied to them. The Wason selection task may be characterised as a 
conditional reasoning problem (e. g. Wason, 1966) or as a probabilistic decision making 
task (Evans, Over and Manktelow, 1993; Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Evans and Over, 
1996), whilst the pseudodiagnosticity task has always been characterised as a test of 
subjects' understanding of Bayes theorem. However, by changing the format in which 
subjects received information on the pseudodiagnosticity problem, the entire structure of 
the task was changed. This new version of the task cannot, in any sense, be thought of as 
requiring subjects to select the piece of information which would enable them to apply 
Bayes theorem. Instead, it demands that subjects infer the consequences of selecting each 
possible piece of evidence. The analysis of the new task, presented here, suggests that a 
similar analysis of the standard version of the pseudodiagnosticity task might profitably 
be 
undertaken. It is also very similar to Sperber, Cara and Girotto's (1995) recent 
characterisation of the selection task in that it claims that subjects will attempt to infer the 
consequences of information selections until they have reached a conclusion which they 
regard as relevant (or satisfactory). This suggests that fruitful use of this new task may 
be 
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made in investigating the relative importance of cognitive effect and cognitive effort to 
information selection for hypothesis evaluation. 
Experiment 2 constituted an attempt to clarify the issues of characterisation raised 
by Experiment 1. In the earlier experiment, subjects overwhelmingly selected further 
information about the hypothesis for which they already possessed some evidence. 
However, their confidence ratings upon receipt of that second piece of information 
suggested that they were not reasoning through all of the consequences involved in 
selecting each piece of evidence. Likewise, the significant effect of the Rarity manipulation 
in Experiment 2 also suggests that subjects were not reasoning through all of possible 
outcomes for each piece of evidence. This, in itself, is support for the notion that cognitive 
economy is vital in information selection. Human beings are cognitive misers. This fact 
must be used to temper any account given of the manner in which subjects use a specific 
source of information such as background knowledge about subjective probability. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
The results of two experiments using the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm, and a 
variant of that paradigm, were described in this chapter. The main aim of Experiment I 
was a demonstration of the effect of subjective probability on subjects' information 
selection for hypothesis evaluation. Although the experiment failed to provide such a 
demonstration, it did provide evidence that changing the format in which subjects receive 
information on the task, from probabilistic to propositional, dramatically alters both 
subjects' behaviour on the task, and the structure of the task itself. Subjects were also asked 
to use the information which they were given on the task. The results were unforeseen and 
suggested that subjects' expectations about unseen evidence are crucial in determining the 
effect of that evidence on their confidence in the hypotheses to which it relates. 
The second experiment, in demonstrating an effect of subjective probability on 
subjects' evidence selection, also suggested that the failure of Experiment 
1 to do so was 
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due to its lack of statistical power. All of the problems used in Experiment 2 gave subjects 
information in a propositional format. The significant effect of subjective probability in 
this experiment suggested that the effect of the Likelihood manipulation in Experiment I 
was not due to the change in the logical structure of the task which propositional 
information entailed. Instead it was argued that subjects' pattern of information selection 
on the task may be explained in terms of their initial representation of the problems and a 
trade off between effort and effect. 
The results of these studies were interpreted as support for a model of information 
selection incorporating general relevance theoretic principles and a specific account of the 
sources of information which subjects have available in background memory. In support of 
this argument a model of the expected information yield for each possible selection of 
further evidence was proposed. According to this model, subjects' selection of information 
in Experiment 2 may be thought of as being dependent not just on the probabilistic 
structure of the task, but also on the constrained representational resources of the human 
information processing system. Finally, it was pointed out that the propositional version of 
the pseudodiagnosticity task constitutes a new instrument for the study of the selection of 
information for hypothesis evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 3- THE ORDER EFFECTS PARADIGM AND MODELS 
OF BELIEF REVISION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is now time to turn to the second question asked in the Introduction to this thesis. 
How is evidence used to evaluate hypotheses? This question has rarely been addressed in 
the reasoning literature. However it is addressed in both the decision making and 
information integration literatures. This chapter will review and critically discuss evidence 
from both of these literatures. In the final chapter of this thesis it will be argued that many 
of the basic mechanisms which are held to underlie information selection also underlie 
how information is used to decide between alternative hypotheses. However, in the 
information integration and belief revision literatures very different accounts of the process 
have been proposed. These accounts are based, to a large extent, on the order effects 
paradigm. As the account given in Chapter 2, of the way in which subjects used the 
information they received, will be tested in the next chapter using an order effects 
paradigm, that paradigm will be reviewed here. Both recency and primacy effects will be 
discussed, as well as the many attempts in the literature to account for their existence. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the models which have been put forward in the 
information integration literature to account for belief revision generally, and order effects 
specifically. It will be argued that there are several a priori reasons for doubting the 
adequacy of all of these models. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will contain the details of six experiments using the order effects 
paradigm. As mentioned above, the first of these experiments will use an order effects 
paradigm to test the account given in Chapter 2 of the results from Experiment 
1. 
Subsequent experiments will use the same paradigm to demonstrate the importance of 
pragmatics to any account of belief revision. Accordingly, a review such as the one which 
will be attempted in this chapter is necessary before presenting the 
details of those 
experiments. 
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One very important point concerning the status of Bayesian approaches to belief 
revision must be made in advance of this review. The existence of order effects suggests 
that subjects do not use Bayesian principles when integrating evidence relevant to a 
hypothesis or set of hypotheses. According to Bayes theorem, evidence order should not 
affect the likelihood assigned to a hypothesis in the light of relevant evidence. As the 
experimental literature which shall be reviewed in this chapter demonstrates, information 
order is, very often, a crucial factor in determining a subject's level of belief in a 
hypothesis. Early studies (Peterson and DuCharme, 1967; Pitz, Downing and Reinhold, 
1967) showed that subjects' revision of subjective probabilities falls far short of the 
prescriptions of Bayes theorem. In general, subjects are not held to revise their beliefs in 
the light of new evidence in a Bayesian fashion, and Bayes theorem is only referred to in 
the literature to be reviewed in connection with de-biasing procedures (see Lopes, 1987). 
Accordingly, Bayesian approaches to the revision of belief will not be discussed in the 
course of this chapter. The issue of subjects' use of background knowledge about the 
probabilities of events in their environment will, however, be returned to in later chapters. 
3.2. ORDER EFFECTS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION 
3.2.1. The order effects paradigm 
The order effects paradigm is very simple and is probably best illustrated using the 
example of Asch's (1946) impression formation task. In Asch's study subjects were given a 
list of six adjectives which they were told described an imaginary person. Three of these 
adjectives were positive - PPP - and three were negative - 
NNN. Subjects were presented 
with these adjectives in the order PPPNNN or NNNPPP. Subjects were then asked 
to 
write a character description of the target individual. Those subjects who 
had received the 
positive adjectives first were found to have formed a more 
favourable impression of the 
target individual's personality than had those subjects who received the negative adjectives 
first. Asch claimed that this finding demonstrated a primacy effect 
in impression formation 
and explained his finding thus: 
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The accounts of the subjects suggest that the first terms set up in most subjects 
a direction which then exerts a continuous effect on the later terms. When the 
j sub ect hears the first term, a broad uncrystallised but directed impression is 
born. The next characteristiccomes not as a separate item, but is related to the 
established direction. Quickly the viewformed acquires a certain stability, so 
that later characteristics arefitted - if conditions permit - to the given 
direction. 
Asch's order effects paradigm was to go on to become to the impression formation 
literature what Wason's selection task has become to the reasoning literature. In the thirty 
years between 1960 and 1980 literally hundreds of experiments were run using the order 
effects paradigm. In fact, it continues to be used to the present day. The domains in which 
the paradigm has been used have varied but some examples are mock trials and simulated 
legal evidence (Anderson, 1959; Furnham, 1986; Tetlock, 1983; Walker, Thiabut and 
Andreoli, 1972); aircraft identification (Adelman, Tolcott and Bresnick, 1993); and 
auditing (Ashton and Ashton, 1988; 1990). As the above examples suggest, the order 
effects paradigm has been used in domains other than impression formation. However, the 
majority of studies have used social materials very similar in nature to those of Asch (e. g. 
Anderson, 1962; Anderson and Jacobson, 1965; Hendrick and Constantini, 1970; Levin 
and Schmidt, 1970; Roby, 1967; Stewart, 1965). 
One of the problems with the literature on order effects has been the finding of both 
primacy and recency effects. Although Asch provided evidence for primacy, the earliest 
demonstration of the importance of information order was that of Lund (1925) who found 
that recently acquired information was the most important in attitude change. Nisbett and 
Ross (1980) in a review of the order effects literature argued that primacy effects are the 
norm in psychological experimentation and are overwhelmingly more probable than are 
recency effects. This is a gross over-simplification of the literature. In fact, one of the most 
important studies in the literature on order effects in impression formation is that of 
Stewart (1965) who found a recency effect using materials very similar to those used by 
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Asch. The crucial difference in Stewart's study was that subjects were required to rate their 
impression of the target individual upon receipt of each personality adjective. He found 
that those subjects who received the positive adjectives in the later stages of the task had a 
significantly more positive impression of the target individual than had those subjects who 
received the positive adjectives in the early stages of the task. In a recent paper Hogarth 
and Einhorn (1992) reviewed the results of 60 papers on order effects and found that 35 of 
them contained experiments demonstrating the importance of recently acquired 
information. Of these 35 recency effects 20 involved asking subjects to respond after 
receipt of each piece of information. Of the remaining 25 studies which demonstrated 
primacy, only two involved asking subjects to respond after each piece of information. 
The implications of this survey are twofold. Firstly, Nisbett and Ross are in error 
when they claim that primacy effects are more likely. It is clear from Hogarth and 
Einhorn's survey that both primacy and recency are common findings in the literature. 
Secondly, requiring subjects to respond as they receive each piece of information is a 
reliable source of recency effects. A crude (but reasonably accurate, and very common) 
reading of the effect of the continuous responding manipulation is that it works by causing 
subjects to attend to each of the adjectives in the series (i. e. by forcing them to treat each 
adjective as being equally important). The importance of this effect is accentuated further 
when one examines the fifteen studies which have produced recency effects in the absence 
of continuous responding. Two of these may be said to have produced recency due to 
attention manipulations (Anderson, 1968; Hendrick and Constantini, 1970) as subjects 
were required to pronounce each adjective as they received it. A further four of these 
studies could be said to rely on a short term memory effect for their results as they 
involved stimulus materials which subjects may have had difficulty in remembering. For 
example, Anderson (1967) required subjects to provide an estimate of six weights; 
Anderson and Jacobson (1968) asked subjects to provide an estimate of three weights; 
Parducci, Thaler and Anderson (1968) used sets of noise and asked subjects to estimate the 
average; and finally, Weiss and Anderson (1969) asked subjects to estimate the average 
length of a set of lines. A reasonable explanation for the results of all of these experiments 
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is that recency was found because subjects had difficulty in remembering early occurring 
stimuli. 
The forgetting of early information is also implicated as a factor in at least three of 
the remaining nine instances where recency in the absence of continuous responding was 
discovered. Crano (1977) used two 600 word passages in his study of opinion change, 
whilst Luchins (1957) also used complex stimulus materials. In both of these cases it is 
easy to imagine how recently presented complex information will seem to be more 
important than early presented information. Lichtenstein and Srull (1987) found their order 
effects in the context of a study on memory and judgement. They examined the effect of 
information order under three conditions. The first two of these - where subjects were told 
that they would have to make a judgement based on sentences describing a target 
individual's behaviour or that they would be asked to recall as many of these sentences as 
possible - both produced a primacy effect. In the third condition where subjects were told 
simply to comprehend the information and to check its coherency and grammaticality, a 
recency effect was discovered. Once again it is likely that recently acquired information 
seemed to influence the judgement of these subjects due to a very simple memory effect. 
It is clear from this review of recency effects in the literature that the vast majority 
of such effects have some kind of short term memory explanation. Reading the literature 
one is inclined to conclude that recently acquired information is important only 
if some 
experimental manipulation is performed which causes subjects to attend to that recently 
acquired information. In most other cases, it is early occurring information which 
is 
attended to. The question begged by this conclusion is how exactly primacy effects 
have 
been explained. 
3.2.2. Three Explanations for Primacy Effects 
It will be remembered from the discussion of 
Asch's primacy effect that his 
explanation for the phenomenon which he had 
discovered was essentially a gestalt 
explanation. Asch's account was the first explanation put 
forward in the literature for the 
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existence of primacy effects. Asch argued that later occurring information was selectively 
processed in terms of the connotative implications of early occurring adjectives. In other 
words, the meaning of these later occurring adjectives was dependent on the context 
provided for them by the early occurring adjectives. For fifteen years this interpretation 
remained unchallenged in the literature. With the exception of one study by Bruner, 
Shapiro and Tagiuri (1958) which appeared to show that impressions inferred from lists of 
words could be reliably predicted from an arithmetic averaging of the independent 
meanings, Asch's own explanation for his primacy effect was the one which was generally 
accepted. 
The first systematic attempt to re examine Asch's interpretation of his primacy 
effect was published in 1961 by Anderson and Barrios. These authors reported a study 
where each subject was presented with over sixty sets of six adjectives. As with the Asch 
study, these sets were comprised of six adjectives, three of which were positive and three 
of which were negative. The crucial manipulation was the extent to which the sets of 
adjectives differed in valence. The valence of an adjective may be defined as its positivity 
or negativity. Therefore, a set of adjectives which differ sharply in valence might go from 
extremely positive to extremely negative whereas a set which differs less sharply might go 
from moderately positive to moderately negative. Half of the adjective sets abruptly 
changed in valence whilst the other half changed gradually. Once they had been exposed to 
each set of adjectives subjects were asked to rate their impression of the target individual 
on a scale which went from -4 (highly unfavourable) to +4 (highly favourable). The results 
were primacy for both conditions. It seemed to make no difference whether the adjective 
set contained an abrupt or a gradual change. 
Anderson ( 198 1) has characterised the results of this experiment as an initial test of 
two types of theory of primacy effects. The first of these are interactive theories which 
suggest that the personality adjectives interact in some way. There are two variants of this 
position. Firstly there is Asch's "change of meaning" hypothesis described 
in the 
introduction to this section which, as has already been mentioned, was the first explanation 
put forward for primacy. The second of the interactive theories (and, therefore, the second 
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possible explanation for the existence of primacy effects) is the discounting hypothesis 
which suggests that the later adjectives are discounted or ignored by the subject as they 
contradict the impression formed from the early occurring adjectives. Both of the theories 
involve some interaction between the personality adjectives received by the subject. These 
theories are in sharp contrast to the attention decrement hypothesis which simply states 
that the importance of early occurring information is due to a decrease in attention across 
the series. This, the third possible explanation for primacy effects, is different from either 
interactive theory in that the attention decrement account does not rely on any relation 
among the adjectives. 
Anderson (198 1) has claimed that the results of the Anderson and Barrios study 
favour the attention decrement account of the primacy effect. This is because of the 
absence of an effect for type of change in the valence of the personality adjectives. He 
argues that the interactive hypotheses would both predict a greater primacy effect in the 
case where the change in valence is abrupt on the grounds that it would make any 
inconsistencies more salient. The reasoning behind this argument would seem to be 
suspect however. Whilst it is clear that the Anderson and Barrios study does discriminate 
between the inconsistency discounting and attention decrement accounts of primacy 
effects, it is not clear how these results affect the status of the change of meaning 
hypothesis. 
The studies which have manipulated subjects' attention, discussed in the previous 
section, have also been claimed as support for the attention decrement hypothesis. For 
example Anderson and Hubert (1963) read subjects a sequence of personality adjectives 
and asked them to rate the likeableness of the target individual. However, they also told 
subjects in certain conditions that there would be a casual recall test of the adjectives after 
rating likeableness. The results were very clear. Those subjects in the recall conditions 
failed to demonstrate primacy in their likeableness ratings. In some cases recency was 
found. This finding has been replicated by Riskey (1979). In a similar vein Stewart (1965) 
also attempted to arbitrate between the attention decrement and interactive 
hypotheses. He 
required subjects in some of his experimental conditions to rate their 
impression of the 
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target individual upon receipt of each adjective. Those subjects in the standard conditions, 
where a response was required only upon receipt of the entire sequence of adjectives, 
demonstrated the usual primacy effect. Those subjects in the cumulative responding 
conditions, on the other hand, demonstrated recency. 
What both of these studies have in common is their attempt to spread subjects' 
attention across all of the adjectives in the set. That they both resulted in a failure to find 
primacy effects suggests that attention decrement is in some way responsible for Asch's 
original primacy effect. ýOnce again however, it is unsafe to claim that either of these 
experiments discount Asch's change of meaning hypothesis. Different criticisms may be 
levelled at each experiment on this score. The Anderson and Hubert study finds no 
evidence for primacy and some slight evidence for recency under memory set instructions. 
It is not clear however how these memory set instructions changed the nature of the task. 
For instance there is evidence from Lichenstein and Srull (1987) that processing 
objectives (i. e. memory or judgement) affect responding on the impression formation task. 
It is not clear what subjects' primary processing objective was in the memory set 
conditions of the Anderson and Hubert study. The presence of the memory instructions not 
only may have equalised subjects' attention across all of the stimuli contained in the 
adjective sets, it may also have fundamentally altered the integration process. 
The Stewart (1965) study produced clear evidence of recency. On this basis it has 
regularly been cited by proponents of the "information integration" approach to belief 
revision as clear evidence that Asch's change of meaning explanation for his primacy 
effect is in error. This criticism only holds however if it is accepted that the 
belief revision 
process is irreversible. There is no doubt that Stewart's recency effect 
is caused by the 
manipulation of subjects' attention. What is not so clear is whether subjects are re- 
interpreting the meaning of earlier adjectives in the light of later adjectives. 
As has been 
previously discussed, there exist many demonstrations 
in the literature of recency effects 
which rely on attentional manipulations. However, 
it is not clear to what extent the re- 
interpretation of earlier evidence may interact with these attention manipulations 
in 
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pro ucing these recencY effects. The last experiment in this thesis will attempt to shed 
some light on the issue of the re- interpretation of earlier evidence. 
One final set of studies deserves consideration in this section of the chapter. These 
are the studies which, after the work of Anderson and Barrios (1961), sought to examine 
the effect of manipulating the inconsistency between the adjectives used in the task. The 
first study to be discussed is that of Anderson (1965) who varied the amount of 
inconsistency present between the personality adjectives he included in his sequences. 
Anderson used two sets of six adjectives. These sets were composed of either three highly 
favourable adjectives and three moderately favourable adjectives (HM+) or three highly 
unfavourable adjectives and three moderately unfavourable adjectives (LM-). Half of the 
subjects received the adjectives in one order, whilst the remaining subjects received them 
in the other order. With both sets of adjectives a recency effect was obtained. Initially this 
result was taken to support the discounting hypothesis. If the primacy effect with sets of 
highly favourable and highly unfavourable adjectives is due to discounting then it should 
vanish when only positive or negative adjectives are used (because the discounting of later 
occurring information is unnecessary when the all of the adjectives are positive or 
negative). On the other hand, the attention decrement hypothesis predicts that primacy will 
be obtained with any set of adjectives. 
Hendrick and Constantini (1970) speculated that Anderson's result was due not to 
the reduction of the inconsistency between the adjectives but instead to his requirement 
that subjects read each adjective aloud as it was exposed. They claimed that this part of 
Anderson's procedure was likely to have caused subjects to attend equally to each adjective 
in the set thus reducing attention decrement. In order to test this intuition Hendrick and 
Constantini carried out two experiments. In the first of these experiments the consistency 
between the adjectives present in the sets used was systematically varied. This was 
achieved by means of a pre-test where subjects were asked to estimate the probability that 
a person possessing a set of three favourable attributes could also produce a set of three 
unfavourable attributes. In this way Hendrick and Constantini were able to construct sets 
of adjectives that contained sets of positive and negative traits which were perceived to 
be 
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of either high or low relatedness. Once again, the attention decrement hypothesis predicts 
primacy effects in both high and low relatedness conditions. The discounting hypothesis 
predicts more primacy in the low relatedness condition. As predicted by attention 
decrement, primacy was found in both conditions. 
In this first experiment by Hendrick and Constantini subjects were not required to 
read each adjective as it was revealed. In a second experiment using exactly the same 
procedure, half of the subjects read the words as they were presented to them whilst the 
other half did not. The results were clear. In the conditions where subjects pronounced the 
traits Anderson's recency effect was replicated. On the other hand, in the conditions where 
subjects did not have to read the adjectives, the primacy effect from Hendrick and 
Constantini's first experiment was replicated. 
Whilst the experiments just described clearly discriminate between the attention 
decrement and discounting hypotheses, once again it is not clear how they affect the status 
of the change of meaning hypothesis. As with the attempts to rule out all forms of 
interactive account which were described earlier, the above experiments do not rule out a 
change of meaning account. This is because these experiments were not designed with the 
change of meaning hypothesis in mind. Regardless of the size of the difference in polarity 
between the two sets of adjectives, the change of meaning account would still predict a 
primacy effect which is exactly what Hendrick and Constantini found in their first 
experiment. 
The purpose of the experiments described above was to rule out interactive 
accounts of how the order in which information is received determines the effect of that 
information on personality impressions. It is clear that much of the evidence produced 
argues against a discounting explanation of subjects' behaviour although this may be a 
product of the impression formation task itself. It is hard to imagine that cases do not exist 
where context will cause subjects to discount some of the information which they receive. 
What is not so clear is the status of Asch's change of meaning hypothesis in the light of 
this evidence. It may be that the problem with Asch's account is its lack of specificity 
in 
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terms of cognitive process. This lack of specificity means that it is very hard to completely 
rule out the change of meaning account. However, evidence will be discussed in a later 
section of this chapter, which suggests how Asch's original insight might be made more 
specific. 
Before discussing that work however, it will be necessary to do two things. Firstly, 
the initial models induced from the extensive work on order effects in belief revision must 
be discussed. These models are very different to the model which will be sketched at the 
end of this chapter. Secondly, more recent models which have their roots in these initial 
models must also be discussed. Although these more recent models are a marked advance 
on the earlier models it will be argued that they are inadequate. What both sets of models 
have in common is that they attempt to capture the nature of the belief revision process by 
the application of mathematical operations to the pieces of evidence which subjects 
receive. It will be argued that whilst they may very well capture the existing data, there are 
several a priori reasons for doubting their ultimate usefulness. 
3.3. MODELS OF BELIEF REVISION AS INFORMATION INTEGRATION 
3.3.1. Cognitive Algebraic Models 
From the previous section it is apparent that the major worker in the area of order 
effects and information integration is Norman Anderson. Not only did Anderson and his 
co-workers produce most of the empirical evidence regarding the order effects paradigm, 
they also did most of the early work attempting to model the process. This work is 
underpinned by the assumptions of cognitive algebra, an approach to cognition which 
although not as influential as it once was, still continues to inspire some theoretical and 
experimental work (see Schlottmann and Anderson, 1993 for an example of information 
integration theory applied to children's perception of causality). 
The cognitive algebraic approach to cognition is based on the fact that subjects, 
when attempting to integrate several pieces of information, very often seem to 
be 
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following algebraic rules (Anderson, 198 1). At various times they seem to be adding, 
subtracting or multiplying when attempting to put the information together. The study and 
description of these kinds of algebraic phenomena rest on several concepts of which 
cognitive algebra is but one. Shanteau and Nagy (1984) have illustrated the basic elements 
of the Information Integration approach to cognition. Their analysis is represented in 
Figure 3.1 below. As may be seen from Figure 3.1, there are three main components of the 
information integration process. The first of these is the evaluation of the stimuli. Once 
evaluated the stimulus comes to have a subjective value for the subject. This subjective 
value is derived 
Stimulus Integration Respone Observed 
evaluation function evaluation resnonse 
Explicit 
stimulus 
JS2, W2 4- r= 
1 
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Fig 3.1: Diagrammatic representation of the Shanteau and Nagy conceptualisation of Information 
Integration. 
from two parameters. The first of these is the subjective stimulus scale value (s) for the 
explicit stimulus. This may be regarded as the evidential strength of any piece of evidence 
in any given context. For example, in an impression formation task the adjective 
"humorous" may be perceived as highly favourable when an impression of a target 
individual's likeableness is being formed. On the other hand, if the impression being 
formed was of the target individual's suitability for a job as an undertaker, the effect might 
not be quite the same. 
In one sense, therefore, the notion of subjective scale value is capable of dealing 
with the context in which a piece of evidence is encountered. However, such a notion of 
subjective value only accounts for the context in which the judgement is made. It will 
be 
remembered that the difference between attention decrement and interactive accounts of 
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order effects in personality impression formation tasks was due to the hypothesised effect 
of the surrounding adjectives on the evaluation of any individual adjective. In order to 
account for the evidential context of evaluation proponents of the cognitive algebraic 
approach to cognition have proposed a second parameter. This second parameter is the 
weight (w) of any piece of information. Although Shanteau and Nagy (1984) claim that the 
weight value "can generally be thought of as the importance or relevance of' an evidential 
item (pg. 50), in practise the weight parameter is never invoked in this way. Once again 
returning to the literature on order effects in impression formation, it is apparent that the 
weight function is normally invoked to account for the decrement in attention which 
researchers like Anderson and Shanteau hold to be the cause of primacy effects. Such an 
argument claims that the later an adjective occurs in the set of adjectives, the less is the 
weight assigned to that adjective. As the subjective value of each adjective is adjusted by 
its weight, later occurring adjectives have a smaller impact on the final rating than do early 
occurring a ectives. 
The second component of the information integration approach is the integration 
function itself. This second component determines how the subjective, weighted values for 
the evidence are combined in order to produce a judgement. There have been many 
different types of models suggested (see Anderson, 1981 for a review) but most discussion 
has centred around additive and averaging models. As their names suggest both types of 
model are based on the very simple intuition that subjects combine evidence by the 
application of very simple mathematical operations. A very simple additive model is 
represented in Equation 3.1. 
r= Sl +S2 Eq. 3.1 
This is a model of the case where a subject receives two pieces of evidence 
(sl and S2) and 
derives her response by adding the subjective values for the pieces of evidence. 
In general 
this model is too simple too account for subjects' behaviour. 
For this reason, models such 
as that described in Equation 3.2 were devised. 
r =: WISI + W2S2 
Because the weight assigned to a piece of evidence decreases the later the piece of 
evidence occurs in the sequence, this kind of model captures the primacy effect found on 
the impression formation task. Shanteau (1970; 1972) is one author who initially favoured 
additive models of information integration. Indeed, whilst the goal of the research carried 
out by proponents of information integration theory was simply to discriminate between 
attention decrement and interactive accounts of Asch's primacy effect, additive models 
were preferred to all other types of model. 
Unfortunately however, the additive model is not the only algebraic model which 
Eq. 3.2 
predicts a primacy effect in impression formation. Consider the model expressed in 
Equation 3.3. 
r= 
SI+S2 
Eq. 3.3 
2 
This is the simplest form of averaging model to describe how subjects integrate two pieces 
of evidence. Essentially it states that subjects arrive at a judgement by adding the 
subjective scale values for the evidence and then taking an average. In other words, 
subjects' impression of a target individual or belief in a hypothesis is equal to the average 
strength of the evidence which they have received. The weighted average version of this 
model, given in Equation 3.4 makes exactly the same primacy predictions for the 
impression formation task as does the weighted adding model. 
NN 
I 
wisi / wi 
i=O i=O 
Eq. 3.4 
The weighted average model is very easy to explain. Imagine the subject asked to 
rate the likeableness of a target individual. She is presented with a series of three ad ectives i 
which describe that individual and have subjective values of . 1, . 4,. 2 respectively 
(where a 
low subjective value corresponds to a negative adjective and a high value corresponds to a 
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positive adjective). Each of these scale values will be assigned a weight by the subject 
(amongst information integration theorists the value of this weight is generally held to 
depend on where a particular adjective comes in the sequence - early occurring adjectives 
receive heavier weighting). For the purposes of this example, suppose that the weights 
assigned are . 6, . 4, and .2 respectively. The weighted averaging model of information 
integration predicts that the subject's response (see Eq. 3.4a) is simply the sum of the 
weighted scale values divided by the sum of the weights. 
R= . 
1(. 6)+. 4(. 4) +. 2(. 2) 
Eq. 3.4a 
. 6+. 4+. 2 
That the averaging and additive models make the same predictions in many cases 
becomes clear if one considers a simple impression formation task where the subject is told 
that the target individual has been described by one acquaintance as being humorous (a 
highly favourable trait) and as being cold (a highly unfavourable trait) by another. With 
both averaging and additive models primacy will occur because the first trait (whether it is 
favourable or unfavourable) will be more heavily weighted than the second. It does not 
matter that the mathematical operation embodied in each model is different - in both cases 
the greater weighting of the first adjective will result in primacy. 
How then are the averaging and additive accounts to be separated? Although they 
may seem to be very similar, averaging and adding models do, in certain situations, make 
differing predictions. This is due to the fact that averaging models possess two types of 
weighting. The first of these is the explicit weighting, described above. The second is the 
weighting implicit in all averages - every value which goes into the production of the 
average weights every other value. Once it was felt that interactive accounts of impression 
formation had been ruled out (although as has already been pointed out, this is not the 
case) testing the differing predictions made by averaging and additive models became the 
central research question in the information integration literature. Several elegant tests 
were devised, the first of which was reported by Anderson (1965). He asked subjects to 
rate the likeableness of target persons described by sets of either two or four adjectives. 
The two adjective sets were composed of either two highly favourable adjectives (HH) or 
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two highly unfavourable ad ectives (LL). The four adjective sets were comprised of two i 
highly favourable adjectives and two moderately favourable adjectives (HHM+M+) or two 
highly unfavourable adjectives and two moderately unfavourable adjectives (LLM- 
M -). 
The averaging and additive models diverge in their predictions about the above 
stimulus materials. If an additive function is in operation then the evaluation of the target 
person given two highly favourable adjectives should be higher than that given highly 
favourable and moderately favourable adjectives. Similarly, the evaluation of the target 
individual should be lower given two highly unfavourable adjectives than it would be 
given two highly unfavourable adjectives and two moderately unfavourable adjectives. If 
an averaging function is in operation however, these predictions are reversed. The average 
of two highly and moderately favourable or unfavourable adjectives should always be less 
extreme than the average of two highly favourable or unfavourable adjectives. With both 
favourable and unfavourable adjectives Anderson's results supported the averaging model. 
That is RHH > RHHM+M+ and RLL < RLLM-M-. This result has been replicated by Hendrick 
(1968) and by Leon, Odeon, and Anderson (1973). 
Similar results have been reported by Lampel and Anderson (1968) who used a 
procedure asking female college students to rate the dateability of males described by 
either a pair of personality trait adjectives and a photograph or a photograph alone. 
As many of the criticisms which may be levelled at the information integration 
approach to impression formation, also apply to later models of belief revision, they will 
not be discussed here. Instead, the criticism which is unique to the impression formation 
approach will be briefly discussed. This criticism is based on the fact that information 
integration theory is enormously ambitious and very powerful but possibly built on 
unsound foundations. The approach is based on three assumptions. The first of these 
is that 
subjects' ratings of likeability, dateability etc. are made on an interval scale. This 
assumption may or may not be valid. The second assumption is that subjects use some 
kind of mathematical function to integrate the subjective scale values of pieces of 
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evidence. The third is that statistical techniques such as the Anova may be used to uncover 
both these subjective values and the weights which are assigned to them. In a sense, these 
assumptions are reliant on each other for their validity. Anderson (198 1) points to the vast 
number of experimental results which corroborate the interval scale assumption. Yet these 
results are themselves the result of fully factorial designs where subjects' responses are 
analysed using Analysis of Variance. 
Furthermore, the estimation of weight and scale values is dependent on the 
assumption that subjects are using an averaging rule. Shanteau and Nagy (1984) have 
admitted that the integration rule and the estimation of weight and scale values are 
dependent on each other. If this is the case, then both are dependent on the assumption that 
subjects are responding on an interval scale. This assumption in turn underlies the 
extensive use of the Anova. The problem with the approach is neatly summed up by Lovie 
(1984): 
One can, therefore, view Anderson's system offunctional measurement as a 
kind of elaborate balancing act where scale type (i. e. interval), substantive 
concepts (i. e. integration and averaging theory) and analysis (i. e. analysis of 
variance) simultaneously support andjustify each other ... Failure of any of the 
parts could, therefore, bring down the whole edifice, but, because of the 
interdependency of the structure it would, paradoxically, be difficult to 
determine which part hadjailed. (pg. 94) 
3.3.2. Procedural Models 
Although the cognitive algebraic approach to cognition was very productive 
in the 
1960's and 70's, its star has, to a large extent, waned. However, rather than 
being discarded 
due to evidence which suggested that the approach was ultimately unworkable, 
it has 
simply been replaced by a new generation of procedural models 
(Lopes, 1987; Hogarth 
and Einhom, 1992). That the information integration approach 
has never been 
demonstrated to be inadequate is probably due to what Lakatos (1970) calls inoculation. 
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Although peripheral theoretical details may have changed (e. g. the substitution of 
averaging models for additive ones), the core concepts have remained the same. As the 
criticism at the end of the last sub-section implies, the manner in which these concepts 
relate to one another suggests that it will be very difficult to provide truly discriminating 
evidence. 
Instead emphasis has simply shifted within the literature. The new generation of 
procedural models, as their name suggests, seek to model the process of belief revision. 
Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the work of Lopes (1987). Taking as her starting 
point the fact that subjects seem to use an averaging procedure in judgement tasks, she has 
attempted to elucidate other aspects of the judgement process which may lead to 
judgmental error. In so doing she seeks to induce a model of what people do when they 
make judgements rather than of the data that they produce (pg. 169). Essentially her 
process model claims that averaging is produced because people integrate new information 
with old composite judgements by adjusting the old value so that the new composite lies 
somewhere between the old composite and the value of the new information. As she points 
out, this process is qualitatively similar to averaging but does not presuppose that subjects 
ever "compute" an average in the algebraic sense of the term. 
Lopes' model is a very simple one and is composed of just a few stages. Firstly, it is 
proposed that subjects scan the evidence. Once this has been done an evidential item is 
chosen as the "anchor point". Typically, the anchor will be chosen based on its relative 
importance (e. g. its diagnosticity). Once an anchor has been chosen, it will be evaluated 
relative to the scale of judgement. In many cases this will produce an initial judgement. 
Subsequent to this, remaining items are integrated in the "averaging" manner described 
above. The remaining items are integrated in order of importance and the process stops 
when there are no important items left unaccounted for. 
This kind of model is certainly an advance, in psychological terms, on the earlier 
cognitive algebraic models. Most important has been the notion of an anchor. Its centrality 
is evidenced by the psychological importance ascribed to it in a more recent, and more 
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comprehensive, model of the belief revision process. This model will now be discussed in 
some detail. 
The belief-adjustment model of Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) is the most ambitious 
of current approaches purporting to model order effects in evidence integration. Their 
model assumes 
... that people handle belief-updating tasks by a general, sequential anchoring- 
and-adjustment process in which current opinion, or the anchor, is adjusted by 
the impact of succeeding pieces of evidence. 
In its most basic form their model may be expressed 
Sk, 
--": 
Sk, 
-I+ 
Wk[S(Xk)- RI Eq. 3.5 
where Sk equals the degree of belief after k pieces of evidence (0:! ý Sk!! ý 1), Sk-I 
corresponds to the anchor or prior opinion (initial strength of belief is So), s(xk) equals the 
subjective evaluation of the kth piece of evidence, R equals the reference point or 
background against which the kth piece of evidence is evaluated and wk equals the 
adjustment weight for the kth piece of evidence (0! ý Wk:! ý I) - 
The model expressed in Equation 3.5 is very simple. It is useless however without 
some definition of its components. Unfortunately, therefore, things are not as simple as 
Equation 3.5 may seem to suggest. In line with Lopes'emphasis on what subjects actually 
do when they update their beliefs, Hogarth and Einhorn propose three different sub- 
processes which constrain the operation of the processes described by the simple form of 
the model. These are (1) how evidence is encoded, (2) how evidence is processed, and (3) 
how the adjustment is accomplished. Each of these sub-processes and its effect on the 
operation of the simple model will be considered individually. As this discussion will 
become quite technical and very involved, the weaknesses inherent in Hogarth and 
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Einhorn's characterisation of each of these sub-processes will be presented as the sub- 
process is described. 
3.3.2.1. How the evidence is encoded. 
The first sub-process which Hogarth and Einhom consider is the encoding of 
evidence. By this they mean the process by which the evidence is related to the hypothesis. 
They define two different types of relationship in terms of whether the evidence is encoded 
relative to constant or variable reference points. Furthermore, they claim that any belief 
revision task may be categorised as involving evaluation or estimation. In evaluation tasks 
a constant reference point is used. Evidence is encoded as being positive or negative 
relative to a theory or hypothesis. For example, consider a research scientist trying to 
decide whether a given hypothesis is valid where her belief about the hypothesis ranges 
along a continuum from "false" (=O) to "true" (=I). In this situation positive evidence 
always increases belief and negative evidence always decreases it. in other words, 
regardless of the scientist's current level of belief in the hypothesis, supporting evidence 
always increases belief in the hypothesis whereas disconfirming evidence always decreases 
it. Thus, evidence is always bipolar (-I :! ý s(xk):! ý +1), and prior belief always equal to zero 
(R = 0). Equation 3.5 can be rewritten for evaluation tasks as 
Sk 
-::::: 
Sk, 
-I+ 
WAS(Xk) Eq. 3.6 
In estimation tasks, on the other hand, evidence is encoded relative to variable 
reference points. These tasks involve some kind of "moving average" and each new piece 
of evidence is encoded relative to current opinion. For example, the typical impression 
formation task, which involves an impression of "likeableness", is a good example of this 
kind of task. Current opinion may be thought of as being expressed on a continuum 
from 
"dislike" (=O) to "like a lot" (=1). Any personality adjective given to a subject will increase 
how much they like the target individual only if that adjective is more positive than the 
subject's current opinion of the target. Therefore, evidence is encoded as 
being positive or 
negative relative to the current level of belief rather than relative to the 
hypothesis under 
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consideration. Contrary to evidence encoding on evaluation tasks, evidence is unipolar (0 < 
S(xk) !ý 1) and R= Sk- 1. Accordingly, Equation 3.5 may be rewritten as 
Sk 
-: -- 
(I 
- Wk)sk -I+ 
WkS(Xk) Eq. 3.7 
As Hogarth and Einhorn point out, Equation 3.5 corresponds to an adding formulation for 
evidence integration, whereas Equation 3.7 corresponds to an averaging formulation. The 
advance which this approach makes on previous approaches is that it has provided a 
rationale for the differential use of adding and averaging formulations, both of which may 
be seen as by-products of what seems, initially at least, a psychologically real distinction. 
It is the issue of what is psychologically real that is of most trouble to this aspect of 
the Hogarth and Einhorn model. Whilst a distinction between the encoding of evidence in 
terms of either a fixed or moving reference point seems plausible and attractive at first 
glance, the question remains as to whether it is either theoretically or experimentally 
tenable. Evaluation tasks, all of which involve fixed reference points, are characterised by 
one or more of the following: 
evidence is coded as positive or negative relative to the hypothesis under consideration. 
For example, evidence relevant to the truth of a hypothesis will either confirm or 
disconfirm that hypothesis. 
o evidence is conceptually measured on a bipolar scale (- I '! ý s(xk) !ý 1), and then 
transformed onto a unipolar scale (0!! ý Sk!! ý 1). In other words, the evidence which a 
subject receives may be positive or negative but is used to adjust belief on a scale 
which runs from "false" (=O) to true 
evidence is marked for one hypothesis or another (Lopes 1985) which facilitates a 
directional interpretation of the information. If evidence is marked as positive or 
negative this makes it easier to understand, and use, in terms of confirmation and 
disconfirmation. 
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evidence requires explicit interpretation as to whether it is for or against a hypothesis. 
Once again, Hogarth and Einhorn claim that this facilitates interpretation of evidence 
in terms of confirmation or disconfirmation. They give the example of a juror having to 
decide whether certain evidence supports a verdict of guilt or innocence. Because the 
hypothesis is bipolar in nature the evidence must be explicitly interpreted as to which 
verdict it supports. 
Estimation tasks, on the other hand, which involve moving reference points, are 
characterised by one or more of the features below: 
0 evidence is interpreted relative to current opinion - subjects are sensitive to the 
difference between the location of the current anchor and the level of belief associated 
with the current evidence 
evidence is transformed from one unipolar scale (0:! ý s(xk)!! ý 1) onto another (0 "ý Sk 
! ýI). That is, evidence is never negative as it is always interpreted in terms of its 
relationship to existing evidence and is used to adjust belief along a continuum which 
ranges from, for example, "dislike" (=O) to "like a lot" (=I) 
0 evidence integration is associated with questions of "how much" rather than "true- 
false". Indeed, continuous scales may elicit estimation whereas dichotomies may elicit 
evaluation. This may be thought of in terms of the earlier distinction between deciding 
whether a hypothesis is true or false and deciding how much one likes a target 
individual. 
evidence requires very little interpretation as to whether it is for or against the 
hypothesis under consideration. This facilitates a comparison of the new evidence with 
already existing levels of belief. For example, imagine being asked to decide whether 
you like or dislike some individual. If you already possess some opinion, being told 
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that five out of six of that person's acquaintances dislike him requires very little 
interpretation and is easily compared to one's existing levels of belief. 
With such a list of defining characteristics the distinction between evaluation and 
estimation tasks might seem to be clear. Closer inspection reveals that this is not so. 
Several points need clarification. Firstly, it is not clear that the characteristics of evaluation 
or estimation tasks are mutually exclusive. Various tasks might be designed which 
confound certain characteristics of both kinds of tasks. For example, an alternatives task 
(true/false) which required subjects to integrate numerical information, or an estimation 
task which used pieces of evidence clearly marked for one hypothesis or another. An 
example of the former case might be asking subjects to decide whether a given hypothesis 
was true or false based on Bayesian evidence (i. e. base rates and likelihood ratios). 
Bayesian evidence is unipolar yet deciding whether a hypothesis is true or false is an 
evaluation task which requires that evidence be interpreted on a bipolar scale. An example 
of the latter case (an estimation task where evidence is clearly marked for one hypothesis 
or the other) might be asking subjects the degree to which they believe that a target 
individual, who possesses some characteristics, comes from one of two occupational 
groups (as in Tversky and Kahneman's, 1974, demonstration of the representativeness 
heuristic). Imagine that subjects receive additional sequential evidence about the 
occupation of specific individuals who possess the same characteristics on this task. The 
task is one of estimation (i. e. subjects must express their degree of belief) yet the evidence 
is clearly marked for one or other of the hypotheses. 
Two counter-arguments are possible. Firstly, it may be possible to argue that there 
are a range of special cases where characteristics of estimation and evaluation tasks are to 
be found in the same task, but that usually tasks are structured as Hogarth and Einhorn 
claim they are. The problem with this kind of counter-argument is that it diminishes the 
power of the model. The second counter-argument that is possible is that although these 
features tend to cluster together in evaluation and estimation tasks, there is really one 
defining feature of each type of task around which the other features tend to cluster. The 
problem with this type of counter-argument is that it is almost always possible to 
imagine a 
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version of a specific task where one of the features is reversed. For example, if it might be 
claimed that the defining difference between evaluation and estimation tasks was whether 
evidence was used to evaluate a phenomenon's category membership (Is this person guilty 
or innocent? or Is this hypothesis true or false? ) or the degree to which a particular state of 
affairs pertains (How much do I like this person? or How likely is it that it will snow 
tornorrow? ). However, it is always possible to ask subjects to make a categorical decision 
about whether they like someone or to estimate how likely it is that a hypothesis is true or 
false. 
A second problem is the distinction made between unipolar and bipolar scales. 
Allied to this distinction is whether evidence is encoded relative to the hypothesis under 
consideration (bipolar scale), or to evidence already encoded. Mynatt, Doherty, and 
Dragan (1993) have demonstrated that in the choice of evidence on a diagnostic reasoning 
task subjects are constrained by the hypothesis to which subjects are attending. The 
hypothesis attended to can be manipulated by the direction of the first piece of evidence. 
Current theorising on hypothetical thinking (e. g. Evans and Over, 1996b) emphasises the 
fact that subjects represent only one alternative at a time. Although the Hogarth and 
Einhorn model can handle the case where subjects are trying to determine whether or not 
one alternative is likely to be the case, it does not give an account of what happens when 
subjects are trying to decide between two alternatives. For example, what happens when 
subjects are trying to decide between two alternatives where the evidential set consists of 
evidence explicitly marked for one or other alternative? Do subjects flip from one scale to 
another? Or does the task become one of estimation? 
3.3.2.2 How the evidence is processed 
The second sub-process which Hogarth and Einhom consider is the processing of 
evidence. Once again they draw a distinction between two forms of processing. 
The key 
issue here is whether the evidence is processed step by step (SbS), or at the end of a series 
(EoS) of pieces of evidence. These two distinct processing strategies map onto the 
experimental manipulation discussed in the second section of this chapter which seems so 
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crucial to whether a primacy or recency effect is found. In the SbS process belief is 
adjusted incrementally by each piece of evidence whereas in the EoS process the initial 
anchor (formed from the first one or two pieces of evidence) is adjusted by the net effect of 
the remaining evidence. The EoS anchoring and adjustment strategy is represented as 
follows 
Sk 
:- SO + Wk[S(Xlg...., Xk)- RI Eq. 3.8 
It is slightly unclear as to what s(xl,.... xk) represents although Hogarth and Einhorn say it 
is 'I ... some function, possibly weighted average, of the individual subjective evaluations of 
the items of evidence that follow the anchor. " 
It is claimed that choice of processing strategy is determined by the demands of the 
task. Thus an SbS strategy is used when 
9 the task demands an SbS response mode 
0 the relative complexity and/or length of the series is small 
On the other hand subjects choose EoS strategies when 
0 the task allows for an EoS response mode (it is important to realise however that it is 
always possible to use an SbS strategy, even when response mode is EoS. SbS will be 
used if complexity and length of series factors are appropriate) 
0 the evidence consists of simple items in short series. 
This is the most non-contentious part of Hogarth and Einhom's model. It seems to capture 
the distinction between sequential responding and responding at the end of the series 
which has been found so important in determining the source of order effect. However, this 
distinction does seem to make parts of the earlier distinction redundant. Specifically, is it 
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possible that a task which requires SbS responding can ever be one of evaluation? It will 
be remembered that in evaluation tasks R (the background against which a piece of 
evidence is evaluated) is always equal to 0. Although this may be possible for the first 
piece of evidence which the subject receives in an SbS task, it is not possible thereafter. 
once the subject has received some evidence R can no longer be equal to 0. As with the 
distinction between evaluation and estimation tasks, it is likely that the distinction between 
SbS and EoS responding is not as clear as it might initially seem. 
3.3.2.3 How the adjustment is accomplished 
The third sub-process in the updating of beliefs considered by Hogarth and Einhorn 
is the process of adjusting belief in the face of evidence. This adjustment is common to 
both evaluation and estimation tasks regardless of whether it occurs step by step or at the 
end of a series. Hogarth and Einhorn's model of how this is accomplished stems directly 
from what they call a "contrast assumption". This contrast assumption is embodied in their 
claim that the adjustment weight should depend on whether the new piece of evidence is 
more or less positive than background knowledge (S(xk) -R in Equation 3.5) and the level 
of the anchor Sk- 1. Accordingly, they propose two separate equations for the adjustment 
weight. 
The first of these is for cases where s(xk) :! ý R: 
Wk a (Sk- 
- 1) 
Substituting Equation 3.9 into Equation 3.5, we now have 
+ a(S,, -, )[s(xk. ) - RI 
3.9a 
The second case is for when S(xk) ý! R: 
Wk --::: 
P(l 
- 
Sk 
- 1) 
Eq. 3.9 
Eq. 
Eq. 3.10 
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Once again, substituting in Equation 3.5 we get 
Sk 
:::::: Sk 
-I+ 
P(l 
- 
Sk- 
1)[S(Xk)- RI Eq. 3.1 Oa 
From Equations 3.9 and 3.10 it can be seen that wk is proportional to the anchor when the 
subjective value of the new evidence is less than R and inversely proportional to the 
anchor when the value of new evidence is greater than R. This means that when the anchor 
is great and the new evidence is weaker than R, this new evidence will have the effect of a 
large downwards revision of belief. When the anchor is low and the new evidence is 
weaker than the background belief this will result in very little downwards revision (of 
course the amount in both cases is related to how much weaker than background belief the 
new evidence is). This of course makes sense. If one does not hold a position very strongly 
then negative evidence will not effect that weak prior level of belief as much as it will a 
strong prior level of belief. 
Conversely, when the subjective value of the new evidence is greater than R and 
the anchor is great, there will be little upwards revision. On the other hand, when the 
subjective value of the new evidence is greater than R but the anchor is low, there will be 
large upwards revision of belief. Once again, this makes perfect sense. If one holds a belief 
strongly then evidence in favour of that belief cannot cause much upwards revision. Strong 
positive evidence will cause large upwards revision, on the other hand, when the original 
belief is weakly held. From the foregoing it is clear that the contrast assumption results in 
predictions of large revisions of belief when the difference between the subjective value of 
new evidence is either much greater or much weaker than the strength of background 
belief. The implications of this assumption will be discussed in the next section. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the constants a and B refer to subjects, 
sensitivity to negative and positive evidence respectively, where 0!! ý a, B:! ý 1. They 
represent an attempt by Hogarth and Einhorn to account for individual and contextual 
factors in sensitivity to new evidence. 
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Hogarth and Einhorn's model makes very specific predictions concerning order 
effects. For example, it always predicts recency when subjects are responding in a step by 
step fashion and R= Sk- I (see Hogarth and Einhom, 1992 for a formal derivation of this 
prediction). As discussed in the second section of this chapter, SbS responding has always 
resulted in recency. For end of series responding Hogarth and Einhorn's model always 
predicts primacy. This prediction is justified by the assumption that as the first piece of 
evidence in the series will almost always be the anchor it will be weighted more heavily 
than the aggregate of the remaining evidence by which it is adjusted. Of 27 studies EoS 
studies which Hogarth and Einhorn review, 19 result in primacy. It is significant that in 
their assumption that the initial piece of evidence will always serve as the anchor in EoS 
responding, Hogarth and Einhorn disagree with Lopes who claims that the most important 
piece of information will be chosen as the anchor. 
Many of Hogarth and Einhom's predictions have never been tested. For example 
they make predictions concerning complex pieces of evidence for which they can find no 
match in the experimental literature. However, those experiments which have been run, 
mostly in applied domains, as tests of the model (e. g. Ashton and Ashton, 1988; Tubbs, 
Messier, and Knechel, 1990; Asare, 1989; Koch, Pei and Reed, 1989) have all resulted in 
confirmation of the model's predictions. Initially it would seem that the Hogarth and 
Einhorn model not only captures most of the existing data, it has also passed several 
experimental tests. However, there is a major, and perhaps insurmountable, problem with 
the information integration approach to belief revision. This problem is suffered by both 
cognitive algebraic and procedural models. The next sub-section will consist of a 
discussion of these problems. 
3.3.3. A Problem for Existing Models 
Although both Lopes and Einhorn and Hogarth have drawn a distinction between 
their approaches to the belief revision process and those of workers such as 
Anderson and 
Shanteau, both algebraic and process models will be considered together here. This 
is 
126 
because they share the same basic assumption about human cognition. This assumption is 
best expressed by Anderson (198 1), who describes it as: 
.... an important, implicit assumption that requires explicit discussion. This is 
the independence assumption that the scale value of each stimulus is constant, 
independent of what other stimuli it is combined with (pg. 18). 
It is this assumption which underlies the entire information integration approach to order 
effects in belief revision. Accordingly, while Asch claimed that the adjectives which 
subjects received in his personality impression formation task interacted, the information 
integration approach claims that the stimuli never interact. This assumption leads directly 
to what is known as the parallelism analysis. Suppose that two or more stimulus variables 
are supposed to add together to yield an observed response. If these variables are 
manipulated in a factorial design then the factorial plot of the data should be parallel. 
A good example of a parallelism analysis in operation is contained in a study by 
Anderson (1962). He asked subjects to rate the likeableness of a target individual in the 
light of two personality adjectives. Each two adjective set was composed of one adjective 
from the set: level-headed, unsophisticated, ungrateful, and one adjective from the set: 
good-natured, bold, humourless. Thus, the experiment had a 3x3 factorial design, with 
subjects receiving all nine possible pairs of adjectives. The response plots for each subject 
exhibited remarkable parallelism. Anderson argued that if impression formation was 
achieved by the interaction of personality adjectives, then these interactions should have 
manifested themselves in the plot of the data. Although, as was discussed in a previous 
sub-section, additive models have to a large extent been ruled out, and marked non- 
parallelism has often been found in information integration experiments (e. g. Lampel and 
Anderson, 1968), the basic assumption still remains: The manner in which humans 
integrate information is best described by assuming that stimuli do not interact. Where it 
seems that they may be interacting (as in the cases where non-parallelism has been 
observed) this is claimed to be due to the operation of a differential weighting operation. 
That is, some stimuli are more important than others in certain contexts. It will be 
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remembered that this was exactly the explanation given for the observed non-parallelism 
observed in the Lampel and Anderson experiment. 
Although the independence assumption is not emphasised by the more recent 
researchers whose aim is to model the process of belief revision, it is still implicitly 
contained in their models. Lopes' model, although not formally expressed, accounts for 
averaging behaviour in terms of difference between the strength of a piece of evidence and 
the strength of a currently held opinion. Likewise, Hogarth and Einhorn assume that the 
process may be modelled in terms of the difference between the strength of the new 
evidential item relative to the strength of background belief. None of the existing models 
contain either the pragmatic or inferential component which is currently held to be so 
crucial in models of many aspects of cognition (see Shanon, 1988; Sperber and Wilson, 
1986; 1995; Evans and Over, 1996; Hilton, 1995). 
There are several a priori reasons for supposing that any model of the belief 
revision process which does not have an inferential pragmatic component cannot hope to 
be adequate. Indeed, there is some recent experimental work which explicitly challenges 
the stimulus independence interpretation of the impression formation literature. There is 
also older work in the concept literature which is directly relevant, as is some work on 
representational theories of meaning. All three strands of work, and their implications, will 
be individually discussed. 
3.3.3.1 Inference, domain-speciflc knowledge structures, and information integration 
Recent experimental work by William Wattenmaker (1995) has several 
implications for current models of information integration. Wattenmaker's main interest 
is 
in domain specific knowledge structures and their effect on the learnability of category 
structures. He proposes the existence of at least two types of categories. The first of these 
are categories which are linearly separable. That is, these categories may 
be partitioned on 
the basis of a weighted, additive combination of component information. If the 
features of 
two category members may be weighted and summed so that there 
is no overlap between 
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the categories, then these categories may be said to be linearly separable. Conversely, non- 
linearly separable categories are those where there is overlap once the features have been 
weighted and summed. Earlier work by Wattenmaker, Dewey, Murphy, and Medin (1986) 
had shown that the ease with which abstract categories are learned is dependent on how 
compatible the category is with the knowledge which is activated whilst learning is taking 
place. For linearly separable categories, any knowledge which provides a basis for the 
summation of individual features was found to facilitate learning. 
The example which Wattenmaker gives is that of the subject who receives the 
following description: knowledgeable, competent, hard, and composed. In the absence of a 
context no knowledge is available to suggest a way to integrate these features. If a context 
such as "scientist" is provided, then the subject can draw on background knowledge to 
enable her to evaluate and sum the features. Wattenmaker et al found that linearly 
separable categories were easier to learn when subjects were given themes which provided 
the basis for summing individual features. On the other hand, Wattenmaker et al found 
that with non-linearly separable categories which contained correlated features, knowledge 
that highlighted these correlations made the NLS categories easier to learn. Such 
knowledge however, makes LS categories more difficult to learn. Wattenmaker et al 
concluded that the ease with which a category will be learned is determined by the 
compatibility between the integration strategies suggested by background knowledge and 
the abstract structure of the category itself. 
Wattenmaker (1995) sought to investigate the types of integration strategies 
induced by knowledge in different domains. He distinguished between social 
categorisation (the categorisation of people based on traits or behaviour) and object 
categorisation (the categorisation of concrete entities in the environment). There are good 
reasons for supposing, in advance, that different knowledge structures underlie object and 
social categorisation. Wattenmaker identifies three such reasons. As they are relevant, not 
only to a description of Wattenmaker's work, but also to the issue of what subjects actually 
do in belief revision tasks, they will be described in some detail. 
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The first reason for supposing that object and social knowledge have different 
underlying structures is the ease with which inconsistent social information may be 
integrated. Lingle, Alton and Medin (1984) analysed social and object categories and 
concluded that a major difference between the two was the greater flexibility associated 
with social knowledge. Accordingly, although it is very easy to form hierarchies of object 
categories which possess such properties as transivity and mutual exclusivity, this is very 
often impossible with social categories. Consider the academic who resigns her post. This 
can be interpreted as providing evidence that the academic in question may be categorised 
as mad, disillusioned, busy, insightful, principled, or even rich! Because of the flexibility 
of such knowledge, it is easier to integrate inconsistent information in social domains. 
This is not simply based on intuition. There is evidence (Asch and Zukier, 1984; Kunda, 
Miller and Claire, 1990) that subjects can resolve inconsistencies in social knowledge with 
very little difficulty. Both Asch and Zukier and Kunda et al have provided evidence that 
the main mechanism by which this is achieved is causal reasoning. People infer a reason 
for the inconsistent information. 
On the other hand, inconsistencies in object information are not so easy to resolve. 
Consider an animal said to have wings, feathers, a beak, andfour legs. Although such an 
animal possesses three very good features for classification as a bird, it is difficult to 
imagine how the animal could be so classified. 
The second reason for supposing that there are domain specific differences in 
knowledge organisation is related to the idea of flexibility of feature interpretation. This is 
the amount of overlap which exists amongst social concepts. As it is only possible to sum 
features when they are perceived to possess some common property which provides a 
basis for the summation, the flexibility with which social features may be interpreted 
makes it more likely that such a common property will be found. This 
flexibility also 
makes it easier to interpret features in terms of a given category label. 
The third reason for supposing differences due to domain in knowledge 
organisation is the evidence which exists suggesting that social 
knowledge is represented 
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differently to object knowledge. It has often been proposed (e. g. Homa, Sterling and 
Trepel, 198 1; Smith and Medin, 198 1) that concepts may be represented by a combination 
of exemplars and more abstract information. It seems intuitively attractive that the manner 
in which concepts are represented differs across domain. For example, it is easy to think of 
exemplars of many object categories. It is even possible to think of exemplars of such 
social categories as good or honest. However, Lingle, Altom, and Medin (1984) have 
pointed out that these exemplars seem smaller in number, less accessible, and less central 
to the concepts than are exemplars of object categories. 
This distinction leads to the proposal of two distinct categorisation strategies. With 
exemplar based object categorisation, classification will be done on the basis of analogy to 
a concrete instance (Brooks, 1978; Estes, 1986; Nosofsky, 1984; Wattenmaker, 1993). As 
Wattenmaker (1995) points out, this also suggests the possibility that the relationship 
which holds between the features of an object to be categorised will also influence 
decisions. It is well known that the relationship which holds between features tends to be 
specified in, at least some, concepts (Goldstone, Medin, and Gentner, 199 1; Medin, 
Goldstone, and Gentner, 1990). There is also evidence (Gentner, 1983; Goldstone, Medin, 
and Gentner, 199 1) that relational properties influence both similarity calculations and the 
use of analogies. However, relational properties tend to inhibit the learning of linearly 
separable categories. 
Accordingly, it is likely that a different strategy is used in social categorisation. 
This strategy is likely to be determined by the abstractness of social concepts. In general, 
features of social concepts tend to be more abstract than those of object concepts. So, in 
terms of the earlier example involving the academic who resigns from her job, we might 
classify this behaviour as altruistic. Such a behaviour is not part of our concept of altruism 
but we infer from the abstract features that are associated with the concept of altruism 
in 
order to make the classification. It has been suggested (Murphy and Medin, 1985; 
Rips, 
1984) that much categorisation is based on inference rather than feature matching. 
That 
social categorisation, in particular, is inferential, explains why the causal reasoning 
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mechanisms used to resolve inconsistencies which were discussed earlier, play such a role 
in social classification decisions. 
Based on this analysis Wattenmaker ran an extensive series of studies to test for 
interactions between domain specific knowledge structures and abstract category 
structures. He found that across a wide range of tasks and materials, linearly separable 
categories were more compatible with social than with object categories. In sorting tasks, 
subjects were more likely to sum characteristic features and form LS categories with 
social materials. In learning tasks , LS categories were easier to learn with social materials 
but NLS categories were easier to learn with object materials. He also found evidence that 
the integration strategies used in categorisation varied across domain. In object conditions 
subjects tended to focus on single dimensions, use configural properties and rely on 
analogy. In social conditions summing features and learning LS categories was the 
strategy used. 
What are the implications of this work for cognitive algebraic and procedural 
models of the belief revision process? Firstly, it would seem that any model of the process 
has to be domain specific. Certainly cognitive algebraic models, with their reliance on 
averaging and summation, are. Also of importance is the fact that the vast majority of 
experimental studies examining belief revision in general, and order effects specifically, 
have used social stimulus materials. Not only are cognitive algebraic models of belief 
revision domain specific by virtue of Wattenmaker's argument, they are domain specific 
by virtue of the data which they are based upon. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Wattenmaker's work casts serious doubt on the 
independence assumption. If the summation of features in social categorisation is an 
inferential process, then it is impossible to work out the subjective value of a piece of 
evidence independently of other evidence. It is probably the case that additive models 
seemed to account for so much of the data produced by workers in the area of 
impression 
formation not because the meaning of the adjectives which subjects received was 
derived 
independently, but because inconsistencies between the adjectives were resolved 
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inferentially. This kind of inference is best viewed as a form of pragmatic inference where 
the task is to constrain the possible meanings of a piece of information rather than to 
derive the only meaning which that piece of information may convey. If, as Asch and 
Zukier (1984) have suggested, causal chains of reasoning are implicated, then it is clear 
that early occurring adjectives provide a context for this pragmatic inference. Indeed, it 
could very well be argued that, in the case of recency effects due to the equalisation of 
subjects' attention, later occurring adjectives provide the context for inferences concerning 
the earlier occurring adjectives. 
3.3.3.2 Background knowledge about correlated features 
The second strand of research which is strongly suggestive of a problem for both 
cognitive algebraic and procedural models of belief revision is very strongly related to the 
research discussed in the previous sub-section. This is the work examining subjects I 
sensitivity to the correlations which exist amongst features of objects in the world. For 
example, Medin, Altom, Edelson and Fresko (1982) demonstrated that subjects were 
sensitive to feature correlations and that they used them in their categorisation judgements 
in experiments with novel categories. Malt and Smith (1984) found essentially the same 
result with natural categories. Such findings are predicted by Rosch, Mervis, Gray, 
Johnson and Boyes-Braern (1976) who proposed that natural categories divide the world 
up according to clusters of features. They further claimed that basic categories maximise 
the correlational structure of the environment by preserving these feature clusters. 
Murphy and Medin (1985) have claimed that Rosch et al's view of conceptual 
knowledge is inadequate. They point out that such an account fails to specify a mechanism 
by which the encoding of correlations is constrained. Neither does it explain why people 
perceive and store "illusory correlations" (Chapman and Chapman, 1967; 1969). They 
claim that the correlational account must be supplemented with a theory-based approach. 
Only in this way can the two major problems for the correlational account be solved. 
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Despite this qualification, there appears to be no doubt that subjects are sensitive to 
the rate at which some features of some phenomena co-occur. The discussion in the 
previous sub-section suggests that knowledge about correlation is most important in non- 
linearly separable categories. As discussed above, Wattenmaker has provided evidence 
that, with objects, categorisation judgements are made based on single or configural 
properties of the object to be categorised. 
How does this finding sit with cognitive algebraic and procedural models of belief 
revision? Not very well in fact. If the previous sub-section was an attempt to show that 
cognitive algebraic models in particular were right about belief revision within social 
contexts, but for the wrong reasons, this sub-section will attempt to demonstrate that 
procedural models of belief revision, which offer the best hope for explaining belief 
revision with object materials, will ultimately be found wanting. As with cognitive 
algebraic models, the fatal flaw in procedural models is connected with the independence 
assumption. This will be demonstrated for the model of Hogarth and Einhorn, which is the 
best specified of existing procedural models. 
That Hogarth and Einhorn's model suffers from the independence assumption is 
best demonstrated by reference to their contrast assumption. It will be remembered that the 
contrast assumption leads to predictions of large increases or decreases in belief when the 
11 1ý absolute difference between the subjective scale value of new evidence is much less or 
much greater than background levels of belief. Accordingly, in many cases, the size of the 
recency effect is predicted to depend on this difference in subjective value. Tubbs, Gaeth, 
Levin and van Osdol (1993) have provided evidence that this is the case. Interestingly, 
they also found that difference in absolute strength was a greater determinant of their order 
effect than was the inconsistency or consistency of the evidence. To a large extent, the 
contrast assumption, and Tubbs et al's finding, makes sense. It very nicely captures the 
potential of very strong, or very weak, evidence for surprise. However, it is inadequate. 
Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption is based on differences in the relative 
strengths of new evidence and background beliefs. The surprise which they model 
is that 
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which comes from having a seemingly very strong (or very weak) hypothesis called into 
question by a very weak (or very strong) piece of evidence. It fails to take account of 
subjects' background knowledge about the world. Whether this background knowledge is 
in the form of theory and correlated features (Murphy and Medin, 1985) or correlated 
features alone, is of little interest here. What is of interest is the observation that, because 
humans store much information about objects in the world in terms of correlated features, 
that version of the independence assumption which is embodied in Hogarth and Einhorn's 
contrast assumption, is unworkable. As well as the surprise which comes from new 
evidence which is much stronger or weaker than the strength of currently existing beliefs, 
information about certain features of objects is also likely to lead to expectations 
concerning other features. If such expectations exist, then the independence assumption 
must be invalid. It will be remembered that the tenuous explanation given for the manner 
in which subjects used the information which they received in Experiment I also 
implicated expectation. The experiments contained in the next chapter will attempt to test 
both that explanation and the sufficiency of Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption, in 
the light of what has been discussed in this sub-section. 
Before moving on to discuss the final a priori reason for doubting the sufficiency 
of both cognitive algebraic and procedural models of belief revision, two further points 
should be made about correlated features. Firstly, as mentioned in the section on domain 
specific differences in the organisation of knowledge, correlated features are themselves a 
feature of object knowledge. Therefore, it is to be expected that the preceding discussion 
of correlated features, and their implications for models of belief revision, relates 
primarily to object knowledge. Secondly, also in the previous section, social 
categorisation was characterised as more inferential in nature than was object 
categorisation. It would be a mistake however to think that inference is not involved in 
object categorisation. For example, if correlated features are implicated in the process, 
then any expectations which information about one of the features leads to, must be 
derived inferentially. Likewise, the extent to which later information meets, exceeds, or 
fails to live up to, those expectations, must also be derived inferentially. 
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3.3.3.3 The importance of pragmatics 
This section of the chapter will deal with two issues where pragmatics are likely to 
be very important. The first of these is the general issue of the pragmatic determinants of 
meaning, which will be very briefly discussed. The second issue is one which has received 
recent attention in the decision making literature. That is the question of how the 
importance of evidence is pragmatically determined. 
3.3.3.3.1 Pragmatics and meaning 
Just as the two preceding arguments against the sufficiency of current models of 
belief revision are related, so too does this argument relate to the other two. This argument 
comes from work done in the last ten years which questions the representational- 
computational approach to cognitive science. The questions which this work raises for 
traditional approaches to cognition are far reaching (Shanon, 1988; Edelman, 1992) and 
therefore, a thorough treatment of them is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, 
discussion will be confined to just one question - the relationship between pragmatics and 
meaning - and to a critique by just one worker - Benny Shanon (Shanon, 1988). The 
advantage of imposing such a constraint on the discussion is twofold. Firstly, discussion 
will be limited to that specific, and relevant, part of the more general argument. Secondly, 
although the conclusions which Shanon draws are by no means representative, the 
criticisms upon which he bases those conclusions are. 
Shanon's critique is based on his argument that representations, as defined in the 
cognitive literature, cannot account for the knowledge manifested by the cognitive agent's 
behaviour (Shanon, 1988, pg. 7 1). He focuses on the semantic representation of the 
meaning of linguistic expressions and argues: (1) that semantic representations, even if 
defined in terms of a well specified code, cannot exhaust the meaning of linguistic and 
other expressions; (2) that even if a semantic representation could exhaust meaning, the 
fact that meaning is context dependent introduces the possibility of infinite numbers of 
meanings for linguistic expressions; (3) that contextual problems cannot be solved using a 
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two stage model where the first stage involves the representation of the basic core of the 
meaning of a linguistic expression. 
Obviously, Shanon's argument has ramifications for all of cognitive science. To 
remedy the problems he has identified, he makes very specific suggestions concerning 
new foundations for the discipline. These suggestions, although contentious, are not at 
issue here. What is of most interest is how Shanon (1988; 1993) has applied his critique to 
existing work in cognitive science. Specifically, he analyses Tversky's (Tversky, 1977; 
Tversky and Gati, 1978) contrast model of judgements of similarity. Once again, space 
and relevance constraints forbid a thorough exposition of either Tversky's or Shanon's 
position here. Suffice it to say that Tversky's model has been very influential - Eysenck 
and Keane (1995) describe it as one of the most long standing models in cognitive 
psychology. Essentially the model claims that the similarity of two objects is based on 
some function of the attributes which the objects share minus the attributes exclusive to 
each. The basic approach is captured in Equation 3.11: 
s(a, b) = Of (A n B) - af (A - B) - Of (B - A) Eq. 3.11 
where a and b are two objects, s is the similarity of these objects, A is the set of attributes 
of object a, B is the set of attributes of object b, A (-)B refers to the set of attributes 
common to both objects, A-B refers to the features unique to a, B-A refers to the 
features unique to b, the function f weights some features in terms of their salience, and 
the parameters 0, a, and P reflect the relative importance of the common and distinctive 
feature sets. Because of the weighting function, Tversky's model does, like existing 
models, take into consideration the judgmental context. Some features of objects will be 
more important than others in certain contexts. However, as Shanon (1988) points out, the 
contrast model assumes that the definition of the features themselves is prior to, and 
independent of, the evaluation of similarity. This assumption is similar to the 
independence assumption contained in existing models of belief revision. 
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Shanon claims that, not only is the differential weighting given to certain features 
due to context, in some cases features are dependent on the evaluation of similarity itself. 
He gives the example (Shanon, 1988, pg. 75) of a new-born baby being inspected by aunts 
from different sides of the family. Aunts from each side will claim that the child is similar 
to a family member from her side of the family, and then proceed to find the evidence in 
the child's features to back up her claim. Thus, rather than the features being evaluated and 
similarity being computed based on the prior evaluation, similarity is first postulated and 
features are then chosen. 
Much the same type of argument may be applied to models of belief revision. For 
example, in the previous sub-section, the importance of background knowledge about the 
relationship which holds between evidential features was pointed out. Current models of 
belief revision are inadequate in two ways. Firstly, they are based on traditional views of 
representation. This view is best expressed by Fodor (1975) who claims the existence of a 
language of thought which allows for a characterisation of all knowledge. Only by making 
this assumption can the independence assumption be justified. The continued holding of 
the independence assumption leads directly to the second inadequacy of existing models 
of belief revision. That is, they all lack a pragmatic component. Without such a pragmatic 
component, the meaning of a piece of evidence cannot be constrained. If social knowledge 
is best characterised by its flexibility, as the work discussed in the section before last 
suggests, then, for models of the belief revision in social settings, the problem becomes 
one of explaining how the meaning of a piece of evidence is constrained and only then, of 
explaining how that evidence comes to have an impact on the beliefs of the cognitive 
agent. As Sperber and Wilson (1986; 1995) have persuasively argued, constraining the 
meaning of a piece of information is an inferential process. Accordingly, the process of 
revising one's beliefs must also be seen as a process which involves pragmatic inference. 
The importance of pragmatics to any model of the belief revision process will be 
further 
illustrated in the next section. 
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3.3.3.3.2 Pragmatic determinants of evidential importance 
The most essential feature which any alternative model of the belief revision 
process would need to possess is a pragmatic component. In addition to the argument 
made in the previous section concerning pragmatics and meaning, such a pragmatic 
component is necessary for a further two reasons. Firstly, although recent models of the 
process of belief revision have emphasised the importance of the anchor, only Lopes 
(1987) has speculated on how a piece of evidence comes to be used as an anchor. She 
suggests that the information which is most diagnostic, or important, for the organism, 
will anchor the judgement. However, the question of what makes information important 
has never been addressed in the belief updating literature. As was demonstrated in the first 
chapter of this thesis, the question of what makes information relevant is a central topic in 
contemporary work on reasoning. There are three accounts of information selection which 
include a well worked out pragmatic component (Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Sperber, 
Cara and Girotto, 1995; Evans and Over, 1996). 
In addition to this recent work in the reasoning literature, there also exists work in 
the decision making literature which suggests that there are pragmatic determinants of the 
evidence which is considered to be important when attempting to decide between 
alternatives. For example, Shafir (1993) asked subjects to imagine that they were serving 
on a jury in an only-child sole-custody case. Subjects were also given a list of attributes 
possessed by each parent. Parent A was average in all respects, whereas parent B 
possessed both very positive, and very negative, attributes. When asked "To which parent 
would you award sole custody of the child? ", 64% of subjects said they would award 
custody to parent B. However, when asked "To which parent would you deny sole custody 
of the child? ", 55% of subjects said they would deny sole custody to parent B. Shafir 
explains these results in terms of reason-based choice. When asked to choose between 
alternatives subjects focus on those attributes of the options which are reasons for 
choosing them. Thus, more subjects choose parent B because parent B possessed more 
extremely positive attributes than did parent A. On the other hand, when asked to reject 
one of a pair of alternatives, Shafir claims that subjects focus on reasons 
for rejection. 
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Accordingly, as parent B also possessed more extremely negative attributes than did 
parent A, parent B was denied custody more often. 
Similarly, Maachi (1994) has demonstrated that the base-rate fallacy (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1980) where subjects fail to use base rate information when estimating the 
probability that an event will occur, is dependent on the wording of both the problem 
contexts and questions used. For example, she gave two groups of subjects the suicide 
problem (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). Subjects in the control group 
received the original version of the problem: 
Consider the following assumptions regarding suicide. In a population of 
young adults, 80% of the individuals are married and 20% are single. The 
percentage of deaths by suicide is three times higher among single individuals 
than among married individuals. 
What is the probability that an individual, selected at randomfrom those that 
had committed suicide, was single. 
Subjects in the experimental condition received exactly the same problem but the 
final question was changed to read: 
What is the probability that a suicide, selected at randomfrom the population 
of young adults, was single? 
For the control condition, Maachi's results were very similar to those of Tversky and 
Kahneman. Sixty six percent of subjects in the control group failed to use the base rate. 
In 
her experimental condition, on the other hand, only thirty four percent of subjects 
fail to 
use the base rate. 
In the suicide problem, the percentages refer to the base rates for single and 
married people in the general population. The ratio of 
deaths by suicide amongst single 
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versus married people is known as the likelihood ratio, and in this case is 3: 1. Tversky and 
Kahneman explained the tendency amongst their subjects to use only the likelihood ratio 
in terms of a perceived causal link between being single and committing suicide. 
Conversely, Maachi interprets their results as being due to the question which subjects 
were asked about the information. She claims that, as the question referred to the 
population of suicide victims, 75% of whom are known to be single, subjects may infer 
that the information concerning suicide victims has been produced by a consideration of 
base rate information. She claims as support for this interpretation the fact that the 
majority of subjects in her experimental condition take the base rate into account when 
producing their estimations. Crucial to this effect is the re-wording of the question where 
it is made clear that the likelihood information is independent of the base rates. 
Both the Shafir and Maachi studies illustrate that pragmatic factors are crucial in 
determining the information that is important to the subject in any given context. They 
also suggest that information which is considered to be irrelevant in any given context 
may be ignored completely. Thus, not only would a theory of belief revision which 
possessed a pragmatic component, be able to predict which information was likely to be 
important to the organism in any given context, it would also have a mechanism for 
constraining the information which is used in making the judgement. 
3.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final section of the chapter will attempt to do two things. Firstly, the 
preceding discussion will be summarised, and secondly, the conclusions which may be 
drawn from what has already been said will be discussed. 
3.4.1 Summary 
The first concern of this chapter was to review in some detail the literature on order 
effects in belief revision. It was argued that although the majority of such effects are of 
primacy, there are also a substantial number of recency effects in the literature. 
However, 
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recency may normally be attributed to some procedural variation rather than to some 
characteristic of the information which subjects are using to revise their beliefs. It was also 
argued that despite the extensive efforts to rule out explanations for primacy based on 
Asch's "change of meaning" hypothesis, Asch's account has not been definitely ruled out. 
This fact is due to the under specification of Asch's hypothesis. Specifically, it is not clear 
to what extent the process of belief revision works backwards, as well as forwards. 
The algebraic and procedural models which have been put forward to both describe 
and explain the belief revision process were also reviewed. The biggest difference 
between the two types of models is that algebraic models attempt to describe the output of 
the judgement process whereas procedural models attempt to explain what people do when 
they integrate information in order to revise their beliefs. A second advantage of certain 
procedural models (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) is that they provide a rationale for the 
differential use of averaging and summation predicted by various algebraic models. Two 
further improvements made by procedural models in our understanding of the process 
were also discussed. The first of these is the assumption that subjects adopt an anchor 
when forming and revising their beliefs. The second is Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast 
assumption which states that the size of an order effect is dependent on the difference in 
subjective value between the pieces of evidence which the subject receives. 
It was argued however, that despite these improvements, procedural, as well as 
algebraic, models are unlikely to provide an adequate characterisation of the belief 
revision process. This is mainly due to a failure to consider the importance of both 
pragmatics and structure in background knowledge to the process. Although both types of 
models agree that the context of judgement is important, they fail, because of the 
independence assumption, to appreciate the importance of evidential context. The 
independence assumption states that the subjective value of a piece of evidence is 
determined independently of any other evidence which the subject might receive and is 
also found in the "language of thought" argument, best expressed by Fodor 
(1975). 
Drawing on various arguments and findings from the literatures on concepts, pragmatics, 
and decision making it was argued firstly, that the independence assumption is 
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unwarranted and secondly, that a pragmatic component is necessary to any complete 
model of the belief revision process. 
It was further argued that because of the failure of existing procedural models to 
take findings about the underlying structure of knowledge into account, advances such as 
the contrast assumption will ultimately prove fruitless. Likewise, it was argued that the 
notion of an anchor is not adequately specified. Once again, a failure to consider 
pragmatics was implicated here. None of the existing procedural models are capable of 
predicting what information will be used as an anchor. In addition to this, it was claimed 
that the inferential aspect of belief revision is ignored by existing models. Although it was 
argued that any account of the belief revision process is likely to be domain specific, 
inference is crucial to an understanding of the process in any domain. 
3.4.2 Conclusions 
The first conclusion which may be drawn from the preceding discussion is that 
there is no adequate model of the belief revision process currently in existence. That is not 
to say however, that existing approaches and models have no merit. For example, it would 
seem that both Asch and Anderson were correct in their intuitions. Based on the work of 
investigators such as Wattenmaker (1995) and Zukier and Asch (1984), social knowledge 
seems to be more abstract and inferential in nature, than is object knowledge. It would 
seem that on a task such as impression formation, the meaning of later adjectives is 
determined by earlier adjectives in terms of the inferences made about the later adjectives 
based on both the earlier adjectives and background knowledge. However, algebraic-type 
operations also characterise categorisation with social knowledge. The work which exists 
on linear separability makes many of the same predictions as investigators such as 
Anderson and Shanteau. Likewise, the more recent work on anchors and the importance of 
evidential contrast also seems to contain more than a germ of truth. However, because of 
this work's failure to incorporate ideas from the literatures on concepts and pragmatics, it 
must be seen as flawed. 
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There also remain several questions which previous work has not addressed. An 
extremely important, but as yet unaddressed, question, concerns the flexibility of the 
process. To what extent is the evaluation and integration of evidence reversible? Massaro 
and Friedman (1990) have characterised all existing models of information integration as 
being forward working. That is, once a piece of evidence is evaluated and integrated, it 
cannot be re evaluated in the light of subsequent information. However, if it is accepted 
that primacy is the result of inference from background knowledge, then surely the 
recency effects which exist in the literature must be seen as a re-evaluation of earlier 
information in terms of the later information which subjects receive. 
This point leads to the question of how best to characterise the role of forgetting in 
the process. If it can be shown that the evaluation of evidence is reversible, then it 
becomes likely that subjects are holding earlier information in working memory and using 
this information as the basis for mental operations (i. e. inferences) in conjunction with 
later occurring information and information from background knowledge. The notion of a 
mental model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Gentner and Stevens, 1983) seems ripe for 
exploitation as an explanatory concept here. It is likely that the structure of such mental 
models will differ across domains, but undoubtedly some structure which allows for the 
operation of basic inferential processes on information from both the world and 
background knowledge is required. 
Another inescapable conclusion from what has already been said is that the notion 
of focus has some part to play in any understanding of the belief revision process. 
Although focus is currently badly understood (Kroger, Cheng, and Holyoak, 1993; Love 
and Kessler, 1995), it plays an important role not just in theories of reasoning, but also in 
recent work on language understanding (e. g. Moxey and Sanford, 1993). Focus is likely to 
be important in understanding belief revision in two ways. Firstly, pragmatically 
determined focus is likely to underlie the selection of an anchor in any particular context. 
Secondly, focus will determine the particular hypothesis or alternative to which subjects 
attend. In short, it seems highly probable that the notions of pragmatically determined 
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focus and mental models have the potential to be very powerful tools in aiding 
understanding of the belief revision process. 
However, before the theoretical constructs, discussed above, may be applied to the 
phenomenon of belief revision, more experimental work is required. Accordingly, the 
following two chapters will have the joint aim of exploring the effect found in 
Experiment 1, and of shedding light on the process of belief revision. The next chapter 
will start with a re-consideration of that effect in the light of what has been said in this 
chapter. It will relate the notion of expectation (postulated in Chapter 2 to explain the 
effect of evidence on subjects' beliefs about the alternatives present in the experimental 
scenarios) to Hogarth and Einhom's contrast assumption. Finally, it will attempt to test 
the adequacy of that assumption in the light of issues discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4- EXPERIMENTS 3,4 AND 5: ORDER EFFECTS, 
EXPECTATION AND BELIEF REVISION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will consist of the details of three experiments designed to further 
examine the results of Experiment 1. There were two aspects to Experiment 1. The first of 
these was the information which subjects selected to enable them to decide between the 
alternatives. Experiment 2 was designed to further examine the factors involved in 
information selection. The second aspect of Experiment I was the use which subjects made 
of the information which they received. This chapter constitutes an attempt to further 
explore how subjects use information to decide between alternatives. A second aim of this 
chapter will be to shed further light on the processes involved in belief revision in general. 
The area of belief updating was critically reviewed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, 
the result of interest from Experiment I will be reconsidered in light of the previous 
discussion. 
4.1.1 Another look at Experiment I 
It will be remembered that Experiment I employed Doherty et al's (1979) 
pseudodiagnosticity task in a novel way. As well as asking subjects to choose information 
to decide between alternative hypotheses, subjects were given the information which they 
had selected, and asked to use that information to state which of the hypotheses was most 
likely. All subjects received a single scenario such as the following: 
Your sister has just bought a new car. It's either a model X or a model Y but 
you can't remember which. You do remember that it hasfour 
doors and a top 
speed of over 95 mph. 
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The scenario above may be broken down into two components. The first of these are the 
evidential features (having four doors and a top speed of over 95 mph) and the second are 
the alternatives amongst which the subject must decide. 
As one of the aims of Experiment I was to examine the effect of rarity on subjects' 
choice and use of information in deciding between alternatives, there were two sets of 
features for each scenario. In the example given above, both of the features have a high 
subjective probability. That is, the majority of cars have four doors and a top speed of over 
95 mph. The second feature set consisted of one feature with high subjective probability 
and one of low subjective probability. So, in the example given above, such a set might be 
having four doors and a top speed of over 165 mph. 
Following the scenario, subjects were told the percentage of one of the models of 
car which possessed one of the features (in all cases relevant to this discussion they were 
told that this percentage was either sixty five or ninety five). Next, subjects were asked to 
choose one piece of information from amongst the remaining three to help them to decide 
whether their sister's car was most likely to be a model X or a model Y. For the example 
given, the four possible pieces of information are given below: 
A. The percentage of model Xs which have four doors 
B. The percentage of model Ys which have four doors 
C. The percentage of model Xs which have a top speed of over 95 mph 
D. the percentage of model Ys which have a top speed of over 95 mph 
In all cases the first piece of information which subjects received was 
A, so their choice 
was restricted to one of B, C, or D. For the feature sets consisting of one rare and one 
common feature, A always concerned the rare feature. 
For the feature sets consisting of 
two common features, A always concerned the 
feature not shared by both sets. For 
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example, in the scenario given above, for the common feature set A always concerned the 
percentage of model X cars said to have a top speed of over 95 mph. 
The evidential impact of the piece of information which subjects chose was 
manipu ated so that it was either positive or negative relative to the X hypothesis. To 
achieve this manipulation the percentages of B, C, and D were set at either 25%, 75%, and 
25% (positive impact on hypothesis X) or 75%, 25%, 75% (negative impact on hypothesis 
X). In this way, regardless of the piece of information which any subject chose, the sign of 
that piece of evidence's impact could be controlled for. 
The results of this part of Experiment I are depicted in Figure 4.1. It will be 
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Figure 4.1: The significant three way interaction between Probability, Feedback and Choice from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in the 65% and 95% conditions of Experiment 1. 
remembered from the discussion of those results that there was a significant interaction in 
subjects' confidence ratings between feature set (two common features or one rare and one 
common), evidence selection (diagnostic or pseudo-diagnostic), and feedback (either 
positive or negative relative to the focal hypothesis). Subsequent analysis revealed that the 
overall significance of this result could be attributed to a significant difference 
between 
two of the means involved in the interaction. Both of the means involved were produced 
by subjects who chose pseudo-diagnostic information and received positive 
feedback from 
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their selection. The only difference between the groups was that one of them initially 
received information about a common feature whilst the other initially received 
information about a rare feature. Those subjects in the latter condition displayed more 
confidence in the Y(or non-focal) hypothesis (mean of 45 on a scale where 0 corresponded 
to complete certainty that Y was the case and 100 corresponded to complete certainty that 
X was the case) whilst those subjects who initially received information about a common 
feature were highly confident that X was the case (mean confidence of 83). 
This result was surprising as, on the face of it, those subjects who initially received 
information about a rare feature might be thought to have possessed stronger evidence in 
favour of hypothesis X than did subjects who received information about a common 
feature. This is because a rare feature of an object is more diagnostic than is a common 
feature. In the car scenario above, knowing that the target car possesses a very rare feature 
in common with the majority of instances of its hypothesised category would seem to be 
very strong evidence that the hypothesised category is the correct category. 
One possible explanation for the counter-intuitive results of Experiment 1 is that 
expectation played a role in subjects' expression of their confidence. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2 such an explanation would claim that the first piece of evidence which subjects 
received led to the formation of expectations about the second piece of evidence. When 
those expectations were not met, subjects lost confidence in the focal hypothesis. Of 
course, this account is based on the assumption that subjects are revising their beliefs about 
the hypotheses in the light of new information. In Experiment I subjects received the 
information in a sequential fashion which should lead to the revision of their initial 
beliefs 
in the light of later information. Unfortunately however, subjects were only asked to 
express their relative confidence in the alternatives upon receipt of 
both pieces of evidence. 
Accordingly, based on the results of Experiment 1, it cannot be claimed with certainty 
that 
subjects are adjusting their beliefs in the light of the second piece of evidence. 
One of the 
purposes of the first study to be described in this chapter will 
be to establish that subjects 
are revising their beliefs in the light of new information. 
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4.1.2 Examining the role of expectation using the order effects paradigm 
It was suggested in the discussion of Experiment I that a useful test of the role 
which expectation played in the effect found in that study could be carried out using the 
order effects paradigm. The effect in Experiment I was found when a strong piece of 
evidence (concerning a rare feature) was followed by a weaker piece of evidence 
(concerning a common feature). If subjects' expectations underlie their interpretation of the 
second weaker piece of evidence, then when the same information is presented in the 
reverse order, the result of Experiment I should be reversed. This is because subjects 
receiving the weaker piece of evidence first will have lower expectations about the second 
piece of evidence. Accordingly, their confidence in the focal hypothesis should increase 
upon receipt of the extra information, whereas in the strong/weak order their confidence 
will decrease. The advantage of using the order effects paradigm is that it allows for the 
examination of subjects' relative confidence in the hypotheses upon receipt of each of the 
pieces of information. 
In terms of the literature on order effects discussed in Chapter 3, the order effect 
predicted here is one of recency. In other words, subjects who receive the stronger piece of 
evidence second will have greater confidence in the focal hypothesis than will subjects 
who initially receive the stronger piece of evidence. It is important however to distinguish 
between the reasons for this prediction and those of Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast 
assumption which would also predict recency. In this case the contrast assumption predicts 
recency because of the difference between the subjective values of the two pieces of 
evidence. Weak evidence followed by strong evidence always results in upwards revision 
of belief, whereas strong evidence followed by weak evidence always results in 
downwards revision of belief. The claim made here however, is that the subjective value of 
the later occurring evidence will, in certain cases, be determined by the subject's 
expectations about that piece of evidence. These expectations are derived from 
both the 
early occurring evidence and background knowledge. 
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Although the aim of Experiment 3 is simply to demonstrate the existence of an 
order effect with materials similar to those used in Experiment 1, Experiments 4 and 5 will 
attempt to demonstrate that, in certain cases, Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption 
will be an inadequate predictor of when order effects will, and will not, occur. Instead, it 
will be argued that the role of expectations in the interpretation of evidence must be 
acknowledged. 
4.2. EXPERIMENT 3 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 will be a direct test of the expectation-based account given for the 
results of Experiment 1. To test this account an order effects paradigm will be used where 
subjects receive the same information but in different orders. In addition to the order 
effects manipulation there will be several changes to the procedure used in Experiment 1. 
Firstly, subjects will be asked to express their relative confidence in the hypotheses upon 
receipt of each piece of information. Such a procedure allows for the examination of both 
the first and second pieces of evidence on subjects' beliefs about the hypotheses. Secondly, 
because there was no independent validation of the perceived frequency of the evidential 
features used in Experiment 1, validation will be obtained in this experiment by asking 
subjects about their expectations concerning the second piece of evidence once they have 
received the initial piece of information. This will enable a manipulation check on the 
perceived frequency of the evidential features used. 
There are several predictions which may be made about the results of this 
experiment in the light of what has previously been said about the role of expectations in 
the belief revision process. Firstly, the effect of manipulating evidence order will be to 
produce a recency effect. This is because the order manipulation will determine which 
evidence subjects receive first. Those subjects who receive the stronger piece of evidence 
first will have high expectations about the second weaker piece of evidence. 
Because this 
second piece of evidence will not meet those expectations, its effect will 
be to leave 
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subjects' beliefs unchanged, or, to cause them to revise downwards their confidence. On 
the other hand, those subjects who receive the stronger piece of evidence second will not 
have high expectations. Accordingly, the second piece of evidence will cause them to 
revise their belief upwards. This leads to the second prediction about the results of 
Experiment 3. Subjects who receive the weak evidence first will revise their beliefs 
upwards significantly more often than will subjects who receive the strong evidence first. 
Finally, it is predicted that subjects who receive the strong evidence first will have 
significantly higher expectations concerning the second piece of evidence than will 
subjects who receive the weak evidence first 
4.2.2 Method 
Subjects: the subjects were 60 students attending an Open University undergraduate 
summer school in cognitive psychology. 44 of the subjects were female and 16 of them 
were male. Their mean age was 40.3 years. The oldest subject was 68 and the youngest 
was 23. 
Materials: each subject received a handout that comprised an instruction sheet and three 
problems. The instructions were as follows: 
Accompanying these instructions is a series of three decision problems which 
require you, in the light of certain information, to rate your confidence in two 
alternatives and to answer some simple questions. Detailed instructions on 
what to do are contained in the problems but it would be very helpful if you 
could bear the following general points in mind throughout the experiment. 
(1) Read each problem carefully and think hard before responding. 
(2) Although there are some surface similarities between the problems, they all 
concern different scenarios, so you should think carefully about each scenario. 
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(3) Don't refer back to previous problems when working on the later problems 
(4) Each problem consists of two pages which are stapled together. It is 
important that you receive the information they contain in the intended order. 
Don't go on to a later page until you have finished the one you are currently 
working on. 
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will answer them. 
Once again, the structure of the problems used was taken from Mynatt, Doherty and 
Dragan (1993). The first page of each problem given to subjects in the first condition 
was as follows: 
Yourfriend is an engineer and worksfor a large construction company. It's 
either company A or company B, but you can't remember which. You do 
remember that he drives a company car and that he earns over 150,000 a 
year. 
You have the following piece of infonnation: 
95% of engineers working for company B earn over 150,000 a year. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your 
confidence in each of the decision alternatives in the light of the information 
you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to complete 
certainty that yourfriend works for company A and the other to complete 
certainty that yourfriend worksfor company B. Please mark the point on the 
line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. Remember that the 
greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should 
be to the 
end of the scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
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certain that your 
friend works for 
company A 
certain that your 
friend works for 
company B 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following 
questions: 
(1) What percentage of engineers working for company A would you expect 
to earn over, 00,000 a year? 
(2) What percentage of engineers working for company B would you expect 
to drive a company car? 
(3) What percentage of engineers workingfor company A would you expect 
to drive a company car? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the 
one behind it by gently pulling the sheets apart at the bottom. 
As may be seen from the above problem materials, subjects were asked about their 
expectations for each possible piece of evidence. This was done so as not to alert them to 
the piece of evidence which they would receive. Only their answers about the piece of 
evidence which they were to receive will be analysed here. The second page of each 
problem contained the following information: 
y Y. - h ere is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
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70% of engineers working for company B drive a company car. 
Once again, there followed a rating scale where subjects were asked to indicate their 
confidence in each of the hypotheses. 
Subjects in the second condition received exactly the same problems except that 
the order in which they received the probabilistic information was reversed. Thus, those 
subjects in the second condition received the information that 70% of engineers working 
for company X drove a company car on the first page of the problem and on the second 
page the information that 95% of engineers working for company X earned more than 
E50,000 a year. 
There were three different contexts used. The second concerned a friend staying in 
one of two hotels in Paris whose room costs f- 165 a night and has an en-suite bathroom. 
The third context involved a friend who lives on one of two streets, in a house with a 
swimming pool and a garage. Examples of materials using each of these contexts are given 
in Appendix 1. The two features about which information was given (company car and 
salary in the engineer problem; garage and swimming pool in the house problem; 
bathroom and price in the hotel problem) were chosen so that one of them was a 
statistically frequent feature and the other was statistically infrequent. Accordingly, the 
infrequent features will be referred to as rare (salary of E50,000+, swimming pool, and rate 
of f- 165 a night), whilst the infrequent features will be referred to as common (company 
car, garage, and en-suite bathroom). 
For ease of reference, the hypothesis about which both pieces of information were 
given will be referred to as the focal hypothesis and the second hypothesis, about which 
subjects were given no information, will be referred to as the alternative hypothesis. 
The 
confidence measure taken before subjects received the second piece of 
information will be 
referred to as confidence before, and the confidence measure taken afterwards, as 
confidence after. 
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Design: there were three predictions made in the introduction to this experiment. This 
first of these involved subjects' ratings of their relative confidence in the hypotheses (this 
will be referred to as Rating). This part of the experiment had a 2x2x3 mixed design. The 
between subject variable was Order (whether subjects received the strong piece of 
information first or second), whilst the within subjects variables were Before/After 
(subjects expressed their confidence in the hypotheses both before and after receipt of the 
second piece of information) and problem content (there were three different contents used 
- engineer, house and hotel). 
The second prediction involved the direction in which subjects would revise their 
beliefs after receipt of the second piece of evidence. This will be referred to as Direction of 
Revision. This part of the study had a 2x3 mixed design. The between subjects variable 
was order, whilst the within subjects variable was problem content. The third part of the 
study involved subjects' expectations (after receipt of the first piece of evidence) about the 
second piece of evidence they were to receive. This dependent variable will be referred to 
as Expectations. This part of the study had a 2x3 mixed design. As before the between 
subjects factor was Order, whilst the within subjects factor was problem content. The 
design of the experiment is summarised in Table 4.1. 
Task Independent Variables Levels 
Ratings 1. ORDER 2- STRONG 1ST; 
STRONG 2ND 
2. BEFORE/AFTER 2- Confidence Before 
Confidence After 
3. PROBLEM CONTENT 3. Engineer, House, Hotel 
Dirertion nf Revi. -, ion I and 3 
Expectations I and 3 
Table 4.1: The independent and dependent variables involved in Experiment I 
Procedure: subjects were run in two groups of 25 and one group of 10, and were 
randomly assigned to one of the two order conditions. They worked on their problems 
individually. The order in which subjects attempted each problem was manipulated so that 
5 subjects in each condition received the problems in each of their six possible orders-. 
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4.2.3 Results 
4.2.3.1 Confidence Ratings 
Two subjects failed to provide confidence ratings on at least one of their six scales, 
so for the purposes of this analysis they will be excluded. This left 29 subjects in each of 
the between subjects conditions. 
Subjects' confidence measures were analysed using a 2x2x3 mixed design analysis 
of variance. The between subjects factor was Order (this had two levels - Strong Ist and 
Strong 2nd), whilst the within subjects factors were Before/After (Confidence Before and 
Confidence After receipt of the second piece of information) and problem content. The 
means and standard deviations from this analysis are given in Table 4.2, whilst a full 
Anova table is given in Appendix 2. 
It will be remembered that subjects were asked to express their confidence on a 
100mm line. At one end of the line was labelled "certain ... V and at the other end 
"certain ... Y". For the purposes of the analysis which 
follows subjects' markings on the line 
were converted to scores on a 100 point scale ranging from I to 100. Each point on this 
scale corresponds to one millimetre on the line and the higher is a subject's score on this 
scale the more confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. 
Before After 
Order Engineer House Hotel Engineer House Hotel 
Strong Ist 63 17 61 15 64 21 58 17 64 14 59 18 
StronL, 2nd 57 15 60 16 63 14 71 17 73 17 72 18 
Table 4.2: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects confidence ratings in 
Experiment 3. 
The main effect for Before/After was significant F(l, 56) = 9.72, p< . 005, as was 
the interaction between Before/After and Order F(l, 56) = 21.01, p <. 
00005. Mean 
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confidence before receipt of the second piece of evidence was 61, whilst the mean rating 
after receipt of that evidence was 66. There was no significant main effect for either Order 
Mean confidence ratings 
Before/After Strong information I st Strong information 2nd 
Confidence before 63(17) 60(15) 
Confidence after 61(16) 72(18) 
Table 4.3: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) involved in the significant interaction between 
Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 3. 
F(l, 56) = 2.2 1, p=. 143, or problem content F(2,112) = . 637, p= . 53 1. Neither were any 
of the other interactions significant. The significant interaction between Order and 
Before/After is displayed in Figure 4.2, whilst the means involved are given in Table 4.3. 
74 Strong 1 st 
--ýtrong 2nd 72 
70 
(D 
0 
c 
668 
C66 0 0 
CC64 U (D 
2 62 
60 
58 
Confidence Before Confidence After 
Figure 4.2: The significant two-way interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 3. 
Tukey HSDs revealed significant differences between the means involved in the 
interaction. Subjects who received the weaker piece of information first were significantly 
more confident, on the second confidence measure, that the focal hypothesis was the case 
than they were on the first measure p<001. They were also significantly more confident 
on this measure than were subjects in the strong information first condition on the 
first 
measure p<. 001, and the second measure p<. 001. 
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4.2.3.2 Direction of Revision 
The number of subjects, broken down by Order and problem content, who revised 
their initial confidence rating upwards or downwards, as well as the number of those who 
made no revision, are given in Table 4.4. A quick look at the table confirms that, for all 
problem contents, there were more upwards revisions of belief when the strong evidence 
was received second than when it was received first. For all problem contents, when the 
strong evidence was received second, there were more upwards revisions of belief than 
downwards revisions. Similarly, for two out of the three problem contents, when the strong 
Strong evidence first Weak evidence first 
Up Down No change Up Down No change 
Engineer 10(34%) 16(55%) 3(10%) 22(76%) 6(21%) 1(3%) 
House 14(48%) 11(38%) 4(14%) 21(72%) 7(24%) 1(3%) 
Hotel 10(34%) 16(55%) 3(10%) 19(65%) 8(28%) 2 ý7%) 
Table 4.4: Number (and equivalent percentages in parentheses) of subjects, broken down by Order and 
problem content, who revised their initial confidence ratings upwards, downwards, or left them unchanged in 
Experiment 3 
information was received first, there were more downwards revisions than upwards 
revisions. For each problem content, differences in the number of upwards revisions 
between conditions were analysed using Chi squares. For the engineer problem there were 
significantly more upwards revisions when the strong information was received second 
than when it was received first (X2 (1) = 4.5, p< . 05). 
With both of the other problem 
contents the Chi squares produced insignificant results (X2 (1) < 3.84, p> . 05 in 
both 
cases). So, although the pattern of upwards revision was in the expected direction, 
for two 
out of three of the problem contents, the difference between the conditions was not 
sufficiently large to produce a significant difference. 
4.2.3.3 Expectations about the second piece of evidence 
A total of 24 subjects failed to express their expectations about the second piece of 
evidence on at least one of their problems, so for the purposes of this analysis 
they were 
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excluded. Of the remaining 36 subjects, 20 received the strong piece of information first, 
and 16 received the strong piece of information second. 
A 2x3 mixed design analysis of variance was used to analyse subjects' expectations 
about the second feature in relation to the focal (X) hypothesis. The between subjects 
factor was Order (although as subjects had received only one piece of information when 
they were asked this question, it is more precise to say that the between subjects factor was 
what information subjects had when asked the question). The within-subjects factor was 
problem content. A full Anova table for this analysis is given in Appendix 2. 
There was a significant main effect for Order F(l, 34) = 56.638, p <. 0001, but not 
for content F(2,68) = 2.054, p= . 136. There was also a significant interaction between 
Order and content F(2,68) = 6.717, p< . 01. Subjects'mean responses are presented in 
Table 4.5, whilst the interaction is displayed in Figure 4.3. Tukey HSDs for unbalanced 
Mean expectation 
Problem content Strong information first Weak information first 
Engineer 
House 
76 (25) N= 20 
93 (15) N= 20 
48 (29) N= 15 
30 (25) N= 15 
Hotel 90 (19) N= 20 51 (29) N= 15 
Table 4.5: The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) involved in the significant interaction 
between Order and problem content from the analysis of subjects' expectations in Experiment 3. 
100 
90 
= 80 
70 
2460 
w 
50 
40 
30 
20 
Engineer House Hotel 
Strong I st 
Strong 2n( 
Figure 4.3: The significant interaction between Order and problem content from the analysis if subjects' 
expectations in Experiment 3 
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samples revealed significant differences between means. Within problem contents the 
mean expectations for the second piece of evidence when the strong piece of evidence was 
received first differed significantly from mean expectations when the weak piece of 
evidence was received first (p < . 00 1 for the house and hotel problems, p< .01 for the 
engineer problem). Within the Order conditions there were no significant differences 
between any of the problem content means although the difference between the means of 
the house and hotel problems when the weak piece of information was received first did 
approach significance (p = . 05 8). 
4.2.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 are very clear. Two of the three predictions made at the 
outset received strong support, whilst the remaining prediction received partial support. As 
predicted, there was an overall recency effect in subjects' confidence ratings. Those 
subjects who received the strong information second were significantly more confident 
that the X (or focal) hypothesis was the case than were subjects who received the strong 
information first. Interestingly, only those subjects who received the strong information 
second revised their beliefs about the hypotheses to a significant degree. Whilst there was 
a significant difference between the initial and final confidence ratings of those subjects 
who received the strong piece of information second, there was no such significant 
difference between the ratings of those subjects who received the information in the 
reverse order. 
Also interesting is the difference between subjects' confidence ratings after receipt 
of the first piece of information, and their expectations based on that information. 
As 
predicted, there was a highly significant difference between the expectations of those 
subjects who received the strong information first and those who received the strong 
information second. However, there was no such significant difference 
between the groups 
for initial confidence ratings. Although this latter result is somewhat surprising, 
it may be 
the case that subjects were waiting for more information 
before anchoring their judgement. 
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The possibility that subjects may use more than one piece of information as a basis for an 
anchor is discussed by both Lopes (1987) and Hogarth and Einhorn (1992). The fact that 
there was a significant difference between the final confidence ratings of the groups does 
suggest that subjects were using the scale to express their beliefs about the hypotheses. 
The only prediction which did not receive full confirmation from the data was that 
concerning the effect of information order on the direction in which subjects would revise 
their beliefs upon receipt of the second piece of evidence. However, for one of the problem 
contents there was a significant difference in the direction predicted and for each of the 
other two problem contents the difference, although not significant, was also in the 
predicted direction. A closer examination of the data presented in Table 4.3 reveals that 
although a large majority of subjects who received the strong piece of information second 
did revise their confidence in the focal hypothesis upwards as was predicted, the same was 
not true of those subjects who received the strong information first. This result makes 
sense in terms of the interaction between the Order and Before/After manipulations. 
Subjects who received the stronger piece of evidence second were significantly more 
confident that the focal hypothesis was the case upon receipt of that second piece of 
evidence. However, subjects who received the stronger piece of evidence first were not 
significantly less confident after receipt of the second piece of evidence than they were 
before receipt of that evidence. Indeed, from the analysis of the direction in which subjects 
revised their beliefs, it seems likely that the weaker piece of evidence was not sufficiently 
weak, when received second, to cause a significant majority of subjects to revise their 
beliefs downwards. 
Although this asymmetry in the results is initially surprising, it does not 
discriminate between the two opposing explanations for these results. It will be 
remembered from the discussion of Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption that when 
strong evidence is followed by weaker evidence, the new belief is calculated as the old 
belief times the difference between the subjective value of the new evidence and the old 
belief. On the other hand, when strong evidence follows weak evidence the new belief 
is 
calculated as one minus the old belief times the difference between the value of the new 
162 
evidence minus the old belief. Accordingly, even though there was no significant 
difference between the initial confidence ratings of either order condition, there is no 
information available about the size of the difference between the subjective value of 
either the weak or the strong evidence and initial belief strength. Therefore, there is no way 
in which specific predictions about the magnitude of the revision may be made using the 
contrast assumption. 
The expectation account also sits comfortably with these results. The key in the 
expectation explanation is firstly, whether expectations are met by the evidence and 
secondly, the size of the difference between the expectation and the evidence. It is clear 
that when the second piece of evidence was strong, it greatly exceeded subjects' 
expectations. When the second piece of evidence was weak, as pointed out above, it is not 
clear how great was the difference between expectations and the actual value of the 
evidence. Therefore, although this experiment may be said to have provided some 
evidence that expectations are important in the belief revision process, the experiment 
itself was incapable of providing discriminatory evidence. The next experiment will 
constitute an attempt to discriminate between the competing accounts. 
4.3 EXPERIMENT 4 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The results of the previous experiment suggested the importance of expectations 
from background knowledge to the process of belief revision. However, the results of 
Experiment 3, although suggestive, may also be explained in terms of Hogarth and 
Einhorn's contrast assumption. The purpose of this experiment is to 
demonstrate that the 
contrast assumption is an inadequate explanation for order effects 
in belief revision. Before 
going on to discuss exactly how this demonstration will 
be achieved, it will be useful to 
say some more about how an explanation based on the contrast assumption 
differs from an 
explanation implicating expectation. 
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The primary difference between the two explanations is in how well they capture 
evidential context. As stated previously, Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption based 
model constitutes an advance on previous models of the belief revision process because it 
attempts to account for the context in which a piece of evidence is received. It does this by 
invoking differences in the subjective value of pieces of evidence. Accordingly, strong 
evidence followed by weak evidence always produces downwards revision. When the 
evidence is in the reverse order, upwards revision will always be observed (the role played 
by the sign of the evidence, i. e. which hypothesis the evidence supports, is moot. See 
overleaf for a discussion of this issue). In terms of the equations in which they express 
their model, the contrast assumption is captured by differential weighting of the subjective 
value of the new evidence. This differential weighting is dependent on the relative 
strengths of the subject's background belief and the new evidence. Thus, when the new 
evidence is weaker than background belief, the subjective value of the new evidence is 
weighted by the anchor. Conversely, when the new evidence is stronger than background 
belief, the weight is inversely proportional to the anchor. 
This intuition appears to have been given support by a set of experiments reported 
by Tubbs, Gaeth, Levin and van Osdol (1993). These authors demonstrated both that there 
were recency effects with inconsistent evidence, and that the size of those recency effects 
was dependent on the degree to which the pieces of inconsistent evidence differed 
in 
subjective value. They also claimed that their finding of recency effects with evidence 
which had the same evidential sign (i. e. all positive or all negative as regards the 
focal 
hypothesis) but different subjective values (i. e. amongst positive evidential items some 
evidence was more positive than other evidence, and amongst negative 
items some 
evidence was more negative then other evidence) suggested that 
it was difference in 
subjective value rather than difference in sign which was the main 
factor underlying 
recency. Tubbs et al argued that this last finding was 
in direct contradiction to Hogarth and 
Einhorn's contrast assumption (which they claimed only predicts recency 
for inconsistent 
evidence). 
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There are two points which may be made about Tubbs et al's finding and their 
interpretation of that finding. Firstly, it is not at all clear that Tubbs et al's results are in 
contradiction with Hogarth and Einhorn's model. In that model, the source of differential 
weighting is the relationship between background belief and the subjective value of any 
new evidence. As discussed above, Hogarth and Einhorn define the case of new evidence 
with a subjective value greater than background belief, and the case of new evidence with 
a value smaller than background belief. Although in defining these two cases they place 
primary emphasis on the sign of new evidence, such an emphasis does not preclude 
consideration of differences in subjective value between two pieces of evidence. 
The second point which may be made about Tubbs et al's results is that they are 
indicative of the problem with all existing models of belief revision, that is, the problem of 
what constitutes contradictory evidence. For example, when trying to decide which of two 
hypotheses is the case, it is not always clear whether evidence is marked for one 
hypothesis or the other. Imagine being asked to categorise a car which possesses four 
doors and leather upholstery as either a model X or a model Y. Does being told that 55% 
of model Xs possess four doors constitute evidence for, or against, the hypothesis that the 
target car is a model X? Both Lopes (1987) and Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) identify this 
problem of interpretation as a stage in the belief revision process where error can occur. 
However, neither of their approaches to the process can solve the problem. The situation is 
complicated when the subject receives two pieces of evidence. How does the subject 
decide whether these pieces of evidence contradict each other? Hogarth and Einhorn's 
unsatisfactory reply is to claim that if there is a difference between the subjective value of 
the new evidence and background belief (which itself must have been formed by earlier 
evidence), then that new evidence contradicts earlier evidence. The problem is, of course, 
one of working out the subjective value of a piece of evidence. It should be pointed out 
here that the term subjective value is used by almost all workers in the area of belief 
revision to refer to the value which a piece of evidence has for the subject. Although the 
term evidential value might be preferable, it will not be used here for two reasons. 
Firstly, 
and most obviously, the term subjective value will be used to preserve continuity with the 
previous literature. Secondly, the use of the term evidential value could 
lead to confusion 
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as it could, in certain circumstances, be understood as referring to the epistemic utility (see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of this concept) of a piece of evidence. 
An account of the belief revision process which implicates expectation, presents a 
solution to many of the problems of working out the subjective values of pieces of 
evidence. In many cases where just one piece of evidence is presented, the problem of 
determining which hypothesis it supports is solved by inferring from background 
knowledge (in this instance about the rate at which models of cars possess various 
features) whether the hypothesised category possesses the evidential feature at a rate which 
is higher or greater than would be expected. Even in many cases where subjects receive 
sequential evidence, later evidence can have an expected value which is determined from 
both background knowledge and the earlier evidence. In the cases where these expected 
values exist, the actual value of the later evidence may be compared with the expected 
value and a decision about the sign of the evidence may be made. 
This difference leads to a direct test of the two approaches. Consider the evidence 
which subjects received in Experiment 3. Asked to decide whether a target house which 
possessed a garage and a swimming pool was most likely to be on street X or street Y, 
subjects were told that 95% of houses on street X possessed a swimming pool and 70% 
possessed a garage. The expectation account of the results of Experiment 3 rest on the 
assumption that these features are in some way related. That is, given 
information about 
one of the features, subjects are able to derive expectations about the other 
feature from 
background knowledge. This assumption about features of objects being in some way 
related seems a reasonable one, especially in the light of the experimental work concerning 
correlated features and categorisation (e. g. Medin, Altom, 
Edelson and Fresko, 1982; Malt 
and Smith, 1984; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 
1976; Murphy and 
Medin, 1985) discussed in Chapter 3. Indeed, there is evidence from the literature on 
expertise in judgement (Phelps and Shanteau, 1978) that 
because of intercorrelations 
between features, experts are able to use more information than is usually thought. 
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However, the relationship which holds between the evidential features used in 
Experiment 3 is much simpler than one of correlation. Consider one of the pairs of features 
which were used in that experiment: having a swimming pool and having a garage. 
Although one would expect a house which possesses a swimming pool to posses a garage, 
one would not expect a house with a garage to possess a swimming pool. If these features 
were correlated, possession of any one feature would enable a prediction about the 
likelihood that an object possessed the second feature. In the case of the feature pair above, 
only one feature is predictive of the other. 
Now consider a situation where subjects are given the same problem but this time 
receive information that 95% of houses on street X are over 200 years old and 70% have a 
garage. Neither of these features is likely to be predictive of the other. Accordingly, given 
one piece of information, subjects will not be able to derive expectations concerning the 
other piece of information from background knowledge. However, it is also likely that the 
probability that a house will possess a swimming pool is equal to the probability that a 
house is over 200 years old. Both features are rare in the general population of houses. 
Thus, they are equally diagnostic and will have the same independent subjective value for 
the subject. The anchor and adjustment model of Hogarth and Einhorn would, therefore, 
predict exactly the same results with the second set of evidential features as with the first. 
The predictions of an account which implicates expectation in the process are very 
clear. Firstly, it is predicted that in the pre-test to establish both the perceived base rates of 
individual features, and the degree of perceived association between pairs of features, 
possession of the rare features used in Experiment 3 will be perceived to predict possession 
of the common features used in Experiment 3. Secondly, it is predicted that although the 
results of Experiment 3 will be replicated with pairs of associated features (i. e. feature 
pairs where one predicts the other, but not vice versa), there will be no order effect when 
subjects are given evidence concerning pairs of non-associated features. Simply put, an 
account which implicates expectation predicts recency with, for example, associated 
feature pairs of houses such as having a swimming pool and having a garage, 
but not with 
non-associated feature pairs such as having a swimming pool and being over 
200 years 
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old. On the other hand, Hogarth and Einhorn's belief adjustment model predicts recency 
with both associated and non-associated features. 
4.3.2 Pre-test 
As the rationale for the pre-test has already been described this section will consist 
of a straightforward method and results section. Before describing the pre-test it should be 
noted that it was decided to abandon one of the scenarios used in the previous experiment 
(the hotel scenario) and to replace it with another scenario concerning a car belonging to 
the subject's sister. This was decided because the hotel scenario was not considered to 
afford the possibilities for manipulation necessary for the planned experiment. 
There were two parts to the pre-test the first of which was described in Chapter 2 
and the second of which will be described in detail here. The first part was designed to 
establish the perceived frequency or base rate of certain features of objects. The second 
part sought to establish the perceived association between the most rare of those features 
and other features of the same objects. The features chosen from the first part of the pre- 
test will be presented before going on to describe the second part -of the pre-test. 
4.3.2.1 Establishing the base rates 
For this experiment, and the two which follow, it was decided to use three problem 
Scenario Feature Estimated Base Rate 
HOUSE Possession of a swimn-dng pool 3% 
Possession of a garage 56% 
Being built between 1945 and 1985 69% 
CAR Having of a top speed of over 165 mph 6% 
Possession of a radio 92% 
Having four doors 58% 
ENGINEER Earning over E60,000 pa 
Having a company car 
. 12% 
62% 
Working in general construction 52% 
Table 4.6: The estimated base rates of the features selected for inclusion in Experiment 
4 
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contents. Two of these were used in Experiment 3 (the engineer scenario and the house 
scenario). The hotel scenario of the previous experiment was replaced (for the reason given 
above) with a problem concerning a car. Based on the results of the first part of the pre-test 
three features were selected for use in Experiment 4. It will be remembered from Chapter 2 
that this part of the pre-test involved asking subjects to estimate how many objects, out of 
every ten thousand, would possess certain features. The features selected, and their 
estimated base rates are presented in Table 4.6. 
4.3.2.2 Establishing the level of perceived associations amongst the features 
Method 
Subjects: 30 subjects participated in the pre-test. 7 of these were male and 23 were 
female. Subjects were drawn from the same population as that used for the first stage of 
the pre-test. Their mean age was 24.7. The youngest was 19 and the oldest was 48. Once 
again all subjects were paid for their participation in the experiment. 
Materials: as with the first part of the pre-test, subjects were presented with a four page 
booklet consisting of an instruction sheet and three question sheets. The instructions were 
as follows: 
On thefollowing pages you willfind a series of three questions, each of which 
has a series of subsections. Each question concerns one particular class of 
things. The subsections ask you to estimate how often, in every one thousand 
occurrences, an item will have a particular feature. So, for example, you may 
be asked: 
Out of every 1000 students living in university accommodation, 
how many 
would you expect to 
(a) own a car? 
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(b) have a part-time job? 
If you feel that the answer to the first part of the question is 155, thenyou 
should write this in the space provided. 
Please try to answer all of the questions. While it is unlikely that you will 
know the exact answer to any of the questions, we are interested in your best 
guess. This does not mean that we want you to put down the first number that 
pops into your head. Your knowledge of each of the things in the questions 
should enable you to give sensible answers in most cases! 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
help you. 
On the following pages were a set of questions concerning objects which possessed the 
feature which had been previously estimated as being rare. The precise form of the 
questions for each of the three problem contents is given below. 
Out of every 1000 houses with a swimming pool, how many would you 
expectto ....... ; 
Out of every 1000 engineers who earn approximatelyf60,000 a year how 
many would you expect to ........ ; 
Out of every 1000 cars bought new in 1988 which have a top speed of over 
165 mph, how many would you expect to ..... . 
Although for each set of questions there were only two estimated base rates which were of 
interest, the questions concerning these base rates were placed in a list of between six and 
nine other items. This was because of the need to pre-test materials for other experiments. 
All of these items are presented in Appendix 4. The estimated base rates 
for some of these 
other features will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Design: as there were only two features of interest for each problem content, this part of 
the pre-test had a 2x3 mixed design. The between subjects factor was degree of association 
(Association) whilst the within subjects factor was problem content. 
Procedure: subjects in this part of the pre-test rare correlation condition were run in 
several groups of between 6 and 10. All subjects were given 15 minutes to complete the 
booklet. 
Results 
The mean ratings for each of the features of interest are given in Table 4.7. The 
ratings produced by subjects in this part of the pre-test were analysed using a 20 within 
subjects Anova. The factors in this analysis were AssociationI (high and low) and 
HOUSE(with a swimming pool) ENGRýEER (earning E60,000 pa) CAR (top speed of 165mph+) 
garage 94%(9) 
built between 58%(24) 
1945-85 
drives a 
company car 
84%(16) radio 
works in general 36% (26) 
construction 
four doors 
95%(18)) 
50%(26) 
Table 4.7: The rate at which objects possessing the rare feature were expected to possess each of the 
common features (standard deviations in parentheses) from the pre-test for Experiment 4. 
problem content. There was a significant main effect for Association F(I, 29) = 239.93, p 
< . 00 1. As expected, the mean 
frequency rating for the predicted high association features 
was higher (mean =91 %) than was the mean rating for the predicted low association 
features (mean = 48%). There was also a significant main effect of problem content F(2, 
58) = 10.06, p< . 
00 1. The mean rating for the engineer problem (mean = 60%) was 
I Association is used here in a restricted sense. It is intended to refer to the case where possession of one 
feature is associated with possession of a second feature. A more strict, correlational, definition of 
association would be Association = ABS[Prob(Common feature/Rare feature) - Prob(Common 
feature)]. As 
may be seen from a consideration of Tables 4.6 and 4.7, there is very little difference 
between the High and 
Low Association conditions when this strict definition is applied. However, the logic of this experiment only 
requires that subjects in the High Association condition, initially told that a high percentage of 
instances of X 
possess the Rare feature have higher expectations concerning the Common feature than 
do subjects in the 
Low Association condition. As may be seen from Table 4.7, this is the case. Ideally, Expectation should 
have 
been term used to describe this manipulation. However, it has already been used to 
describe the second 
dependent variable in Experiment 3 and is thus unavailable. 
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significantly lower than the mean ratings for the house and car problems (mean ratings of 
76% and 72%, respectively). However, the interaction between predicted correlation and 
content was not significant F(2,5 8) = 1.4 1, p> . 25). The mean ratings for all of the 
features used in this part of the pre-test are given in Appendix 4. 
One aspects of these results deserves a brief mention. The finding of significant 
effects of content leads to the expectation that there will be significant effects for content 
in Experiment 4. In practice, it was impossible to control for these differences. 
4.3.3 Experiment 4- Method 
Subjects: 72 subjects took part in this experiment. 25 of these were male and 47 were 
female. There were two distinct groups of subjects who participated in the experiment: 31 
from the first year Business Studies Department at the University of Plymouth; and 41 
from the first and third year classes in the Psychology Department at the University of 
Plymouth. Subjects from these two distinct groups were evenly distributed across 
conditions. The mean age of the subjects was 23.4. The oldest subject was 43 and the 
youngest was 17. 
Materials: subjects received a handout which comprised of an instruction sheet and three 
problems. These instructions were as follows: 
Accompanying these instructions is a series of three decision problems which 
require you, in the light of certain information, to rate your confidence in two 
alternatives and to answer some simple questions. Detailed instructions on 
what to do are contained in the problems but it would be very helpful if you 
could bear the following general points in mind throughout the experiment. 
(1) Read each problem carefully and think hard before responding. 
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(2) Although there are some surface similarities between the problems, they all 
concern different scenarios, so you should think carefully about each scenario. 
(3) Don't refer back to previous problems when working on the later problems 
(4) Each problem consists of two pages which are stapled together. It is 
important that you receive the information they contain in the intended order. 
Don't go on to a later page until you have finished the one you are currently 
working on. 
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will answer them. 
The structure and content of the problems was similar to that used in Experiment 
3. Thus, for each problem, subjects were given a scenario involving a decision about which 
of two alternatives was likely to be the case. Next they received a piece of evidence 
relevant to the decision and were asked to rate their confidence in the alternatives in the 
light of the evidence they had received. Following this, subjects were asked to state their 
expectations about the remaining unseen evidence. On the next page was a further piece of 
information relevant to their decision and a second rating scale. As in Experiment 3, all of 
the evidence which subjects received was relevant to just one of the alternatives presented 
in the scenario. Each subject received three problems involving a house, an engineer and a 
car. 
As stated above, subjects were once again asked about their expectations for each 
possible piece of evidence. This was done in order to keep the conditions in this 
experiment as similar as possible to those in Experiment 3. Once again, as a manipulation 
check, only those answers about the piece of evidence which subjects were to receive will 
be analysed here. 
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There were four conditions in this experiment. In two of the four conditions 
subjects received the information in the order of the example given for Experiment 3 (see 
pgs 153 - 155). In the other two conditions subjects received the evidence in the opposite 
order. The second manipulation in this experiment was achieved by varying the level of 
perceived association amongst the features with which subjects were presented. For each 
of the three problem types there were two sets of features, one set which had a high level 
of perceived association (as in the example on pgs 153 - 155), and the other which had a 
low level of perceived association. The strengths of these perceived associations were 
established in the pre-test (see previous section). These feature pairs are shown in Table 
4.8. 
From the preceding description of the materials it should be apparent that this 
experiment is merely an extension of Experiment 3. In fact, one half of this experiment is a 
replication of Experiment 3. 
Association Strength House Engineer Car 
High Strong swimming pool E60,000+ p. a. 165+mph 
Weak garage company car radio 
Low Strong swimming pool E60,000+ p. a. 165+mph 
Weak built between works in gener- four doors 
1945-85 al construction 
Table 4.8: Combinations of high and low association features used in Experiment 4 broken down by whether 
the feature formed part of a strong or weak piece of evidence. 
Design: there were two parts to this experiment. The first involved subjects' ratings of 
their confidence in the hypotheses. This part of the experiment had a 2x2x2x3 mixed 
design, with the between subjects factors being the perceived association between the 
features (Association) and the order in which information was presented to subjects 
(Order), and the within subjects factors being whether subjects rated their confidence 
in the 
hypotheses before or after presentation of the second piece of evidence (Before/After) and 
problem content. The second part of the experiment involved subjects' expectations about 
the second piece of evidence which they received. As this measure was taken prior 
to 
receipt of the second piece of evidence, the Before/After 
factor is not involved here. This 
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measure therefore involves a 2x2x3 design. The design of both parts of the experiment is 
summarised in Table 4.9. 
Task Independent Variables Levels 
Confidence Ratings 1. ASSOCIATION 2- HIGH, LOW 
2. ORDER 
3. BEFORE/AFTER 
2- STRONG IST; 
STRONG 2ND 
2- Confidence Before 
Confidence After 
4. PROBLEM CONTENT 3. Engineer, House, Car 
Expectations 1,2 and 4 
Table 4.9: Independent and dependent variables from Experiment 4. 
Procedure: as this experiment was run in parallel with several others, two thirds of the 
subjects were run as part of two groups of one hundred. The other third of the subjects 
were run as part of several smaller groups of between ten and sixteen subjects. All subjects 
participated in the experiment during class-time. Each of the four conditions contained 
approximately equal numbers of subjects from both sizes of groups. In each condition 
three subjects received the problems in each of the six possible orders. They worked on 
their problems individually. 
4.3.4 Results 
4.3.4.1 Confidence ratings 
Subjects' confidence ratings were analysed using a 2x2x2x3 mixed design analysis 
of variance. The between sub ects factors were Association and Order, whilst the within j 
subjects factors were Before/After and problem content. The means and standard 
deviations from this analysis are given in Table 4.10, whilst a full Anova table is given in 
Appendix 2. Once again it will be remembered that subjects were asked to express their 
confidence on a 100mm line. At one end of the line was labelled "certain ... 
V and at the 
other end "certain ... Y". For the purposes of the analysis which 
follows subjects' markings 
on the line were converted to scores on a 100 point scale ranging 
from I to 100. Each point 
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on this scale corresponds to one millimetre on the line and the higher is a subject's score on 
this scale the more confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. 
The main effect for Before/After was highly significant F(l, 68) = 22.02, p< . 00 1. 
The mean confidence before rating was 66 whereas the mean confidence after rating was 
73. There were no other significant main effects. The interaction between Order and 
Before After 
Associat'n Order 
I 
House Engineer Car House fý-- 
High Strong Ist 68 16 66 17 73 18 68 15 67 15 71 16 
Strong 2nd 63 16 63 16 63 18 78 18 77 19 82 16 
Low Strong Ist 65 20 69 23 69 23 73 20 70 19 72 19 
Stroniz 2nd 64 13 65 11 63 11 73 19 72 21 69 21 
Table 4.10: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 4. 
Before/After was significant F(l, 68) = 11.57, p <. 002. This interaction is shown in Figure 
4.4, whilst the means and standard deviations involved in the interaction are given in Table 
4.11. Tukey HSDs revealed that neither the difference between the means produced before 
receipt of the second piece of evidence, nor the difference between the means produced 
after, was significant (p > . 05 
in both cases). Thus, the overall recency effect in this 
experiment was not significant. 
78 ,I. -I 
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Strong 1 st 
Strong 2nd 
Figure 4.4: Interaction of Order with Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence 
ratings in 
Experiment 4. 
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Before After 
Strong Ist 68(18) 70(16) 
Strong 2nd 63(12) 75(16) 
Table 4.11: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) involved in the significant interaction between 
Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 4. 
The interaction between Association, Order and when Before/After was also 
significant F(l, 68) = 4.53, p< . 04. The means and standard deviations involved in this 
interaction are given in Table 4.12, whilst the interaction itself is presented in Figure 4.5. 
Association Order Before After 
High Strong I st 69(16) 69(14) 
Strong 2nd 63(15) 79(16) 
Low Strong lst 68(20) 72(17) 
Strone 2nd 64(9) 71(16) 
Table 4.12: The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) involved in the significant interaction 
between Association, Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 4. 
Tests for simple interaction effects on the significant three way interaction revealed 
a significant interaction between Order and Before/After when the perceived association 
between the features was high (F(l, 68) = 5.09, p< . 05), 
but not when the perceived 
association between the features was low (F(l, 68) < 1). Tukey HSDs were performed on 
the significant half of the three way interaction. Those subjects who received the strong 
piece of evidence second produced a mean confidence rating after receipt of 
the strong 
evidence which was significantly higher than the remaining three means 
involved in the 
interaction. The increase in confidence, due to receipt of the second piece of evidence, 
for 
this group was highly significant (p < . 0002), whilst 
both of the other differences were 
significant at p< . 
02. None of the other differences between the means 
involved in this 
interaction were significant. 
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Figure 4.5: The significant interaction between Association, Order and Before/After from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 4. 
4.3.4.2 Expectations about the second piece of evidence 
A total of 16 subjects failed to respond to at least one of the questions measuring 
expectation so they have been excluded for the purposes of this analysis. Of the remaining 
56 subjects there were 13 in the high association/strong information first condition; 15 in 
the high association/weak information first condition, and 14 in each of the remaining 
conditions. A 2x2x3 mixed design Anova was used to analyse results on this measure. The 
between subjects factors were Association and Order, whilst the within subjects factor was 
problem content. The means and standard deviations from this analysis are given in Table 
4.13, whilst a full Anova table is given in Appendix 2. 
Association Order 
I 
House Engineer Car Totals 
High Strong Ist 86 17 80 19 87 17 84 16 
Strong 2nd 30 27 48 30 48 36 4225 
Low Strong Ist 69 25 63 30 61 31 6422 
Strong 2nd 33 27 26 25 46 31 3524 
Table 4.13: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' expectations 
in 
Experiment 4. 
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There was a significant main effect for Association F(l, 52) = 5.22, p< . 03; 
subjects in the high association conditions had a mean expectation of 63 whilst those in the 
low association condition had a mean expectation of 50. There was also a significant main 
effect for Order F(I, 52) = 36.80, p< . 000 1; subjects who received the strong information 
first had a mean expectation of 74 whilst those who received the weak information first 
had a mean expectation of 39. The interaction between these two factors was not 
significant (F(I, 52) = 1.26, p> . 25) 
There was a significant two-way interaction between Order and problem content 
F(2,104) = 3.34, p< . 04. Tukey HSD tests revealed significant differences amongst the 
means involved in this interaction. These means and their standard deviations are shown in 
Table 4.14, whilst the interaction is represented in Figure 4.6. The differences between 
means were, with just one exception, as expected. Each mean expectation produced by 
subjects who received the strong evidence first, was significantly higher than each mean 
produced by those subjects who received the strong evidence second (p < . 00 1 in all 
cases). The one unexpected result was the significant difference in the strong information 
2nd condition between mean expectations for the second piece of evidence in the house 
problem and mean expectations in the car problem (p < . 05). None of the other interactions 
involved in this analysis were significant. 
85 
75 
Strong 1 st 
Strong 2nd 
65 
55 
9 
045 
35 
25 
House Engineer Car 
content 
Figure 4.6: The significant interaction between Order and problem content from the analysis of subjects' 
expectations in Experiment 4. 
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House Engineer Car 
Strong Ist 77(23) 71(26) 73(28) 
Strong 2nd 32(26) 39(30) 47(33) 
Table 4.14: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) involved in the interaction between Order and 
problem content from the analysis of subjects' expectations in Experiment 4. 
4.3.5 Discussion 
Both of the predictions made at the outset of this experiment have been confirmed. 
Firstly, the features which were used in Experiment 3 were shown to have a high degree of 
perceived association. By this it is meant that subjects expected a very high proportion of 
instances of the ob . ects used, which possessed the rare feature, to also possess the common 
feature. Secondly, although the recency effect of Experiment 3 was replicated when 
subjects were given information concerning these associated features, no recency effect 
was obtained when the features used were not perceived by subjects to be associated. As 
was stated in the introduction to this experiment, such a result strongly supports an account 
of the belief revision process which implicates expectation, and suggests that the anchor 
and adjust model of Hogarth and Einhorn is an insufficient account of the belief revision 
process. 
Subjects' expectations about the unseen evidence are also of interest. The 
significant main effects of the Association and Order manipulations suggest that these 
manipulations were successful. Subjects, who received initial information that the majority 
of instances of an hypothesised category possessed a certain feature, had significantly 
greater expectations concerning the second feature when that feature was perceived to be 
associated with the first feature. Likewise, subjects, given initial information that the 
majority of instances of a hypothesised category possessed a very rare feature, expected 
the majority of those instances to also possess the common feature. On the other 
hand, 
subjects, when told that the majority of instances of the hypothesised category possessed a 
common feature, had significantly lower expectations concerning the 
level at which the 
rare feature was likely to be present. 
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The two way interaction between Association and Order, although insignificant, 
was also very interesting (see Figure 4.13). Whilst initial information about a rare feature 
produced high expectations concerning both types of common feature, these expectations 
were higher for the associated common features than for the non-associated features. The 
equivalent difference between the expectations of subjects given an initial piece of 
information about a common feature was very slight and suggests that differences in 
expectations did not play a major role in the belief revision of those subjects who received 
initial information about the rare feature. 
Although a detailed discussion of the implications of these results for theories of 
belief revision will be left until the general discussion, the performance of those subjects 
who received information about non-associated features will be briefly discussed here. 
What is most interesting about the results of this half of the experiment is the complete 
disappearance of the recency effect. This disappearance is probably the cause of the non- 
significance of the overall recency effect in the experiment. The complete absence of a 
recency effect may also be taken as evidence of rational information use on the part of 
subjects. Although the information which subjects received was relevant to only one of the 
hypotheses and therefore, according to the normative analysis adopted by workers such as 
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan (1993), non-diagnostic, subjects did seem to use that 
information in a manner which would be expected. Those subjects who were given the 
strong information first had a higher level of belief in the focal hypothesis after receipt of 
this first piece of information than had subjects who received the strong piece of evidence 
second. However, the second piece of information had a greater effect on subjects' initial 
beliefs when that second piece of information was the stronger one. In fact, the effect of a 
strong second piece of evidence was to raise the confidence of subjects to the same 
level as 
that of subjects who received the strong piece of evidence first. What 
is surprising is the 
fact that the final confidence ratings of all of the subjects who received information 
concerning features which had low perceived association were 
lower than the final 
confidence ratings of subjects who received information about 
high association features in 
the weak/strong order. This is surprising because expectations were not predicted 
to play a 
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significant effect in the confidence ratings of any of these three groups of subjects. As both 
the perceived frequency of the features about which these subjects received information 
and the rate at which these features were said to be possessed by instances of category X 
were equal, the final confidence ratings of all three groups of subjects should also have 
been approximately equal. Although Figure 4.5 seems to suggest that there is a large 
difference between the final confidence ratings of those subjects in the high 
association/strong 2nd condition and the final ratings of subjects in both of the low 
association conditions, this difference was not found to be significant. 
Of course, because the evidence which subjects received in this experiment was 
"non-diagnostic", according to the traditional normative analysis of the pseudo- 
diagnosticity task (e. g. Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan, 1993), subjects in both halves of the 
experiment should have expressed equal confidence in the X and Y hypotheses after 
receipt of each piece of evidence. Nevertheless, it may be claimed, on the basis of these 
results, that the "irrational" effect of information order is due, at least in some cases, to the 
existence of "rational" (e. g. Dennett, 1991) expectations. In this light, it is worth pointing 
out that although an alternative normative analysis of information use on the pseudo- 
diagnosticity task will not be attempted in this thesis, the normative analysis of the task 
used in Experiment 2 suggests that an alternative normative analysis of information use is 
also possible. As with the analysis presented in Chapter 2, subjects' expectations about 
unseen evidence are likely to be crucial in any alternative normative analysis of 
information use. 
4.4 EXPERIMENT 5 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The major finding of the previous studies in this chapter was that 
Hogarth and 
Einhorn's contrast assumption is incapable of predicting when recency will, and will not, 
occur. It was concluded that this is so because Hogarth and Einhom's model 
does not take 
into account the degree of relationship which may exist between two pieces of evidence. 
In 
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Experiment 4, degree of contrast was controlled for by means of a rating study. 
Experiment 5 will constitute an attempt to further demonstrate that Hogarth and Einhorn's 
contrast assumption is an inadequate predictor of recency. As was the case in Experiment 
4, degree of contrast will be controlled for in Experiment 5. In this experiment, however, 
degree of contrast will be controlled for by using the same features in each half of the 
experiment. This is best illustrated by the example which follows. 
Consider the subject who is asked to decide which model of car her sister owns. 
She is initially told that 95% of car Xs possess a top speed of over 165 mph. Next she is 
told that 70% of car Xs possess a radio. In Experiments 3 and 4 these types of materials, in 
the above order, produced roughly identical confidence ratings before and after receipt of 
the second piece of evidence. When the order in which subjects received the evidence was 
reversed, a significant increase in ratings after receipt of the second piece of evidence was 
found. Experiment 4 demonstrated that such an effect is due to the degree which 
possession of the common feature is predicted by possession of the rare feature. When 
subjects received information about two features which were equally different in terms of 
their perceived frequency (and therefore likely to have equal "subjective value" for the 
subject), but where the rare feature was not perceived to predict the common feature, no 
order effect was observed. 
It is possible to imagine a very similar experiment where it is the likelihood that 
members of category X possess each of the features which is manipulated, rather than the 
strength of the perceived relationship between the features (in all cases the perceived 
association between the features would be high). For example, one group of subjects might 
first be told that 95% of car Xs possessed a top speed of 165 mph and then be told that 
95% of car Xs possessed a radio, whilst another group might initially 
be told that 70% of 
car Xs possessed a top speed of 165 mph and subsequently be told that 
70% of cars Xs 
possessed a radio. In this case both sets of subjects are receiving 
information likely to be 
equally different in subjective value. This is because both groups receive 
information 
about the same features, and both are told that these features are possessed 
by the focal 
category at the same rate. Although one set of subjects is told that 
both features are 
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possessed by 95% of instances of, category X, whereas the other set of subjects are told that 
both features are possessed by 70% of instances of category X, no differences in degree of 
contrast between groups should be caused by this manipulation. 
Due to the contrast assumption, Hogarth and Einhorn's model of belief revision 
would predict a similar sized recency effect for both groups of subjects. However, an 
account of belief revision which implicated expectation would not make such a prediction. 
It would claim that a recency effect was much more likely in the case where subjects were 
told that 95% of instances of the focal category possessed both of the evidential features. 
This is because of the predicted difference between subjects' expectations about the second 
piece of evidence which they will receive and the actual value of that evidence. Subjects 
told that 95% of instances of car X possessed a top speed of over 165 mph will have higher 
expectations about the second piece of evidence than will subjects told that 70% of car Xs 
possess such a top speed. However, in both cases it is likely that those expectations will be 
met by the evidence which subjects receive. Subjects told that 95% of instances of the 
focal (X) category possess the rare feature will also be told that 95% of instances of that 
category possess the common feature. Likewise, subjects told that 70% of instances of the 
focal category possess the rare feature will also be told that 70% of instances possess the 
common feature. In both cases, the information which subjects receive would be predicted 
to meet subjects' expectations about that information. Accordingly, these subjects would be 
predicted to revise their beliefs upwards to the same extent. 
However, the final confidence ratings of those subjects who receive an initial piece 
of information about a common feature are expected to differ significantly. If expectation 
is implicated in the process of belief revision, then the final confidence ratings of subjects 
initially told that 95% of instances of the focal category possess the common feature are 
expected to be significantly higher than the final confidence ratings of subjects told that 
70% of instances of the focal category possess the common feature. Once again this 
prediction is made based upon the predicted differences between these subjects' 
expectations about the unseen evidence and the actual value of that evidence. Consider the 
subject told that 95% of instances of the focal category possess a common feature. She will 
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expect a relatively low proportion of instances of that category to possess the rare feature. 
However, the subsequent information that 95% of instances of the focal category possess 
the rare feature will greatly exceed her expectations thereby causing her to revise her initial 
confidence rating upwards in favour of the focal hypothesis. Now consider a second 
subject, told that 70% of instances of the focal category possess the common feature. Her 
expectations about the unseen evidence would be predicted to be approximately equal to 
those of the earlier subject. This is because although predictions may be made about 
possession of the common feature given possession of the rare feature, the reverse is not 
the case. Accordingly, changes in the likelihood that instances of the focal category 
possess the common feature should not dramatically affect subjects' predictions about the 
likelihood that instances of that category will possess the rare feature. This second subject 
will be told that 70% of instances of the focal category possess the rare feature. Although 
this piece of evidence is predicted to be stronger than subjects' expectations, it will not 
exceed those expectations to the same extent that being told that 95% of instances possess 
the rare feature would. For this reason, it is predicted that the final confidence rating of this 
subject in the 70% condition would be lower than the final confidence rating of the 
previous subject in the 95% condition. 
There are two possible outcomes given an experiment such as the one just 
described. Firstly, it may be the case that recency will be observed in both halves of the 
experiment. However, even if this is the case, a significantly larger recency effect is 
predicted amongst subjects told that 95% of instances of category X posses both of the 
features. This is because subjects in this condition, who receive the stronger piece of 
evidence second, are predicted to revise their initial confidence ratings upwards to a 
greater degree than will the equivalent subjects in the 70% condition. The second possible 
outcome is that of a recency effect in the 95% condition and no such effect in the 70% 
condition. It may be the case that in order for subjects who receive the strong piece of 
evidence second to revise their initial ratings upwards to a significant extent, the 
final 
piece of evidence which they receive must dramatically exceed their expectations as 
it did 
in Experiments 1,3 and 4. Either of these outcomes would constitute evidence against 
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Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption however which predicts equal recency in both 
halves of the experiment. 
Accordingly, the experiment which follows may be thought of as having two 
purposes. Firstly, it seeks to further examine the order effect established in Chapter 4. The 
specific question which it asks is the extent to which the difference in the likelihood of 
occurrence attributed to the evidential features in Experiments 3 and 4 contributes to the 
order effect found in both those experiments. Secondly, the experiment seeks to provide 
Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption with a further test. It will reduce but at the 
same time, keep constant, the contrast between the pieces of evidence which subjects 
receive. This reduction in contrast will be achieved by increasing, or decreasing, the 
overall strength of the evidence which subjects receive. It is predicted that if a recency 
effect is found, it will only be found, or be significantly larger, in those conditions where 
the overall strength of the evidence has been increased. 
4.4.2 Method 
Subjects: 72 subjects took part in this experiment. 31 of these were male and 41 were 
female. Subjects were drawn from the same groups as in the previous experiment and were 
evenly distributed across conditions. Thirty business students and forty two psychology 
students participated. The mean age of subjects was 23.6. The oldest subject was 
47 and 
the youngest was 18. 
Materials: as in Experiment 4, subjects received a handout which comprised an 
instruction sheet and three problems. The instructions were exactly the same as 
those used 
in Experiment 4. The structure and content of the problems was also exactly 
the same as 
that used in Experiment 4. Thus, for each problem, subjects were given 
a scenario 
involving a decision about which of two alternatives was 
likely to be the case. Next they 
received a piece of evidence relevant to the decision and were asked 
to rate their 
confidence in the alternatives in the light of the evidence 
they had received. Following 
this, subjects were asked to state their expectations about 
the remaining unseen evidence. 
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On the next page was a further piece of information relevant to their decision and a second 
rating scale. As in Experiments 3 and 4, all of the evidence which subjects received was 
relevant to just one of the alternatives presented in the scenario. Each subject received 
three problems involving a house, an engineer and a car. The features used were the same 
as those used in the high association problems of Experiment 4. 
As stated above, subjects were once again asked about their expectations for each 
possible piece of evidence. This was done in order to keep the conditions in this 
experiment as similar as possible to those in Experiment 3. Once again, as a manipulation 
check, only those answers about the piece of evidence which subjects were to receive will 
be analysed here. 
As with Experiments 3 and 4, the order in which subjects received pieces of 
evidence was manipulated. Thus, subjects received pieces of evidence in a strong/weak or 
weak/strong order. The second manipulation in this experiment was the likelihood that 
members of the category X possessed each of the evidential features. In Experiments 3 and 
4, the common feature was possessed by 70% of instances of category X, whilst the rare 
feature was possessed by 95% of instances. Half of the subjects in this experiment were 
told that both features were possessed by 95% of instances of category X, whilst the other 
half were told that both features were possessed by 70% of instances. This meant that the 
information order manipulation was achieved simply by varying the order in which 
subjects received information about the rare and common features. 
Design: this was a 2x2x2x3 mixed design, with the between subjects factors being the 
likelihood that the evidential features were possessed by instances of the focal (X) 
category (Likelihood), and the order in which information was presented to subjects 
(Order). The within subjects factors were when subjects rated their confidence in the 
hypothesis (Before/After), and problem content. 
As with Experiment 4, the second measure was subjects' expectations about the 
second piece of evidence. As this measure was taken before receipt of the second piece of 
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evidence, the Before/After factor is not involved here. This measure therefore had a 2x2x3 
design. The design of both parts of this experiment is summarised in Table 4.15. 
Task Independent Variables Levels 
Confidence Ratings 1. LIKELIHOOD 
2. ORDER 
3. BEFORE/AFTER 
2-95%, 70% 
2- STRONG I ST; 
STRONG 2ND 
2- Confidence Before 
Confidence After 
4. PROBLEM CONTENT 3. En . gineer, House, Car 
Expectations 1,2 and 4 
Table 4.15: Independent and dependent variables from Experiment 5. 
Procedure: as this experiment was run in parallel with several others, two thirds of the 
subjects were run as part of two groups of one hundred. The other third of the subjects 
were run as part of several smaller groups of between ten and sixteen subjects. All subjects 
participated in the experiment during class-time. Each of the four conditions contained 
approximately equal numbers of subjects from both sizes of groups. In each condition 
three subjects received the problems in each of the six possible orders. They worked on 
their problems individually. 
4.4.3 Results 
4.4.3.1 Confidence measures 
In this section the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings will be presented. As in 
Experiments 3 and 4 subjects were asked to express their confidence on a 100mm line. At 
one end of the line was labelled "certain ... 
V and at the other end "certain ... Y". 
For the 
purposes of the analysis which follows subjects' markings on the line were converted to 
scores on a 100 point scale ranging from I to 100. Each point on this scale corresponds 
to 
one millimetre on the line and the higher is a subject's score on this scale the more 
confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. 
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One subject in the 70%/strong information first condition failed to complete at least 
one of the confidence scales. For the purposes of this analysis this subject has been 
excluded. A 2x2x2x3 mixed design Anova was used to analyse results on the confidence 
measure. The between subjects factors were Likelihood (95% vs. 70%) and Order. The 
within subjects factors were Before/After and problem content. The means and standard 
deviations from this analysis are presented in Table 4.16, whilst a full Anova table is given 
in Appendix 3. 
Likelihood Order House 
Before 
Engineer Car House En 
After 
gineer Car 
_ 
95% Strong I st 69 16 66 18 65 17 72 19 70 20 69 18 
Strong 2nd 64 15 63 17 64 16 79 18 78 18 80 18 
70% Strong Ist 70 15 64 12 62 20 68 16 70 16 69 21 
Stroniz 2nd 61 14 58 13 58 10 67 16 61 16 69 17 
Table 4.16: Means and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 5. 
There was a highly significant main effect for Before/After (F(I, 67) = 37.48, p< 
. 001). The mean confidence rating 
before receipt of the second piece of evidence was 64 
(S. D. = 13), whilst the mean rating after was 71 (S. D. = 16). None of the other main effects 
approached significance. As was the case in Experiments 3 and 4, there was also a highly 
significant two-way interaction between the Order and Before/After factors fll, 67) = 
Order Bef/Aft 1 66(13) 2 70(15) 3 61(12) 4 72(16) 
strong Ist before 1 . 
05 . 
003 
after 2 . 
0002 
strong 2nd before 3 . 
05 . 
002 0002 
after 4 . 
003 . 
0002 
Table 4.17: Means (in bold) and standard deviations (in parentheses), and significant 
differences between 
means for the interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence 
ratings in 
Experiment 5 
37.48, p< . 005). 
This interaction is represented in Figure 4.7. Tukey HSD tests 
for unequal 
sample sizes revealed significant differences between means 
involved In this interaction. 
The means and their standard deviations, as well as significant 
differences between means, 
involved in this interaction are given in Table 4.17. 
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74 
72 
a) 70 
-568 LP c 0 066 
C 
0)64 
62 
60 
Before After 
Figure 4.7: The significant interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 5. 
Strong 1 st 
*-,. )&, Strong 2nd 
The two-way interaction between Likelihood and Before/After was marginally significant 
(F(l, 67) = 3.56, p< . 07). This interaction is represented in Figure 4.8. 
76 
74 
95%/95% 
70%f7O% 
, a) 72 
-070 
0068 
qD) 66 
2 
64 
62 
60 
Before After 
Figure 4.8: The interaction between Likelihood and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence 
ratings in Experiment 5. 
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As there was good reason for believing that there would be significant differences between 
means, Tukey HSD tests were once again used. The means involved in this interaction and 
the significant differences between means are given in Table 4.18. 
Likelihood Bef/Aft 
95 before 1 
95 after 2 
'7 fN I- -r 
1 65 (15) 2 75(17 
. 
0002 
. 
0002 
3 62(10 
0002 
4 67(14 
0006 
oeiore -ý . 
0002 
70 after 4 
. 0006 . 03 
Table 4.18: Means and standard deviations (In parentheses) and sig. differences between means for the 
interaction between Likelihood and Order from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings from 
Experiment 5. 
The three way interaction between Likelihood, Order, and Before/After also approached 
significance (F(l, 67) = 3.23, p< . 08). This interaction is shown in Figure 4.9. 
Likel'd Order B/A 
95% str I st bef I 
aft 2 
str 2nd bef 3 
aft 4 
70% str I st bef 5 
aft 6 
str 2nd bef 7 
aft 8 
1 66 2 70 
(15) (16) 
3 63 4 79 5 65 
(14) (16) (10) 
* 
* 
* 
6 69 7 59 
(14) (9) 
8 66 
(14) 
* 
Table 4.19: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses) and sig. differences between means for the 
interaction between Likelihood, Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 5 (* indicates p <. 0005). 
Once again Tukey HSD tests revealed significant differences between means involved in 
this interaction. Means and significant differences are given in Table 4.19- As may be seen 
from Figure 4.9 the confidence ratings of subjects told that 95% of instances of category X 
possess both features display a recency effect whereas there is a trend towards primacy in 
the ratings of subjects told that 70% of instances of category X possess both features. An 
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examination of Table 4.19 reveals that the former recency effect is significant whereas the 
latter trend towards primacy is not. 
84 
80 
76 
72 
68 
64 
60 
56 
Before After 
Likelihood 95%/95% 
TT-. - 
Figure 4.9: The interaction between Likelihood, Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 5. 
4.4.3.2 Expectation measures 
A 2x2x3 mixed design Anova was used to analyse subjects' expectations about the 
unseen evidence. The between subjects factors were Likelihood and Order, whilst the 
within subjects factor was problem content. A total of 14 subjects failed to respond to at 
least one of the questions measuring expectation so they have been excluded for the 
purposes of this analysis. Of the remaining 58 subjects, there were 14 in both the 
95%/strong I st and 70%/strong 2nd conditions, whilst there were 15 subjects in each of the 
Likelihood Order 
Before After 
70%/70% 
Car 
95% Strong I st 91 18 84 21 86 20 
87 
Strong 2nd 36 36 63 36 63 38 54 
70% Strong I st 87 14 69 20 83 16 
80 
Strong 2nd 139 26 41 23 
52 19 44 
Table 4.20: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings 
in 
Experiment 5. 
Strong 1 st 
Strong 2nd 
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other two conditions. The rneans and standard deviations from this analysis are given in 
Table 4.20, whilst a full Anova table is given in Appendix 2. 
There was a highly significant main effect for Order (F(l, 54) =50.33, p <. 001). 
Subjects in the strong I st conditions had a mean expectation of 83 (S. D. = 13) whilst those 
in the strong 2nd conditions had a mean expectation of 49 (S. D. = 23). The main effect for 
Likelihood also approached significance (F (1,54) = 3.26, p< . 08). Subjects in the 95% 
likelihood conditions had a mean expectation of 70 (S. D. = 27) whilst those in the 70% 
likelihood condition gave a mean response of 62 (S. D. = 23). 
100 
90 
' 80 0 
70 
Ci- 
60 
250 
40 
Strong 1 st 
Strong 2nd 
30 
House Engineer Car 
Content 
Figure 4.10: The interaction between Order and problem content from the analysis of subjects' expectations 
in Experiment 5. 
Info Content 1 89(16) 2 76(21) 3 84(18 
strong 
weak 
house I 
eng 2 
car 3 
house 4 
eng 5 
car 6 
* 
* 
* 
. 02 
4 37(31 
. 008 
5 52(32 6 57(31 
. 
02 
008 
In fo C Table 4.21: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses) and sig differences between mea sr th 
interaction of Order with problem content from the analysis of subjects' expectations 
in Experiment 5 
indicates p< . 
001). 
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There was also a significant two-way interaction between Order and problem 
content (F(2,54) = 7.13, p< . 002). This interaction is shown in Figure 4.10. Tukey HSD 
tests for unequal sample sizes revealed significant differences between means. The means 
involved in the interaction and the significant differences between means, are given in 
Table 4.2 1. The interaction between Likelihood and Order was not significant (F(I, 54) < 
. 1). The means involved in this interaction may be seen in Table 4.20. 
4.4.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 5 are striking and confirm the general predictions made 
at the outset. As usual there was a significant difference between subjects I confidence 
before and after receipt of the second piece of evidence. More interesting however, is the 
absence of a significant overall recency effect. This absence is to be seen in the interaction 
between Order and Before/After. Although the interaction itself is significant, follow-up 
tests revealed that the difference between the final ratings of those subjects who received 
the strong information first and those who received the strong information second was not 
significant. This finding is interesting because it is in contrast to the results of Experiments 
3 and 4 and suggests that the reduction in contrast between the pieces of evidence which 
subjects received had a significant overall impact on the recency effect. 
However, such a conclusion, based on the significant two-way interaction, must be 
tempered somewhat when the three-way interaction between Order, Before/After, and 
Likelihood (see Figure 4.9) is examined. Although the interaction itself was not 
significant, it was felt that the predictions made at the outset were strong enough to warrant 
the use of follow-up tests to further examine the interaction. These follow-ups revealed 
that, as predicted, there was a significant recency effect produced by those subjects told 
that both evidential features were possessed by 95% of instances of the focal category. On 
the other hand, when subjects were told that the same features were possessed by only 70% 
of instances of the focal category, a non-significant trend towards primacy is observed. 
Such a finding confirms the prediction made at the outset of this experiment. Although the 
degree of contrast between the subjective values of the individual pieces of evidence was 
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equal in both halves of this experiment, recency was found only when the overall strength 
of the evidence was raised. Such a finding is not to be explained in terms of raising or 
lowering the strength of the evidence. Rather, it is the product of the expectations caused 
by the initial piece of evidence. 
Also of interest in the three way interaction is the degree to which subjects revised 
upwards their confidence in the focal hypothesis upon receipt of the second piece of 
evidence. In all cases subjects revised their beliefs upwards. This is in contrast to the 
results of Experiments 3 and 4 where those subjects who received the strong information 
first displayed either reduced, or unchanged, confidence following receipt of the second 
piece of evidence. It would seem that in both halves of this experiment, the second piece of 
information which subjects received went some way towards meeting the expectations of 
those subjects who received the strong information first. Interestingly, the pattern of 
subjects' upwards revisions was as suggested in the introduction to this experiment. As 
predicted, the greatest revision occurred amongst subjects in the 95% condition who 
received the strong evidence second. Also as predicted, the extent to which subjects who 
received the strong evidence first revised their beliefs in the focal hypothesis upon receipt 
of the second piece of information, was the same in both of the Likelihood conditions. 
Subjects in the 70% condition who received the strong evidence second revised their 
confidence ratings to a greater degree than did subjects in either of the Likelihood 
conditions who received the strong piece of evidence first. Accordingly, it may be inferred 
that the difference between the expectations of subjects in the 70% condition who received 
the strong evidence second and the actual value of the evidence given to these subjects was 
not great enough to cause a significant upwards revision of belief. 
The two way interaction between Likelihood and Before/After is also interesting. 
Although this interaction is significant, the results here are that across information orders, 
subjects in both likelihood conditions were significantly more confident that the focal 
hypothesis was the case after receipt of the second piece of information than they were 
before receipt of that information. The significance of the interaction was caused 
by the 
increase in confidence amongst subjects in the 95% condition following receipt of the 
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second piece of evidence being greater than the increase amongst subjects in the 70% 
condition. This finding further supports the suggestion that the second piece of evidence 
which subjects received in this experiment went further, in all cases, towards meeting 
initial expectations than the equivalent evidence in the previous experiments. The 
significant difference between the final confidence of those subjects told that both features 
were possessed by 95% of instances of the focal category and that of subjects told that the 
same features were possessed by only 70% of instances, is as expected. 
Also as expected are the results of the manipulation check on subjects' own 
expectations. Subjects who received initial information about the rare feature had 
significantly greater expectations than did subjects who received initial information about 
the common feature. Likewise, the main effect for likelihood also approached significance. 
Those subjects initially told that 95% of instances of the focal category possessed one of 
the evidential features expected more instances of that category to possess the remaining 
feature than did subjects told that the likelihood of the first feature being possessed by 
instances of the focal category was 70%. 
In general, therefore, the main thrust of the findings of Experiment 5 is, once again, 
to suggest that it is impossible to explain the effect, or integration, of evidence outside of 
the context in which that evidence is received. The results of this experiment demonstrate 
that it is not the difference in the subjective values of pieces of evidence which are 
predictive of the recency effect found in Experiment 3. Rather, it is the relationship 
between the pieces of evidence, which itself is determined by inferences from background 
knowledge, which underlies the effect of information order observed here. The 
experiments to be presented in the next chapter will seek to investigate more closely the 
effects of background knowledge on the belief revision process. Specifically, they will 
seek to determine how subjects use background knowledge about both the base rates of 
evidential features and the meaning of likelihood expressions in order to assign a 
subjective value to a piece of evidence. Once again, it will be argued that there are very 
important pragmatic factors at work in this process. 
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4.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter has provided evidence concerning the nature of the belief revision 
process. It will be argued that in the light of this evidence, current conceptions of how that 
process works will have to be altered. Experiment 3 demonstrated the effect of information 
order on subjects' integration of evidence concerning a hypothesis which was to be 
evaluated. This order effect was suggested by the results of Experiment I- The finding in 
Experiment 4, that the order effect vanished when subjects were given pieces of evidence 
which did not lead to the formation of expectations, provided concrete evidence that 
expectation is in some way implicated in the belief revision process. The results of 
Experiment 5 also support this view. Although the contrast between the pieces of evidence 
which subjects received was controlled for in Experiment 5, recency was only found when 
subjects received a final piece of evidence which greatly exceeded the expectations caused 
by the initial piece of evidence. 
What then are the implications of these results for current accounts of the belief 
revision process? The answer is very simple. The combined results of Experiments 1,3,4 
and 5 suggest that current models of the process are wholly inadequate. It was argued in 
Chapter 3 that current models would prove to be inadequate due to a range of theoretical 
and experimental work which has been carried out over the last ten years. Much of this 
work comes from the literature on pragmatics (e. g. Shanon, 1988) and concepts (e. g. 
Murphy and Medin, 1985; Wattenmaker, 1995). The assumption shared by all current 
models of belief revision which sits most uneasily with this work is that of independent 
subjective values for each piece of evidence. 
The fact that expectation has been implicated in the belief revision process suggests 
that independent subjective values for pieces of evidence do not exist. Specifically, the 
results of the experiments reported in this chapter suggest that the subjective value of a 
piece of evidence is determined on-line, and is thus context-dependent. It has long 
been 
recognised in the belief revision literature (Anderson, 198 1; Shanteau and Nagy, 1984; 
Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) that the subjective value of any piece of evidence must be 
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sensitive to the context of judgement. Thus, in an impression formation task, the adjective 
"cold" would be assigned different values depending on whether the subject was asked to 
judge the target individual's intelligence, likeableness, or fitness for political office. What 
has rarely been recognised however, is the importance of evidential context in the 
derivation of the subjective value of any piece of evidence. With the exception of Gestalt 
psychologists such as Asch (1946), the emphasis in modelling belief revision has been on 
assuming a fixed subjective value, and accounting for the differential effect of evidence by 
a process of differential weighting. 
The most recent example of such a model is Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) anchor 
and adjust model. Much of this chapter has been taken up with consideration of the 
contrast assumption which is contained in that model. This has been because the anchor 
and adjust account would seem to be the most plausible which currently exists. The 
contrast assumption is an admirable attempt to cope with the problem of evidential 
context. Unfortunately however, it is based on the idea that subjective value may be 
assumed. Therefore, although the contrast assumption can account for the results of 
Experiment 3, it cannot account for those of Experiment 4 and 5, where the difference in 
subjective value between the two pieces of evidence was kept constant but either the 
degree of association between the evidential features or the strength of the initial piece of 
evidence were manipulated. 
What does it mean to say that the subjective value of a piece of evidence is 
determined on-line? In a sense, both Lopes (1987) and Hogarth and Einhorn have been 
claiming that some part of the meaning of some evidence is so determined. Both have 
recognised the potential for error inherent in the process of deciding for what hypothesis a 
piece of evidence is marked (i. e. which hypothesis a piece of evidence supports). 
Neither, 
however, has given an account of how this happens. Is the context-dependency of meaning 
best described by Asch as a directional force exerted by early occurring evidence over 
later 
occurring evidence? To accept Asch's characterisation of the process would, undoubtedly, 
be a retrograde step. Instead, the process of assigning a subjective value to a piece of 
evidence is best described as being inferential in nature. 
198 
In Chapter 3 the importance of inference to the process of categorisation was 
stressed. Specifically, it was suggested that, in the light of work by Wattenmaker (1995) 
and Asch and Zukier (1984), the process of categorising social phenomena on the basis of 
their features, involves a great deal of inference. However, it was also pointed out that 
inference must also be central to the categorisation of object knowledge. How then, might 
inference be involved in the belief revision task used in the experiments described in this 
chapter? One very obvious possibility is that when early occurring information leads to 
high expectations about as yet, unseen, evidence, those expectations form the major 
premise of a deductive inference. The minor premise is the evidence in the world. This 
leads to an argument such as the following (in this example, and the next, the expected 
level is taken from the results of the pre-test): 
If my friend's house is on Street X then 94% of houses on Street X will have garages. 
70% of houses on Street X have garages. 
Therefore, my friend's house is not on Street X 
Because this conclusion contradicts the strong piece of information which subjects 
received initially, they do not adjust their beliefs. Conversely, although those subjects who 
received the information in the opposite order may be thought of as performing the same 
type of inference, the premises are not the same. Rather, the major premise will consist of 
a conditional expressing expectations about the base rate of the rare feature and the minor 
premise will come from information present in the problem: 
If my friend's house is on Street X then 3% of houses on Street X will possess a swimming 
pool 
95% of houses on Street X possess swimming pools 
Therefore, my friend's house is on Street X 
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Because this conclusion agrees with the initial piece of evidence which these subjects 
received, its effect is to increase confidence in the focal hypothesis. 
An advantage of such a characterisation of the process is that it allows for an 
interpretation of which hypothesis the evidence is marked for (Lopes, 1987; Hogarth and 
Einhorn, 1992). In addition to this, it provides a framework for the understanding of how 
evidence comes to have a subjective value. It does so in a manner which not only allows 
for, but is driven by, both the judgmental and evidential context. 
One very interesting feature of the results of Experiment 4 howeven, is the contrast 
between the pattern of results for those subjects who received evidence about features 
where possession of the rare feature was perceived to predict possession of the common 
feature, and those who did not. Apart from the obvious contrast, those subjects who 
received information about low association features, in the weak/strong order, might have 
been predicted to have very low expectations about the second piece of evidence. Indeed, 
the expectations expressed by these subjects was not significantly different from the 
expectations of subjects who received evidence about associated features in the 
weak/strong order. It could be argued that the effect of the second, stronger, piece of 
information on subjects' beliefs about the hypotheses should have been the same in both 
cases. Because recency occurred only in that half of the experiment where subjects 
received information about associated features, it is obvious that the stronger piece of 
information did not have the same effect in both cases. 
One possible explanation for this is provided by Stevenson and Over (1995). These 
experimenters showed that subjects, when making inferences, are sensitive to the certainty 
with which they may hold their premises. Thus, Stevenson and Over found that subjects 
were less confident in conclusions drawn from uncertain premises than they were in 
conclusions drawn from certain premises. Although there is a similar statistical likelihood 
that houses which have garages and houses built between 1945 and 1985 will have 
swimming pools, in the former case the link between the two features is stronger. 
Accordingly, subjects' confidence in their initial premise may have been greater in the 
200 
former case. This in turn would have caused them to have greater confidence in their 
conclusion, and to have revised their beliefs to a greater extent in the light of that 
conclusion. What is interesting about this feature of the results is that it illustrates the 
insufficiency of arguments from probability, in giving a comprehensive account of either 
belief revision, or how knowledge is organised. In Chapter 3, Murphy and Medin's (1985) 
argument against accounts based wholly on feature frequency was mentioned. Likewise, in 
Chapter 1, it was argued that a completely probabilistic account of information selection is 
most likely to be impossible. Although the studies contained in both this chapter, and 
Chapter 2, demonstrate the importance of subjective probability to the organism, it is not 
argued in this thesis that probabilistic information is the sole source of information 
available to subjects. 
This caveat aside, the experiments to be described in the next chapter will further 
investigate the factors involved in the basic recency effect found in Experiment 3. The 
effect of the perceived frequency of the individual experimental features used will be 
examined, as will the effects of background knowledge on the representation of individual 
pieces of evidence. 
4.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided evidence supporting the view that the effect of interest in 
Experiment I was due to the sequential nature of the evidence with which subjects were 
provided. In so doing, these experiments have also provided evidence of the importance of 
expectations to the process of belief revision. Experiment 3 produced an order effect. 
Specifically, subjects given strong information following weak information were more 
confident in the hypothesis to which that information related than were subjects given 
the 
same information, but in the reverse order. 
Experiment 4 attempted to discriminate between two opposing accounts 
for the 
results of Experiment 3. The account of Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992) suggests that the 
recency effect in Experiment 3 occurred because of the 
difference in the subjective value 
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of the pieces of evidence which subjects received. An alternative account of the results was 
presented which claimed that the recency effect was due to the process of deriving the 
subjective values for the pieces of evidence presented. Such an account would claim that a 
subjective value is derived by a combination of expectations from background knowledge 
and information presented in the problem. In Experiment 4, subjects were presented with 
evidence where the difference in subjective value was controlled for. However, half of the 
subjects received information about features where the possession of a rare feature was 
perceived to predict possession of the common feature, and the other half received 
information about features for which there was no perceived association. The recency 
effect of Experiment 3 was replicated with the associated features, but no recency was 
found with the non-associated features. 
The results of Experiment 5 also suggest that Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast 
assumption is an inadequate explanation for the recency effect found in Experiment 3. In 
Experiment 5 degree of contrast was controlled for by using the same evidential features 
throughout and telling subjects that instances of the focal category possessed each of the 
features at the same rate. However, half of the subjects were told that 95% of instances of 
the focal category possessed both features whilst the remaining subjects were told that 
70% of instances of the focal category possessed both features. As predicted, recency was 
found only amongst the confidence ratings of those subjects told that 95% of instances of 
the focal category possessed both features. 
The results of Experiment 4 and 5 were interpreted as providing evidence for an 
account of belief revision where the subjective value of a piece of evidence is determined 
on-line. It was argued that this on-line process is an inferential one, where inferences are 
made from a combination of information from background knowledge and information 
present in the problem. It was further argued that such an account of the process explains 
how evidence comes to be seen as being marked for one hypothesis or the other, and 
how 
that same evidence comes to have a subjective value for the subject. 
Finally, it was pointed 
out that the results of Experiment 4 suggest that the information 
drawn on from 
background knowledge is likely to be both statistical and theoretical. 
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CHAPTER 5- EXPERIMENTS 6,7 AND 8-* SOURCES OF 
EVIDENTIAL STRENGTH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established the existence of a recency effect in subjects' use 
of information for the evaluation of hypothesis, and the importance to that effect of both 
the relationship which exists between those pieces of evidence and the strength of the 
expectation caused by the initial piece of evidence. In so doing, it suggested that the most 
recent, and most comprehensive, model of belief revision (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) is, 
at least in some respects, inadequate. This chapter will report the details of three 
experiments all of which will use the same basic methodology used in Experiments 3,4 
and 5. 
To understand the rationale for these experiments it is necessary to, once again, 
consider Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption. Simply expressed, the contrast 
assumption states that, in many cases, the occurrence of a recency effect is dependent on 
the degree to which the pieces of evidence which a subject receives differ in their 
subjective value. The greater the difference, the more the subject's final expression of 
belief or confidence will seem to reflect the value of the later evidence she receives. As 
was discussed in the previous chapter, workers in the area of belief revision use the term 
subjective value to mean the degree to which the subject understands a piece of evidence to 
support a particular hypothesis. This begs the question of how the subject comes to assign 
a subjective value to any piece of evidence. Typically, in the literature on belief revision, 
some form of pre-test is carried out in order to determine in advance the subjective value 
of any piece of evidence given to subjects. These pre-tests have ranged from tests of the 
positivity and negativity of personality adjectives (a technique used by Norman Anderson 
and his co-workers) to very detailed examinations of individual pieces of evidence (used 
for example by Tubbs, Gaeth, Levin and van Osdol, 1993). 
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The materials used in this thesis differ in several respects from those used 
elsewhere in the literature. Firstly, the pieces of evidence which subjects have received in 
the course of the experiments described in this thesis have not been pre-tested for their 
actual subjective value. Rather, various characteristics of the features about which subjects 
were asked to reason have been pre-tested. Thus it has been claimed that predictions may 
be made about the direction, and extent, of subjects'belief revision in the face of certain 
pieces of evidence on the basis of their background beliefs about the base rates of features 
of objects as well as the extent to which one feature is predicted by another. 
A second difference which exists between the materials used in this thesis and, for 
example, the materials used in personality impression formation tasks, is the slightly more 
complex nature of the evidence used in the experiments described here. By complexity is 
not meant the absolute length of the pieces of evidence which subjects receive (absolute 
length has been used by Hogarth and Einhorn to distinguish simple from complex pieces 
of information). Instead complexity is intended in this context to refer to the number of 
specific sources of information available to the subject from background knowledge when 
she comes to assign a subjective value to a piece of evidence. Consider the subject asked 
whether her sister's car is a model X or a model Y. She is told: 
95% of model Xs have a top speed of over 165 miles per hour 
and 
70% of model Xs have a radio. 
The experiments described in Chapter 4 have demonstrated that information about the 
extent to which possession of the second feature (having a radio) is predicted 
by 
possession of the first feature (having a top speed of over 165 mph) 
is central to subjects' 
confidence ratings based on this evidence. However, there are two other sources of 
information available to subjects in assigning a subjective value to these pieces of 
evidence. The first of these is their belief about the base rates of the evidential 
features, 
whilst the second is their knowledge about likelihood, or probability expressions. 
How 
these sources of information might be used by the subjects will 
be discussed in the 
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introduction to Experiment 6. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that the experiments 
described in this chapter will seek to investigate the differential use of these sources of 
information by subjects in assigning subjective values to pieces of evidence. The first two 
experiments to be described in this chapter will examine the influence of background 
knowledge about both the base rates of the features, and the use of likelihood expressions, 
on the process. Neither of these sources of information from background knowledge have 
proven to be particularly important to the results of the previous studies. The experiments 
to be reported here will attempt to demonstrate their use by subjects. By so doing, it is 
hoped to specify more clearly both the sources of background information upon which the 
pragmatic inferences, argued in Chapter 4 to be so central to the process of evidence 
interpretation, are based, and to determine how any one such source assumes more 
importance than another in a given context. Experiment 8, the final experiment to be 
described in this thesis, will follow on from the results of Experiments 6 and 7. It will 
attempt to demonstrate subjects' differential use of information from background 
knowledge within the same task. In order to do so, an order effects manipulation will once 
again be used. In the case of Experiment 8, however, subjects will be given information 
relevant to both hypotheses. 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 6 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The previous three experiments have focused on the order effect suggested 
by the results of Experiment 1. One of the striking findings of these studies is the 
importance of the perceived association between features to the occurrence of that effect. 
It 
has been argued that the existence of cases where the effect does not occur, 
due to lack of 
association between the evidential features used, is evidence that an account of the 
belief 
revision process based on Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption, 
is inadequate. 
However, it has not been claimed that the contrast assumption will prove to 
be an 
inadequate description in every case. Although this claim has not been made, the next 
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experiment to be described in this chapter will be an attempt to show that even when the 
contrast assumption does seem to account for the manner in which subjects integrate 
evidence with hypotheses, no existing model of the process is capable of predicting, a 
priori, when an order effect will occur. This is because none of these models specify the 
process by which a subjective value is assigned to a piece of evidence. 
The results of Experiments 3,4, and 5 are best understood as demonstrations of the 
role played by pragmatic factors in the belief revision process. In summary, it has been 
demonstrated that early occurring evidence sets up a context in which the meaning of later 
occurring evidence is determined. As has been pointed out, the process by which the 
meaning of later occurring evidence is determined, is an inferential one. Current models of 
the belief revision process cannot account for these results because they lack a pragmatic 
component. However, as was discussed in Chapter 1, there are two elements to current 
accounts of pragmatics (e. g. Sperber and Wilson, 1986; 1995). The first of these is 
pragmatic inference where people infer conclusions from both information in the world 
and information present in background knowledge. Before a pragmatic inference may be 
made however, the premises from which such an inference may be made must be selected. 
It was argued in Chapter I that Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory offers an 
insight into the process by which the information which is important to the organism 
comes to be attended to. This account is based on what Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) 
have called "the first (or Cognitive) Principle of Relevance". This has been discussed in 
some detail in Chapter 1. To recap, the information which is focused upon in any situation 
is that which has the greatest cognitive effect, and poses the least cognitive effort, for the 
organism. Thus, being told that the next train to London leaves Plymouth in 2,400 seconds 
is less relevant to the organism than is being told that it leaves in 40 minutes. This 
is 
because an understanding of the former utterance requires more cognitive effort than an 
understanding of the latter. Likewise, being told that the next train to 
London leaves at 
5.30 p. m. is more relevant than being told that it leaves sometime after 
4.00 p. m., because 
the first piece of information leads to more inferences than the second. 
Considerations of 
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effect and effort lead to a trade off between how much work the organism must do to 
process a piece of information and how useful that information is. 
How does such a notion of cognitive effect come into play when making 
predictions about the task used in the previous three experiments? The answer is relatively 
simple. There are several sources of information available to subjects engaging in the task. 
The first of these, the effect of which has already been demonstrated, is knowledge about 
the extent to which the evidential features are associated. Thus far, all of the experiments 
examining belief revision in this thesis have used materials where possession of the 
common feature was predicted by possession of the rare feature. The one exception to this 
occurred in Experiment 4 where only a weak association existed between the evidential 
features used. The purpose of the experiments to be described in this chapter is to examine 
the influence of other sources of information, available from background knowledge, on 
subjects' interpretation of evidence. Experiment 6 is best characterised as an exploratory 
study which seeks to investigate the differential use of two other sources of information 
which are available to subjects. 
Before proceeding with a more detailed discussion of these other sources of 
information, it will be useful to quickly describe the kinds of materials which will be used 
in Experiment 6. As before, subjects will be asked to express their confidence in two 
alternatives. So, for example, subjects might be asked to rate their relative confidence that 
their sister's car is a model X or a model Y in the light of some evidence. Experiment 6 
will differ from Experiments 4 and 5 only in terms of the evidence which subjects receive. 
Half of the subjects will receive evidence such as the following: 
1.95% of model Xs have a top speed of over 165 miles per hour 
2.70% of model Xs have leather upholstery. 
As may be seen from this example, half of the subjects will 
be given information 
concerning two rare features of the object to be categorised. 
The remaining subjects will 
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receive evidence concerning two common features of these objects. So, for example, in the 
context of the car problem these subjects might be told the following: 
1.95% of model Xs have a radio 
2.70% of model Xs have a top speed of over 90 miles per hour. 
These features will be pre-tested for their perceived base rates and, as far as is possible, the 
degree to which any one feature is predicted by the other feature in the pair will be 
controlled for and maintained at a low level. The order of information manipulation will be 
achieved by switching the order of the likelihoods. Thus, whilst half of the subjects who 
receive information about two rare features will receive the information in the first 
example above, the remaining subjects will receive the following: 
1.70% of model Xs have a top speed of over 165 miles per hour 
2.95% of model Xs have leather upholstery 
Likewise, half of the subjects in the common features condition will receive the 
information in the second example above, whilst the remaining subjects will be told 
1.70% of model Xs have a radio 
2.95% of model Xs have a top speed of over 90 miles per hour. 
Thus, a partial order manipulation will be used in this experiment. This will facilitate a 
clearer understanding of the results of the experiment. 
As Experiment 6 is exploratory in nature, no definite predictions may be made 
about its results. However, some possible results will now be discussed. Firstly, it is 
possible that a main effect of feature rarity will be found. In order words, it is possible that 
both the initial, and final, confidence ratings of those subjects who receive information 
about rare features will be significantly more in favour of the focal hypothesis than the 
initial, and final, confidence ratings of those subjects who receive information about 
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common features. This is not considered likely, however, as no such significant differences 
have emerged in the results of the previous experiments. 
It is much more likely that a difference between the confidence ratings of subjects 
given information about rare features and those given information about common features 
will be found in the three way interaction between Rarity, Order and Before/After (as 
before, subjects will be asked to express their relative confidence in the hypotheses both 
before, and after, receipt of the second piece of information). Owing to notions of 
cognitive economy it is possible that a recency effect will be found amongst the results of 
subjects given information about common features but not amongst the results of those 
subjects given information about rare features. Such a result is possible because of the 
information which is available to subjects from background knowledge when assigning 
subjective values to the pieces of evidence which they receive. This background 
knowledge has to do with firstly, subjects' beliefs about the base rates of the features 
contained in the evidence and secondly, with subjects' knowledge about the meaning of 
likelihood expressions. It is possible that this knowledge will be used differentially with 
common and rare features. 
Consider the subject asked to express their relative confidence that their sister's car, 
which possesses a top speed of over 165 miles per hour and has leather upholstery, is a 
model X or a model Y. They are told that: 
1.95% of model Xs have a top speed of over 165 miles per hour 
2.70% of model Xs have leather upholstery. 
This evidence is highly suggestive that the subject's sister's car is a model X. 
This is 
because the features about which the subject has received information are very rare 
amongst the general population of cars and it is unlikely that model Y cars will possess 
both of these features at an equally high rate. What is important, or most relevant, about 
these pieces of information is that both of the (very rare) features are possessed 
by 
instances of one of the candidate alternatives with a likelihood that 
is much higher than 
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was expected. However, the exact likelihood is unimportant. Subjects, focus, when 
assigning subjective values to these pieces of evidence, is much more likely to be on the 
features than on the likelihoods. 
Now consider the subject, this time informed that their sister's car has a top speed 
of over 90 miles per hour and a radio, who is told: 
1.95% of model Xs have a radio 
2.70% of model Xs have a top speed of over 90 miles per hour. 
Neither of these pieces of information is particularly suggestive of the subject's sister's car 
being a model X (although the fact that the experimenter has chosen to give the subject 
pieces of information relevant to category X might lead the subject to make the pragmatic 
assumption that she is expected to favour category X). This is because neither of the 
features are rare in the general population of cars and they are both possessed by model X 
cars at approximately the rates that would be expected. Therefore, beliefs about the base 
rates of common features are not as informative (or as relevant) as they are when the 
features are rare. Thus, in this case it is likely that subjects will focus on the likelihoods to 
a greater extent than they will in the case where they receive information about rare 
features. 
How might this difference in the information which subjects attend to cause a 
recency effect when information is received about common features but not when 
information is received about rare features? If subjects'focus is on the evidential features 
in the case where they receive information about rare attributes of the object to be 
classified then there should be very little contrast between the subjective values of the 
pieces of evidence. Because the features are of equal rarity, and if subjects are focusing on 
the features, then they should be understood as providing approximately equal support for 
the hypothesis that the instance to be categorised is a member of category X. On the other 
hand, if, when they receive information about two common features, subjects are focusing 
to a greater extent on the likelihoods, then there should be some contrast between the 
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subjective values which subjects assign to the pieces of evidence. This is because, once 
i again, even though the features about which subjects receive information are equally 
common, they are focusing upon the likelihoods which do differ (from 95% to 70%). In 
this case recency should be observed. 
Before proceeding with a description of the experiment sketched above, two points 
must briefly be made. The first is that the predictions discussed above cannot be made by 
any existing account of the belief revision process. They are made based upon a 
consideration of the influence of pragmatic factors on the determination of a sub ective 
value for a piece of evidence. Existing accounts of the process, both algebraic (Anderson, 
198 1), and procedural (Lopes, 1987; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992), assume a subjective 
value for any piece of evidence. They do not address themselves to the issue of how 
evidence is interpreted by the subject. The predictions made here assume that the value of 
any piece of evidence is context dependent. 
The second point which should be made concerns the recency effect predicted with 
common features in this experiment. Although such an effect is predicted by Hogarth and 
Einhorn's contrast assumption, it is also predicted by an averaging model of the sort put 
forward by Anderson (198 1), Shanteau and Nagy (1984), and Lopes (1987). The recency 
prediction made in this instance is not directly motivated by any of these different models. 
Rather it is motivated by the results in the experimental literature (discussed in Chapter 3) 
which suggest that averaging-type behaviour does seem to take place with simple stimulus 
materials. The purpose of the experiment to be described is not to provide support for any 
of the above-mentioned models. Rather it is to demonstrate their inadequacy in terms of 
predicting when, and with what stimulus materials, a recency effect will occur. 
5.2.2 Method 
Subjects: 72 subjects took part in this experiment. Of these 21 were male and 51 were 
female. 29 were first year undergraduate Business Studies students and 43 were second or 
third year psychology students. As before all subjects were students at the 
University of 
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Plymouth. Subjects from both groups were evenly distributed across conditions. Subjects' 
mean age was 22.8 years, with the youngest being 18 and the oldest 40. 
Materials: as with Experiments 4 and 5, subjects received a handout which comprised an 
instruction sheet and three problems. The instructions were exactly the same as those used 
in Experiments 4 and 5. The structure and content of the problems was also exactly the 
same as that used in Experiment 4 and 5. Thus, for each problem, subjects were given a 
scenario involving a decision about which of two alternatives was likely to be the case. 
Next they received a piece of evidence relevant to the decision and were asked to rate their 
confidence in the alternatives in the light of the evidence they had received. Following 
this, subjects were asked to state their expectations about the remaining unseen evidence. 
On the next page was a further piece of information relevant to their decision and a second 
rating scale. As in Experiments 3 and 4, all of the evidence which subjects received was 
relevant to just one of the alternatives presented in the scenario. Each subject received 
three problems involving a house, an engineer and a car. Examples of each of the problem 
contents used in this experiment are to be found in Appendix 1. 
As stated above, subjects were once again asked about their expectations for each 
possible piece of evidence. This was done in order to keep the conditions in this 
experiment as similar as possible to those in Experiment 3. Once again, as a manipulation 
check, only those answers about the piece of evidence which subjects were to receive will 
be analysed here. 
As with Experiments 3,4 and 5, the order in which subjects received pieces of 
evidence was manipulated. Thus, subjects received pieces of evidence in a strong/weak or 
weak/strong order. Unlike previous experiments this manipulation was achieved simply 
by 
reversing the order in which subjects received the likelihood information. 
Thus subjects in 
the strong/weak condition were told that 95% of instances of X possess the 
first feature 
and then told that 70% of instances of X possess the second feature. 
Conversely, subjects 
in the weak/strong condition were told that 70% of instances of 
X possess the first feature 
and were then told that 95% of instances of X possess the second 
feature. Most 
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importantly, in order to achieve the Order manipulation in this experiment the order in 
which subjects received information about the features was not varied. Thus all subjects 
received an initial piece of information about the same feature. 
The second manipulation in this experiment was the rarity of the evidential features 
used. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects received information about one common and one 
rare feature of the objects they were reasoning about. Half of the subjects in this 
experiment were given information about two rare features whilst the other half were given 
information about two common features. 
Also like Experiments 4 and 5, there were four conditions in this experiment. These 
were achieved by crossing the perceived base rates of the feature pairs with information 
order. Thus, one group of subjects received information concerning two rare features 
where the first feature was said to be present in 95% of instances of the focal category and 
the second was said to be present in 70% of instances. For example: 
95% of houses on street X possess a swimming pool 
and 
70% of houses on street X are worth 1250,000. 
In order to achieve the Order manipulation the remaining subjects received the following 
information: 
70% of houses on street X possess a swimming pool 
and 
95% of houses on street X are worth 1250,000 
The remaining two groups of subjects received information concerning common 
features. 
Again, one of these groups were told that 95% of instances of the 
focal category possessed 
the first feature, whilst the other group were told that 70% of instances possessed 
the first 
feature. 
As stated earlier, the Rarity manipulation was achieved 
by giving subjects 
evidence about either two rare evidential features or two common evidential 
features. 
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These features were chosen on the basis of the pre-test described in Chapter 4. One of the 
features from all of the common and rare pairs had already been used in the previous 
experiments (see Table 5.1). The other feature in each pair was chosen with reference to 
both parts of the pre-test. Thus, each feature pair contained features which were perceived 
to be of approximately equal rarity. An attempt was also made, by consultation with the 
results of the second part of the pre-test, to control for the strength of perceived association 
between the features in each pair. As far as possible all of the perceived associations 
between the features used in this experiment were kept approximately equal. An 
examination of Table 5.1 reveals that the most obvious exception was the rare feature pair 
for the engineer scenario. For this pair the perceived association was much weaker than for 
the other pairs. This was because it was felt that the new feature chosen for the engineer 
scenario was the one most suitable for problem construction. 
Further examination of Table 5.1 reveals two things. Firstly, that subjects' 
expectations about the percentage of instances already possessing the old Common feature 
which will also possess the new Common feature are higher than the equivalent 
expectations for Rare features. Whether this has any effect on the results of this experiment 
will be very easy to infer. Experiment 5 demonstrated that the extent to which subjects 
expectations about the second piece of evidence are exceeded by the actual value of that 
evidence, in some cases, determines the extent to which they revise their beliefs in the light 
of that evidence. As the expectations of subjects in the Rare conditions are likely to be 
lower than the expectations of subjects in the Common conditions, if those expectations 
influence the results of this experiment then we would expect subjects in the Rare 
conditions to revise their beliefs to a greater extent after receipt of the second piece of 
evidence than will subjects in the Common conditions. 
Further examination of Table 5.1 reveals a second difference between the Rare and 
Common features. This difference involves the degree of association between the features 
as measured by the absolute value of C-B (i. e. expectations about the new feature given 
possession of the old feature - expectations about the new feature). 
A quick glance at Table 
5.1 shows that the Rare features are more closely associated on this measure (mean = 
36) 
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than are the Common features (mean = 5). It is not clear how this difference might affect 
the results of the study. In general, this measure of association may determine the 
confidence with which subjects would make predictions about the unseen evidence. A high 
degree of such association does not imply, given a high rate of possession of the old 
feature, a high rate of the new feature. Instead, it is a measure of how rate of possession of 
the new feature is affected by possession of the old feature. Given, however, that 
possession of the new Rare feature seems to be positively affected by possession of the old 
Rare feature (more so than is the case for the Common features), it may be the case that 
subjects in the Rare conditions will have stronger expectations concerning the second piece 
of evidence than subjects in the Common conditions. If these expectations are implicated 
in the results of the experiment then, by the same argument as was used in the previous 
paragraph, there should be less belief revision in the Rare conditions. 
lt should also be borne in mind that the pre-test only produced data about 
expectations concerning the second (new) feature of each pair given the presence of the 
features which have been used throughout this series of experiments (the old features), 
However, as the order in which subjects received the information about the features was 
not manipulated in this experiment this data will suffice for an interpretation of the results. 
The order of information manipulation was achieved as it had been in the earlier 
Prob Old feature AI New feature BC 
com house garage 
engineer company car 
car radio 
56% garden 81% 82% 
62% earns E25,000 p. a. 49% 60% 
92% 90 mph + top speed 78% 82% 
rare house swimming pool 
engineer earns E60,000 p. a. 
car 165 mph 
3% 1 worth E250,000 162% 
12% 1 travels abroad regularly 
6% 1 leather 
11% 125% 
13% 152% 
Table 5.1: Perceived rarity and associations for the features used in Experiment 6. Column A contains the 
% 
of instances expected to possess the old features. Column B contains the same information 
for the new 
features. Column C contains the % of instances which possess the old feature, also expected to possess the 
new feature. 
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experiments. As the level of each feature said to be present in each hypothesised set was 
either 95% or 70%, and the features were of approximately equal diagnosticity, the strong 
piece of evidence always concerned the feature present at a level of 95%. However, unlike 
the earlier experiments, the order in which subjects received information about each 
feature was kept constant. The first piece of information which subjects received always 
concerned an old feature. The order of information manipulation was achieved by varying 
the likelihood of this initial feature. 
Design: once again this was a 2x2x2x3 mixed design with the between subjects 
manipulations being rarity of feature pairs (Rarity) and Order. In descriptions of previous 
experiments, the levels of the Order manipulation have been referred to as Strong I st and 
Strong 2nd. For the purposes of this experiment, they will be referred to as 95% - 70% and 
70% - 95%. This is because these terms are a more accurate description of the order 
manipulation used in this experiment. The within subjects manipulations were when the 
confidence measure was taken (Before/After) and problem content. 
The second measure used in this experiment was, again, subjects' expectations 
about the second piece of evidence. This measure had a 2x2x3 mixed design. The between au 
subjects factors were as with the confidence measure, whilst the only within subjects factor 
was problem content. The design of both parts of the experiment is summarised in Table 
5.2 
Task Independent Variables Levels 
Ratings 1. ORDER 2- STRONG IST; 
STRONG 2ND 
2. RARITY 2- Rare features 
Common features 
3. BEFORE/AFTER 2- Confidence Before 
Confidence After 
4. PROBLEM CONTENT 3. Engineer, House, Hotel 
_ 
Expectations 1,2 and 4 
Table 5.2: The independent and dependent variables involved in Experiment 6. 
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Procedure: as this experiment was run in parallel with several others, two thirds of the 
subjects were run as part of two groups of one hundred. The other third of the subjects 
were run as part of several smaller groups of between ten and sixteen subjects. All subjects 
participated in the experiment during class-time. Each of the four conditions contained 
approximately equal numbers of subjects from both sizes of groups. In each condition 
three subjects received the problems in each of the six possible orders. They worked on 
their problems individually. 
5.2.3 Results 
5.2.3.1 Confidence measures 
As with previous experiments subjects were asked to express their confidence on a 
100mm line. At one end of the line was labelled "certain ... V and at the other end 
"certain... Y". For the purposes of the analysis which follows subjects' markings on the line 
were converted to scores on a 100 point scale ranging from I to 100. Each point on this 
scale corresponds to one millemetre on the line and the higher is a subject's score on this 
scale the more confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. Two subjects (one in each 
of the rare features conditions) failed to complete at least one of the confidence measures. 
For the purposes of this analysis they have been excluded. A 2x2x2x3 mixed design Anova 
was used to analyse results on this measure. The between subjects factors were Rarity and 
Order. The within subjects factors were Before/After and problem content. Both the means 
and standard deviations from this analysis are given in Table 5.3, whilst a full Anova table 
is given in Appendix 3. 
Before After 
Rarity Order House En gineer Car House _ 
Eng ineer Car 
Rare 95-70 
70-95 
70 16 
68 11 
64 
63 
14 
15 
66 
62 
17 
15 
73 17 
78 19 
77 
75 
14 
19 
76 14 
77 18 
Common 95-70 
70-95 
61 13 
67 11 
67 
64 
16 
15 
67 
66 
19 
16 
72 15 
81 18 
72 
84 
17 
16 
72 20 
82 17 
Table 5.3: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the ana lysis of subjects' confidence ratings 
in 
Experiment 6. 
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There was one highly significant main effect. This was the effect of Before/After 
manipulation (F(l, 66) = 71.13, p< . 001). The mean confidence rating before receipt of 
the second piece of evidence was 66 (S. D. = 11), whilst the mean rating after was 76 (S. D. 
= 15). None of the other main effects approached significance. The single significant two- 
way interaction was that between Order and Before/After (F(1,66) = 6.97, p <. 02). This 
interaction is shown in Figure 5.1. Tukey HSD tests for unequal sample sizes revealed 
significant differences between the means involved in this interaction. These means and 
significant differences are given in Table 5.4. There were no other significant results. 
However, the three way interaction between Rarity, Order, and Before/After (F(1,66) 
1.40, p> . 24), is shown in Figure 5.2. 
82 
80 
78 
o76 
74 
72 
0 
U 70 
68 
66 
64 
Before After 
'-», 95% - 70% 
70% - 95% 
Figure 5.1: The significant interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 6. 
Order Bef/Aft 
95%-70% 
70%-95% 
before I 
after 
before 3 
1 66(11) 273(14 
. 0008 
0008 
after 41 . 0002 
0003 
01 
3650 
. 0003 
. 0002 
479(15) 
. 0002 
. 
01 
. 
0002 
Table 5.4: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses) and significant differences between means 
for the interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 6. 
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86 
82 
78 
74 
70 
66 
62 
Before After Before After 
Rare Features Common Features 
95% - 70% 
70% - 95% 
Figure 5.2: The interaction between Order, Rarity, and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 6. 
As may be seen from Figure 5.2, although the interaction between Order, Rarity 
and Before/After was not significant, the trend towards recency is more pronounced 
amongst subjects who received information about common features than amongst those 
who received information about rare features. 
5.2.3.2 Expectation measures 
A 2x2x3 mixed design Anova was used to analyse subjects' expectations about the 
unseen evidence. The between subjects factors were Rarity and Order. The within subjects 
factor was problem content. A total of 13 subjects failed to respond to at least one of the 
questions measuring expectation, so for the purposes of this analysis they have been 
excluded. Of the remaining 59 subjects there were 15 in the rare features/95% - 
70% 
condition, 16 in the rare featuresnO% - 95% condition, 15 in the common 
features/95% - 
70% condition, and 13 in the common features/70% - 95% condition. 
The means and 
standard deviations from this analysis are given in Table 
5.5, whilst the full Anova table is 
given in Appendix 3. 
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Rarit 
Rare 
Order House En Car 
95-70 
70-95 
80 21 
63 13 
56 28 
58 25 
70 27 
63 19 
Common 95-70 81 15 58 30 76 21 
70-95 71 19 65 18 82 13 
Table 5.5: Means (in bold), and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' expectations in 
Experiment 6. 
There were two significant main effects. The first was for Rarity, F(1,55) = 4.24, p 
< . 
05. Subjects receiving information about a rare feature expected 65 % (S. D. = 15) of 
members of the hypothesised set to possess the second rare feature. The equivalent mean 
for subjects in the common features condition was 72% (S. D. = 11). The second significant 
main effect was for problem content, F(2, I 10) = 9.04, p< . 0003. The mean expectation 
for the house scenario was 74% (S. D. = 18), for the engineer scenario it was 59% (S. D. = 
25), and for the car scenario 72% (S. D. =2 1). The only other effect which approached 
significance was the interaction between problem content and information order F(2,110) 
= 2.89, p< . 06. 
This interaction is displayed in Figure 5.3. Tukey HSD tests for unequal 
sample sizes revealed significant differences between means. These means and any 
significant differences between these means are given in Table 5.5. 
84 
78 
1972 
Q (D 
P4 
X 
0'466 
60 
54 
House Engineer Car 
95%nO% 
70%/95% 
Figure 5.3: The interaction between Order and problem content from the analysis of subjects' expectations in 
Experiment 6. 
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Order Content 
95% - 70% house 
eng 
car 
70% - 95% house 
eng 
car 
1 81(18) 257(28) 373(24 
0005 
. 0005 . 05 
05 
009 
467 16) 561 
009 
672(19 
Table 5.6: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses) and significant differences between means 
involved in the interaction between Order and problem content from the analysis of subjects' expectations in 
Experiment 6. 
5.2.4 Discussion 
As Experiment 6 was exploratory in nature the results of this experiment cannot be 
discussed in terms of predictions which have been confirmed or disconfirmed. However, 
the results of this experiment do have some things in common with the results of previous 
experiments. For example, as with previous experiments a significant main effect was 
found for the Before/After manipulation. Subjects were significantly more confident that 
the X hypothesis was the case after receipt of the second piece of evidence. Unlike 
Experiment 5 however, this experiment has produced an overall recency effect. Although 
subjects in both Order conditions were significantly more confident after receipt of the 
second piece of information than they were before receipt of that information, the final 
confidence ratings of those subjects in the 70% - 95% condition (i. e. subjects who received 
the strong information second) were significantly greater than the final confidence ratings 
of those subjects in the 95% - 70% condition (i. e. subjects who received the strong 
information first). 
However, when the three way interaction between Order, Before/After, and Rarity 
is examined (see Figure 5.2), it can clearly be seen that the significant two way interaction 
is due to the trend towards recency present in the ratings of those subjects who received 
information about common features. There is no such trend present in the results of those 
subjects who received information about rare features. Although non-significant, this 
interaction suggests that subjects derived the subjective value of the pieces of infon-nation 
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which they received from different sources. It was suggested in the introduction to 
Experiment 6 that those subjects who received information about features with high 
perceived base rates would focus on those features when assigning a subjective value to 
the pieces of evidence which they received. Accordingly, as there was no difference in the 
perceived base rate of these rare features, there would be no difference in the subjective 
value assigned to the two pieces of evidence. Such a suggestion fits with the finding that, 
regardless of information order, the confidence ratings of these subjects increased upon 
receipt of the second piece of information. 
On the other hand, it was suggested that those subjects who received information 
about two common features would focus on the likelihood information when assigning a 
subjective value to the evidence. Because the likelihoods given were different, it was 
suggested that there would also be a difference in the subjective value assigned to the 
pieces of evidence. Such a difference in the subjective values assigned to the pieces of 
evidence would account for the recency effect observed in the common features half of the 
experiment. 
Although there are several accounts of belief revision which can, post hoc, account 
for the results, no existing account is capable of making predictions about subjects' locus 
of attention when assigning a value to a piece of evidence. It is interesting that, despite 
over forty years of experimental work on order effects, no account has been given 
emphasising the importance to the effect of information order of how the subjective value 
of the evidence is derived. It is clear from these results that an adequate model of the belief 
revision process must account for both the derivation of subjective values for pieces of 
evidence and the effect of these subjective values on subjects' beliefs about the world. As 
was argued in the introduction to this experiment, such an account must be pragmatic in 
nature. This experiment suggests that, in this case at least, when there are competing 
sources of information available to the organism, that information which is most relevant 
will be used. 
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The analysis of subjects' expectations confirmed the results of the pre-test. A 
significant difference was found in subjects' expectations about the unseen evidence due to 
base rate of the features about which subjects received information. Those subjects who 
received information about common features had significantly higher expectations about 
the second piece of evidence than did subjects who received information concerning two 
rare features. This is reflected in the results of the pre test (see Table 5.1) which show that 
the perceived association between the common features used in this experiment was higher 
than for the rare features. However, there are several a priori reasons for suspecting that 
subjects' expectations played no role in the results of this experiment. Firstly, although 
significant, the observed difference in expectations was relatively small when compared to 
the differences in expectations found in cases where those expectations were claimed to be 
the crucial mediating factor. Secondly, if subjects' expectations were responsible for the 
results of this experiment, a significant two way interaction between the base rates of the 
features and their likelihoods should have been observed. Such a result was not obtained. 
This can be attributed to two things, the absence of a significant main effect for likelihood 
and the fact that only a partial order manipulation was used in this experiment - only the 
order of the likelihood was rotated, the order in which subjects were given information 
about the features remained the same across conditions. The third reason for doubting that 
differences in expectations led to this result is the effect of problem content on subjects' 
expectations. Although this factor did have a significant effect on subjects' expectations 
-'-out the unseen evidence (as the results of the pre test suggested might be the case) no au 
corresponding effect of problem content on subjects' confidence ratings was observed. 
This leads to the conclusion that expectation did not underlie the recencY effect found 
amongst the results of those subjects given information about common features. 
The final reason for suspecting the non-influence of subjects' expectations about 
the second piece of evidence given information about the first piece of evidence is 
connected with the point made in the Method section concerning the possible effects of 
differences in expectations between the Common and Rare conditions. It was pointed out 
that the results of Experiment 5 suggest that, in certain cases, the extent to which 
expectations about unseen evidence are exceeded by the actual value of that evidence 
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determines the extent to which subjects revise their beliefs in the light of that evidence. In 
this experiment, expectations were greater in the Common condition than in the Rare 
condition. This should have lead to greater upwards belief revision amongst subjects in the 
Rare condition. This was not the case. 
It was also pointed out in the Method section that if the absolute value of the 
difference between subjects' expectations about the new feature given possession of the old 
feature and their expectations about the new feature on its own was taken as a measure of 
the Association between the features, then there was greater Association between the Rare 
features than the Common features. It was pointed out that the relationship between such a 
measure of Association and belief revision was not clear. However, given the fact that this 
measure seemed to indicate a strong, positive, relationship between the rare features used 
in this experiment it might be argued that subjects in the Rare conditions would have 
stronger expectations about the unseen evidence than would subjects in the Common 
conditions. In this case a prediction opposite to the one made above would be made: 
greater belief revision amongst subjects in the Common features condition. Once again, no 
such result was observed. 
Before moving to a description of the next experiment however, the partial nature 
of the order manipulation used in this experiment deserves some discussion. Strictly 
speaking, a true order effect was not observed. This is because the Order manipulation 
consisted only of rotating the likelihoods with which the features were said to be possessed 
by instances of category X. In all cases sub ects received information about the evidential 
features in the same order. This was done because it was the likelihood information which 
was of prime interest in this study. As the base rates of the features used was kept 
approximately constant within the base rate conditions, the non-reversal of feature order 
was not expected to affect the results of the experiment. The fact that the Order 
manipulation had no significant effect on subjects' expectations confirms the success of the 
pre-test. 
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5.3 EXPERIMENT 7 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 7 will be a direct follow-on from the previous experiment and, 
as such, will require little introduction. The finding of a trend towards recency with 
common features but not with rare features in the previous experiment, was interpreted as 
being due to subjects using different sources of information in assigning subjective values 
to the pieces of evidence which they received. Subjects in the rare features half of the 
experiment were claimed to have focused on the evidential features because of their rarity, 
whereas subjects who received information concerning common attributes were claimed to 
have focused more on the likelihoods. The problem with this interpretation of Experiment 
6 is its speculative nature. However, this interpretation, although speculative, does lead to 
some very specific predictions. Experiment 7 will test one such prediction. This prediction 
is that the confidence ratings of subjects on a task which is structurally similar to that used 
in Experiment 6, but about the content of which subjects can have no background 
knowledge, will be exactly the same as the confidence ratings of subjects who received 
information about common features in Experiment 6. 
The simplest way to dispense with the problem of subjects' background knowledge 
about the base rates of the features used, is to employ an abstract version of the task. Such 
a distinction, between abstract and concrete versions of a task, is to be found in the 
experimental literature on the Wason selection task (see Chapter I for an extensive 
discussion). In that literature, manipulations of the content of the task are also used to 
control for the background knowledge which subjects bring to bear on the experimental 
situation. 
An abstract version of the task used in Experiments 3-6 
is very easy to construct. 
Imagine being told that there exist two mutually exclusive categories X and 
Y. You are 
also told that there further exists an object 0 which belongs to one of these categories, and 
that it is your task to decide, in the light of evidence which will 
be provided, which of the 
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categories 0 is most likely to belong to. Firstly you are provided with information that 0 
possesses two features, a and b. Next you are told that 95% of instances of category X also 
possess feature a, and that 70% of instances of X possess feature b. Given this evidence 
you must rate your confidence in the hypotheses. 
How do you, in the absence of any information in background knowledge about the 
categories or the features, integrate the evidence which you possess with the available 
hypotheses? Although a subject, faced with this kind of task, has no background 
information about the problem content, she does have knowledge about likelihood 
expressions. From this knowledge she may infer that the fact that 70% of instances of 
category X possess feature b is evidence in favour of that category. Likewise, knowing that 
95% of instances of X possess feature a is even stronger evidence in favour of category X. 
As it was claimed in the discussion of Experiment 6 that subjects who had been given 
information about common features focused on the likelihood with which instances of 
category X were said to possess the features, rather than the features themselves, the 
confidence ratings of subjects given an abstract version of the same task should be almost 
identical to those of subjects given information about common features. 
Although the example of an abstract task given above consists of exclusive 
categories, X and Y, and a target object 0 which possessed features a and b, such a level of 
abstraction is neither necessary, nor desirable, in order to control for subjects' background 
knowledge. Instead, the experiment to be reported here will employ materials analogous to 
those already used, but abstract in the sense that subjects can have no background 
knowledge about the base rates of the features used. However, the levels at which 
instances of the focal category were said to possess the evidential features used in 
Experiment 6, will also be used in this experiment. The experiment to be reported here will 
also revert to the order manipulation used in Experiments 3,4, and 5. In other words, a 
full 
order manipulation will be employed where all subjects will receive the same 
information, 
but the order of that information will be reversed for half of the subjects. 
226 
Predictions about the results of this experiment may be made at several levels. 
Firstly it is predicted that a recency effect will be found. Those subjects who receive the 
evidence in the strong/weak order will be significantly less confident, upon receipt of both 
pieces of evidence, that the focal hypothesis is the case than will subjects who receive the 
evidence in the weak/strong order. As the experiment to be reported here is a replication of 
one half of Experiment 6, but with abstract materials, a second, qualitative, prediction may 
be made. The interaction between information order and when subjects express their 
confidence from this experiment, should resemble more closely that half of the three way 
interaction between Order, Before/After and Rarity from Experiment 6 involving common 
features, than the half involving rare features. 
5.3.2 Method 
Subjects: 36 subjects took part in this experiment. 12 of these were male and 24 were 
female. Subjects were recruited by placing notices around the psychology department at 
the University of Plymouth. All subjects were paid for their participation. The mean age of 
subjects was 25.8. The oldest subject was 45 and the youngest was 18. 
Materials: as with previous experiments, subjects received a handout which comprised 
of an instruction sheet and three problems. The instructions were as follows: 
Accompanying these instructions is a series of three decision problems which 
require you to imagine yourself to be a linguistfrom the 25th century. Each of 
the problems concerns parts of speech (nouns, pronouns etc. ) from a 
language spoken on the planet Zog. Zogese is a symbolic language based on 
combinations of concepts which approximate to earthling concepts such as 
diagonal lines, dots, squares, triangles, circles etc. 
In each problem you will be given a description of a symbol and will be 
asked to decide which of two parts of speech the symbol represents. You will 
be given pieces of information relevant to each decision, and in each of the 
three problems you will be asked to rate your confidence in the two 
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alternatives in the light of this information. More detailed instructions on what 
to do will accompany each of the problems. 
Please bear the following points in mind throughout the experiment: 
(1) Read each problem carefully and think hard before responding. 
(2) Although there are some surface similarities between the problems, they all 
concern different parts of speech, so you should think carefully about each 
problem. 
(3) Don't refer back to previous problems when working on the later problems. 
(4) Each problem consists of two pages which are stapled together. It is 
important that you receive the information that they contain in the intended 
order. Don't go onto a laterpage untilyou arefinished the one you are 
currently working on. 
If you have any questions at any time please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will answer them. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this 
experiment. 
The structure and content of the problems was also exactly the same as that used in 
previous experiments. Thus, for each problem, subjects initially received information such 
as the following: 
You are currently studying a Zogese symbol. The symbol definitely represents 
either an adjective or a passive verb, and your task is to decide which of these 
two parts of speech the symbol actually represents. The symbol itself 
is 
triangular and there is a diagonal line running through the triangle. 
You have the following piece of infonnation: 
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95% of adjectives in Zogese have a triangular element. 
Now look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in 
each of the decision alternatives in the light of the information you have 
available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to complete certainly that 
the symbol you are studying represents a passive verb and the other to 
complete certainty that it represents an adjective. Please mark the point on the 
line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. Remember that the 
greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to 
the end of the scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
certain that the symbol 
represents a passive verb 
certain that the symbol 
represents an adjective 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following 
questions: 
(1) What percentage of passive verbs in Zogese would you expect to 
have a 
triangular element? 
(2) What percentage of adjectives in Zogese would you expect to 
have a 
diagonal line running through the main part of the symbol? 
(3) What percentage of passive verbs in Zogese would you expect 
to have a 
diagonal line running through the main part of the symbol? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate 
this page from the 
one behind it by gently pulling the sheets apart at the 
bottom. 
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As may be seen from the above problem materials, subjects were once again asked 
about their expectations for each possible piece of evidence. This was done in order to 
keep the conditions in this experiment as similar as possible to those in previous 
experiments. Once again, as a manipulation check, only those answers about the piece of 
evidence which subjects were to receive will be analysed here. The second page of each 
problem contained the following information: 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of adjectives in Zogese have a diagonal line running through the main 
part of the symbol. 
Once again, there followed a rating scale where subjects were asked to indicate their 
confidence in each of the hypotheses. 
As with Experiments 3,4, and 5, the order in which subjects received pieces of 
evidence was manipulated. Thus, subjects received pieces of evidence in a strong/weak or 
weak/strong order. Accordingly, for the example given above, half of the subjects were 
initially told that 95% of adjectives in Zogese have a triangular element, whilst the other 
half were initially told that 70% of adjectives in Zogese have a diagonal line running 
through the main part of the symbol. As stated above, three problem contents were used in 
this experiment. In addition to the example given above, subjects were asked to decide 
whether a symbol, possessing a circular element and followed by a series of three dots, 
was a proper noun or a preposition, and whether a symbol, possessing a rectangular 
element and a line over the main part of the symbol, was an active verb or a pronoun. The 
full text of all the problems used is given in Appendix I- 
Design: this was a 2x2x3 mixed design, with the between subjects factor being the order 
in which information was presented to subjects (Order). As with the previous experiment, 
the Order manipulation involved half of the subjects receiving information that 95% of 
instances of the X category possessed one feature followed by information that 70% of 
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instances of that same category possessed the second feature. The remaining subjects 
received this same information in the reverse order. For ease of exposition, therefore, the 
levels of the Order manipulation will be referred to as 95%/70% and 70%/95%. The within 
subjects factors were when subjects rated their confidence in the hypotheses 
(Before/After), and problem content. As with Experiments 4-6, the second measure was 
subjects' expectations about the second piece of evidence. As this measure was taken 
before receipt of the second piece of evidence, the Before/After factor is not involved here. 
This measure therefore had a 20 design. The design of both parts of the experiment is 
surnmarised in Table 5.6 
Task Independent Variables Levels 
Confidence Ratings 1. ORDER 
2. BEFORE/AFTER. 
3. PROBLEM CONTENT 
2- 95%/70%; 70%/95% 
2- Confidence Before 
Confidence After 
3- see Appendix I 
Expectations I and 3 
Table 5.7: The independent and dependent variables involved in Experiment 7. 
Procedure: subjects were run in groups of between ten and sixteen. In each condition 
three subjects received the problems in each of the six possible orders. They worked on 
their problems individually. 
5.3.3 Results 
Once again, in this experiment, subjects were asked to express their confidence on 
a 100mm. line. At one end of the line was labelled "certain ... 
V and at the other end 
If certain ... Y". For the purposes of 
the analysis which follows subjects' markings on the line 
were converted to scores on a 100 point scale ranging from I to 
100. Each point on this 
scale corresponds to one millimetre on the line and the higher 
is a subject's score on this 
scale the more confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. 
One subject, in the 95%/70% condition, failed to complete at 
least one of the confidence 
measures. For the purposes of this analysis they have been excluded. 
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A 2x2x3 mixed design Anova was used to analyse subjects' confidence ratings. The 
between subjects factor was Order, whilst the within subjects factors were Before/After 
and problem content. The means and standard deviations from this analysis are given in 
Table 5.7, whilst a full Anova table is given in Appendix 3. 
Before After 
Adjective/ Proper Noun/ Active Verb/ Adjective/ Proper Noun/ Active Verb/ 
Order Passive Verb Preposition Pronoun Passive Verb Preposition Pronoun 
95-70 67 16 66 17 63 23 73 19 73 20 74 19 
70-95 62 12 59 12 66 14 81 10 82 11 83 10 
Table 5.8: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 7. 
The main effect of the Before/After manipulation was highly significant (F(l, 33) = 
86.87, p< . 001). 
Subjects' mean confidence before receipt of the second piece of 
information was 64 (S. D. = 14), whilst the mean rating after was 78 (S. D. = 15). Neither 
the main effect of information order (F(l, 33) < 1), nor the main effect of problem content 
Rl, 66) < 1), were significant. 
The only other effect which was significant was the two-way interaction 
between 
the Order and Before/After manipulations (F(l, 33) = 15.16, p <. 001). 
The means and 
standard deviations involved in this interaction, as well as significant 
differences between 
means (tested for with Tukey HSDs for unequal sample sizes), are presented 
in Table 5.8. 
As may be seen from Figure 5.4 a significant recency effect was 
found in the confidence 
ratings of subjects in this experiment. As strong predictions were made at 
the outset about 
this interaction in relation to the three way interaction between 
Order, Before/After, and 
Rarity from Experiment 6, Figure 5.4 depicts the relevant means from 
both experiments. 
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Info Order Bef/Aft 1 65 (18ý 274(18) 362(10) 482(9) 95%/70% before I -MM 0 005 
after 2 . 005 
. . 0005 
. 0005 005 70%/95% before 3 
. 0005 
. V 0005 
after 4 . 0005 . 005 .0 05 
. 
Table 5.9: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses), and significant differences between means 
for the interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 7. 
84 
80 
76 
72 
68 
64 
60 
of 
Before Afte r Before After Before After 
Exp. 6: Rare Features Exp. 7: Abstract Materials 
Exp. 6: Common Features 
95%/70 '/, 
14-. 70%/95'/. 
Figure 5.4: A comparison of the interaction between Order and Before/After from Experiment 7 (on the 
right) with the three-way interaction between Order, Before/After, and Rarity from Experiment 6 (on the 
left). 
Subjects' expectations about the second piece of evidence were analysed using a 
2x3 mixed design Anova. The between subjects factor was Order, whilst the within 
subjects factor was problem content. A total of four subjects from each of the between 
subjects condition failed to express their expectations for at least one of the problems. For 
the purposes of this analysis they have been excluded. The means and standard deviations 
from this analysis are given in Table 5.9, whilst a full Anova table is given in Appendix 
3. 
None of the effects were significant. Of most interest was the main effect of 
information 
order (F(l, 26) <. 2). Subjects in the 95%/70% condition expected 48% (S. D. = 
18) of 
instances of the focal category to possess the other feature, whilst subjects 
in the 70%/95% 
condition expected 46% (S. D. = 12) of instances of the focal category to possess 
the other 
feature. 
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Order Adjective/Passive Verb 
95-70 147 27 
70-95 149 17 
Noun/Prep sition Active Verb/Pronoun 
50 29 48 25 
51 19 37 20 
Table 5.10: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' expectations in 
Experiment 7. 
5.3.3 Discussion 
A discussion of the results from this experiment is a relatively simple affair. As in 
previous studies, a significant main effect for the Before/After manipulation has been 
found. ýOnce again, this means that, overall, subjects were more confident that the focal 
hypothesis was the case after receipt of the second piece of evidence. Also as predicted, 
was the significant interaction between Order and when Before/After. Although subjects in 
both order conditions were significantly more confident that the focal hypothesis was the 
case after receipt of the second piece of evidence, the final confidence ratings of subjects 
in the 70%/95% condition were significantly higher than those of subjects in the 95%/70% 
condition. An examination of Figure 5.4 reveals how similar the results of this interaction 
in the present experiment are to the common features half of the three-way interaction 
between Order, Before/After, and Rarity from Experiment 6. 
One of the predictions made at the outset of this experiment was that there would 
be no significant differences in subjects' expectations about the unseen evidence (see pg. 
227). This prediction has been confirmed. Confirmation of both predictions made at the 
outset (pg. 227) suggests that the account given of the results of Experiment 6 was indeed 
correct. Because the task used in this experiment was unfamiliar to subjects, the only 
source of information which they had available to them when relating evidence to 
hypotheses was knowledge about likelihoods. Most surprising is the fact that subjects were 
willing to rate one hypothesis as being more likely than the other in the light of such 
information. As Figure 5.4 demonstrates however, subjects' performance on this task was 
virtually identical to the performance of those subjects who received information about 
common features in Experiment 6. This suggests that those subjects in Experiment 
6 did 
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not take the base rates of the evidential features, about which they received evidence, into 
account when relating evidence to hypothesis. The difference between the results of 
subjects who received information about rare features in Experiment 6, and those of the 
remaining subjects in that experiment, and in this one (also to be seen in Figure 5.4) 
suggests that the former were assigning subjective values to the evidence which they 
received based on a different source of information. As was pointed out in the discussion 
of Experiment 6, that source of information is likely to have been background knowledge 
about the base rates of the evidential features. 
The results of this experiment, because of their similarity to those from subjects in 
the common features conditions of Experiment 6, suggest that subjects' expectations about 
the unseen evidence were not a factor in the judgements of those subjects. The similarity of 
these results to the previous ones also suggests that the partial order manipulation used in 
Experiment 6 was not a factor in the results. As Experiment 4 has demonstrated, reversing 
the order of the features leads to a recency effect only when there is a high degree of 
perceived association between the features. In other words, manipulating the order of the 
features has an effect only when knowledge about the relationship between the features is 
used as a source of information in integrating evidence and hypothesis. The results of this 
experiment, and the previous one, suggest that subjects do have access to other sources of 
information. The use of these other sources may also lead to order effects in belief 
revision. The problem for existing accounts is to specify what information 
is used, and 
when. 
5.4 EXPERIMENT 8 
5.4.1 Intro uction 
This section of Chapter 5 will contain the details of the 
final experiment to be 
described in this thesis. One of the aims of this experiment will 
be to demonstrate the 
differential use of information from background memory 
in assigning subjective values to 
pieces of evidence within the same task. In attempting such a 
demonstration, subjects will 
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be asked to form, and revise, beliefs in a pair of exclusive hypothesis in the light of 
diagnostic information relating to those hypotheses. This signals both a change in the 
experimental task, and a widening of focus. 
In Experiment I subjects were asked to choose a piece of information in order to 
decide between two hypotheses. The order effect established in Experiment 3, and further 
explored in the subsequent experiments, was based upon the results of those subjects who 
chose pseudodiagnostic evidence to help them decide between the hypotheses. The 
question of how subjects use diagnostic information to decide between hypotheses has 
received little attention in this thesis. Before discussing the questions which a 
consideration of diagnostic evidence raises, a reminder of the differences between 
diagnostic and non-diagnostic versions of the task will prove useful. 
Thus far, the majority of subjects in this thesis have been given a scenario 
containing two alternatives followed by some information relevant to one of those 
alternatives, and have then been asked to use that information to indicate their relative 
confidence in the alternatives. A typical example might be the subject told that her sister 
has just bought a new car which she knows to be a model X or a model Y but can't 
remember which. She does remember that the car possesses a radio and four doors. Next, 
the subject is told that 95% of car Xs possess a radio and 70% possess four doors. Her task 
is to decide how likely each of the alternatives is in the light of such evidence. From the 
point of view of traditional normative analyses of the task (Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan, 
1993), the evidence which this subject has received is non-diagnostic - no decision can be 
made between the alternatives based on such evidence. This is because all of the evidence 
which the subject has received pertains to just one of the alternatives and therefore, the 
subject possesses no information upon which to base a comparison of those alternatives. 
However, as was pointed out in the discussion of Experiment 2, there exists the possibility 
of alternative normative analyses of the pseudodiagnosticity task which would assign 
informational utility to the pseudodi agnostic piece of information normally chosen 
by 
subjects on the task, and which the subjects in Experiments 3-7 of this thesis 
have been 
asked to use when deciding between the alternatives. 
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If, on the other hand, a subject given the same scenario, was told that 95% of 
model Xs possessed a radio and 25% of model Ys possessed a radio, then the subject 
could be said to possess diagnostic information (once again, from the traditional normative 
view). In other words, by the application of Bayes theorem (see Chapter I for a fuller 
discussion of this topic), the subject could work out how likely each of the alternatives is 
in the light of the evidence which she possesses. Although there exists considerable 
evidence (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney and Schiavo, 1979; Mynatt, Doherty and Dragan, 
1993) that subjects are insensitive to the diagnosticity of evidence when asked to choose 
information to help them decide between hypotheses (but see Chapters I and 2 for an 
alternative normative analysis of the pseudodiagnosticity task), there also exists evidence 
that subjects can make normatively correct use of such evidence once they possess it. For 
example, Beyth-Marorn and Fischhoff (1983), based on a series of studies investigating 
subjects' use of diagnostic information, concluded that subjects are much better at using 
such information than they are at seeking it out. Likewise, Ofir (1988) found that subjects 
will use the likelihood ratio when they perceive it to discriminate between competing 
hypotheses. In a similar vein, Evans (1989) has pointed out how subjects are passively 
Popperian on Wason's (1960) 246 task. By this he means that although subjects do not 
seek out disconfirming evidence on the task, once they have received that evidence they 
are capable of putting it to use. Based upon such a consideration of the evidence, it is 
predicted that if subjects are given diagnostic information in a task such as the one used in 
earlier experiments, they will use it to provide confidence ratings which conform closely 
to those prescribed by Bayes theorem. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether subjects make the normatively correct use of 
information is completely separate from the question of what processes are involved 
in the 
use of such information. In so far as subjects have been given non-diagnostic 
information 
in Experiments 3-7, this thesis could be said to be focused on the latter, rather than the 
former question. Although there will be a normative yardstick against which to measure 
subjects' performance in this experiment, the question still remains as to the processes 
underlying subjects' eventual confidence ratings. Before proceeding 
it should be pointed 
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out that the results of previous studies do suggest a normative account of the use of 
" pseudodi agnostic" information - its use should be related to the subject's prior 
expectations about that information. 
The previous experiments in this thesis have suggested that the process of evidence 
interpretation is central to how subjects update their beliefs about a hypothesis in the light 
of new information. Experiments 6 and 7, in particular, demonstrated the use of different 
sources of information in background knowledge in assigning subjective value's to pieces 
of evidence. These different sources of information were background knowledge about the 
base rates of the evidential features used and knowledge about the meaning of likelihood 
expressions. If, as predicted, subjects do use the diagnostic information which they receive 
to produce normatively correct confidence ratings, then it may be inferred that they are 
using background information about likelihood expressions in order to do so. In any 
probabilistic reasoning task, it is the level at which instances of the hypothesised 
categories possess a feature which should be taken into account when deciding which of 
the hypotheses is more likely, rather than the feature itself. This makes sense when one 
remembers that the hypotheses are being compared on a single feature. Thus it is the 
likelihood of the feature's occurrence which is important rather than the base rate of the 
feature itself. 
However, both Experiments 2 and 6 have provided clear evidence that subjects are 
sensitive to, and use, information about the base rates of the features which they are 
reasoning about. How might such a sensitivity be expected to manifest itself on a task such 
as the one used in this thesis? Consider two groups of subjects - one group is given 
information concerning the likelihood that each of two hypothesised categories possesses a 
feature with a low base rate, whilst the other is given equivalent information concerning a 
feature with a high base rate. If the evidence is given sequentially, those subjects given 
information about a rare feature would be expected to use background 
information about 
base rates to assign a subjective value to the initial piece of evidence. 
However, upon 
receipt of the second piece of evidence, those same subjects would 
be expected to use the 
likelihood ratio as a basis for their confidence ratings. On the other 
hand, those subjects 
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who received information about a common feature would be expected to use the 
likelihoods in assigning subjective values to both pieces of evidence. 
What is interesting about this hypothetical account is that it suggests that subjects 
who receive evidence concerning a rare feature will re-interpret the early piece of evidence 
in the light of the later piece of evidence. The first subjective value which they assign to 
the initial piece of evidence will be based on their background knowledge about base rates 
whereas the second subjective value assigned will be based on their knowledge of 
likelihood expressions. Experiments 3,4, and 5 demonstrated that the subjective value of 
later evidence is dependent on inferences based upon both the initial piece of evidence and 
background knowledge. It is suggested here that, in certain cases, the meaning of early 
occurring evidence may be dependent upon inferences based on background knowledge 
and the later piece of evidence. Such a finding would be in stark contrast to current 
conceptions of information integration. For example, Massaro and Friedman (1990) in a 
paper reviewing and comparing current models of integration given multiple sources of 
information, claimed that the general stage model displayed in Figure 5.5 could be used to 
characterise all current models. 
EVALUATION 1 lm-ý INTEGRATION ' -d DECISION 
Figure 5.5: Massaro and Friedman's (1990) general stage model of information integration. 
Such a model is essentially forward working, and assumes that once a piece of evidence 
has been evaluated by the organism it is fed into the integration stage of the process. The 
product of the integration process is then fed into the decision stage. An example of such a 
model at work is that of Hogarth and Einhorn where each piece of evidence 
is integrated 
with previous evidence and the product of the integration is, itself, used 
in determining the 
effect of any subsequent evidence. This position is in stark contrast to the predictions 
made here, where it is expected that early evidence will be re-evaluated 
based on later 
evidence. 
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One way of testing these predictions is with an information order manipulation. If 
two groups of subjects are given the likelihood ratio for a feature, one group receiving 
information about a rare feature, and the other receiving information about a common 
feature, the initial, rather than final, confidence ratings of subjects should be dependent on 
information order. This is because subjects who receive an initial piece of information 
about a rare feature should be significantly more confident that the hypothesis to which it 
relates is the case than subjects who receive an initial piece of information about a 
common feature. However, if subjects use the likelihood ratio to make their final 
confidence ratings, then there should be only small differences in those final ratings due to 
the base rate of the features or information order. 
5.4.2 Method 
Subjects: 144 subjects participated in this experiment. They were recruited by placing 
notices around the University of Plymouth. 68 of the students were male and 75 were 
female. Their mean age was 23.2 years. The oldest subject was 45 and the youngest was 
18. All subjects were paid for participation in the experiment. 
Materials: each subject received a handout comprised of an instruction sheet and three 
problems. The instructions were as follows: 
Accompanying these instructions is a series of three decision problems which 
require you, in the light of certain information, to rate your confidence in two 
alternatives and to answer some simple questions. Detailed instructions on 
what to do are contained in the problems but it would 
be very helpful if you 
could bear the following general points in mind throughout the experiment. 
(1) Read each problem carefully and think hard before responding. 
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(2) Although there are some surface similarities between the problems, they 
all concern different scenarios, so you should think carefully about each 
scenario. 
(3) Don't refer back to previous problems when working on the later problems 
(4) Each problem consists of two pages which are stapled together. It is 
important that you receive the information they contain in the intended order. 
Don't go on to a later page until you have finished the one you are currently 
working on. 
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will answer them. 
The first page of each problem was similar to the following: 
Yourfriend has just bought a new house. You can't remember whether it's on 
street X or street Y. You do remember that the house has a swimming pool and 
a garage. 
You have the following piece of information: 
95% of houses on street X have a swimming pool. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your 
confidence in each of the decision alternatives in the light of the 
information 
you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to complete 
certainty that your friend now lives on street X and the other 
to complete 
certainty that yourfriend lives on street Y. Please mark the point on 
the line 
that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the 
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greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the 
end of the scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that your friend 
lives on Street X 
Certain that your friend 
lives on Street Y 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following 
questions: 
(1) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a 
swimming pool? 
(2) What percentage of the houses on street X would you expect to have a 
garage? 
(3) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a 
garage? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the 
one behind it by gently pulling the sheets apart at the bottom. 
The second page of each problem contained the following information: 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
25% of houses on street Y have a swimming pool. 
This was followed by a second rating scale. 
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All problems were of the same format as that given above. The first manipulation 
was that of information order. This was achieved by simply reversing the order in which 
subjects received the information about the hypotheses. One of the pieces of information 
always related to the focal hypothesis (category X) whilst the other always related to the 
non-focal hypothesis (category Y). It should be pointed out that the X hypothesis is 
referred to as the focal hypothesis because, in all cases, it is the hypothesis favoured by the 
likelihood ratio which subjects received. It is undoubtedly the case, however, that those 
subjects initially given a piece of evidence concerning the Y category will focus on the Y 
hypothesis until receipt of the second piece of information. For the above example, 
subjects given the focal evidence first received the information as it is presented here. 
Because the nature of the evidence given to all subjects meant that the focal hypothesis 
was always the one supported, the order manipulation in this experiment may be thought 
of as being analogous to the order manipulations in previous experiments. Accordingly, 
the focal evidence always offered strong support for the focal hypothesis whilst the non- 
focal evidence never offered as much support for the non-focal hypothesis and may, 
therefore, be thought of as offering weak evidence in favour of the focal hypothesis. 
The second manipulation involved the rarity of the feature for which subjects were 
given the likelihood ratio. In the above example subjects were given information only 
about the rare feature although they were told that the target object possessed both a rare 
and a common feature. Half of the subjects were given information about the rare feature 
only and the other half about the common feature only. The features used were the same as 
those used in Experiment 5. The full text of the problems used is to be found in Appendix 
1. The three scenarios used were the one presented above, one concerning an engineer- 
friend who works for one of two companies, and a problem concerning a friend who 
has 
bought either a model X or model Y car. 
The third manipulation involved changing the likelihood ratio which subjects were 
given. All subjects were told that 95% of instances of the 
focal category possessed the 
relevant feature (this was always the strongest piece of 
information which subjects 
received). Half the subjects were also told that 25% of the non-focal category possessed 
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this feature whilst the other half were told that 60% of instances of the non-focal category 
possessed the feature. 
Procedure: subjects were run in groups of between 4 and 10 in sessions without a time- 
limit. All subjects were paid for their participation in the experiment. 
_Task 
Independent Variables Levels 
Confidence Ratings 1. ORDER 
2. RARITY 
3. LIKELIHOOD RATIO 
4. BEFORE/AFTER 
2- FOCAL I st; 
FOCAL 2nd 
2- COMMON; 
RARE 
2-95%/25% 
95%/60% 
2- Confidence Before 
Confidence After 
5. PROBLEM CONTENT 3 different problem contents 
Table 5.11: The independent and dependent variables involved in Experiment 8. 
Design: this was a 2x2x2x2x3 mixed design. The between-subject variables were Order 
(Focal Ist vs. Focal 2nd), Rarity of the feature about which evidence was received (Rare 
vs. Common), and Likelihood Ratio (95/25 vs. 95/60). The within-subject variables were 
when subjects expressed their confidence (Before/After) and problem content. The design 
of the experiment is summarised in Table 5.10 
5.4.3 Results 
It will be remembered that subjects were asked to express their confidence on a 
100mm line. At one end of the line was labelled "certain ... 
V and at the other end 
11certain ... 
Y". For the purposes of the analysis which follows subjects' markings on the 
line 
were converted to scores on a 100 point scale ranging from 
1 to 100. Each point on this 
scale corresponds to one millimetre on the line and the 
higher is a subject's score on this 
scale the more confident she is that the X hypothesis is the case. 
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Of the 144 subjects who participated, one subject, who received information about 
a common feature and a likelihood ratio of 95/60, failed to provide confidence ratings. 
Accordingly this subject will not be included in the analysis of subjects I confidence ratings 
which follow. Subjects' confidence ratings were analysed using a 2x2x2x2x3 mixed design 
analysis of variance. The between-subject factors were Order, Rarity and Likelihood 
Ratio. The within-subjects factors were Before/After and problem content. The means and 
standard deviations from this analysis are given in Table 5.11, whilst a full Anova table is 
to be found in Appendix 3. 
Before After 
Likellh'd 
Rarity Ratio Order House Engineer Car House Engineer Car 
Rare 95/60 Focal I st 66 16 68 17 74 18 68 14 64 16 68 13 
Focal2nd 42 12 41 8 42 10 75 13 77 14 77 13 
95/25 Focal I st 71 17 65 18 68 19 81 13 77 15 76 13 
Focal2nd 47 18 50 15 52 16 77 17 77 15 81 14 
Common 95/60 Focal I st 62 16 60 15 63 18 63 12 68 11 68 13 
Focal2nd 46 10 40 10 40 11 70 12 70 14 72 9 
95/25 Focal I st 61 12 58 14 58 14 72 12 71 13 73 12 
Focal2nd 
. 
54 19 50 19 59 18 82 15 73 21 79 14 
Table 5.12: Means (in bold) and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 8, 
The main effect of Order was highly significant (F(l, 135) = 16.92, p< . 001). Subjects 
who received initial information about the focal hypothesis (the strong information) gave a 
mean rating of 68 (S. D. = 10) whereas subjects who received this information second gave 
a mean rating of 61 (S. D. = 9). The main effect of Likelihood Ratio was also significant, 
fll, 135) = 12.66, p< . 001), as was the main effect of 
Rarity (F(1,135) = 3.98, p< 
-05). Subjects given a 
likelihood ratio of 95/25 had an overall rating of 67 (S. D. = 
11) 
versus a rating of 62 (S. D. = 8) for those subjects given a likelihood ratio of 
95/60 - 
Subjects given information about rare features displayed a mean confidence rating of 
66 
(S. D. = 10) whereas subjects given information about the common 
features gave a mean 
rating of 63 (S. D. = 10) - 
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The first of the within-subjects factors - Before/After - was also highly significant 
(F(l, 135) = 18 1, p <. 00 1). The mean rating before receipt of the second piece of evidence 
was 56 (S. D. = 15), whilst the mean rating after was 73 (S. D. = 12) - The effect of content 
was also significant (F(2,270) = 3.64, p< . 05). The mean rating for the house problem 
was 65 (S. D. = 12), for the engineer problem 63 (S. D. = 12), and for the car problem 66 
(S. D. = 11). As an inspection of the data from the pre-test used to select features 
demonstrates (Chapter 4, Table 4.5), it was impossible to produce features with exactly the 
same frequency levels. Accordingly, slight differences due to content are to be expected. It 
should be pointed out, however, that although both the main effects of Rarity and problem 
content are significant, the effect is very small in each case 
Of the two-way interactions involved in the experiment, one - the interaction 
between Order and Rarity - approached significance (F(t, t35) = 3.33, p< . 08) and one 
was highly significant - the interaction between Order and Before/After (F(I, 135) = 
74.87, p< . 001). These interactions are shown 
in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 respectively, whilst 
the means involved in these interactions are given in Table 5.12. Subsequent analyses of 
the simple effects in the interaction between Order and Before/After revealed a significant 
difference between the Order conditions when subjects expressed their confidence before 
receipt of the second piece of evidence(F(l, 135) = 35.43, p <0 1) but not after (F(l, 135) = 
1.63). Thus there was a significant difference in confidence expressed before the second 
piece of evidence, but not after receipt of that evidence. There was also a significant 
difference between before and after 
order feature frequency when confidence was expresse 
rare common before after 
strong Ist 70(11) 65(9) 64(14) 71(12) 
stronR 2nd 62(8) 61(10) 47(12 
76(13 
Table 5.13: Means, and standard deviations (in parentheses), involved in the two-way 
interaction between 
Order and Rarity and in the two-way interaction between order and Before/After- 
Both from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 8. 
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measures when subjects received the Focal (X) information second (F(l, 135) = 80.96, P< 
. 
01) but not when they received that information first (F(1,135) = 3.01, p> . 05). Subjects 
who received the Focal (X) information second were significantly more confident after 
receipt of the second piece of information than they had been before receipt of that 
information. The same was not true for subjects who received the Focal piece of 
information first. 
72 
70 
, 868 19 
66 0 
64 
62 
60 
RARE COMMON 
Focal (X) I st 
Focal (X) 2nd 
FIGURE 5.6: The interaction between Order and Rarity from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 8. 
80 
74 
, 868 
0 U62 
9 
956 
50 
44 
BEFORE AFTER 
'*«w. Focal (X) Ist 
'4'116%Focal (X) 2nd 
FIGURE 5.7: ne interaction between Order and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' confidence 
ratings in Experiment 8. 
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Although the two way interaction between Likelihood Ratio and Before/After 
(displayed in Figure 5.8) was not significant (F (1,135) < 1), strong predictions had been 
made at the outset about differences between the means involved in this interaction. Tukey 
HSDs for unequal sample sizes were used to test for these differences. Their results are 
shown in Table 5.13. 
Likelih'd Ratio Before/After 1 54(16) 270(11) 358(15) 4 77 (13) 
95/60 before 1 
. 001 . 001 
after 2 . 001 
771 
. 001 . 005 
95/25 before 3 001 001 
after 4 . 001 . 005 . 001 
. 00, mum". 
F 'All 
J210 
Table 5.14: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses) and significant differences between means 
fof the two way interaction between Likelihood Ratio and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 8. 
80 
76 
a) 
C) 
E: 72 
c68 0 0 
C: 
, a)64 
M 
2 
60 
56 
52 
Before After 
95/60 
95/25 
Figure 5.8: The interaction between Likelihood Ratio and Before/After from Experiment 8. 
There were three significant three-way interactions. The first of these was the 
interaction between Order, Rarity and Before/After (F(l, 35) = 4.19, p< . 05). 
An analysis 
of simple interaction effects revealed the interaction between Order and Before/After to 
be 
significant at both the rare level of the Rarity variable (F(l, 135) = 19.22, p< . 
01), and at 
the common level (F(l, 135) = 6.8 1, p< . 025). 
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests for unequal 
sample sizes revealed significant differences amongst the means involved 
in this 
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interaction. These are reported in Table 5.14 below, whilst the interaction is displayed in 
Figure 5.9. 
cl. ) 
0 
cl. ) 
Ii 
C 
L) 
0 
80 
75 
70 
65 
60 
55 
50 
45 
40 
"%ýFocal (X) Ist 
%'4*ýFocal (X) 2nd 
BEFORE AFTER BEFORE AFTER 
RAREFEATURE COMMON FEATURE 
FIGURE 5.9: The interaction between Order, Rarity, and Before/After from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 8. 
Order Rarity Before/ 
After 
1 69 
(14) 
2 72 
(14) 
3 60 
(13) 
4 69 
(9) 
5 46 
(10) 
6 77 
(12) 
7 48 
(13) 
8 74 
(13) 
X Ist rare bef 1 . 05 . 001 . 05 . 001 
aft 2 . 001 . 001 . 001 
COMM bef 3 . 05 . 001 05 . 
001 . 001 . 001 . 001 
aft 4 . 05 (01 05 . 001 
X 2nd rare bef 5 . 001 . 001 . 001 
00, . 001 . 
001 
aft 6 . 05 . 
001 . 05 . 001 . 
001 
Comm bef 7 . 001 . 001 . 001 . 001 . 001 I 
I'll, womb 001 
aft 81 . 001 . 
001 . 001 
L 
Id significant differences between means Table 5.15: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses), an I 
for the three-way interaction between Order, Before/After, and Rarity from the analysis of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 8. 
The second significant three-way interaction was between Order, Likelihood Ratio 
and Before/After (F(l, 135) = 9.59, p <. 005). Once again, an analysis of simple 
interaction effects revealed that Order interacted significantly with Before/After when 
subjects were given a likelihood ratio of 95/25 (F(l, 135) = 5.20, p< . 05), and when 
the 
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ratio was 95/60 (F(I, 135) = 22.18, p< .0 1). Tukey HSDs for unequal sample sizes also 
revealed significant differences amongst the means involved in this interaction. These are 
shown in Table 5.15 below, whilst the interaction is displayed in Figure 5.10. 
85 
75 
65 
55 
45 
35 
BEFORE AFTER BEFORE AFTER 
Likelihood 95/60 95/25 
Ratio 
FIGURE 5.10: The interaction between Order, Likelihood Ratio, and Before/After from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 8. 
Order L'hood 
Ratio 
Before/ 1 65 
After (14) 
"**ýFocal (X) Ist 
"'*ýFocal (X) 2nd 
2 66 
(10) 
3 63 
(14) 
4 75 
(12) 
5 
(7 
42 
) 
6 74 
(11) 
7 52 
(13) 
8 78 
(13) 
X lst 95/60 bef I 1; 'g . 01 . 001 . 05 . 001 . 001 
aft 2 
One, 
. 05 . 001 . 001 . 001 
95/25 bef 3 
M 
-. 
901 . 001 . 005 . 001 . 001 
aft 4 . 01 . 05 . 001 . 
001 
X 2nd 60/95 bef 5 . 001 . 001 . 001 . 
001 . 001 . 005 . 
001 
aft 6 . 05 . 005 . 
001 M -001 
25/95 bef 7 . 001 . 001 . 001 . 
001 . 005 . 001 
aft 8 . 001 . 001 . 
001 . 001 . 
001 
Table 5.16: Means (in bold), standard deviations (in parentheses), and significant differences between means 
for the three way interaction between Order, Before/After, and Likelihood Ratio from the analysis of 
subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 8. 
Demonstrating once again that there were differences between the perceived 
frequency of the features, the interaction between Order, Likelihood Ratio and problem 
content was also significant (F(2,270) = 3.3 1, p< . 05). 
A further three-way interaction 
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involving problem content, Order, and RaritY approached significance (F(2,270) = 2.70, p 
< . 07). 
5.4.4 Discussion 
There were two predictions made at the outset of this experiment. The first of these 
was that all subjects would use the likelihood ratio which they received to provide 
confidence ratings close to those prescribed by Bayes theorem. The second prediction was 
that all of the differences between the means of the various groups of subjects in this 
experiment would occur amongst confidence ratings collected before receipt of the second 
piece of evidence. This prediction is of course limited to differences due to feature rarity 
and information order, as the first prediction implies differences in final confidence ratings 
due to the likelihood ratio. 
The relationship between the results of the experiment and these predictions will be 
discussed in turn with the first topic of discussion being the normative accuracy of 
subjects' predictions. Overall, subjects' mean confidence rating in the 95/60 likelihood 
condition was 62, whilst the equivalent mean for those subjects in the 95/25 condition was 
67. Although this difference was significant, it tells us nothing about subjects' accuracy as 
it is based upon the before and after ratings of all subjects. The most revealing result as 
regards subjects' normative accuracy is the non-significant interaction between Likelihood 
Ratio and Before/After (see Figure 5.8). Subjects in the 95/60 likelihood condition 
expressed a mean confidence of 70 after receipt of the second piece of evidence, whilst the 
equivalent mean for subjects in the 95/25 condition was 77. The difference between these 
means was significant. Given a likelihood ratio of 95/60, the probability, according to 
Bayes theorem, that the focal hypothesis is the case is . 
61, whilst with a likelihood ratio of 
95/25, the probability is . 79. Although subjects given a 
likelihood ratio of 95/60 seem to 
be over-confident that the focal hypothesis was the case, subjects given a likelihood ratio 
of 95/25 have used that information to produce confidence ratings almost exactly as 
prescribed by Bayes theorem. 
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The results of the three way interaction between Order, Likelihood Ratio, and 
Before/After (see Figure 5.10) demonstrate that information order did have some effect on 
subjects' final confidence ratings. With both likelihood ratios, those subjects who received 
initial information about the focal hypothesis displayed less final confidence that the focal 
hypothesis was the case than did subjects who received initial information about the non- 
focal hypothesis. This recency effect was not significant for either of the likelihood ratios. 
However, the trend towards recency was strongest amongst subjects who were given a 
likelihood ratio of 95/60. This was caused by the overconfidence of subjects in this 
condition who received the information about the non-focal hypothesis first. As predicted 
however, the majority of significant differences between the means involved in this 
interaction were between confidence ratings before receipt of the second piece of 
evidence. 
Nevertheless, final confidence ratings can be said to have corresponded reasonably 
closely to what would be prescribed by Bayes theorem. In the context of, for example, 
research on utilisation of the base rate, the classic finding is that subjects grossly 
overestimate the posterior probability of the hypothesis through a neglect of the base rate 
when there is no clear causal link between the base rate and the probability of an outcome 
(although see Kohler, 1996, for a different reading of this literature). The difference 
between subjects'judgements and the normative answer is reduced considerably when that 
causal link is made clear (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). Even with this improved 
performance however, the ratings of subjects in this experiment correspond more closely 
to the Bayesian norm than they did in the original Tversky and Kahneman study. 
Ofir (1988) found that subjects used likelihood information to resolve 
inconsistencies present in the other information which they were given. When he presented 
subjects with a high base rate and hit rate (P(E/H), i. e. the likelihood of the data given the 
focal hypothesis) the pattern of judgements was similar to the normative curve. He 
concluded however, that this was due to subjects neglecting the false alarm (P(E/Ha)) and 
so subjects did not demonstrate an understanding of diagnosticity. 
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The probable reason for subjects relatively good performance on the task used in 
this experiment is its simplicity. Subjects were given only two pieces of information and 
the task was such that their relevance was apparent. The only way to resolve the 
inconsistency inherent in the categorisation task was to use both pieces of information. 
This of course, is not to claim that subjects, when cued to use both pieces of information, 
use them in a Bayesian way. The integration function is not Bayesian, as most of the 
studies in the area demonstrate (Pitz, Downing and Reinhold, 1967; Pitz, 1969; Roby, 
1967; Shanteau, 1972; Peterson and DuCharme, 1967; Lopes, 1985; 1986). Thus, the 
prediction that final confidence ratings would approximate Bayesian solutions in this study 
was not motivated by a belief that the process is in any sense Bayesian, but rather by the 
observation that subjects can, in some cases, use information to derive ratings that are 
close to the norm. 
The question of the process by which subjects came to use the information which 
they received in an apparently Bayesian manner is, as stated previously, separate from the 
question of their accuracy in using that information. It was predicted at the outset that there 
would be a differential use of sources of information available in background memory in 
assigning subjective values to the pieces of evidence. The result of interest in this regard is 
the significant interaction between Order, Rarity, and Before/After (see Figure 5.9). As 
predicted, there are large differences between confidence ratings involved in this 
interaction produced by subjects before receipt of the second piece of evidence. However, 
an examination of Table 5.14 where the means, and significant differences between means, 
involved in this interaction are displayed, shows that the only significant difference of 
interest is that between the initial confidence of subjects given information about the 
likelihood that a member of the focal (X) category would possess a rare feature, and the 
initial confidence of subjects informed of the likelihood that a member of the 
focal (X) 
category would possess a common feature. This finding leads to the inference that subjects 
who received the focal information first were using their knowledge about the 
base rates of 
the evidential features in assigning a subjective value to the initial pieces of evidence. 
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However, there is only one significant difference amongst the confidence ratings 
produced after receipt of the second piece of information. Subjects who received 
information about a common feature in the Focal I st/non-Focal 2nd order were 
significantly less confident that the focal hypothesis was the case than were subjects who 
received information about a rare feature in the non-Focal I st/Focal 2nd order. None of the 
other differences between the means involved in this half of the interaction were 
significant. It would seem that although subjects were using different sources of 
information before receipt of the second piece of information, all subjects were using the 
likelihood ratio after receipt of that piece of information. 
That subjects were using different sources of information in assigning subjective 
values to the initial pieces of evidence which they received is further evidenced by a 
comparison of subjects' initial confidence ratings in the interaction between Order, Rarity 
and Before/After (see Figure 5.9) and the interaction between Order, Likelihood Ratio and 
Before/After (see Figure 5.10). As has already been pointed out, the former interaction 
suggests that subjects initially given evidence about the focal hypothesis were using 
information about the base rates of the evidential features in assigning a subjective value 
to the piece of evidence which they received. However, there is no such significant 
difference between the initial confidence ratings of those subjects who received 
information about the non-focal hypothesis first. In order words, these subjects do not 
seem to have been sensitive to the base rates of the evidential features about which they 
were given information. It is not the case that the initial confidence ratings of these 
subjects are completely heterogeneous, however. An examination of the three way 
interaction between Order, Likelihood Ratio and Before/After (see Figure 5.10) reveals a 
significant difference between the means of subjects given an initial piece of information 
about the non-focal hypothesis. This difference is due to the Likelihood Ratio 
manipulation. Thus, those subjects initially told that 25% of instances of the non-focal 
category (the Y category) possessed either the common or rare feature were significantly 
more confident that the focal hypothesis (the X hypothesis) was the case than were 
subjects initially told that 60% of instances of the non-focal category possessed either 
the 
common or rare feature. Accordingly, subjects who received evidence about 
the non-focal 
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hypothesis first were more sensitive to differences in the likelihood attached to that piece 
of evidence than they were to the base rate of the feature which it concerned. 
This result suggests that subjects were using different sources of information to 
assign subjective values to the initial pieces of evidence which they received. However, all 
subjects seem to have predominantly used the likelihood ratio in making their final 
confidence rating. This is interesting because it suggests that subjects who were initially 
told that 95% of instances of the focal category possessed the rare feature were forced to 
re-evaluate that first piece of evidence in the light of the second piece of evidence which 
they received. This means that, in certain cases, even when a piece of information has been 
evaluated and a decision has been made about how that evidence relates to the hypotheses, 
that piece of information may have to be re-evaluated, and a new subjective value fed into 
the integration process. Such a re-evaluation is necessary in this experiment because once 
the subject possesses a full likelihood ratio than the rarity of the feature on which the 
hypotheses are being compared is of no informational value. So, although the rarity of the 
features was used by subjects in assigning a subjective value to the evidence when they 
possessed just one piece of evidence, such information was not relevant once the subject 
was in possession of the full likelihood ratio. As has been seen, subjects made very good 
use of the likelihood ratios which they were given. 
Such an interpretation of these results is further backed up by a specific 
consideration of how they relate to the belief adjustment model of Hogarth and Einhorn. It 
has been repeatedly pointed out that their predictions, about order effects for the type of 
task used in the experiments contained in this thesis, rely on both the subjective values of 
the pieces of information which subjects receive and the difference in these subjective 
values. If the initial confidence ratings produced by subjects is taken as a rough 
index of 
the subjective value for the pieces of information which those ratings are 
based upon, it 
will be seen that the difference in subjective values between the pieces of 
information 
which subjects received is almost twice as large with rare 
features as it is with common 
features (see Figure 5.9). However, the recency effect produced in both halves of the three 
way interaction between Order, Rarity, and Before/After, 
is exactly the same. This result 
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can only be explained in terms of subjects who received an initial piece of evidence 
concerning a rare feature, re-evaluating that initial evidence. 
Therefore, not only has this experiment demonstrated the differential use of 
sources of information from background knowledge within a belief revision task, it has 
also shown that the process of assigning a subjective value to a piece of infon-nation is 
reversible. This contrasts with an assumption which underlies all existing models of 
information integration and is nicely summed up by Massaro and Friedman (1990) when 
they claim that the scale value produced by the integration stage has no "memory" of how 
it was obtained. This experiment has demonstrated that initial evidence is held in memory 
and may be subjected to a second stage of evaluation, if later occurring evidence suggests 
that the initial evaluation was inadequate. 
Although this experiment is far from enabling a complete account of how subjects 
integrate evidence with hypothesis, it does suggest that the process is more flexible than 
was previously suspected. It also has a bearing on what information is represented by the 
subject during the process, and how this representation is structured. These issues will be 
discussed in the next, and final chapter of the thesis. The discussion will be relatively 
conservative however. Whilst Experiment 8 suggests some very interesting avenues for 
further research, and asks some questions which current accounts of the belief revision 
process seem unable to answer, it should be seen as a starting point rather than an ending. 
5.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The experiments described in this chapter have strengthened the case 
for a model 
of the belief revision process which includes a strong pragmatic component. 
These 
experiments have also cast further doubt on those existing models of the process which 
do 
not possess a pragmatic element. Although the subject of all three experiments 
is the 
question of how background knowledge is used in assigning subjective values 
to pieces of 
evidence, they differ slightly in their focus. Experiments 
6 and 7 constitute an initial 
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demonstration of how the meaning, or strength, of any piece of evidence is determined by 
which of its components is focused on, whilst Experiment 8 suggests that subjects' focus 
may switch within the same task. With this in mind, it will be worthwhile, initially at least, 
to discuss Experiments 6 and 7 separately from Experiment 8. 
The results of Experiments 6 and 7 force a modification of the sketch of the belief 
revision process offered at the end of Chapter 4. These experiments were based on an 
analysis of the information available to subjects engaging in the task used in Experiments 
3,4 and 5. Three sources of information were identified: information about the level of 
association between the evidential features; information about the base rates of the 
features; and information about the meaning of likelihoods. Experiment 6 was designed to 
investigate the differential use of the last two sources of information. Subjects were given 
information about either two rare, or two common, features. One possibility, recognised at 
the outset, was that subjects who received information about two common features would 
be more likely to produce a recency effect than would subjects who received information 
about two rare features. That is, with common features, the effect of an Order manipulation 
would be more likely to result in significantly higher final confidence ratings when the 
stronger piece of evidence was received second rather than first. No such effect of 
information order was predicted amongst the results of subjects who received information 
about rare features. This suggestion was based on the assumption that subjects given 
information about rare features would be more likely to use background information about 
the base rates of the features in assigning a subjective value to the evidence than would 
subjects who received information about two common features. As the features used were 
of equal rarity (and, therefore, likely to be equally diagnostic of the objects to be 
categorised), use of base rate information would minimise the contrast between the 
subjective values of the evidence. On the other hand, subjects who received information 
about two common features were expected to use the levels at which members of the 
focal 
category possessed the features in assigning subjective values to the evidence. 
As there 
was a difference in these levels, a difference in the sub ective values assigned to 
the pieces j 
of evidence was expected. It was suggested that this difference 
in subjective values would 
lead to a recency effect. 
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The results of Experiment 6 supported the predictions made at the outset. Although 
non-significant, the three way interaction between Order, Rarity and Before/After (see 
Figure 5.2) revealed a trend towards recencY amongst those subjects who received 
evidence about common features but not amongst the results of subjects who received 
information about rare features. However, the results of Experiment 7 offer much stronger 
support for these predictions. Subjects in Experiment 7 behaved in the same manner, on an 
abstract version of the task, as had subjects in Experiment 6 upon receipt of evidence 
concerning two common features. Taken together, these experiments lend strong support 
to initial predictions concerning the differential use of information in assigning subjective 
values to pieces of evidence. 
The confirmation of these predictions is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they 
indicate, once again, the importance of pragmatics to the occurrence of an order effect. 
This experiment, along with those in Chapter 4, indicates that the process of assigning a 
subjective value to a piece of evidence is central to the effect of that evidence on the 
beliefs of the organism. Once again, existing accounts of the belief revision process are 
inadequate in this respect. All existing accounts (e. g. Anderson, 198 1; Lopes, 1987; 
Hogarth and Einhom, 1992) assume a subjective value for the pieces of evidence which 
subjects receive. They are incapable of accounting for the derivation of that subjective 
value. This may clearly be seen in Figure 3.1 from Chapter 3 which represents Shanteau 
and Nagy's (1984) conceptual isation of models of information integration. Although their 
conceptualisation allows for a separate stage for stimulus evaluation, it is clear from the 
research described in Chapter 3 that almost all experimental effort has gone into a 
description of the integration stage of the process. However, it is equally clear, from the 
results of Experiment 6, that what Shanteau and Nagy term the stimulus evaluation stage 
of the process, is at least as crucial to the final belief, as is the integration stage. Although, 
as was pointed out in the introduction to Experiment 6, there are several existing models 
which may account for the trend towards recency (significant in the case of Experiment 7, 
insignificant in the case of Experiment 6) observed in these experiments, these models are 
incapable of predicting such results. No existing model makes any predictions about how a 
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piece of evidence comes to have a meaning for the subject. Accordingly, in the absence of 
information about the subjective value of the evidence, they are unable to make a priori 
predictions about when a recency effect will occur. Simply put, Hogarth and Einhorn, for 
example, predict that a difference between the subjective values of the evidence which 
subjects receive will lead to recency. However, because they offer no account of how these 
subjective values are derived, their model is incapable of predicting when there will be a 
difference in subjective values and, by extension, of predicting when recency will occur. 
The second point of interest in these findings is their implications for any 
pragmatic component of belief revision. In the general discussion of the experiments 
contained in Chapter 4, it was claimed that the assignment of a subjective value to a piece 
of evidence was an inferential process where the selection of the premises upon which 
inferences were made was pragmatically determined. It is still claimed, based upon the 
results of the experiments contained in this chapter that the process is an inferential one. 
However, the range of sources of information available to the subject has been broadened 
by these experiments. Thus far, the use of three different sources of information has been 
experimentally demonstrated. The question becomes one of determining which source of 
information will be used in any given context. 
As was discussed both in Chapter I and in the introduction to Experiment 6, 
Sperber and Wilson's (1986; 1995) Relevance Theory predicts the differential use of 
background information depending on context. In a similar vein, Shanon's (1988) critique 
of Tversky's (1977) model of similarity (discussed in Chapter 3) rests on the recognition of 
the importance of background knowledge to the selection of features upon which to 
compute similarity. How is a single source of information chosen from the many 
competing sources in background knowledge? The effect/effort trade-off described 
by 
Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) goes some way towards answering this question. 
The effect/effort trade-off claims that only that information which 
is most relevant 
to the organism in any given context will become important. Relevance 
is determined by 
how much effect any piece of information has for the organism, 
balanced against how 
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much processing effort that information requires. Such a notion of cognitive economy may 
be used to account for the results of both Experiments 6 and 7 and the experiments in 
Chapter 4. In each experiment reported, there seems to have been one source of 
information which was of primary importance to subjects. In Experiments 3,4, and 5 this 
was information in background knowledge about the level of association between the 
evidential features used. In Experiment 6, information about the base rates of the features 
used or knowledge about likelihood expressions, was important. 
These three sources of information seem to be arranged in a hierarchy. In 
Experiments 3,4, and 5, even though information about the base rates of the features used, 
and knowledge about likelihood expressions, was available to the subject, knowledge 
about associations between features was most important. Experiment 6 demonstrated that 
in the absence of strong associations between features, information about the base rates of 
the evidential features was most commonly used - but only if the base rates of the features 
were low. When the base rates of the features were high - as in the common features 
conditions - or was absent - as in Experiment 7- information about the meaning of 
likelihood expressions was used in making the judgement. 
Why the different sources of information should be so arranged is not completely 
clear. It is likely however, that a ma or factor underlying their arrangement is the fact that 
the background knowledge invoked becomes more specific to the context as one travels up 
the hierarchy. Knowledge about the relationship which exists between two features of an 
object constitutes more specific knowledge about the object than does knowledge about 
the base rates of its individual features, or indeed, than does no knowledge about its 
features. It is also clear that Sperber, Cara, and Girotto's (1995) effect/effort trade-off must 
be invoked in accounting for the fact that possessing background information about 
common features of an object results in the same pattern of results as possessing no 
background knowledge about the object. In the former case information about the 
likelihood that instances of the focal category possess the features, on its own, must be 
easier to represent and just as informative, as likelihood information and base rate 
information combined. 
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Experiment 8 demonstrates the differential use of two of the sources of 
information, discussed above, in the assignment of subjective values to pieces of 
information within the same task. Eight groups of subjects were given two pieces of 
information, comprising a likelihood ratio, concerning a pair of hypotheses. The order in 
which subjects received this information was manipulated, as were both the rarity of the 
feature to which the likelihood ratio related and the value of the likelihood ratio itself. 
After receipt of both pieces of information, subjects displayed a sensitivity to the actual 
value of the likelihood ratio and produced confidence ratings similar to those which would 
be prescribed by a consideration of Bayes Theorem. However, before receipt of the second 
piece of information, subjects' confidence ratings reflected both the rarity of the feature 
about which they had received evidence and the likelihood that instances of the category to 
which that evidence related possessed the feature. Interestingly, such differences were not 
apparent in subjects' final confidence ratings. It was argued that this result suggests that 
subjects were, in some cases, re-evaluating the earlier piece of evidence which they had 
received in the light of the later evidence. The result of most interest is the finding of a 
significant difference amongst the initial confidence ratings of those subjects told the 
percentage of instances of category X which possessed a rare feature and those told the 
percentage of instances of category X which possessed a common feature. The finding of 
such a difference suggests that subjects were using information about the rarity of the 
features in order to assign a subjective value to the pieces of evidence. However, upon 
receipt of the second piece of information (the percentage of instances of category Y which 
possessed either the rare or common feature) there was no such significant difference 
between the final confidence ratings of subjects in these groups. This suggests that those 
subjects who had assigned a subjective value to the first piece of evidence based upon the 
feature it concerned were forced to re-evaluate that evidence in the light of the later 
evidence. As there was just one significant difference between the final confidence ratings 
of the subjects in these groups it may be inferred that they made their 
final confidence 
judgement based primarily on the likelihood ratio rather than on the feature 
for which the 
likelihood ratio was given. 
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As stated previously, this finding contradicts the view of information integration 
(best expressed by Massaro and Friedman, 1990) normally held in the literature. This view 
holds that once a piece of evidence is evaluated and integrated with the hypotheses, it 
cannot be re-evaluated. In Massaro and Friedman's terms, a subjective value has no 
memory for the piece of evidence from which it was derived. If, as has been demonstrated, 
a piece of evidence may be re-evaluated, then some conclusions may be drawn about how 
subjects represent the task used in this thesis. At the very least, subjects must be holding in 
working memory a representation of the earlier evidence which they have received as well 
as a representation of the strength of that piece of evidence. This would facilitate the re- 
evaluation of that earlier piece of evidence in the light of later evidence. It is also likely 
that subjects are capable of focusing on different parts of their representation of the earlier 
piece of evidence. Thus, later evidence may be thought of as manipulating the locus of 
subjects' attention and, therefore, the meaning of earlier evidence. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described three experiments. The first of these suggested a 
differential use of information from background knowledge in assigning subjective values 
to pieces of evidence. Subjects received information about either common or rare features 
of the object to be classified. The weak prediction was made that information about 
common features would lead to a recency effect, whereas information about rare 
features 
would not. The findings suggested that these predictions were correct and were 
interpreted 
in terms of subjects in each condition using different sources of 
information in assigning a 
subjective value to the evidence. Those subjects who received 
information about rare 
features used that information about the rarity of the 
features in determining the value of 
the evidence. Accordingly, as both features were rare, there was no contrast 
in the strength 
of the pieces of information. However, those subjects who received 
information about 
common features of the objects used information about 
the meaning of likelihood 
expressions in assigning a subjective value to the evidence. 
Accordingly, the difference in 
the likelihoods that instances of the focal category possessed the evidential 
features, which 
had not been used by subjects in the rare features condition, 
resulted in a difference in the 
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subjective values of the pieces of evidence. This difference in subjective values led to the 
observed recency effect. 
Such an interpretation of these results received support from the results of 
Experiment 7 which employed an abstract version of the task used in previous 
experiments. This experiment replicated Experiment 6 but used abstract materials and a 
full order manipulation (only a partial order manipulation was used in Experiment 6). The 
pattern of results for subjects in Experiment 7 was almost exactly the same as that of those 
subjects who had received information about common features in Experiment 6. This 
indicates that the interpretation of Experiment 6 was correct in claiming that subjects who 
received information about common features did not use information, stored in 
background knowledge, about the base rates of those features, to inform their confidence 
ratings of the hypotheses. 
The results of these first two studies were interpreted as being damaging for 
existing accounts of the belief revision process. Any explanation of these findings requires 
a model which will explain how subjective values are assigned to pieces of evidence as 
well as how these subjective values are integrated, and such a model does not currently 
exist. This is because the results of Experiments 6 and 7 suggest that the process of 
assigning a subjective value to a piece of evidence, in many cases, determines the 
occurrence of an order effect. The results are also interesting in terms of explaining the 
influence of pragmatics on the belief revision process. They suggest that there are several 
sources of information available to the subject when assigning a subjective value to a piece 
of evidence. Along with the experiments contained in Chapter 4, they also suggest that 
these sources of information have differing degrees of importance to the subject. It was 
argued that the differential use of these sources of information is best explained 
by Sperber 
et al's trade-off between cognitive effect and cognitive effort. 
Experiment 8, on the other hand, was an attempt to demonstrate the 
differential use 
of sources of information from background memory in assigning subjective values 
to 
pieces of evidence within a belief revision task. Subjects were given 
diagnostic evidence 
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concerning a pair of hypotheses in sequential order. There was a significant difference 
found due to changes in the likelihood ratio which subjects received. Subjects used these 
likelihoods in a manner approximating the use prescribed by Bayes theorem and, although 
there was a trend towards recency present in the data, the effect of information order did 
not significantly affect subjects' use of the likelihood ratio. 
The differential use of sources of information was observed in this experiment. 
There were significant differences observed in subjects' initial confidence ratings which 
were ascribed to use of both background information about the base rate of the evidential 
features and background information about the meaning of likelihood expressions. 
However, there was only one significant difference observed between subjects' confidence 
ratings after receipt of the second piece of evidence. In general, subjects final confidence 
ratings were less varied than were their initial confidence ratings. This was explained as 
being due to the use of the likelihood ratio in comparing the hypotheses upon receipt of 
both pieces of evidence. 
The results of this experiment were interpreted as providing evidence that subjects 
are capable of using the likelihood ratio as prescribed by Bayes theorem in very simple 
problems. It was not claimed that the integration function was Bayesian however. 
Secondly, this experiment was interpreted as providing evidence that the evaluation of a 
piece of evidence is reversible. Early occurring information may be re-evaluated in the 
light of later occurring information. Such a finding contradicts current views of 
belief 
revision and information integration. 
The failure to find significant recency effects was also discussed. This was 
despite 
the fact that there were highly significant differences found between subjects' 
initial 
confidence ratings. Failure to find increased recency in those conditions where 
the 
difference in subjects' initial confidence ratings due to information order was 
twice as large 
as in the other half of the experiment was interpreted as 
further evidence against the 
notion that the size of a recency effect is determined 
by the degree of contrast between the 
pieces of evidence which subjects receive. Once again, 
it was argued that the effects 
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observed are explainable only in terms of the re-evaluation of early occurring evidence in 
the light of later evidence. 
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CHAPTER 6- OVERVIEW 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This, the final chapter of the thesis, has four aims. The first of these is simply to 
summarise the results of the eight experiments described in Chapters 2,4 and 5. These 
experiments fall naturally into three groups: experiments on information selection; 
experiments on expectation and belief revision; and experiments on the role played by 
selective attention in assigning subjective values to pieces of evidence. Accordingly, each 
of these groups of experiments will be summarised separately. The second aim of this 
chapter is to place the results of these experiments in context. Each summary section will, 
therefore, both outline the novelty of the experimental results which they summarise, and 
reflect upon how these results are to be integrated with the existing experimental literature. 
The third aim of this chapter will be to specify how the results of the thesis sit with current 
accounts of the role of background knowledge in both information selection and belief 
revision. The fourth, and final, aim of this chapter is to comment on the relationship 
between belief revision (normally construed as a subset of decision making) and 
hypothesis testing (which until recently was considered to be a problem for investigators of 
reasoning). It will be argued that recent empirical and theoretical work, and the results of 
the experiments contained in this thesis, suggest that many of the processes underlying 
these phenomena are the same. 
6.2 A SUMMARY AND INITIAL DISCUSSION OF THE EXPERIMENTS ON 
INFORMATION SELECTION 
The first two experiments in this thesis were concerned with subjects' use of 
background information concerning subjective probability when selecting evidence to help 
them decide between two hypotheses. These experiments were motivated by the review of 
the literature on information selection presented in Chapter 1. One of the conclusions of 
that review was that although there exist several theoretical accounts of 
information 
selection which suggest the importance of subjective probability to subjects' selection of 
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information for hypothesis evaluation (Evans and Over, 1996a&b, Oaksford and Chater, 
1994) there is insufficient empirical work to discriminate between these various accounts. 
A second conclusion from the review presented in Chapter I was that the 
pseudodiagnosticity task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney and Schiavo, 1979; Mynatt, Doherty 
and Dragan, 1993) is a suitable instrument for testing intuitions about the role of subjective 
probability in hypothesis testing. 
Using the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm, Experiment I attempted to establish a 
basic effect of subjective probability on subjects' patterns of information selection. The 
pseudodiagnosticity paradigm involves giving subjects a scenario where a target object 
possessing two features has to be categorised as belonging to one of two categories. The 
evidence which subjects receive consists of the likelihoods that instances of each of these 
categories possess the features possessed by the target object. As the specific version of the 
task which was used was taken from Mynatt et al, all subjects received an initial piece of 
information following receipt of the scenario. In order to examine the effect of subjective 
probability the rarity of the feature which this initial piece of information concerned was 
manipulated. A second aim of Experiment I was to examine the effect of the strength of 
this initial piece of information on subjects' subsequent information selections. 
Accordingly, one group of subjects were told that 65% of instances of one of the categories 
possessed one of the evidential features, another group that 95% of instances possessed the 
feature, whilst a third group were simply told that instances of one of the categories 
possessed the feature. 
The results of Experiment I showed no effect for the rarity manipulation. The only 
effect of interest was the difference in information selection caused by manipulating the 
strength of the initial piece of information which subjects received. Subjects given 
information in propositional form (i. e. told that instances of one of the categories 
possessed the evidential feature) were significantly more likely to select 
further 
information about the category to which the initial piece of information related 
(further Hx 
information) than were subjects who received information in the 
form of probabilities. It 
was argued that by giving subjects information in propositional 
form, the structure of the 
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task had been changed. Accordingly, subjects who received information in propositional 
form may have decided that further Hx information was the most informative because of a 
consideration of all possible selections and their consequent outcomes. It was argued, 
however, that such an explanation for the results was unlikely and that subjects' tendency 
to select further Hx information was more likely to be due to attentional factors. 
Specifically, it was argued that the initial piece of information which subjects received led 
them to focus on further information about the hypothesis which they were currently 
considering. 
Experiment 2 constituted an attempt both to tease apart these possible explanations 
for the significant result found in Experiment 1, and to demonstrate an effect of subjective 
probability on the task. In Experiment 2 all subjects were given in evidence in 
propositional form. That is, all subjects were initially told that instances of one of the 
categories possessed one of the features said to be possessed by the target object. The 
remaining evidence, from amongst which subjects could choose was also expressed in 
terms of possession, or non-possession, of the evidential features. For half of the subjects 
the initial piece of evidence which they received concerned a rare feature whilst for the 
remaining subjects this initial piece of evidence concerned a common feature. Owing to 
the structure of the propositional version of the task, it was felt that one factor which may 
have contributed to the results of Experiment I was whether subjects made the pragmatic 
inference that there was a piece of evidence available to them which would be helpful in 
deciding between the alternatives. This was the case because the utility of each piece of 
evidence available was dependent on the actual value of that evidence. Because subjects 
did not have any information about these values, it is possible that some subjects may not 
have assumed that the evidence available was useful. In Experiment 2 half of the subjects 
in each of the Rarity conditions were told that there was, at least, one piece of evidence 
which, regardless of its outcome, would enable them to decide with certainty between the 
altematives. 
The results of Experiment 2 were, on the whole, as expected. Subjects who 
received an initial piece of evidence concerning a common feature of the object to 
be 
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categorised were significantly more likely to select further Hx information than were 
subjects who received an initial piece of evidence about a rare feature. This result is a clear 
demonstration of the importance of subjective probability to subjects, selection of 
information for hypothesis testing. The rarity of the feature about which subjects' initially 
received some information determined the further information which they selected. In their 
patterns of evidence selection subjects demonstrated a sensitivity to the probabilistic 
structure of the task. Due to this probabilistic structure, initial information about a common 
feature meant that further Hx information was likely to be more informative than 
information about the initial feature in relation to category Y. Conversely, given 
information about a rare feature, information about that rare feature in relation to category 
Y was likely to be more informative than further Hx information. 
Also as expected, there was no effect of whether subjects were told that at least one 
piece of information would allow them to decide between the alternatives with certainty. 
These results were interpreted as suggesting that subjects did, in any case, infer that the 
evidence available to them on the task was useful and, more importantly, that subjects 
considered the possible pieces of evidence in the order in which they were suggested by 
the problem content and settled on a piece of evidence which they felt would enable them 
to discriminate between the hypotheses. 
A normative analysis of the experimental task used in Experiment 2 was also 
presented. Like the recent analyses of the selection task presented by Kirby (1994a), 
Oaksford and Chater (1994), and Evans and Over (I 996a&b), this analysis relied on the 
concepts of subjective probability and subjective expected utility. It was demonstrated that 
subjects' pattern of information selection on the task used in Experiment 2 closely 
corresponded to the prescriptions of the normative analysis. Thus when subjects received 
an initial piece of information concerning a common feature of the object to be 
categorised, the normatively correct selection was further information about the 
hypothesis 
to which the initial piece of information related. When the initial piece of information 
concerned a rare feature, however, the information to be gained from the selection of 
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information concerning whether instances of the alternative category possessed that feature 
was greatly increased. 
The normative analysis presented in Chapter 2 was used, in conjunction with 
notions of relevance, to explain the pattern of results found in Experiment 2. This 
explanation may be thought of as constituting a model of subjects' behaviour on the task 
used in that experiment. Essentially the model is one of constrained rationality. By this it is 
meant that although the model assumes that subjects are sensitive to the probabilities and 
utilities of the various outcomes which are possible on the task, the extent to which they 
represent, or consider, these outcomes (and hence the utilities which subjects assign to 
them) is constrained by their limited cognitive resources. This constrained rationality 
model claims that subjects' patterns of information selections in Experiment 2 are to be 
captured by a consideration of subjects' knowledge about the probability of the task 
features, the extent to which they consider various possible outcomes, and the utilities 
which they assign to these outcomes. Crucially, the assignment of utilities is seen as being 
dependent on subjects' limited representational resources. Thus, the model claims that, in 
some cases, low utility (or no utility) will be assigned to particular outcomes because the 
subject has not considered them, either at all, or to any great extent. 
This constrained rationality model is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is in 
line with several recent models of both similar (Klayman and Ha, 1987; Kirby, 1994a; 
Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Evans and Over, 1996a&b) and different (Anderson, 1990; 
Cheng and Novick, 1990; Corter and Gluck, 1992) cognitive processes. All of these 
models have in common the emphasis which they place on the organism's knowledge of 
subjective probability. Secondly, the constrained rationality model suggests that an 
alternative normative analysis of the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm is possible. The 
traditional analysis of the paradigm (Doherty, Schiavo, Mynatt and Tweney, 1979; 
Mynatt, 
Doherty and Dragan, 1993) would claim that failure to choose information relevant to the 
alternative hypothesis about the feature for which you already possess some 
information is 
a violation of the prescriptions of Bayes theorem. Interestingly, Stephen 
Stich (Stich, 
1990) has claimed that results on the pseudodiagnosticity task demonstrate the 
irrationality 
270 
of human subjects. However, if the task is thought of as one about which subjects have 
expectations based on background knowledge about subjective probabilities, then Stich's 
claim is considerably weakened. Although this thesis has not demonstrated the use of 
knowledge about subjective probabilities on a standard version of the pseudodiagnosticity 
paradigm (Experiment 1, where such evidence might have been obtainedl was under- 
powered), it has suggested that an alternative normative analysis is possible. 
The third, and perhaps most interesting, point of interest in the constrained 
rationality model is its apparent psychological plausibility. In Chapter I Oaksford and 
Chater's model of the selection task was considered in considerable detail. This model was 
criticised on several grounds, but chiefly for its lack of psychological realism. For 
example, its claim that subjects engage in more processing on some versions of the 
selection task than on others seems dubious, as do its claims about the rarity assumption. 
The status of the model was also questioned. Is it a normative (see Evans and Over, 
1996a&b) or a psychological model? One of the problems with Oaksford and Chater's 
model which received little attention in Chapter I is its failure to account for the 
importance of representation to subjects' behaviour on the selection task. For example, in 
recent years work has appeared which emphasises the importance of what is represented to 
people's patterns of performance on a variety of reasoning tasks (Girotto, Johnson-Laird 
and Legrenzi, 1993; Love and Kessler, 1995; Handley, 1996). Oaksford and Chater fail to 
consider the importance of selective representation to the process of selecting evidence for 
hypothesis testing. In this sense, more than any other, their model may be thought of as a 
normative one. 
The constrained rationality model, on the other hand, is an account of how 
representational constraints interact with subjects' background knowledge about subjective 
probability in order to produce the observed patterns of information selection on 
the task 
used in Experiment 2. Underlying this account is Sperber, Cara and 
Girotto's (1995) 
assumption that people consider possible cognitive effects in the order of their accessibility 
and cease to consider these effects when the expected level of relevance 
is achieved. 
Accordingly, even though the model claims that the information which subjects 
select to 
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test their hypotheses is determined by both background knowledge of subjective 
probability and a consideration of the utility of the various outcomes of a test, the 
perceived utility of certain outcomes was claimed to be dependent on the manner in which 
subjects represent the problem. Thus, the model presented in Chapter 2 constitutes an 
advance on the almost wholly normative model of Oaksford and Chater. 
In addition to the advance which the model constitutes, the studies upon which it is 
based also contain novel findings. Firstly, the basic finding of an effect of subjective 
probability on subjects' information selection in the task used in Experiment 2 is the first 
such effect found outside Wason's selection task. Such a finding also raises questions 
about current explanations of subjects' performance on the task. Both Mynatt, Doherty and 
Dragan (1993) and Evans and Over (1996b) claim that subjects are predisposed towards 
selecting further evidence relevant to the hypothesis which they currently consider to be 
most likely. The finding in Experiment 2, however, was that subjects given a strong initial 
piece of information (concerning a rare feature) were less likely to choose further 
information about the hypothesis to which that initial evidence related than were subjects 
given a much weaker initial piece of information (concerning a common feature) - Thus, 
the subjects who might have been expected to have the highest level of confidence in the 
focal hypothesis were less likely to choose further information about that hypothesis. 
It is clear that such a finding directly contradicts Mynatt et al's explanation of 
previous results on the task. However, the account of Evans and Over differs somewhat 
from that of Mynatt et al. This is because although Evans and Over do claim that subjects 
are likely to build a mental model of the experimental situation around the hypothesis 
which they currently consider to be most likely, these authors also claim that aspects of the 
experimental materials may lead subjects to construct a model of the experimental 
situation around the feature which the initial piece of evidence concerns. 
Thus, Evans and 
Over might claim that subjects given an initial piece of information concerning a rare 
feature tended to select further information relevant to the alternative 
hypothesis because 
their model of the experimental situation was constructed around the rare 
feature. The 
question, of course, is how sensitive subjects are to increases 
in the information to be 
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gained from certain information selections due to the rarity of the features which those 
selections concern. Is it simply the case that sub ects' attention is focused onto the rare 
j 
feature because of its rarity or do they explicitly consider the information to be gained 
from the selection of further evidence concerning that rare feature? The answer to this 
question has a bearing, not only on our conception of human abilities in relation to 
hypothesis testing, but also on our general view of human cognition. Unfortunately, neither 
the experiments described in this thesis, nor any studies currently in the literature, are of 
any help in answering this question. 
6.3 A SUMMARY AND INITIAL DISCUSSION OF THE EXPERIMENTS ON 
INFORMATION USE 
Whilst Experiments I and 2 examined subjects' selection of information for 
hypothesis testing, Experiments 3-8 examined how subjects revised their beliefs in the 
light of evidence relevant to competing hypotheses. These experiments can be neatly 
categorised into two groups. Experiments 3-5 followed up on the result of Experiment I 
and sought to investigate the role of expectations from background knowledge in the belief 
revision process. Experiments 6-8, on the other hand, demonstrated that there are several 
sources of information available to subjects when determining the strength of a piece of 
evidence. Experiments 6 and 7 revealed that which of these sources of information is used 
depends on context, whereas Experiment 8 demonstrated the sequential use of more than 
one source of information within the same task. The source of information used by 
subjects in assigning a subjective value to the evidence which they received was found to 
determine the occurrence or non-occurrence of an order effect. Both sets of studies were 
argued to provide evidence of the insufficiency of existing accounts of belief revision. In 
the following sections these studies will be described and discussed in more detail. 
6.3.1 Experiments 3,4 and 5: The role of expectation in belief revision 
Experiments 3-5 were designed to investigate the unexpected result of Experiment 
I- Although the information selection aspect of that study has already been discussed 
in the 
273 
previous section of this chapter, subjects' use of the information which they received has, 
thus far, been neglected. In Experiment 1, as well as choosing information to aid them 
decide between two alternatives, subjects were also asked to state their confidence in those 
alternatives in the light of the information which they received. The finding of interest 
from that experiment was contained in the confidence ratings of subjects who chose a 
further piece of evidence relevant to the hypothesis about which they already possessed 
some information. Of greatest interest were the confidence ratings of subjects who 
received evidence about a common or a rare feature and chose a second piece of evidence 
which also suggested that the focal hypothesis was the case. The confidence ratings of 
subjects in the Rare condition were significantly lower than the confidence ratings of 
subjects in the Common condition. This result was surprising as, on the face of it, those 
subjects given initial information concerning a rare feature possessed stronger evidence 
than the subjects who had received a first piece of evidence about a common feature. It 
was argued that this result was due to very high expectations about the second piece of 
evidence amongst those subjects in the Rare condition. The second piece of evidence failed 
to meet those expectations causing them to produce lower confidence ratings than subjects 
in the Common condition who did not have such high expectations about the second piece 
of evidence. 
Experiment 3 was an attempt to test this expectation account of the results of 
Experiment 1. It was reasoned that if subjects' expectations underlay their behaviour in 
Experiment I then a recency effect should be observed when two groups of subjects were 
given exactly the same evidence - consisting of one strong, and one weak, evidential 
item 
- but in different orders. Such a recency effect was observed, with subjects who received 
the strong piece of evidence first producing significantly lower confidence ratings than 
were produced by subjects who received the strong piece of evidence second. Once again, 
it was argued that subjects who received the strong piece of evidence first had 
higher 
expectations about the second piece of evidence than did subjects who received the weaker 
piece of evidence first (there was a significant difference in the expected 
direction between 
the mean expectations of subjects in both groups concerning the second piece of evidence). 
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However, the literature on order effects, reviewed in Chapter 3, suggested an 
alternative explanation for these results. This alternative explanation comes from the work 
of Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) who have proposed that, with certain kinds of belief 
updating task, sequential evidence with contrasting strength will always result in recency. 
According to their model, weak evidence followed by strong evidence always results in 
upwards revision of belief, whereas strong evidence followed by weak evidence always 
results in downwards revision. Their model makes these predictions because it assumes 
that the weight assigned to new evidence will be either proportional, or inversely 
proportional, to the anchor (i. e. subjects' beliefs based on earlier evidence) dependent on 
whether that new evidence is more or less positive than background belief. Thus, when 
new evidence is more positive than background belief and the anchor is small, that new 
evidence will produce a large upwards belief revision. Conversely, when new evidence is 
less positive than background belief and the anchor is large, the new evidence will produce 
a large downwards revision. Hogarth and Einhorn also claim that the size of the recency 
effect is directly related to the degree of contrast between the pieces of evidence which 
subjects receive. 
This account is firmly in the tradition of belief revision as information integration 
best exemplified by the work of Anderson (1962; 1965; 198 1) and Shanteau (1970; 1972). 
According to this tradition the processes involved in belief revision may be modelled 
mathematically in terms of the value which subjects assign to pieces of evidence and the 
algebra-like operations which they carry out on those values. This approach, and 
associated work, was extensively reviewed in Chapter 3, as were problems with the 
approach. The problem most relevant to this summary is that of the independence of 
evidential items. That is, Hogarth and Einhorn (and many other workers in the field) 
assume that the values assigned to pieces of evidence by subjects are derived 
independently of each other. This is in sharp contrast to the account, given above, 
implicating expectation in the results of Experiments I and 3. Such an account claims that, 
in many cases, values will be assigned to pieces of evidence in the light of expectations 
caused by earlier occurring evidence. 
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Experiments 4 and 5 were attempts to discriminate between expectation and 
contrast based accounts of the result of Experiment I and the recency effect in Experiment 
3. In Experiment 4 degree of contrast between the evidential items was controlled for by 
means of a pre-test. Thus, for each problem content, two sets of features were chosen. 
Each set consisted of one rare and one common feature. Each set was received by two 
groups of subjects, with one group receiving the strong evidence first and the other group 
receiving the strong evidence second. The crucial difference between these sets of features 
was the degree to which possession of the common feature was perceived to be predicted 
by possession of the rare feature. For one of the feature sets the common feature was 
strongly predicted by the rare feature (the Strong Association condition), whereas in the 
second set the predictive relationship was weak (the Low Association condition). Because 
degree of contrast was held constant across both feature sets, Hogarth and Einhorn's 
contrast assumption predicted recency with both pairs of evidential items. An expectation 
based account, on the other hand, predicted recency with the High Association set but not 
with the Low Association set. As predicted, recency was found for the High, but not for 
the Low, Association features. 
Experiment 5 also used an order manipulation, where the degree of contrast across 
two sets of features was kept constant, to discriminate between the expectation and 
contrast accounts for the results of Experiments I and 3. In Experiments 3 and 4 all 
subjects were told that the rare feature was possessed by 95% of instances of the 
focal 
category, whereas 70% of instances of that category possessed the common 
feature. In 
Experiment 5 subjects were told either that 95% of instances of the 
focal category 
possessed both a common and a rare feature or, that 70% of 
instances of the focal category 
possessed both of those features. In this way, although the absolute value of 
the evidence 
given to subjects was either increased or decreased relative to the evidence received 
by 
subjects in Experiment 3 and 4, the degree of contrast 
between the pieces of evidence was 
kept constant. In both cases, there was no difference 
between the likelihoods that members 
of the focal category possessed the features. The only 
difference between the evidential 
items was the perceived rarity of the features themselves. 
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Once again, Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption predicted recency in both 
the 95% and 70% conditions. The expectation based account, on the other hand, predicted 
recency only in the 95% condition. This prediction was based on the degree to which the 
expectations of subjects who received the strong evidence first would be exceeded by the 
second piece of evidence in both conditions. Although there was very little difference 
predicted between the expectations about the rare feature of subjects told that 95% of 
instances of the focal category possessed the common feature and the expectations of 
subjects told that 70% of instances possessed the common feature, the second pieces of 
evidence which these subjects received were markedly different. Subjects told that 95% of 
instances of the focal category possessed the common feature were also told that 95% of 
instances of that category possessed the rare feature. Subjects initially told that 70% of 
instances of the focal category possessed the common feature were told that 70% of 
instances possessed the rare feature. Thus, a greater recency effect was predicted amongst 
the results of subjects in the 95% condition than amongst the results of subjects in the 70% 
condition. Once again, as predicted, the results of Experiment 5 displayed significant 
recency in the 95% condition and a slight trend towards primacy in the 70% condition. 
The novelty of the results described above lies in their demonstration that, at least 
in certain cases, the value assigned by subjects to a piece of evidence is dependent on 
earlier occurring evidence. These results are at odds with the account of evidence 
understanding implicit in most accounts of belief revision. Although Asch (1946), who 
provided one of the first demonstrations of an order effect in personality impression 
formation,, accounted for his results in terms of a change of meaning hypothesis, the 
demonstration of context effects which cannot be explained in terms of a cognitive 
algebraic model is notoriously difficult. The experiments surnmarised here consist of such 
a demonstration and suggest that although subjects are performing some type of simple 
algebra-like operation upon the values which they assign to the evidence they receive, it is 
the process of value-assignment which is of most interest. In the discussion of Experiments 
3-5 it was suggested that the process by which subjects assign values to the pieces of 
evidence which they receive is an inferential one. By this it is meant that subjects 
have 
expectations concerning the evidence which they receive. These expectations act as the 
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major premise in a deductive inference where the minor premise takes the form of the 
actual evidence which those expectations concern. 
This suggestion, that the process by which subjective values are assigned to pieces 
of evidence is inferential, has several interesting implications. Firstly, it resolves the 
problem of how a piece of evidence is understood as being marked for one of the available 
candidate hypotheses. Both Lopes (1987) and Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) have pointed 
out how this part of the process of evidence understanding contains the possibility for 
error. Neither author (or set of authors) details a clear proposition of how this part of the 
process is achieved. The claim that it is inferential solves the specific problem of how a 
decision is reached about which hypothesis a piece of evidence is marked for. Thus, if the 
conclusion of a deductive inference involving an expectation and a piece of evidence 
agrees with the expectation derived, either from background knowledge or early occurring 
evidence and background knowledge, then the evidence supports the focal hypothesis. If 
the conclusion does not agree with the expectation then the evidence is marked for the 
alternative hypothesis. 
The second interesting implication of the experiments summarised in this section of 
the chapter is that they suggest a view of the belief revision process which is broadly in 
line with current models of other cognitive phenomena. Central to this view is that no 
single piece of information is interpreted in isolation and that meaning is dependent on 
context. This context is comprised of both background knowledge and information already 
present in the specific situation. Such a view is to be seen in work on language. For 
example, Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; 1995) and Sanford and Garrod's 
(198 1) model of text comprehension are both inferentially driven. Two very good specific 
examples are Moxey and Sanford's (1993) work on quantifiers and Shanon's (1988) 
analysis of similarity judgements described in Chapter 3. In the former example, the 
approximate quantity communicated by a quantifier is seen as being dependent on subjects' 
expectations about the context in which the quantifier is used. Likewise, Shanon's analysis 
of similarity judgements rests on the assumption that subjects will often use their 
background knowledge about the likelihood that a relationship of similarity exists between 
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two objects and then go on to search for features across which to compute actual similarity. 
In a similar vein, Experiments 1,3,4 and 5 have demonstrated how pieces of evidence 
may be dependent. Although the general approach taken in these experiments to the 
derivation of subjective values for pieces of evidence is not new, the demonstration of 
order effects which may only be explained in these terms is a novel one and suggests that 
current models of the belief revision process will, at the very least, have to be revised. 
6.3.2 Experiments 6,7 and 8: Assigning values to evidence 
The experiments summarised in the previous section examined the specific 
question of how expectations derived from early occurring evidence are used in the 
interpretation of later evidence. The experiments to be summarised, and discussed, in this 
section were designed to examine the differential use of information, other than 
information about the extent to which the evidential features are associated, in subjects I 
assignment of values to the pieces of evidence which they received. In all of the 
experiments concerning belief revision contained in this thesis, subjects received evidence 
of the form: 
A% of instances of category X possess feature B. 
Apart from the extent to which possession of one feature is predicted by possession of 
another, each piece of evidence contained two parts about which the subject might be 
expected to possess some knowledge: features and likelihood expressions. Although it is 
obvious that subjects must integrate both of these sources of knowledge in forming an 
initial representation of the meaning of the piece of evidence, Experiments 6-8 attempted 
to test the intuition that subjects would focus upon these sources of information to a 
greater, or lesser, extent when assigning subjective values to pieces of evidence. 
Experiment 6 was an exploratory investigation of this intuition where, as in 
previous experiments, all subjects received one strong, and one weak, piece of evidence. 
As before, the order in which subjects received the evidence was manipulated. 
Of most 
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interest, however, were the features about which subjects received information. Half of the 
subjects were given evidence concerning two rare features whilst the remaining subjects 
received evidence concerning two common features. The rarity of the features within each 
set was kept approximately equal by means of a pre-test as was the perceived association 
between the features which was low. Accordingly, the order manipulation was achieved 
simply by telling subjects in one condition that 95% of instances of the focal category 
possessed the first feature and that 70% of instances possessed the second feature. Subjects 
in the second order condition, on the other hand, were told that 70% of instances Possessed 
the first feature and 95% of instances possessed the second feature. 
Some cautious predictions were made about the results of this experiment. It was 
predicted that whilst assigning subjective values to the pieces of evidence which they had 
received, subjects would attend to different elements of these pieces of evidence dependent 
on the rarity of the features which they concerned. Thus, subjects who received evidence 
about two rare features were expected to focus on the features (because of their rarity) 
whilst subjects who received evidence about two common features were expected to focus 
on the likelihood element of the information which they received. This latter expectation, 
of reduced focus on the features amongst subjects who received evidence concerning 
common features, was based on the intuition that common features would be less 
informative, and therefore less relevant, to subjects than would rare features. The effect of 
this difference in the information upon which subjects focused was expected to manifest 
itself in the presence, or absence, of order effects. That is, the results of subjects who 
received information about common features were expected to contain an order effect, 
whereas the results of subjects given information about rare features were not expected to 
display an effect of information order. That part of the evidence which subjects focus upon 
should determine the degree of contrast between the pieces of evidence which they receive. 
Thus, if subjects focus on the features there should be little contrast between the pieces of 
evidence as both features are of approximately equal rarity. Conversely, if subjects focus 
on the likelihoods there should be greater contrast between the pieces of evidence as there 
is a difference between the likelihoods (95% vs. 70%). 
280 
Interestingly, most models of belief revision (e. g. Anderson, 198 1; Lopes, 1987; 
Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992) make the same prediction. However, they are only capable of 
doing so when the degree of contrast between the pieces of evidence is known in advance. 
The (weak) predictions made at the outset of this experiment were made in the absence of 
such knowledge. Rather, they were made on the basis of which element of the pieces of 
evidence it was felt would be most informative to the subjects. Although the result of 
interest in this experiment was not significant, the relevant data plot suggested a trend 
towards recency with common features but no such trend was apparent with rare features. 
Experiment 7 followed up on the results of Experiment 6. Once again an order 
manipulation was employed with all subjects being told that 95% of instances of the focal 
category possessed one feature and 70% of instances possessed the other. Unlike the 
previous experiments, however, the problem contents used in Experiment 7 were abstract, 
with subjects being asked to categorise parts of speech from an ancient form of an 
imaginary language based on what is known about the modem form of that language. The 
results of Experiment 7 replicated, almost exactly, the results of those subjects in 
Experiment 6 who had been given information about common features. It was argued that 
as subjects in Experiment 7 could not have been assigning values to the pieces of evidence 
which they received based upon background knowledge about the features, the results of 
Experiment 7 constituted confirmation of the claim that subjects in Experiment 6, who 
received evidence concerning common features of the objects to be categorised, did not 
use information about those features from background knowledge to assign subjective 
values to the pieces of evidence which they received. 
The results of Experiments 6 and 7 are both interesting, and novel, for several 
reasons. Firstly, no existing account of belief revision could have predicted the similarities 
present in the results of Experiments 6 and 7 in advance. Once again, this is because the 
emphasis in existing models of the belief revision process has been on the integration of 
evidence rather than on the process of assigning a subjective value to new information. 
it 
should be pointed out, however, that there are several accounts of belief revision 
in 
existence which can account for the results of Experiments 6 and 7 in a post 
hoc manner. 
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Such an explanation would rely on the simple notion of averaging (or contrast in the case 
of Hogarth and Einhorn, whose model accounts for averaging-like behaviour). 
Nonetheless, in order to predict when an order effect will, or will not, occur, it is necessary 
to be capable of predicting when there will be contrast between the pieces of evidence 
which subjects receive. Current model of belief revision are incapable of making such 
predictions. 
The similarity which was found between the confidence ratings of subjects given 
information about common features in Experiment 6 and the confidence ratings produced 
by subjects in Experiment 7 were predicted on the basis of what was felt would be relevant 
to subjects engaging in the task. Thus, subjects given information about rare features were 
expected to focus on the features when assigning subjective values to the evidence which 
they received. Subjects given information about common, and abstract, features were 
expected to focus on the likelihoods associated with those features, rather than on the 
features themselves. The confirmation of these predictions is interpreted as providing 
support for the view that human cognition is bound by Sperber, Cara and Girotto's (1995) 
effort/effect trade off. This echoes the interpretation which was given of the results of 
Experiment 2 where subjects' behaviour was explained in terms of an interaction between 
background knowledge and a limited representational system. Thus, those subjects in 
Experiment 6 who were given information about common features assigned subjective 
values to the pieces of information which they received on the basis of the most 
informative component of the pieces of evidence which they received. As the features were 
common, they were also relatively uninformative, and focusing on the likelihoods with 
which those features were possessed by instances of the focal category represented the 
strategy likely to lead to most cognitive effects in terms of deciding between the 
hypotheses. 
What is most interesting about this account of the results of Experiments 6 and 7 
is 
that it suggests an alternative approach to the study of decision making. Previous work 
has 
tended to focus on subjects' non-normative use of base rates (e. g. Tversky and Kahneman, 
1980; Bar-Hillel, 1980) or likelihoods (e. g. Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff, 1983; Ofir, 
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1988). Indeed, even the more recent work of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996) which claims to demonstrate the normative use of base rate 
information by subjects (when presented in terms of frequencies) might be said to share the 
view that base rates, or likelihoods, should be viewed as basic units of information. Whilst 
this may be correct in a Bayesian sense, it is clearly inappropriate from a psychological 
point of view. Although some work does exist (described in Chapter 3) which suggests that 
the information which subjects attend to in a decision making situation is context- 
dependent (e. g. Macchi, 1995; for a discussion of this topic also see Evans and Over, 
1996b) this work still regards base rates as the basic unit of analysis. Experiments 6 and 7 
in this thesis, on the other hand, suggest that a more thorough analysis is required. A base 
rate, for example, consists of both a feature and a probability expression. In certain 
circumstances the information contained in the base rate will not be treated by subjects as a 
unit. Thus, in certain situations, subjects may concentrate on the probability expression 
(for example, when the feature for which the base rate is being given is uninformative), 
whilst in others they may focus on the feature itself. 
That subjects are very sophisticated users of these different sources of information 
is demonstrated by the results of Experiment 8. In that experiment all subjects received a 
likelihood ratio in sequence. That is, all subjects were initially told the percentage of 
instances of one category which possessed a certain feature and were then told the 
percentage of instances of a second category which possessed the same feature. Two 
different likelihood ratios were used as well as two different features (one rare and one 
common). The results of this study revealed significant differences, due to feature rarity, 
between the initial confidence ratings produced by subjects but, in general, not between 
their final confidence ratings. Significant differences in final confidence ratings were due 
to the different likelihood ratios which subjects received. 
These results are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, they reveal that subjects 
may switch their focus from the feature component of the pieces of evidence onto the 
likelihood component within the same task. It was argued that the significant 
differences 
between subjects' initial confidence ratings was due to the subjects who received 
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information about a rare feature using their background knowledge about that feature's 
rarity when assigning a subjective value to the piece of evidence which they received. 
Conversely, subjects who received an initial piece of information concerning a common 
feature were claimed to have focused more on the likelihood expression when deriving a 
subjective value. However, as the second piece of evidence which subjects received always 
consisted of the second half of a likelihood ratio, subjects in all conditions focused on the 
value of that ratio rather than on the feature for which the ratio had been given. In terms of 
discriminating between the hypotheses, the likelihood ratio was the most informative 
information upon which to base their final confidence ratings. 
A second point of interest in the results of Experiment 8 is their implications for 
current models of information integration, generally, and belief revision in particular. The 
effect of information order was to create a greater difference between the initial confidence 
ratings of subjects given information about a rare feature than between the initial 
confidence ratings of subjects given an initial piece of information concerning a common 
feature. According to Hogarth and Einhorn's contrast assumption this should have resulted 
in a greater recency effect amongst the final confidence ratings of subjects given 
information about rare features than amongst the final ratings of subjects given information 
about common features. This was not the case. In both halves of the experiment, the size of 
the trend towards recency was equal. In terms of general approaches to information 
integration, these results are interesting because they cast doubt on the claim that the 
interpretation of a piece of evidence is irreversible. Most models of information integration 
(see Massaro and Friedman, 1990 for a detailed review) assume that once a piece of 
evidence has been encoded and integrated, it cannot be re-encoded and re-interpreted 
by 
the subject. The results of Experiment 8 suggest that subjects who received 
information 
about rare features were able to re-interpret the initial piece of evidence which 
they 
received. Although these subjects seemed to be using 
background knowledge about 
subjective probability when assigning a subjective value to the initial piece of evidence 
which they received, their final confidence ratings seem to 
have been based on the 
likelihood ratio with no effect of feature rarity. Accordingly, these subjects seem 
to have 
re-interpreted the initial piece of evidence which they received 
in the light of later 
284 
evidence. The final point of interest in these results is how closely the final confidence 
ratings of all subjects resembled those which would be prescribed by Bayes theorem. 
Although subjects' normative accuracy in their use of the likelihood ratio which they 
received was not the focus of Experiment 8, nevertheless, the experiment does provide 
evidence that subjects are capable of using likelihood information accurately. However, it 
was not claimed that the process by which subjects arrived at their final confidence ratings 
involved the use of Bayes theorem. 
Perhaps the most novel aspect of the findings from all three of the experiments 
summarised in this section is their suggestion that subjects focus on different aspects of the 
information which they receive in a judgement task, and that the locus of their attention is 
dependent on considerations of cognitive effect. Experiment 8, in suggesting that the locus 
of subjects' attention can switch in the course of the task, also suggests that subjects 
construct a model of the judgmental situation which contains both new and old 
information. The information which they attend to within this model is that which is most 
likely to have cognitive effects in terms of deciding between the alternatives. 
6.4 THE ROLE OF BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE IN INFORMATION 
SELECTION AND BELIEF REVISION 
In many ways this thesis might be said to be almost exclusively concerned with the 
role of background knowledge in the selection and use of information 
for hypothesis 
evaluation. However, because the literatures pertaining to selection and use are at 
different 
stages of development, the experiments contained in this thesis relate 
to these separate 
literatures in different ways. Broadly speaking, the experiments on 
information selection 
may be seen as contributing to a debate currently taking place 
in the selection task 
literature. On the other hand, it is hoped that the experiments on 
information use will 
initiate such a debate in the belief revision literature. 
This section of the chapter will 
outline the main contributions of the experiments 
described in this thesis both to what is 
known about the role of background knowledge in 
information selection and use, and to 
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the debate of how best to characterise background knowledge when considering 
information selection and information use. 
It is clear from all of the experiments presented in this thesis, that background 
knowledge plays a role in the selection, and use, of information for hypothesis evaluation. 
Much of the work in the reasoning literature has been concerned with the exact 
specification of this role. Part of the novelty of the findings of Experiments I-8 is their 
demonstration of a role for background knowledge in the pseudodiagnosticity task (or 
variants of that task). Three sources of background knowledge have been shown to affect 
the way in which subjects select and use information on the task. These are: background 
beliefs about the rarity of the features; information about the degree to which possession of 
one feature is predicted by possession of another; and information about the use of 
probability expressions. The first of these sources of information was found to play a role 
in information selection and it is the role and characterisation of background knowledge in 
selection tasks which will be discussed first. 
In Chapter 1 three separate accounts of how background knowledge influences the 
selection of information for hypothesis testing were discussed. The first of these was 
Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) pragmatic reasoning schemas account of Wason's selection 
task. Essentially, their account claims that subjects' information selection is guided by the 
activation of rules contained in schemas. These schemas are said to be induced from 
"ordinary life experiences" such as permissions and obligations and are defined in terms of 
goals and relationships to these goals. These goals constrain the inferences which subjects 
make to those which are pragmatically useful. 
A second account of how background knowledge affects subjects' patterns of 
information selection has been given by Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995). 
These authors 
take a much more flexible view of the role of background 
knowledge in information 
selection and suggest that its operation is guided by a trade-off 
between cognitive effort 
and cognitive effect. Thus, Sperber et al argue that subjects will consider 
those pieces of 
information which are likely to yield the greatest cognitive effects (the greatest number of 
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inferences and new beliefs etc. ) for the least amount of cognitive processing. In Chapter I 
this general approach was contrasted with the approach of Oaksford and Chater (1994) 
who argued that subjects calculate the expected information to be gained from each 
possible piece of information and decide which pieces to select based on these calculations 
(for a discussion of the decision-theoretic approach to information selection, see the next 
section). These calculations are based on the subjects' background knowledge of the 
probability of events in their environment. 
It was argued in Chapter I that Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) characterisation of the 
structure of background knowledge was too rigid to be of general value. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how the pragmatic reasoning schemas approach might usefully be applied 
to the results of the experiments in Chapter 2 where the pseudodiagnosticity task was used. 
It does not seem possible to argue that subjects were applying rules contained in some 
general purpose schema when deciding which evidence to select. Whilst it is possible that 
some general strategy exists for selecting information with which to test hypotheses (see 
Klayman and Ha, 1987), it is unlikely that this strategy is captured, in every case, by 
schemas. 
Cheng and Holyoak's approach rests on the claim that the general purpose schemas 
which they claim to exist are domain specific. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, both 
Oaksford and Chater (1993) and Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have questioned the 
validity of the schema approach by pointing out that no general principles have yet been 
identified which specify how a domain is to be isolated. The work of Wattenmaker (1995) 
- described in Chapter 3- is very interesting 
in this regard. He has speculated that 
knowledge may be compartmentalised into domains on the basis of category structure. 
He 
claims that the factor underlying this compartmentalisation is whether categorisation can 
take place on the basis of summing the features of the object to be categorised. 
This seems 
to be the case for social, but not for object, knowledge. This approach to the question of 
domain specificity deals with knowledge about objects rather than 
knowledge about the 
relationship between objects. Nor does it deal with the application of rules. 
Accordingly, it 
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is likely to much more flexible than the approach favoured by Cheng and Holyoak. It also 
has the advantage of being a principled distinction between domains. 
Wattenmaker's approach to domain specificity is also more compatible with the 
pseudodiagnosticity task. Based on the experiments reported in this thesis, it would seem 
that the pseudodiagnosticity task is best viewed as a task of categorisation rather than as a 
reasoning task. Subjects are asked to select information in order to help them categorise an 
object. Interestingly, in selecting, and using that information subjects have been shown to 
be sensitive to both feature frequency and the degree of association between features. As 
was discussed in Chapter 3, these are factors which are known to underlie the learning of 
category structure. In fact, one of the advantages of the pseudodiagnosticity task as an 
instrument for the investigation of the factors underlying information selection for 
hypothesis testing is that it is not amenable to a pragmatic reasoning schemas 
interpretation. The knowledge activated in the course of the task cannot be characterised. as 
possessing a schema-like structure. Instead, the task allows for an unconfounded 
examination of how knowledge about the features of objects is used when selecting 
information for the purposes of deciding between hypotheses. In terms of domain 
specificity, the task might be used to see whether object and social knowledge have 
different effects on the selection, and use, of evidence for hypothesis evaluation. 
1n Chapter I it was argued that a combination of the approaches of Oaksford and 
Chater and Sperber, Cara and Girotto to the question of how background knowledge is 
used when selecting information to test hypotheses was likely to be most successful. 
Certainly, in terms of how this background knowledge is characterised, Oaksford and 
Chater seem to have more to say that is relevant to the pseudodiagnosticity task than do 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985). Their account is cast at the level of the probabilities of 
features of objects which is very similar to the level at which the constrained rationality 
model, outlined in Chapter 2, works. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, 
however, one of the 
theoretical responsibilities of any model of how background knowledge operates to guide 
information selection is to specify how its operation is constrained. 
Humans have limited 
representational resources so the argument that they calculate the 
information which they 
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expect to gain from the selection of each possible piece of evidence is untenable. 
Although, as was argued in Chapter 1, Sperber et al fail to give an account of the specific 
sources of information available to subjects in any given context, they do specify a 
principle by which the activation of background knowledge might be specified in a 
hypothesis evaluation task. The constrained rationality model relies on this principle, of a 
trade-off between effort and effect, in order to capture the data from Experiment 2. 
As was mentioned in the opening paragraph of this section, the literature on belief 
revision is at a very different stage of development to the literature on reasoning and 
information selection. As has just been seen, the information selection literature is 
relatively sophisticated in its attempts to capture the effects of background knowledge on 
the processes involved in choosing evidence with which to evaluate hypotheses. The 
belief revision literature, on the other hand, is striking in its failure to consider background 
knowledge as a factor in the use of evidence. Experiments 3-8 clearly demonstrate that 
background knowledge about features of objects plays a role in subjects' use of 
information about those objects for purposes of hypothesis evaluation. Experiments 3-5 
demonstrate the importance of degree of association between features to the process of 
assigning subjective values to pieces of evidence. Experiments 6-8 demonstrate the role 
of selective attention, guided by background knowledge, to the occurrence (or non- 
occurrence) of an order effect. In so doing, all of these experiments emphasise elements of 
the belief revision process which have received very little attention in the experimental 
literature. 
It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that existing accounts of belief revision (both 
algebraic and procedural) rely on the independence assumption for their operation. That is, 
these accounts assume that the subjective values of pieces of evidence (even when they 
occur in sequence) are derived independently of each other. Thus, when Hogarth and 
Einhom (1992) claim that the contrast between the subjective value of pieces of sequential 
evidence underlies recency, they are claiming that, given a subjective value 
for one piece 
of information, if the subjective value of later evidence is much greater, or much 
less, than 
the value of this earlier evidence, recency will occur. Strikingly, Hogarth and 
Einhorn fail 
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to account for the process by which the subjective value for any piece of evidence is 
derived. It was argued in Chapter 3 that there are several a priori reasons for doubting the 
assumption that these values are derived independently. Wattenmaker's (1995) work on 
domain specific differences in knowledge organisation was cited, as well as work on 
feature correlation in the concept literature and more general work (e. g. Shanon, 1988) on 
representational theories of meaning. 
Experiments 1,3,4 and 5 also suggest that the independence assumption is 
unwarranted. Their results suggest that, in certain cases, early evidence gives rise to 
expectations about later occurring evidence (these expectations are due to background 
knowledge about the degree of association between the evidential features). These 
expectations determine the subjective value assigned to the later evidence. Experiment 4, 
in particular, demonstrates that the occurrence of a recency effect is dependent on these 
expectations from background knowledge. In Experiment 4 subjects received information 
about two features which were either high, or low, in association. Recency was only 
observed amongst the results of those subjects given information about high association 
features. This finding was explained in terms of subjects in the high association condition 
being given early evidence which led to very strong expectations about subsequent 
evidence. Because the subsequent evidence did not meet those expectations, these subjects 
left their initial confidence ratings unchanged. Subjects who received the same evidence, 
but in a different order, did not have such high expectations. Accordingly, their final 
confidence ratings were significantly higher than both their initial confidence ratings and 
the final confidence ratings of subjects who had received the evidence in the reverse order. 
In the low association conditions, no such recency effect was observed. 
This result suggests that both the independence, and contrast, assumptions are 
inadequate. Background knowledge (about the association between evidential features, in 
the case just described) has a role to play in the interpretation of evidence. For this reason, 
it is not enough to rely on the notion of contrast between the subjective values of pieces of 
evidence to explain recency. An account is also needed of the circumstances under which 
contrast will occur and background knowledge is likely to be central to any such account. 
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The results of Experiments 6-8 demonstrate that there are determinants of 
contrast other than background knowledge about the degree to which to evidential features 
are associated. The finding of a trend towards recency with common features in 
Experiment 6, but not with rare features, suggests that subjects were focusing on the 
features in the latter case and on the likelihood expressions in the former. The similarity of 
the results of Experiment 7, where abstract materials were used, to the results with 
common features in Experiment 6, also strengthens this suggestion. Contrast will exist 
between two pieces of evidence only if they differ on the dimension upon which subjects 
tend to focus. It was argued that subjects in the common features condition of Experiment 
6 focused on the likelihood expressions. As the pieces of evidence which they received 
differed along this dimension, there was contrast between the subjective values assigned to 
the pieces of evidence and recency was observed. That subjects were focusing on the 
likelihood expressions is also suggested by the similarity of these results to the results of 
Experiment 7 where subjects had no background knowledge about the features used. 
Interestingly, the suggestion that subjects were focusing on the likelihood 
component of the evidence which they received in the common condition of Experiment 6 
and in Experiment 7, suggests that subjects were using information about likelihood 
expressions when assigning subjective values to the pieces of evidence which they 
received. This suggests that it is not possible to give an account of information 
interpretation, and use, wholly in terms of subjects' background knowledge about the 
probabilities of the features they receive evidence about. Likelihood expressions are 
quantifiers, however, and existing accounts of the operation of linguistic quantifiers 
(Moxey and Sanford, 1993) might be expected to generalise to the operation of 
likelihood 
expressions. 
The results of Experiments 3-8 also suggest that the manner 
in which the 
pseudodiagnosticity task was characterised, earlier in this section, was accurate. 
It was 
argued that the task is one of selecting information in order to categorise an object. 
In this 
sense, many of the factors found to affect both the 
learning of categories, and 
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categorisation judgements, should also be found to affect judgements based on information 
received in the pseudodiagnosticity task. This has been found to be the case with both 
association between features (Experiments 1,3,4 and 5), and feature frequency 
(Experiments 6- 8), proving to underlie subjects' assignment of subjective values to the 
evidence which they received. The finding of an effect of feature association is particularly 
interesting in terms of information selection. Although this thesis does not provide 
evidence that subjects' background knowledge about the degree to which possession of one 
feature is predicted by possession of another affects the information which they select to 
test hypotheses, it is likely that such effects will be found with the appropriate stimulus 
materials. If subjects are sensitive to such associations when assigning subjective values to 
pieces of information, then it is highly likely that they will also take this information into 
account when considering the probability of various test outcomes given information 
about an associated feature. 
6.4 WHAT DO INFORMATION SELECTION AND INFORMATION USE HAVE 
IN COMMON? 
In the introduction to this thesis it was pointed out that there have been several 
recent attempts to integrate the fields of reasoning, and decision making, research. 
For 
example, the work of Johnson-Laird (1994) and Evans, Manktelow and 
Over (1993) was 
cited. The former has attempted to apply principles derived 
from the study of deductive 
reasoning to probabilistic thinking, whereas the latter workers 
have attempted to recast 
Wason's selection task (traditionally thought of as a reasoning problem) 
in terms of 
decision making. In addition to the links made in the previous section, which concerned 
background knowledge, this section of Chapter 6 will attempt to enlarge upon 
links 
already known to exist between these (supposedly) 
different processes, and, hopefully, to 
make new links. 
The most obvious place to start is in terms of the experimental 
tasks which subjects 
were asked to perform in the course of this thesis. 
In Experiments I and 2 subjects were 
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asked to choose one of three possible pieces of evidence in order to help them decide 
between two alternatives. Also in Experiment 1, and in Experiments 3-8, subjects were 
given some evidence and asked to rate their confidence in a pair of hypotheses in the light 
of that information. The distinction between the two types of task may be surnmarised as 
follows: The choice task involves a decision about what is likely to constitute good 
evidence whilst the rating task involves deciding how good some evidence, already 
received, actually is. Stated in these terms the tasks appear to be very similar. However, as 
a reading of the literature reviews contained in Chapters I and 3 reveals, the tasks of 
information choice and information use have received vastly different treatments in their 
respective literatures. The next section will constitute a discussion of the extent to which 
the pseudodiagnosticity task, and information selection tasks in general, may be 
successfully viewed as decision making tasks. The penultimate section of the chapter will 
discuss the role played by inference in tasks traditionally thought of as involving 
judgement or decision making. 
6.4.1 Information selection as decision making 
One of the themes of Chapter I was the role played by general considerations of 
relevance and specific considerations of subjective probability in the selection of 
information for hypothesis testing. It was seen that a tension exists within the literature on 
information selection between workers such as Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) who wish 
to account for information selection in terms of the general cognitive principles of effect 
and effort, and other workers (Oaksford and Chater, 1994; 1995) who claim 
that subjects' 
background knowledge of, and assumptions about, subjective probability provide a means 
of quantifying intuitions about relevance. On one 
level, there is a very fundamental 
difference between these two approaches as one views the subject as being 
involved in an 
act of communication whilst the other views the subject as a scientist attempting 
to decide 
which is the best experiment to carry out. On another 
level, of course, the distinction 
between these two approaches is trivial as both are agreed that a complete understanding 
of 
subjects'pattern of information selections in hypothesis 
testing tasks may only be 
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understood via an understanding of the background knowledge and pragmatic assumptions 
which subjects bring to the task. 
Despite this tension, at the time of writing there does seem to be a strong consensus 
within the field that information selection for hypothesis testing may be viewed, in part at 
least, as a behaviour which involves decision making. Thus, alongside the work of 
Oaksford and Chater lies the work of Kirby (I 994a&b) and Evans and Over (I 996a&b; 
Evans, Over and Manktelow, 1993). What all of these workers have in common is the 
belief that an analysis of the subjective probabilities of outcomes, and their associated 
utilities, mirrors some of the processes involved in human hypothesis testing behaviour. 
The constrained rationality model presented in Chapter 2 is couched in these terms. It 
claims that subjects make decisions when selecting evidence and that these decisions are 
based upon a consideration of the information which the available pieces of evidence are 
likely to yield. 
The model, however, does not claim that subjects engage in a thorough analysis of 
the outcomes contingent on the choice of each piece of information available. Rather, it 
views subjects as performing a limited analysis. In this respect, it resembles the work of 
Evans and Over more closely than it does the work of Oaksford and Chater. This 
resemblance is to do with the recognition that the human representational system is, in 
general, incapable of the amount of cognitive effort required to consider all possible 
outcomes, and their associated utilities, when selecting information to test hypotheses. 
Thus, subjects will perform an analysis of those pieces of information which appear most 
relevant and, to paraphrase Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995), stop when their expectations 
of relevance have been met. There are many possible sources of relevance, other than 
subjective probability. For example, Evans' (1984; 1989) work on matching bias 
in the 
abstract selection task suggests that subjects' representation of the conditional rule 
in the 
task is guided by sources of linguistic relevance. Likewise, Evans and 
Over (1996b) 
suggest that, in many cases, evidence pertaining to the hypothesis which they currently 
think most likely, assumes relevance for subjects. Although the results of 
Experiment 2 
294 
suggest that this may not always be the case, what is important is the search for principles 
underlying the selective attention which is so essential to subjects' behaviour on the task. 
Although there is nothing new in this kind of "bounded rationality" argument, what 
is novel about the constrained rationality model is its demonstration of how probabilistic 
factors may operate within cognitive constraints to determine subjects' patterns of 
information selection on a hypothesis testing task. Thus, the information which subjects 
select to test the alternatives present in the scenario which they receive is determined both 
by their assignment of probabilities and utilities to potential test outcomes and their initial 
representation of the task. In this sense, the model presented in this thesis may be deemed 
to be more psychological in its concerns than is Oaksford and Chater's model, reviewed in 
Chapter 1. Accordingly, although patterns of information selection may, on one level, be 
said to be the product of decision-theoretic processes, the operation of these processes is 
confined to a subset of the possible evidence. This subset is determined by a trade-off 
between cognitive effect and effort. 
6.4.2 Belief revision, inference and relevance 
In the previous section, the argument that information selection may be described 
in decision -theoretic terms was briefly discussed. In this section it will be argued that 
belief revision, a type of decision making, shares many of the features traditionally 
associated with the reasoning literature and selection tasks in general. The traditional view 
of hypothesis testing is that it involves the application of the hypothetico-deductive 
method (Popper, 1959). That is, the hypothesis tester must infer testable consequences of 
the hypothesis currently under consideration. As was described in the previous section, the 
current consensus is that selection tasks may best be described in decision theoretic 
terms 
(with the exception of Sperber, Cara and Girotto who seem to favour the traditional 
approach in their characterisation of Wason's selection task). Paradoxically, one of 
the 
claims made in this thesis is that belief revision tasks, traditionally viewed 
in the same 
light as decision making, involve a large amount of inference. 
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This claim was first made in Chapter 3 where the differences between knowledge 
about objects and knowledge about social phenomena was discussed. It has been suggested 
(Asch and Zukier, 1984; Wattenmaker, 1995) that social knowledge is distinguished from 
object knowledge by its largely inferential nature. In other words, subjects are able to infer 
a cause for inconsistencies between pieces of social information (Asch and Zukier 1984; 
Kunda, Miller and Claire, 1990) whereas this is likely to be much more difficult with 
inconsistent information about objects. However, it was also pointed out that the very 
inflexibility of object knowledge necessitates the involvement of inferential processes 
when object knowledge is being integrated. Given some information about features of an 
object, a subject is likely to infer some very strong hypotheses about other features of that 
object which will be tested against information in the world. For example, a subject told 
that a piece of furniture has a seat might infer that it is a chair and hypothesise that it will 
also possess some legs. This hypothesis may be tested against information about whether 
the piece of furniture actually possesses legs. 
Experiments 1,3,4 and 5 strongly suggest that this kind of hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning underlies, at least some, order effects in belief revision. It was seen that subjects, 
when told that a high percentage of instances of an object possessed a certain feature, 
generated expectations about the likelihood that instances of the same object would 
possess a second feature which they knew, from background knowledge, to be highly 
associated with the first feature. These expectations may be characterised as hypotheses 
which were tested against information about the actual percentage of instances of the 
object which possessed the second feature. It was pointed out that this kind of inference 
provides a solution to the problem of how subjects decide which of the alternative 
hypotheses, present in the scenario, the evidence is marked for. What is interesting about 
such a solution is that it characterises evidence interpretation in decision making and 
judgement tasks in inferential terms. Thus, not only does the process of evidence selection 
involve decision making, the process of making judgements on the basis of evidence 
involves inference. 
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The phenomena of evidence selection and belief revision are even more closely 
related, however, as Experiments 6-8 demonstrated. In the previous section the 
importance of selective attention to evidence selection was discussed. It was argued that 
subjects attend to a subset of the possible evidence and that their attention is directed by 
considerations of relevance. Experiments 6,7 and 8 demonstrated that selective attention 
also plays a part in the process of assigning a subjective value to a piece of evidence. The 
results of Experiment 6 suggested that subjects attend to the most informative component 
of the pieces of evidence which they receive. Thus, subjects given information about rare 
features tend to focus on the features themselves when assigning subjective values to the 
evidence. On the other hand, subjects who receive information about common features 
focus on the likelihood associated with those features. This interpretation of Experiment 6 
was confirmed by the results of Experiment 7. It is likely that selective attention plays a 
role in the assignment of subjective values to pieces of evidence for exactly the same 
reasons as it does in evidence selection. The human representational system is subject to 
constraints, and subjects will tend to focus on that aspect of a piece of evidence which they 
know from background knowledge to be most likely to discriminate between the 
hypotheses. 
Experiment 8 also supports such an analysis of the processes involved in assigning 
values to evidence. In Experiment 8 the locus of subjects' attention was observed to switch 
from one component of the evidence (the features) to another (the associated likelihoods). 
This was explained, once again, in terms of the information which was most likely to 
discriminate between the alternatives present in the scenario. In the absence of a full 
likelihood ratio, subjects, given evidence concerning rare features of the object to be 
categorised, focused on those features when deriving a subjective value for the evidence. 
Once the second piece of evidence was received, and subjects possessed a complete 
likelihood ratio, focus switched onto the likelihoods themselves. 
The results of Experiments 6-8 are, in some respects, very similar to results 
obtained by Macchi (1994) and Shafir (1993). Both of these experimenters demonstrated 
that subjects are more likely to base a probability estimate, or a choice, on information 
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which is relevant to that estimate, or choice. Thus, Shafir found that subjects were more 
likely to choose an option which possessed one or two very positive attributes, but that 
they were also more likely to reject the same option if it possessed some negative 
attributes. In other words, subjects will focus on that aspect of the available evidence 
which is most relevant to the task which they are asked to perform. When asked which of 
two alternatives they would accept, subjects focus on reasons for acceptance, whereas 
when the task is framed in terms of rejection subjects focus on reasons for rejection. 
Likewise, Macchi, using the base rate problem, found that subjects'use of the base rates 
which they received was dependent on both the context, and the specific questions they 
were asked. If the questions were framed so as to make the base rates seem relevant, then 
subjects used them in generating their probability estimate. 
What is novel about the results of Experiments 6-8 is their suggestion that 
pragmatic processes of selective attention are at work even when subjects assign values to 
single pieces of evidence. As was pointed out in the summary and initial discussion of 
those experiments, their results suggest that the processes underlying evidence 
interpretation will have to be re-thought. These results also suggest that the task facing 
workers in the areas of both evidence selection and decision making, judgement and belief 
revision is the same. This task is one of specifying how a piece of evidence, an aspect of a 
piece of evidence, or a potential piece of evidence, assumes relevance for the subject in 
any context. Essentially, the task reduces to one of determining what the important sources 
of information are for the organism. Whilst the experiments described in this thesis suggest 
that knowledge about feature rarity is one such source of information, as we have seen, 
there are, at least, several others. 
6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The research contained in this thesis has extended knowledge about information 
selection and information use for the testing of hypotheses in several ways. It has 
demonstrated an effect of subjective probability on a propositional reasoning task which 
is 
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closely related to the pseudodiagnosticity paradigm. Furthermore, an account of these 
results has been offered suggesting that considerations of subjective probability and utility, 
as well as considerations of relevance, are responsible for their production. The thesis also 
contains a demonstration that the assumption that pieces of evidence are interpreted 
independently prior to their use for hypothesis evaluation is untenable. In many cases, later 
evidence is interpreted in the light of expectations derived from early evidence. In the 
absence of these expectations, the thesis demonstrates the operation of processes of 
selective attention in assigning values to pieces of evidence. It has been argued that the 
factors guiding attention in value assignment are the same as those underlying subjects' 
limited consideration of possible evidence in the experiments on information selection. 
The thesis implies that future research into information selection should investigate the 
extent to which subjects are aware of the importance of subjective probability in evidence 
selection. It also suggests that the central problem facing researchers in reasoning and in 
decision making is the same. This problem is one of giving a principled account of the 
factors underlying selective attention. 
299 
APPENDIX I- Example stimulus materials from Experiments 1-8 
Table of Contents 
Appendix la - Examples of the materials used in Experiment I ................................... 301 
Appendix Ib - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 2 ..... ............................ 303 
Appendix 1c - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 3 ................................... 307 
Appendix Id - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 4 ................................... 310 
Appendix le - Examples of stimulus materials from Experiment 6 ............................. 313 
Appendix If - Example materials from Experiment 7 .................................................. 316 
Appendix 1g - Example materials from Experiment 8 ................................................... 319 
300 
Appendix la - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 1: Common Features, 
65 % Likelihood, Positive Feedback Condition 
Engineer Problem 
Your friend is an engineer and works for a large construction company. It's either company X or company Y, but 
you can't remember which. You do remember that he earns over E14,000 a year and that he drives a company car 
You have the following piece of information: 
(a) 65% of engineers working for company X earn over f 14,000 a year. 
Three additional pieces of information are also available: 
(b) The percentage of engineers working for company Y that earn over E14,000 a year. 25% 
(c) The percentage of engineers working for company X that drive a company car. 75% 
(d) The percentage of engineers working for company Y that drive a company car. 25% 
Assuming that you could find out only ONE of these pieces of information (b, c, or d), which would you want in 
order to help you decide what company your friend works for? 
Once you have marked your answer please peel back the sticker which corresponds to that answer. Underneath is 
the piece of information which you have selected. Now turn to the next page where you will find a scale designe( 
to measure your confidence in each of the decision alternatives in the light of the information you have available 
you. One end of the scale corresponds to complete certainty that your friend works for company X and the other 
complete certainty that he now works for company Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the alternatives. Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark 
should be to that altemative. 
University Problem 
Your neighbour has just gone away to university. You can't remember whether she attends university X or 
university Y. You do remember that she achieved two grade Cs and one grade B at A-level and that she has 
had to take up a foreign language. You have the following piece of information: 
(a) 65% of students at university X achieved two grade Cs and one grade B or better at A-level. 
Three additional pieces of information are available: 
(b) The percentage of students at university Y that achieved two grade Cs and one B or better. 
25% 
(c) The percentage of students at university X that has to take up a foreign language. 
75% 
(d) The percentage of students at university Y that has to take up a foreign language. 
25% 
The remainder of the text was as for the Engineer problem. For all of the problems used 
in Experiment 1, the 
feedback (i. e. the percentages corresponding to each possible information selection), was concealed 
by 
seperate opaque stickers. 
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Hotel Problem 
Your friend is staying in a hotel in Paris. You can't remember whether it's hotel X or hotel Y. You do 
remember that the room costs E35 a night and that it has an en-suite bathroom. You have the following piece 
of information: 
65% of the rooms in hotel X cost; E35 a night 
Three additional pieces of information are available: 
(b) The percentage of rooms in hotel Y that cost E35 a night 25% 
(c) The percentage of rooms in hotel X that have en-suite bathrooms 75% 
(d) The percentage of rooms in hotel Y that have en-suite bathrooms 25% 
The remainder of the text was as for the Engineer Problem 
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Appendix Ib - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 2: Common Features 
Condition 
Car Problem 
Your sister bought a new car in 1988. You can't remember whether it's a model X or a model Y but you do 
remember that it has four doors and a radio. 
We have already asked the following question for you and have given you the answer: 
Question A 
whether model X cars bought in 1988 have a radio 
Answer: YES 
Three additional questions are possible which we have listed below along with their possible answers: 
Question B 
whether model Y cars bought in 1988 have a radio 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question C 
whether model X cars bought in 1988 have four doors 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question D 
whether model Y cars bought in 1988 have four doors 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Assuming that you could discover the answer to only one of these questions 
(B, C, or D), which would you 
ask in order to help you decide which model car your sister drives? 
Please circle your choice 
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Engineer Problem 
Your friend is a civil engineer and works for a large construction company. It's either company X or 
company Y, but you can't remember which. You do remember that she earns E25,000 a year and drives a 
company car. 
We have already asked the following question for you and have given you the answer: 
Question A 
whether civil engineers working for company X earn E25,000 a year 
Answer: YES 
Three additional questions are possible which we have listed below along with their possible answers: 
Question B 
whether civil engineers working for company Y earn E25,000 a year 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question C 
whether civil engineers working for company X drive company cars 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question 1ý 
whether civil engineers working for company Y drive company cars 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Assuming that you could discover the answer to only one of these questions 
(B, C, or D), which would you 
ask in order to help you decide which company your friend works 
for? 
Please circle you choice 
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House Problem 
Your friend has just bought a new house. It's either on street X or street Y but you can't remember which. 
You do remember that the house has a garden and a garage. 
We have already asked the following question for you and have given you the answer: 
Ouestion A 
whether houses on street X have gardens 
Answer: YES 
Three additional questions are possible which we have listed below along with their possible answers: 
Question B 
whether houses on street Y have gardens 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question C 
whether houses on street X have garages 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question D 
whether houses on street Y have garages 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Assuming that you could discover the answer to only one of these questions 
(B, C, or D), which would you 
ask in order to help you decide which street your friend lives on? 
Please circle your choice 
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Spanish Villa Problem 
Your parents rented a villa in Spain last summer but you can't remember whether they rented it form 
company X or company Y. You do remember that the villa was built sometime iD the last twenty years and 
that it cost E150 per week. 
We have already asked the following question for you and have given you the answer: 
Question A 
whether company X villas cost f 150 per week 
Answer: YES 
Three additional questions are possible which we have listed below along with their possible answers: 
Question B 
whether company Y villas cost E150 per week 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Question C 
whether company X villas were built sometime in the last twenty years 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Ouestion D 
whether company Y villas were built sometime in the last twenty years 
Possible Answers: YES or NO 
How useful would knowing the answer to this question be in deciding between the alternatives? 
OF LITTLE USE OF GREAT USE 
Assuming that you could discover the answer to only one of these questions (13, 
C, or D), which would you 
ask in order to help you decide which company your parents rented the villa 
from? 
Please circle your choice 
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Appendix Ic - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 3: Strong Information 
First Condition 
House Problem - Page I 
Your friend has just bought a new house. You can't remember whether its' on street X or street Y. You do 
remember that the house has a swimming pool and a garage. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of houses on street X have swimming pools. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend now lives on street X and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
lives on street Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a swimming pool? 
(2)What percentage of the houses on street X would you expect to have a garage? 
(3) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a garage? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind 
it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
House Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of houses on street X have a garage 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence 
in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available 
to you. Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of 
decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds 
to your belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
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Engineer Problem - Page 1 
Your friend is an engineer and works for a large construction company. Its' either company A or company B, 
but you can't remember which. You do remember that he drives a company car and that he earns over 
E50,000 a year. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of engineers working for company B earn over E50,000 a year. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend works for company A and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
works for company B. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of engineers working for company A would you expect to earn over E50,000 a year? 
(2)What percentage of engineers working for company B would you expect to drive a company car? 
(3) What percentage of engineers working for company A would you expect to drive a company car? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Engineer Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of engineers working for company B drive a company car.. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
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Hotel Problem - Page 1 
Your friend is staying in a hotel in Paris. You can't remember whether its' hotel P or hotel Q. You do 
remember that the room costs E165 a night and that it has an en-suite bathroom. You have the following 
piece of information: 
95% of the rooms in hotel P cost E165 a night. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you, One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend is staying in hotel P and the other to complete certainty that your friend is 
staying in hotel Q. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
is staying in hotel Y 
Certain that my friend 
is staying in hotel X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of the rooms in hotel Q would you expect to cost E165 a night? 
(2)What percentage of the rooms in hotel P would you expect to have en-suite bathrooms? 
(3) What percentage of the rooms in hotel Q would you expect to have en-suite bathrooms? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Hotel Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of rooms in hotel P have an en-suite bathroom. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you, Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
is staying in hotel Y 
Certain that my friend 
is staying in hotel X 
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Appendix Id - Examples of the materials used in Experiment 4: Low 
Association/Strong Information First Condition 
House Problem - Page I 
Your friend has just bought a new house. You can't remember whether its' on street X or street Y. You do 
remember that the house has a swimming pool and that it was built sometime between 1945 and 1985. You 
have the following piece of information: 
95% of houses on street X have Swimming pools. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend now lives on street X and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
lives on street Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a swimming pool? 
(2) What percentage of the houses on street X would you expect to have been built sometime between 1945 
and 1985? 
(3) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have been built sometime between 1945 
and 1985? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
House Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of houses on street X were built sometime between 1945 and 19ý5. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence 
in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. Once again either end of 
the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives 
is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
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Engineer Problem - Page 1 
Your friend is a civil engineer and works for a large construction company. Itseither company A or 
company B, but you can't remember which. You do remember that he works in general construction and that 
he earns over E60,000 a year. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of civil engineers working for company A earn over E60,000 a year. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend works for company A and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
works for company B. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of civil engineers working for company B would you expect to earn over f. 60,000 a 
year? 
(2) What percentage of civil engineers working for company A would you expect to work in general 
construction? 
(3) What percentage of civil engineers working for company B would you expect to work in general 
construction? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind 
it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Engineer Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of civil engineers working-for company A work in general construction. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence 
in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. 
Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of 
decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the 
line that corresponds to your belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
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Car Problem - Page 1 
Your sister bought a new car in 1988. You can't remember whether its' a model X or a model Y. You do 
remember that it has four doors and a top speed of over 165 miles per hour. You have the following piece of 
information: 
95% of model Xs bought in 1988 have a top speed of over L65 mph. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your sister's car is a model X and the other to complete certainty that her car is a 
model Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. Remember 
that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the scale that 
corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model Y 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of model Ys bought in 1988 would you expect to have a top speed of over 165 mph? 
(2) What percentage of model Xs bought in 1988 would you expect to have four doors? 
(3) What percentage of model Ys bought in 1988 would you expect to have four doors? 
When you have finished answering the questions seperate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Car Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of model Xs bouaht in 1988 have four doors. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the 
altematives. 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model Y 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model X 
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Appendix le - Examples of stimulus materials from Experiment 6: Rare 
Features/Strong Information First Condition 
House Problem - Page 1 
Your friend has just bought a new house. You can't remember whether its, on street X or street Y. You do 
remember that the house has a swimming pool and that it's worth approximately E250,000. You have the 
following piece of information: 
95% of houses on street X have swimming pools. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend now lives on street X and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
lives on street Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a swimming pool? 
(2) What percentage of the houses on street X would you expect to be worth approximately f, 250,000? 
(3) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to be worth approximately E250,000? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
House Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of houses on street X are worth approximately E250.000. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence in each of 
the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. 
Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives 
is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
313 
Engineer Problem - Page I 
Your friend is a civil engineer and works for a large construction company. Its' either company A or 
company B, but you can't remember which. You do remember that he travels regularly to supervise projects 
abroad and that he eams over E60,000 a year. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of civil engineers working for coml2any_A earn over F-60,000 a year. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend works for company A and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
works for company B. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of civil engineers working for company B would you expect to earn over E60,000 a 
year? 
(2) What percentage of civil engineers working for company A would you expect to travel regularly to 
supervise projects abroad? 
ý(3) What percentage of civil engineers working for company B would you expect to travel regularly to 
supervise projects abroad? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Engineer Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of civil engineers working for company A travel regularly to supervise 12r9jects abroad. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence 
in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. Once again either end of 
the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives is true. 
Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
314 
Car Problem - Page 
Your sister bought a new car in 1988. You can't remember whether its' a model X or a model Y. You do 
remember that it has leather upholstery and a top speed of over 165 miles per hour. You have the following 
piece of information: 
95% of model Xs bought in 1988 have a top speed of over. 165 mph. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your sister's car is a model X and the other to complete certainty that her car is a 
model Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. Remember 
that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the scale that 
corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model Y 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of model Ys bought in 1988 would you expect to have a top speed of over 165 mph? 
(2) What percentage of model Xs bought in 1988 would you expect to have leather upholstery? 
(3) What percentage of model Ys bought in 1988 would you expect to have leather upholstery? 
When you have finished answering the questions seperate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Car Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of model Xs bought in 1988 have leather upholatýjý- 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the 
altematives. 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model Y 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model X 
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Appendix lf - Example materials from Experiment 7: Strong Information First 
Condition 
Adjective/Passive Verb Problem - Page I 
You are currently studying a Zogese symbol. The symbol definitely represents either an adjective or a 
passive verb, and your task is to decide which of these two parts of speech the symbol actually represents. 
The symbol itself is triangular and there is a diagonal line running through the triangle. You have the 
following piece of information: 
95% of adjgctives in Zogese have a triangular element. 
Now look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that the symbol you are studying represents a passive verb and the other to complete 
certainty that it represents an adjective. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief 
about the alternatives. Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark 
should be to the end of the scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
certain that the symbol 
represents a passive verb 
certain that the symbol 
represents an adjective 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of passive verbs in Zogese would you expect to have a triangular element? 
(2) What percentage of adjectives in Zogese would you expect to have a diagonal line running through the 
main part of the symbol? 
(3) What percentage of passive verbs in Zogese would you expect to have a diagonal line running through 
the main part of the symbol? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Adjective/Passive Verb Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of adjectives in Zogese have a diagonal line runninR through the main part of the symbol. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions that is designed to measure your confidence 
in each of 
the decision alternatives in the light of the information available to you. Once again either end of 
the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or other of the decision alternatives 
is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
altematives. 
certain that the sYmbol 
represents a passive verb 
certain that the symbol 
represents an adjective 
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Proper Noun[Preposition Problem - Page I 
You are currently studying a Zogese symbol. The symbol definitely represents either a proper noun or a 
preposition, and your task is to decide which of these two parts of speech the symbol actually represents. The 
symbol itself is circular and the circular part of the symbol is followed by a series of three dots. You have the 
following piece of information: 
95% of proper nouns in Zogese have a circiLlar element. 
Now look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that the symbol you are studying represents a proper noun and the other to complete 
certainty that it represents a preposition. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief 
about the alternatives. Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark 
should be to the end of the scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
certain that the symbol 
represents a preposition 
certain that the symbol 
represents a proper noun 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of prepositions in Zogese would you expect to have a circular element? 
(2) What percentage of proper nouns in Zogese would you expect to have a series of three dots after the main 
part of the symbol? 
(3) What percentage of prepositions in Zogese would you expect to have a series of three dots after the main 
part of the symbol? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Proper Noun/Preposition Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of proper nouns in Zogese have a series of three dots after the main 12art of the symb 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions that is designed to measure your confidence 
in each of 
the decision alternatives in the light of the information available to you. Once again either end of 
the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or other of the decision alternatives 
is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
altematives. 
certain that the symbol certain that the symbol 
represents a preposition represents a proper noun 
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Active Verb/Pronoun Problem - Page I 
You are currently studying a Zogese symbol. The symbol definitely represents either an active verb or a 
pronoun, and your task is to decide which it actually is. The symbol itself is rectangular and there is a line 
over the main part of the symbol. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of pronouns in Zogese have a rectangular element. 
Now look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that the symbol you are studying represents a pronoun and the other to complete certainty 
that it represents an active verb. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the 
alternatives. Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to 
the end of the scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
certain that the symbol certain that the symbol 
represents an active verb represents a pronoun 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of active verbs in Zogese would you expect to have a rectangular element? 
(2) What percentage of pronouns in Zogese would you expect to have a line over the main part of the 
symbol? 
(3) What percentage of active verbs in Zogese would you expect to have a line over the main part of the 
symbol? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Active Verb/Pronoun Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
70% of pronouns in Zogese have a line over the main part of the symbol. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions that is designed to measure your confidence 
in each of 
the decision alternatives in the light of the information available to You- Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or other of the decision alternatives is true. 
Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
altematives. 
certain that the symbol 
represents an active verb 
certain that the symbol 
represents a pronoun 
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Appendix Ig - Example materials frOm Experiment 8: Rare Feature, 95 %/25 
Strong Information First Condition 
House Problem - Page I 
Your friend has just bought a new house. You can't remember whether its' on street X or street Y. You do 
remember that the house has a swimming pool and a garage. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of houses on street X have a swimmin. gy 12ool. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure Your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend now lives on street X and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
lives on street Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a swimming pool? 
(2) What percentage of the houses on street X would you expect to have a garage? 
(3) What percentage of the houses on street Y would you expect to have a garage? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
House Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
25% of houses on sLieet Y have a swimming PQOI 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence 
in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the 'Information you have available to you. 
Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives 
is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your 
belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street Y 
Certain that my friend 
lives on Street X 
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Engineer Problem - Page 1 
Your friend is a civil engineer and works for a large construction company. Its' either company A or 
company B, but you can't remember which. You do remember that he drives a company car and that he earns 
over E60,000 a year. You have the following piece of information: 
95% of civil engineers working for company A earn over E60. QOO a_year. 
Now please look at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your friend works for company A and the other to complete certainty that your friend 
works for company B. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. 
Remember that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the 
scale that corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of civil engineers working for company B would you expect to earn over E60,000 a 
year? 
(2) What percentage of civil engineers working for company A would you expect to drive a company car? 
(3) What percentage of civil engineers working for company B would you expect to drive a company car? 
When you have finished answering the questions separate this page from the one behind 
it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Engineer Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
25% of civil engineers working for company B earn over E60,000 a year. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence 
in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. 
Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of 
decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds 
to your belief about the 
altematives. 
Certain that my friend 
works for company Y 
Certain that my friend 
works for company X 
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Car Problem - Page I 
Your sister bought a new car in 1988. You can't remember whether its' a model X or a model Y. You do 
remember that it has a radio and a top speed of over 165 miles per hour. You have the following piece of 
information: 
95% of model Xs bought in 1988 have a top speed of over 16 ml2h, 
Now please took at the scale below which is designed to measure your confidence in each of the decision 
alternatives in the light of the information you have available to you. One end of the scale corresponds to 
complete certainty that your sister's car is a model X and the other to complete certainty that her car is a 
model Y. Please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the alternatives. Remember 
that the greater your confidence in an alternative the closer your mark should be to the end of the scale that 
corresponds to complete certainty in that alternative. 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model Y 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model X 
Once you have placed your mark on the line please answer the following questions: 
(1) What percentage of model Ys bought in 1988 would you expect to have a top speed of over 165 mph? 
(2) What percentage of model Xs bought in 1988 would you expect to have a radio? 
(3) What percentage of model Ys bought in 1988 would you expect to have a radio? 
When you have finished answering the questions seperate this page from the one behind it by gently pulling 
the sheets apart at the bottom. 
Car Problem - Page 2 
Here is a second piece of information about the problem on the previous page: 
25% of model Ys bought in 1988 have a top speed of over 165 mj2h. 
Once again there is a scale below these instructions designed to measure your confidence in each of the 
decision alternatives in light of the information you have available to you. Once again either end of the scale 
corresponds to complete certainty that one or the other of decision alternatives is true. Bearing the new piece 
of information in mind, please mark the point on the line that corresponds to your belief about the 
alternatives. 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model Y 
Certain that my sister's 
car is a model X 
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Appendix 2a - Selection frequencies for Experiment I 
Likeli Rarity En gineer University Hotel 
-hood B C D B C D B C D 
65% Rare 2 4 0 2 3 1 5 0 1 
Comm 3 2 1 4 2 0 4 2 0 
95% Rare 4 1 1 3 3 0 1 5 0 
Comm 2 4 0 4 1 1 3 3 0 
100% Rare 0 6 0 1 4 1 0 5 0 
Comm 1 5 0 1 5 0 2 2 2 
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Appendix 2b - Anova tables and tables of means from the analyses of subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment I 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 4834.898 51 469.8523 10.29025 
. 0023122 
2 1 634.689 51 469.8523 1.35083 
. 2505438 
3 1 427.299 51 469.8523 
. 90943 . 3447635 
4 1 85.422 51 469.8523 
. 18181 . 6716197 
12 1 137.521 51 469.8523 
. 29269 . 5908573 
13 1 576.022 51 469.8523 1.22596 
. 2733883 
23 1 718.223 51 469.8523 1.52862 . 2219843 
14 1 3332.023 51 469.8523 7.09164 . 0103367 
24 1 1781-153 51 469.8523 3.79088 . 0570496 
34 1 1.712 51 469.8523 . 00364 . 9520995 
123 1 378.772 51 469.8523 . 80615 . 3734797 
124 1 82.689 51 469.8523 . 17599 . 6766049 
134 1 387.200 51 469.8523 . 82409 . 3682571 
234 1 2158.580 51 469.8523 4.59417 . 0368727 
1234 1 157.631 51 469.8523 . 33549 . 5649939 
2b(i): The effect of Likelihood (=1), Rarity (=2), Feedback (=3) and Choice on the confidence ratings of 
subjects in the 65% and 95% Likelihood conditions of Experiment 1. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
Content 2 558.3305 64 647.9248 . 8617211 . 
4272770 
2b(ii): The effect Of problem content on subjects' confidence ratings in Experiment 
I- 
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Positive Feedback___. Negative Feedback 
Likelihood Choice Rare Feature Comm Feature Rare Feature Comm Feature 
65% Diagnostic 59 30N=5 43 23N=5 36 ION=4 33 12N=6 
Pseudodiag 49 24N=3 76 17N=3 54 15N=4 60 41N=3 
95% Diagnostic 73 8N=4 71 22N=3 76 IIN=4 80 6N=6 
Pseudodiag 42 32N=4 87 14N=5 65 28N=5 56 37N=3 
2b(ifi): Means (in bold), standard deviations and subject numbers from the analysis of the effects of 
Likelihood, Rarity, Feedback and Choice on subjects' confidence ratings in the 65% and 95% Likelihood 
conditions of Experiment 1. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
11 301.014 23 843.1418 . 357014 . 5560068 
21 4829.014 23 843.1418 5.727404 . 0252548 
12 1 1163.905 23 843.1418 1.380438 . 2520474 
2b(iv): The effect of Rarity (=l) and Feedback (=2) on the confidence ratings of subjects in the 100% 
likelihood condition who choose the pseudodiagnostic evidence in Experiment 1. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Effor F ratio p-level 
Content 2 69.58393 24 1047.473 . 0664303 . 
9358996 
2b(v): The effect problem content on the confidence ratings of subjects in the 100% likelihood condition 
who choose the pseudodiagnostic evidence in Experiment I- 
Positive Feedback Negative Feedback 
Rare Feature 65 18 N=8 51 16 N=6 
Common Feature 72 36 N=7 31 41 N=6 
2b(vi): Means (in bold), standard deviations and subject numbers from the analysis of the effects of 
Rarity 
and Feedback on the confidence ratings of subjects in the 100% 
Likelihood condition who selected 
pseudodiagnostic evidence in Experiment 1. 
325 
Appendix 2c, - Selection frequencies from Experiment 2 
Common Features Rare Features 
Content Choice Hint No Hint Hint No Hint 
House B 5 6 10 11 
c 19 16 13 10 
D 2 1 1 
Engineer B 6 9 6 10 
C 18 12 12 11 
D 3 6 1 
Car B 5 9 10 7 
c 19 14 11 13 
D 1 3 2 
Villa B 8 to 9 10 
c 16 12 10 11 
D 2 5 1 
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Appendix 2d - Anova tables from the analyses of subjects' evidence selections and 
usefulness ratings in Experiment 2 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
112.263973 90 2.258754 1.002311 
. 3194362 
219.730639 90 2.258754 4.307967 
. 0407876 
12 1 4.530640 90 2.258754 2.005814 . 1601490 
2d(i): The effect of Hint (= 1) and Rarity (=2) on subjects' selection of item C in Experiment 2. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 2501.44 90 2291.684 1.09153 . 2989305 
2 1 3453.96 90 2291.684 1.50717 . 2227727 
3 3 1125.62 270 415.721 2.70762 . 0456445 
4 2 19693.05 180 1094.553 17.99187 . 0000001 
12 1 416.76 90 2291.684 . 18186 . 
6708001 
13 3 444.98 270 415.721 1.07038 . 3620817 
23 3 391.19 270 415.721 . 94100 . 4212760 
14 2 2952.17 180 1094.553 2.69714 . 0701219 
24 2 1018.51 180 1094.553 . 93053 . 3962351 
34 6 918.16 540 359.861 2.55142 . 0191122 
123 3 403.54 270 415.721 . 97070 . 
4070068 
124 2 2722.54 180 1094.553 2.48735 . 0859835 
134 6 378.48 540 359.861 1.05173 . 
3907560 
234 6 513.03 540 359.861 1.42565 . 
2025427 
1234 6 704.99 540 359.961 1.95906 . 
0697189 
2d(ii): The effect of Hint (=1), Rarity (=2), problem content 
(=3) and Item Rated (=4) on subjects' usefulness 
ratings in Experiment 2. 
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Appendix 2e - Table of means and standard deviations from the analysis of subjects' 
usefulness ratings in Experiment 2 
Common Features Rare Features 
Content Item Rated Hint No Hint Hint No Hint 
House B 64 27 67 26 67 25 70 27 
C 82 19 75 24 69 24 66 29 
D 59 27 72 20 59 26 54 26 
Engineer B 59 28 70 24 58 29 73 23 
C 79 19 73 18 61 32 67 31 
D 51 27 61 25 51 29 51 26 
Car B 54 28 66 26 58 30 56 33 
C 83 15 67 24 67 25 78 16 
D 53 26 60 26 5328 67 22 
Villa B 64 27 69 23 56 31 72 21 
C 76 22 64 27 67 28 68 23 
D 55 26 58 27 56 26 51 26 
(Means in bold) 
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Appendix 2f - Anova tables from the analyses of subjects, confidence ratings and 
expectations in Experiment 3 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 1485.520 56 672.9253 2.20756 
. 1429445 
2 1 2061.520 56 212.0218 9.72315 
. 0028722 
3 2 187.940 112 295.1402 
. 63678 . 5308968 
12 1 4454.095 56 212.0218 21.00772 
. 0000261 
13 2 44.710 112 295.1402 . 15149 . 8596053 
23 2 276.003 112 115.1160 2.39761 . 0955887 
123 2 146.336 112 115.1160 1.27121 . 2845082 
2f(i): The effect of Order (=I), Before/After (=2) and problem content on subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 3 
Effect 
- 
df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
11 47251.31 33 805.2808 58.67682 UUUUUUU 
22 858.02 66 440.6500 1.94716 . 1507881 
12 2 2759.16 66 440.6500 6.26157 . 
0032361 
2f(ii): The effect of Order (= 1) and problem content on subjects' expectations in Experiment 3. 
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Appendix 2g - Anova tables from the analyses of subjects' confidence ratings and 
expectations in Experiment 4 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 145.836 68 1239.351 
. 11767 . 7326326 
2 1 
. 058 68 1239.351 . 00005 . 9945679 
3 1 5090.947 68 231.234 22.01647 
. 0000135 
4 2 102.502 136 121.566 
. 84318 . 4325772 
12 1 479.225 68 1239.351 
. 38667 . 5361324 
13 1 167.502 68 231.234 
. 72439 . 3976963 
23 1 2675.058 68 231.234 11.56864 . 0011270 
14 2 218.155 136 121-566 1.79453 . 1701180 
24 2 155.530 136 121.566 1.27938 . 2815355 
34 2 13.766 136 88.493 . 15556 . 8560854 
123 1 1048.447 68 231.234 4.53415 . 0368485 
124 2 12.461 136 121.566 . 10250 . 9026471 
134 2 75.502 136 88.493 . 85320 . 4283162 
234 2 25.488 136 88.493 . 28803 . 7501969 
1234 2 74.558 136 88.493 . 84253 . 4328550 
2g(i): The effects of Association (=l), Order (= 2), Before/After (=3) and problem content (=4) on subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 4. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 7566.23 52 1449.686 5.21922 . 0264495 
2 1 53342.57 52 1449.686 36.79595 . 0000002 
3 2 624.46 104 387.796 1.61029 . 2047711 
12 1 1831.57 52 1449.686 1.26342 . 2661665 
13 2 540.77 104 387.796 1.39447 2525614 
23 2 12ý94.95 104 387.796 3.33925 . 0393046 
911 2 875.58 104 387.796 2.25783 . 1096801 
2g(fi)- The effects of Association (=I), Order (=2) and problem content 
(=3) on subjects' expectations in 
Experiment 4. 
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Appendix 3a - Anova tables from the analyses of subjects' confidence ratings and 
expectations in Experiment 5. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio 
-p- 
level 
1 1 2710.958 67 1022.009 2.65258 
. 1080757 2 1 116.397 67 1022.009 
. 11389 . 7368131 3 1 5901.179 67 157.445 37.48096 
. 0000001 4 2 193.125 134 186.956 1.03300 
. 3587555 
12 1 1526.011 67 1022.009 1.49315 
. 2260105 
13 1 560.430 67 157.445 3.55953 
. 0635384 
23 1 1344.309 67 157.445 8.53830 
. 0047367 
14 2 15.238 134 186.956 
. 08151 . 9217724 
24 2 179.570 134 186.956 
. 96049 . 3853229 
34 2 122.858 134 68.800 1.78571 
. 1716448 
123 1 508-990 67 157.445 3.23282 
. 0766817 
124 2 26.454 134 186.956 . 14150 . 8681865 
134 2 70.823 134 68.800 1.02940 . 3600276 
234 2 88.268 134 68.800 1.28296 . 2805980 
1234 2 55.174 134 68.800 . 80195 . 4505948 
3a(i): The effects of Likelihood (=1), Order (=2), Before/After (=3) and problem content (=4) on subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 5. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 3295.20 54 1010.879 3.25974 . 0765760 
2 1 50877.82 54 1010.879 50.33029 . 0000000 
3 2 998.16 108 468.231 2.13178 . 1235914 
12 1 89.36 54 1010.879 . 08840 . 7673629 
13 2 1118.45 108 468.231 2.38866 . 0965844 
23 2 3337.48 108 468.231 7.12785 . 0012369 
123 2 253.41 108 468.231 . 54120 . 5836208 
3a(fi): The effects of Likelihood (= 1), Order (=2) and problem content on subjects' expectations 
in 
Experiment 5. 
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Appendix 3b - Anova tables for the analyses of subjects' confidence ratings and 
expectations in Experiment 6. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 665.18 66 844.9006 
. 78728 . 3781447 2 1 15.96 66 844.9006 
. 01888 . 8911160 
3 1 12299.24 66 172.9042 71.13326 
. 0000000 
4 2 10.95 132 176.6656 
. 06196 . 9399454 
12 1 968.03 66 844.9006 1.14574 
. 2883422 
13 1 1205.67 66 172.9042 6.97305 
. 0103181 
23 1 30.94 66 172.9042 
. 17893 . 6736727 
14 2 98.76 132 176.6656 
. 55904 . 5731082 
24 2 168.97 132 176.6656 
. 95642 . 3869144 
34 2 100.33 132 88.2156 1.13733 . 3237953 
123 1 241.57 66 172.9042 1.39716 . 2414410 
124 2 . 56 132 176.6656 . 00318 . 9968225 
134 2 23.80 132 88.2156 . 26980 . 7639527 
234 2 162.74 132 88.2156 1.84480 . 1621091 
1234 2 184.22 132 88.2156 2.08829 . 1279737 
3b(i): The effects of Order (=1), Rarity (=2), Before/After (=3) and problem content (=4) on subjects' 
confidence ratings in Experiment 6. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 407.748 55 516.0072 . 790198 . 3779116 
2 1 2188.466 55 516.0072 4.241155 . 0442017 
3 2 3932.718 110 434.9565 9.041636 . 0002315 
12 1 722.661 55 516.0072 1.400487 . 2417320 
13 2 1256.651 110 434.9565 2.889142 . 0598559 
23 2 295.105 110 434.9565 . 678470 . 
5095030 
?., 1 2 77.009 110 434.9565 . 177049 . 
8379769 
3b(ii): The effects of Order (= 1), Rarity (=2) and problem content (=3) on subjects' expectations 
in 
Experiment 6. 
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Appendix R- Anova tables for the analyses of subjects' confidence ratings and 
expectations in Experiment 7. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Effor MS Error F ratio p-level 
1 1 426.96 33 1154.009 
. 36998 . 5471779 
2 1 10275.20 33 118.286 86.86724 . 0000000 
3 2 37.31 66 73.988 . 50433 . 6062158 
12 1 1793.68 33 118.286 15.16387 . 0004540 
13 2 98.43 66 73.988 1.33034 . 2713834 
23 2 28.10 66 49.700 . 56547 . 5708208 
123 2 90.09 66 49.700 1.81275 . 1712357 
3c(i): The effects of Order (=1), Before/After (=2) and problem content on subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 7. 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio p-level 
11 126.2976 26 736.8690 . 171398 . 
6822681 
22 465.2262 52 443.4240 1.049169 . 3575242 
12 2 402.0833 52 443.4240 . 906769 . 
4101158 
3c(ii): The effects of Order (=1) and problem content (=2) on subjects' expectations 
in Experiment 7. 
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Appendix 3d - Anova table from the analysis of subjects' confidence ratings in 
Experiment 8 
Effect df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F ratio P-level 
1 1 8199.12 135 484.7120 16.9154 
. 0000675 
2 1 1927.88 135 484.7120 3.9774 
. 0481295 
3 1 6138.14 135 484.7120 12-6635 
. 0005152 
4 1 65997.64 135 364.1313 181.2468 
. 0000000 
5 2 443.64 270 121.7271 3.6446 
. 0274268 
12 1 1612.44 135 484.7120 3.3266 
. 0703799 
13 1 921.07 135 484.7120 1.9002 . 1703311 
23 1 42.07 135 484.7120 
. 0868 . 7687454 
14 1 27260.94 135 364.1313 74.8657 . 0000000 
24 1 0.00 135 364.1313 0.0000 . 9985853 
34 1 341.27 135 364.1313 
. 9372 . 3347261 
15 2 15-88 270 121.7271 . 1305 . 8777403 
25 2 51.43 270 121.7271 . 4225 . 6558170 
35 2 120.12 270 121.7271 . 9868 . 3740992 
45 2 10-33 270 92.5111 . 1116 . 8944135 
123 1 962.68 135 484.7120 1.9861 . 1610502 
124 1 1527.44 135 364.1313 4.1947 . 0424880 
134 1 3490.59 135 364.1313 9.5861 . 0023847 
234 1 41.92 135 364.1313 . 1151 . 7349270 
125 2 329.04 270 121.7271 2.7031 . 0688114 
135 2 402.54 270 121.7271 3.3069 . 0381177 
235 2 66.09 270 121.7271 . 5429 . 5816947 
145 2 12.14 270 92.5111 . 1313 . 8770323 
245 2 104.77 270 92.5111 1.1325 . 3237576 
345 2 53.53 270 92.5111 . 5787 . 5613451 
1234 1 104.10 135 364.1313 . 2859 . 
5937542 
1235 2 41.28 270 121.7271 . 3391 . 
7127151 
1245 2 96.57 270 92.5111 1.0439 . 3535080 
1345 2 143.86 270 92.5111 1.5551 . 
2130561 
2345 2 98.48 270 92.5111 1,0646 . 
3463186 
12345 2 70.27 270 92.5111 . 
7596 . 4688407 
(Order = 1; Rarity = 2; Likelihood = 3; Before/After = 
4; Content = 5) 
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APPENDIX 4- Stimulus materials, mean ratings and standard deviations from the 
pre-tests 
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Appendix 4a - Materials, mean ratings and standard deviations from the pre-test 
establishing the perceived rarity of the evidential features 
House Problem 
Out of every 10,000 houses how many would you expect to 
(a) have a swimming pool? 
(b) have a garden? 
(c) have a garage? 
(d) be worth approximately E250,000? 
(e) be worth approximately E40,000? 
(f) have been built in 1994? 
(g) have been built sometime between 1945 and 1985? 
(h) be over 200 years old? 
Engineer Problem 
Out of every 10,000 civil engineers how many would you expect to 
(a) drive a company car? 
(b) earn approximately E25,000 a year? 
(c) earn approximately E60,000 a year? 
(d) work in the south-east of England? 
(e) work in Plymouth? 
(f) work in general construction? 
(g) specialise in the construction of cantilever bridges? 
(h) travel regularly to supervise projects abroad? 
Mean Rgtinc, Standard Deviation 
3% 6% 
81% 13% 
56% 17% 
8% 12% 
46% 26% 
9% 12% 
69% 18% 
3% 3% 
Mean Ratine Standard Deviation 
62% 28% 
49% 23% 
12% 14% 
32% 21% 
5% 8% 
52% 24% 
6% 7% 
11% 15% 
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Car Problem 
Out of every 10,000 cars bought new in 1988 how many would you expect to 
(a) have a radio? 
(b) have a multi-disc CD player? 
(c) have leather upholstery? 
(d) have four doors? 
(e) have a current value of over E500? 
(f) have a current value of over F-15,000? 
(g) never have had any mechanical problems? 
(h) have a top speed of over 90 mph? 
(i) have a top speed of over 165 mph? 
0) have been recalled due to a design flaw? 
Mean Rating Standard Deviation 
92% 17% 
11% 16% 
13% 14% 
58% 19% 
76% 24% 
12% 15% 
12% 21% 
78% 23% 
6% 10% 
5% 5% 
Spanish Villa Problem 
Out of every 10,000 holiday villas in Spain, how many would you expect to 
Mean Rating Standard Deviation 
(a) have eight bedrooms? 14% 19% 
(b) cost E 150 per week? 51% 25% 
(c) be within walking distance of a beach? 67% 20% 
(d) have been built in 1994? 8% 6% 
(e) cost F. 1,000 per week? 8% 13% 
(f) have two bedrooms? 40% 24% 
(g) be located over 100 miles from the sea? 9% 9% 
(h) have been built in the last twenty years? 84% 17% 
(i) to have a large balcony? 52% 
26% 
0) to have a sitting room? 
83% 23% 
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Appendix 4b - Materials, mean ratings and standard deviations from the pre-test 
establishing the perceived association between the evidential features 
House Problem 
Out of every 1000 houses with a swimming pool, how many would you expect to 
(a) have a garden? 
(b) have a garage? 
(c) be worth approximately E250,000? 
(d) be worth approximately E40,000? 
(e) have been built in 1994? 
(f) have been built sometime between 1945 and 1985? 
(g) be over 200 years old? 
(h) have a tennis court? 
Engineer Problem 
Mean Rating Standard Deviation 
93% 12% 
94% 9% 
62% 21% 
14% 22% 
13% 13% 
58% 24% 
7% 6% 
84% 16% 
Out of every 1000 civil engineers who earn approximately E60,000 a year, how many would you expect to 
Mean Ratin2 Standard Deviation 
(a) drive a company car? 84% 16% 
(b) work in the south-east of England? 47% 21% 
(c) work in Plymouth? 5% 6% 
(d) work in general construction? 36% 
26% 
(e) specialise in the construction of cantilever bridges? 
8% 11% 
(f) travel regularly to supervise projects abroad? 
25% 27% 
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Car Problem 
Out of every 1000 cars bought new In 1988 which have a top speed of over 165 mph, how many would you expectto 
(a) have a radio? 
(b) have a multi-disc CD player? 
(c) have leather upholstery? 
(d) have four doors? 
(e) have a current value of over; E500? 
(f) have a current value of over E15,000? 
(g) never have had any mechanical problems? 
(h) have been recalled due to a design flaw? 
Mean RatinLy Standard Deviation 
95% 18% 
40% 33% 
52% 31% 
50% 26% 
87% 23% 
42% 28% 
15% 20% 
13% 21% 
Spanish Villa Problem 
Out of every 1,000 holiday villas in Spain which cost fl, 000 per week, how many woul d you expect to 
Mean Rating Standard Deviation 
(a) have eight bedrooms? 51% 28% 
(b) be within walking distance of a beach? 73% 15% 
(c) have been built in 1994? 15% 9% 
(d) have two bedrooms? 18% 25% 
(e) be located over 100 miles from the sea? 9% 7% 
(f) have been built in the last twenty years? 72% 27% 
(g) to have a large balcony? 70% 25% 
(h) to have a sitting room? 94% 
8% 
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